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ABSTRACT 
 




According to the deliberative view of democracy, the legitimacy of democratic politics is 
closely tied to whether the use of political power is accompanied by a process of rational 
deliberation among the citizenry and their representatives.  Critics have questioned whether this 
level of deliberative capacity is even possible among modern citizenries—due to limitations of 
time, energy, and differential backgrounds—which therefore calls into question the very 
possibility of this type of democracy.  In my dissertation, I counter this line of criticism, arguing 
that deliberative democrats and their critics have both idealized the wrong kind of citizen 
deliberation.  Citizen deliberation should not be concerned with the indeterminate project of 
“translating” abstract democratic principles and values into everyday cases of political problem-
solving.  Instead, deliberation should take the form of analogy, just as we already find it in 
everyday politics and affairs.   
When ordinary citizens use analogies, they do not derive decisions from general 
principles or values, but they still reason nonetheless.  Seen from this analogical perspective, 
deliberative democracy is already a practical reality to a large degree.  When an election is on the 
horizon, a campaign season arises in which debates, forums, and “barstool” dialogues 
exponentially increase the amount of citizen deliberation.  In these settings, citizens can readily 
be seen to be mapping analogous past candidates, elections, issues, and problems onto those 
currently on the ballot so as to reason about them.  Consequently, analogical reasoning allows 
citizens to treat the majority rule mechanisms that proliferate in real politics as “deliberative 
   
outlets,” which is to say, as catalysts of deliberation akin to the “creative outlets” that catalyze 
self-expression in the arts. 
While citizens may recognize majority rule mechanisms as catalysts of deliberation, 
many democratic theorists will hesitate to embrace this vision of the practical reality of 
deliberative politics.  Isn’t analogical reasoning too low in rigor to be placed at the heart of the 
deliberative ideal?  I develop two arguments to explain the foundational role analogy plays in 
deliberation and to counter such critics.  First, I draw on the explosion of research on analogical 
reasoning over the past two decades to show that it is far more rigorous and systematic than 
many suppose.  Second, I argue that to the extent that citizen deliberation is concerned with 
rational planning, rather than just reasoning in general, analogical reasoning is logically 
superior.   
When we reason about what to do, we make plans that incorporate predictions about what 
is likely to ensue when a given course of action is selected.  However, as soon as predictions 
enter into deliberation, its underlying logic changes as well.  The reason for this change in logic 
is that as our probabilistic reasoning expands, the probability of its conclusions 
degenerates.  Therefore, when assessing probabilities, we no longer should seek decisions 
derived from long, elegant chains of reasoning that connect our various options to generalities 
like values and principles.  Instead, what we need is “short and sweet,” or terse, humble lines of 
reasoning, which are more congruent with this form of deliberation. 
Thus, to the extent that democratic deliberation is involved in rational planning, it calls 
not for the elegant, deductive kind of reasoning idealized by proponents and critics of 
deliberative democracy alike.  Instead, democratic deliberation calls for the “short and sweet,” 
analogical kind of decision-making we associate with ordinary citizens already.  After all, as 
   
research has shown, analogies are a much preferred and rigorous way by which even experts 
engage in probabilistic reasoning.  By focusing on analogical reasoning, I therefore conclude that 
the practical reality of deliberative democracy should be recognized in ways that might 
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Deliberative Democracy: A Vague Vision of Politics? 
Ordinary citizens may seem ill-equipped to make the political ideal known as deliberative 
democracy, or “government by discussion,” a reality.  Generally speaking, it seems unrealistic to 
imagine most people taking an active interest in talking about political decisions, let alone 
talking about those decisions rationally.  As Thomas Christiano has observed, after a grueling 
day at work or busy hours of domestic life, citizens can be excused for having so little time and 
energy left over for thinking about political decisions.  Worse yet, not only do these decisions 
occur in diverse, pluralistic societies filled with divisiveness and difference, but each citizen 
individually also tends to hold many self-contradictory beliefs that are deeply entrenched in their 
personal histories.  As a result, the prospects for “government by discussion” and a rationally 
deliberative democracy seem dim.  With so little time and so much divisiveness, how can 
citizens be expected to find shared principles and values with which to frame political decisions, 
not to mention actually agree on one decision as best?  The task of translating principles and 
values into concrete decision-making is a long, arduous one that never gets very far in the face of 
so much discord.   
Consequently, deliberative democracy seems to lack much practical appeal.  As a tool for 
actually envisioning how citizens can make decisions politically, deliberative democracy offers a 
vague, impractical guide.  While it may seem nice as a rarefied ideal for academic theorizing, it 
offers little help in actually determining what to do.  As one commentator has put it, reading any 
theory of deliberative democracy will not help an activist lawyer figure out how to litigate on 
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behalf of the democratic ideal.  While the theory may safely tell the activist lawyer that certain 
options are off the table (e.g., violent coercion), it is indeterminate when it comes to selecting the 
best way to help the cause of democracy.  In a word, it invites worries about its practical 
indeterminacy.   
 This “indeterminacy worry” has not been lost on critics of deliberative democracy.  The 
task of translating principles and values into concrete decisions has been criticized time and 
again for three major reasons hinted at above.  First, this task seems far too inefficient to be 
practical.  Political decisions need to be made when time is limited and attention is often in short 
supply.  Asking people to locate shared principles and values, to study the contexts into which 
those principles and values must be translated, and finally to assess the myriad considerations for 
and against different ways of translating those principles and values into action seems impossibly 
demanding.  Second, even if time and energy were not limited, members of pluralistic societies 
are so divided about which principles and values should be translated into political decision-
making that deliberative democracy can seem ill-suited to real politics.  Third, when it comes 
time to actually commit to a course of action, citizens cannot be expected to ignore their deeply 
personal beliefs.  To what extent collective reasoning can actually determine what citizens do is 
therefore an open question.  Does democratic deliberation have any chance of influencing citizen 
behavior when it stands at odds with deeply personal beliefs, or only when its conclusions 
happen to overlap with what citizens believe already? 
 This indeterminacy worry has not been lost on proponents of deliberative democracy 
either, though.  Many have contended that these three variations on the indeterminacy worry do 
not pose as much of a threat to the practical appeal of deliberative democracy as critics have 
claimed.  Such “apologetic” responses are common and often very sophisticated.  Other 
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proponents of deliberative democracy have not defended its practical appeal in this way, but 
rather adopted a “critical” approach, one that challenges the very force of the indeterminacy 
worry itself.  Why should political philosophers care about the practicality of deliberative 
democracy?  Isn’t the point of such a theory that it offers an ideal standard with which to locate 
the present deficiencies in politics?  If an ideal simply replicated what is already found in the real 
world, it would be of limited value as a theoretical tool. 
 
A Diagnosis 
 Though both of these approaches to the indeterminacy of deliberative democracy have 
uncovered many interesting insights, neither has sought to defend it by simply meeting the 
indeterminacy worry “head-on,” by disputing it.  Could one dispute the very basis of the 
indeterminacy worry by claiming that, contrary to appearances, deliberative democracy is not as 
impractical and vague a vision of politics as would seem to be the case?  Often, such disputes 
revolve around the “diagnosis” of a problematic assumption.  Accordingly, in this context, one 
might “diagnose” an assumption among critics and proponents of deliberative democracy alike 
and thereby undermine the practical appeal of deliberative democracy from the start. 
In this dissertation, I pursue such a “diagnostic” approach to worries about the practical 
indeterminacy of deliberative democracy.  More specifically, I try to locate a problematic 
assumption, or structural flaw that has undermined the practical appeal of deliberative 
democracy time and again.  Such a flaw does not mean that “apologetic” and “critical” efforts to 
articulate and defend deliberative democracy in the past are worthless.  Rather, because the flaw 
is structural and the assumption runs so deep and wide, it means that past efforts to articulate and 
defend deliberative democracy have been unable to make as powerful a case for deliberative 
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democracy as possible.  Their efforts, in other words, have been hamstrung by an assumption, a 
structural flaw, that this project seeks to disclose through its diagnosis.   
 The question, now, might therefore be phrased as follows.  What would happen if the 
description of the task of democratic deliberation as a process of translating principles and values 
into concrete decisions is structurally flawed?  What if citizens do not live a 
“compartmentalized” existence, one neatly divided into spaces of work, domestic life, and 
politics, that eat up an unequal amount of their time and energy?  What if their beliefs do not 
neatly divide into two categories, being consistent and inconsistent, acceptable and divisive, or 
socially popular and unpopular?  What if, instead, deliberation consists of a patchwork of 
parallels?  Lessons learned at work might be seen to provide helpful parallels for problem-
solving at home, or even in politics, thereby saving the amount of time needed in those domains 
where time is most of the essence.  Divergent background experiences among citizens might be 
seen to nonetheless run in parallel, being analogous in ways that afford shared insights into work, 
domestic life, or politics.  Would the practical appeal of deliberative democracy change, with 
such a change in orientation brought about by analogy?  Is deliberative democracy both more 
attractive and realistic when its fabric is presented as a patchwork of parallels?  
 
Borrowing the Practical Appeal of Majority Rule 
 In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I explore the possibility of such a change in 
perspective to defend the practical appeal of deliberative democracy.  In doing so, I focus on one 
key idea from this alternative perspective on citizen deliberation: It is driven by analogy.  Every 
day, citizens draw parallels across seemingly disparate domains with analogies.  The “Great 
Recession” is like the “Great Depression.”  The current candidates on the ballot are analogous to 
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the candidates on a previous ballot.  The humanitarian crisis somewhere in the world right now is 
so much like a past crisis, as to call for the same kind of political response.  Political discourse is 
a “patchwork of parallels” drawn by so very many analogies.  From this perspective, deliberative 
democracy emerges as a more realistic vision of politics in two important ways.   
First, analogies are everywhere, and therefore, citizen deliberation is too.  As a result, 
deliberative democracy must no longer be identified with a rare and rarefied activity.  It has a 
greater practical reality than is often assumed, especially by its critics.  Second, instead of being 
contrasted with the more realistic politics of majority rule, deliberative democracy can 
incorporate majority rule procedures into the core of deliberative politics.  The anticipation of an 
election on the horizon catalyzes citizen deliberation, as seen when “campaign seasons” begin 
and debates, forums, and dialogue proliferates.  This proliferation follows naturally from the fact 
that majority rule procedures readily invite the use of analogies to interpret them.  Ballots pair 
candidates, for instance, in ways that quickly send the citizenry in search for analogous pairs of 
candidates from political history, if not further afield.   
Thus, where others have argued against deliberative democracy by stressing the superior 
practical appeal of majority rule procedures, I argue that a focus on analogy allows us to borrow 
that same practical appeal for the cause of deliberative democracy, thereby increasing its value as 
a political vision.  From a distance, we can see that majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices form the core of deliberative democracy, by catalyzing citizen reasoning of an 
“analogical” kind.  Much as a creative outlet catalyzes creative activity, so too majority rule 
procedures like voting catalyze deliberative activity.  For instance, a vote on the horizon will 
stimulate an increase in the quantity of deliberation as well as its dramatic quality when 
analogies used to map the ballot or candidate rivalries “go viral.”   
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In these ways, majority rule procedures and their associated practices are at the core of 
the dynamism of deliberative democracy, with analogical reasoning providing its much 
overlooked, “real world” form.  The diagnosis seems to be complete.  Deliberative democracy 
has practical appeal because it unites the practicality of majority rule with the familiarity of 
analogical reasoning.  Where others have assumed that majority rule and democratic deliberation 
belong to two distinct categories of democratic politics, they have undermined the practical 
appeal of deliberative democracy and failed to see the parallels that are drawn across such a 
“compartmentalized” vision of politics. 
 
The Contemporary Perspective on Analogical Reasoning 
 Focusing on the analogies citizens draw will immediately raise red flags for many people, 
though.  Isn’t the kind of reasoning associated with analogies known to be superficial?  Doesn’t 
it often fixate on accidental similarities in ways that make its conclusions spurious?  Aren’t 
analogies fuel for psychological manipulation, rather than reasoning?  Unfortunately, many of 
these worries are driven by an outdated conception of analogical reasoning.  As John Stuart Mill 
observed in his highly influential 19th century logic textbook, analogy is usually taken to be a 
superficial kind of argument that proceeds by simply identifying similarity among the properties 
in two domains.  If a dog and cat are alike in several ways (e.g., they both have legs, tails, feet, 
noses, etc.), then we can argue that (by analogy) they are similar in other, unknown ways as well 
(e.g, both are mammals).  The classic way of framing analogies on standardized tests assumes 
this way of framing analogical reasoning.  These tests ask, “Dog is to bark as cat is to what?” 
(Dog:bark::Cat:?).  Such questions are rarely profound. 
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 By contrast, empirical, formal and philosophical research of the last two decades in 
particular has led to the overhaul of this outdated, “Millian” conception of analogical 
reasoning.  Researchers have discovered not only that analogy is everywhere, but also that it is 
incredibly rigorous, massively systematic, and experientially rich.  This new conception of 
analogical reasoning, which I refer to as the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning 
(CPAR), shows that good analogical reasoning is anything but superficial, spurious, and prone to 
psychological manipulation.  Three claims are essential to this perspective and the overhaul in 
thinking about analogy that it demands.   
First (CPAR.i), analogies obtain not simply among the properties in two domains (e.g., 
cat and dog), but rather among the entrenched, systematic relations in them.  When an analogy is 
drawn between the Great Depression and the Great Recession, what is extended from one 
domain to the other is not a list of properties (e.g., high unemployment, failed nonfinancial firms, 
bank runs, etc.), but relations among those properties (e.g., decreased liquidity, decreased 
demand), as well as relations among those relations (e.g., the paradox of financial crises), and 
relations among those relations of relations (i.e., meta-relations), on and on (to use examples 
drawn from Gary B. Gorton’s work).  In dealing with such a massive array of features and 
relations, analogies are massively systematic from this contemporary perspective.  Furthermore, 
not only is the sheer number of levels of relations massive, but they also stretch across time.  For 
instance, it may take many episodes of hearing about the failure of nonfinancial firms in the 
news before a threshold is reached and an entire population suddenly embraces pessimism about 
investment opportunities in an economic system.  In this sense, the systematic understanding 
analogies deal with is importantly entrenched, being embedded through a diachronic series of 
episodes, rather than simply in single, “one-off” events. 
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Second (CPAR.ii), the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning updates the 
sense in which analogies extend our understanding of one domain (e.g., dogs) to another (e.g., 
cats).  Because analogies deal with entrenched, systematic relations (CPAR.i), what is extended 
is importantly different in two ways.  First, it will elude sentential formulation.  One reason we 
use analogies is that they are a very efficient and accurate way of conveying highly complex, 
entrenched, systematic knowledge, unlike the non-analogical use of a list of statements or “facts” 
about a domain, which can often be tedious and dull.  Second, part of what it means to extend 
such a rich understanding from one domain to another is to also extend an understanding of the 
preconditions required for assessment.  We have a sense of what it takes for the systematicity to 
obtain in one domain (e.g., the Great Depression’s paradox of financial crises), and therefore 
what it would take for that systematicity to also obtain in another, less familiar domain (e.g., the 
Great Recession’s paradox of financial crises). 
Third (CPAR.iii), analogical reasoning is not a single-step process that transfers 
understanding from one domain to another.  Instead, on account of its systematicity and built-in 
appreciation of preconditions, analogical reasoning invites assessment of its spuriousness, or 
accidental correlation among domains.  Far from being the weapon of critics of analogy, 
accidental correlation is a concern that motivates users of analogical reasoning as well.  The idea 
here is a methodological one.  What it means to use analogies when reasoning is that one will 
first (1) extend a systematic understanding of one familiar domain to another, less familiar 
domain (CPAR.i-ii), and then (2) explore in detail what was initially a kind of “ballpark” 
inference meant to squarely frame the target domain for further, more detailed 
analysis.  Questions about spuriousness are at the heart of analogical reasoning. 
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As these three essential claims show, the contemporary perspective on analogical 
reasoning (CPAR.i-iii) is anything but superficial, manipulative, and blind to the threat of 
spuriousness.  It is not superficial because it deals with entrenched, systematic relations in the 
target and source domains (CPAR.i).  It is not manipulative because it engages in inference, not 
mere association of domains (CPAR.ii).  Finally, it is not blind to the threat of spuriousness 
because it includes a concern for whether an analogy meets the preconditions implied by its 
systematic relations, or merely trades in accidental correlations (CPAR.iii). 
 
The Logical Interpretation of Political Judgment 
 While the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.i-iii) may safely 
assuage common fears about any proposal that stresses the role of analogy in politics, it will 
likely fail to address less popular, more philosophically sophisticated worries about 
it.  Deliberative democrats have indeed ignored the prevalence of analogical reasoning in politics 
and everyday affairs.  However, many will contend that they have ignored it for good 
reason.  Admitting that analogical reasoning is indeed rigorous from a contemporary perspective 
(CPAR), many deliberative democrats will nonetheless bristle at my focus on it.  Is analogical 
reasoning really the kind of reasoning we want most from the citizenry?  Logically speaking, is 
there not a stronger form of reasoning widely available, one we might choose instead? 
 The answer to this last question is obvious from prior accounts of deliberative 
democracy.  When it comes to citizen reasoning, what most deliberative democrats idealize is not 
the use of analogies, but rather the use of principles.  Time and again, deliberative democrats 
describe citizen reasoning in terms of a common starting point: Mutually acceptable 
principles.  Furthermore, deliberative democrats also tend to consistently describe the process of 
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citizen deliberation as an attempt to first (1) identify shared principles or other common 
commitments, and then (2) to translate them into a particular context of decision-making (e.g., 
economic policy).  The advantages of such principled deliberation over analogical reasoning are 
well-known.  Principled reasoning is deductive.  It begins with a general principle to which we 
have a firm, certain level of commitment (e.g., a principle of mutual respect).  The principle is 
then “applied” to a particular context.  This application occurs through long, elegant lines of 
reasoning, in which we preserve that initial, firm, certain level of commitment “step-by-step,” 
until we reach a conclusion about what to do.  At that concluding moment, we have simply 
reformulated our initial, general principle in a later, particular context.  We can be as certain of 
the conclusion as we are of the initial principle with which we began. 
 By contrast, analogical reasoning begins not with a general principle to which we attach a 
firm, certain level of commitment.  Rather, analogical reasoning starts with a particular context 
with which we are already familiar (i.e., the “source domain”), and then maps the entrenched, 
systematic, familiar understanding we have of that source domain onto another particular domain 
(i.e., the “target domain”).  Analogical reasoning is a far less certain affair, instead being 
pervaded with uncertainty and guesswork about what is probable and what is expected, though 
not for sure.  As uncertain as we are of the source domain, which we know only through past 
experience (often at least), so too we must be at least as uncertain (if not more so) in the target 
domain.  Given the tremendous disparity in certainty between the principled and analogical 
forms of reasoning, we can see why many deliberative democrats might believe that analogical 
reasoning has been overlooked for a very good reason: It is logically weaker.  Principled 
reasoning simply reformulates an initially strong starting point (its principle) into a particular 
context; while analogical reasoning moves across continually shaky ground. 
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 However, this priority changes once we recognize a logical insight.  When it comes to 
practical life, even principled reasoning must enter shaky ground.  One cannot apply any 
principle (no matter how firm and certain) to a particular context, without engaging in some 
reasoning about probabilities, predictions, and other uncertain matters.  Indeed, politics in 
particular is rife with such uncertain matters.  Courses of action are entangled with all manner of 
questions about what is likely to happen if a military intervention is pursued, a federal program is 
cut, or an economic incentive is created.  By contrast, the deductive logic behind principled 
reasoning, which makes its conclusions so firm, has long been associated not with the shaky 
terrain of politics, but with the certain terrain of mathematics.  In particular, Euclid’s Elements 
has been the entry point for generations into the rigors and attending rational appeal of deductive, 
“principled” reasoning from initial, firm, certain commitments (e.g., axioms).  In geometry and 
mathematics, the uncertain matters that proliferate politics are rarely on display. 
 This contrast is significant because once one steps outside the space of geometry and 
mathematics and into the uncertain terrain of politics, deductive logic loses its logical 
superiority.  As Michael Dummett has pointed out, when reason has to deal with probability, it 
does better to be “short and sweet,” than to be elegantly derived across long chains of reasoning.  
Think of a “conspiracy theory” and its explanation of a political event.  What makes the 
explanation so suspicious is that it takes so very, very many steps to arrive at its conclusion.  
Along the way, we can almost feel the probability of the conclusion degenerating to nothing … 
almost in no time.  By contrast, a non-conspiratorial theory is “short and sweet,” often based on 
an analogy to a past event (e.g., Great Recession and Great Depression), and arrives at its 
conclusion long before its probability has completely degenerated into nothingness.  Similarly, 
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reasoners do better in highly probabilistic domains like politics to be short, sweet, and 
analogical, than to be elegant, extensive, and principled. 
 This logical insight alone might be enough to answer many skeptics of my turn to 
analogy.  However, recent empirical research on political judgment gives astonishingly strong, 
additional support.  In this research, it has been shown that “experts” as a class of decision-
makers are not any better than a flip of a coin at making prediction-laden political judgments.  
Within the class of so-called “experts,” though, some of them do very well, while others do so 
terribly, that they are the ones responsible for dragging down the record of “experts” and putting 
them on a par with coin flips.  Interestingly, the ones who do so poorly are those who use a 
“deductive” style of reasoning and rely extensively on general principles, which they then apply 
in their political judgments.  The incredibly successful “experts” differ remarkably insofar as 
they use analogy and form predictions and related judgments by pasting together their shaky 
knowledge of a terrain to arrive at conclusions that are shaky, but far more accurate than a flip of 
a coin.  Together with Dummett’s logical insight, these results suggest what I call the logical 
interpretation of political judgment: In politics, what we want is “short and sweet,” analogical 
reasoning, not the disastrous performances of principled reasoners whose conclusions suffer 
tremendously from a degeneration of probability.  Thus, deliberative democrats would do well – 
logically and empirically – to shift away from a “deductivist” fixation on principled visions of 
citizen deliberation and towards an analogical one. 
 This shift is especially important for a very practical reason too, though.  If politics is 
indeed the domain of probability, prediction, and uncertainty, ordinary citizens need a way to 
think rigorously about it.  Rarely, though, do experts, let alone ordinary citizens, have statistical 
quantities memorized with which to make predictions and probabilistic judgments about politics.  
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However, studies have shown that even experts rely extensively on analogies to qualitatively 
assess probabilities in rigorous, efficient, and easily communicable ways.  Thus, analogical 
reasoning is essential to democratic deliberation because without it, the average citizen and 
expert alike lack a realistic means for qualitatively reasoning about probabilistic quantities.   
 
Addressing the Indeterminacy Worry 
 If analogies can help even experts reason rigorously and efficiently about the uncertain 
world that is politics, it is easy to see how analogical reasoning might help deliberative 
democracy address the indeterminacy worry in each of its variations … or so the fifth chapter 
endeavor to show. 
One reason people use analogies is that they are so very efficient at conveying massively 
systematic, entrenched knowledge about one familiar domain into the understanding of another 
domain.  A tremendous amount of empirical research, computational study, and philosophical 
investigation has shown both why people are right to use analogies to save time and energy along 
these lines.  In being so very familiar, analogical reasoning can quickly convey what is grasped 
with tremendous complexity in ways that elude quick sentential formulation.  What we know by 
analogy is often way too complex to efficiently convey otherwise … it would take a vast amount 
of time to actually spell out each and every thing we learned about a familiar, source domain.  
Analogy moves much faster.  In doing so, though, it does not sacrifice its value as a tool for 
quick critical evaluation.  In dealing with massive numbers of systematic relations with which 
we are deeply familiar, analogical reasoning has at its disposal an even more massive number of 
places at which we can study the analogy for its accuracy.  To say that the Great Recession of 
2008 is like the Great Depression is to open oneself up to countless questions about empirical 
   14 
correlations in both of these domains.  Moreover, as the contemporary perspective on analogical 
reasoning reveals, analogies are also well-suited to critical evaluation because they tend to 
incorporate standards for checking their spuriousness within the analogy itself. 
Furthermore, analogical reasoning excels in the face of pluralism, inconsistency, and 
contradiction.  Because it is comparative in its underlying architecture, rather than computational 
in the use of general rules to manipulate information one piece at a time, analogical reasoning is 
not befuddled by a contradiction.  It can easily draw parallels between analogs by grading them 
according to their similarity and dissimilarity.  By contrast, principled reasoning and its use of 
general propositions and rules easily gets hung up trying to find the best solution in the face of 
informational complexity.  As a result, in the face of informational complexity and social 
pluralism, analogical reasoning is a pragmatic way to reason about what to do, while principled 
reasoning often is not.   
Finally, when it comes to “first-personal” differences, analogical reasoning allows people 
coming from very disparate backgrounds to “mentally blend” their familiar grasp of the 
entrenched systematicity of disparate domains into a collective, shared perspective on what it is 
best to do.  Studies of real political events, including past uses of military power, show that such 
“mental blending” is indeed highly efficacious in practical affairs.  Thus, past personal 
experience need not be set aside and “bracketed” while citizens are asked to figure out the 
general principles and public beliefs they should use when deliberating together.  Citizens need 
not approach politics with “compartmentalized” lives.  Rather, with analogical reasoning, past 
personal experience can be “mentally blended” into the heart of deliberative politics.  Divergent 
personal histories and perspectives are no hurdle to democratic deliberation. 
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Where Deliberative Democratic Theory Went Wrong 
 Deliberative democrats have not given analogy much of a role in their vision of 
democratic politics.  It is easy to see why.  Analogy can seem logically weaker to those trained in 
mathematical logic or geometry, since it eschews a deductive approach.  Furthermore, analogy 
can seem superficial to those who are unaware of the fascinating recent research on the richness 
and rigor of analogical reasoning and its use by experts and non-experts alike.  Hopefully, the 
contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR) and the logical interpretation of 
political judgment offset these prejudices.  If they do not, though, the application of my 
“diagnosis” to past accounts of deliberative democracy in the sixth chapter should help.   
If we look at actual accounts of deliberative democratic theory, it can be seen time and 
again that the indeterminacy of deliberative democracy is often driven by a focus on principled 
politics, while those instances of practical realism championed by deliberative democrats are 
often allied with analogical reasoning.  For instance, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson are 
proud of the progress that has been made by one particular argument in applied ethics … the 
success of that argument shows that deliberation can achieve progress even on contentious 
issues.  However, if we look at that progress-producing argument, what we find is that it is 
actually an argument by analogy!  Furthermore, the infamous “social choice critique of voting in 
a deliberative context” associated with Kenneth Arrow’s famous work is rapidly deflated as a 
threat to the practical reality of deliberative politics.  The concluding chapter of my project takes 
up these and many other instances in which deliberative democracy has suffered for practical 
appeal on account of its “deductivist” fixation on first principles.  By diagnosing this latent 
“deductivism” and prejudice against analogical reasoning and associated majority rule 
procedures and practices, a suggestive way past the indeterminacy worry is opened up and the 
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real theoretical value of focusing on analogy becomes fully entrenched. 
 
Conclusion 
 At the end of the dissertation, I survey some of the commonalities between the diagnostic 
method of inquiry this project has pursued and prior work by deliberative democrats that has 
often come to analogous conclusions about the practical reality of deliberative politics.  A final 
remark about the methodology of this investigation and this prior work is used to reflect on the 
ways in which the form of the preceding chapters dialectically illustrates their argumentative 
content.  This dialectical self-illustration further establishes the connection between democracy 
and analogy, as well as the advantage of portraying citizen deliberation as a patchwork of 
parallels, which is to say, analogy. 
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Chapter One: Deliberative Democracy as a Vague Political Vision 
 
 
The Liberal Lawyer’s Lament: On the Indeterminacy of Deliberative Democracy 
As a vision of democratic politics, deliberative democracy is routinely criticized for the 
vague sense of direction it would actually offer real political decision-makers.1  To many people, 
this criticism seems like a natural consequence of the vision’s definition.  In making democratic 
legitimacy depend on whether or not the exercise of political power is accompanied by a process 
of collective citizen reasoning, the deliberative vision ties the meaning of democracy too closely 
to a process with unlikely prospects for success in modern societies.  For instance, Ian Shapiro 
has argued that in modern societies plagued by conflicts among powerful interests, deliberation 
cannot be expected to have as much of an effect as deliberative democrats say it would.  When 
applied to real politics, deliberation will likely just play right into the hands of powerful interests, 
unlike less deliberative and more pragmatic reform efforts directed at realistic goals like 
campaign finance reform or institutionalized support for third parties.2   
One of the best expressions for this worry about the indeterminacy of deliberative 
democracy was expressed in response to a major statement of the deliberative view offered by 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.  In response to their exposition of the deliberative view as 
a set of carefully reasoned principles, one critic lamented the indeterminacy of such theoretical 
principles as political guides, suggesting such a political theory is prone to “the familiar 
                                                
1 e.g., Shapiro, Ian (2003). The State of Democratic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 24-5, Shapiro, 
2 Shapiro 2003, 24-5. 
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complaint of leftist lawyers that liberal principles are too indeterminate to do the work that 
political theorists assign them.”3  For a lawyer confronted with a concrete situation in which 
people are actually suffering dearly, a set of theoretical principles will not spell out the 
“democratic” thing to do with sufficient specificity to actually be helpful.4  More likely, even 
with a firm grasp on the principles of deliberative democracy, a number of options will seem to 
resonate with their dynamic vision of democracy.  Too much seems consistent with deliberative 
democracy, the liberal lawyer is said to lament.  Thus, while the principles and other theoretical 
details of deliberative democracy may clearly imply that some small set of options should be off 
the table (e.g., a violent rebuke to the political system), too many remaining options are still on 
the table for those considerations to supply a determinate answer to the problem at hand. 
Behind this lament from “leftist lawyers” is a fundamental philosophical problem.  The 
deliberative view and its associated principles underdetermine what the lawyer ought to do by 
safely eliminating some options, but leaving too many still on the table.5  Alone, the principles of 
deliberative democracy are “not enough” for political guidance.  They do not go far enough 
towards guiding the choices of real political agents, like “liberal lawyers,” to be of any major 
help.   
By contrast, the majority rule procedures and associated practices (e.g., elections) with 
which democracy is traditionally identified go plenty far in determining a course of action.  If a 
group of liberal lawyers voted on a course of action, a decision would easily be determined.  
Thus, by comparison, one of the advantages of the traditional view of democracy is that majority 
                                                
3 Simon, William H. (1999). “Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy.” in Deliberative Politics: Essays on 
Democracy and Disagreement. ed. Stephen Macedo. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 54. 
4 For an even more skeptical view of such normative theorizing, see Leiter, Brian (2006). “The Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion.” in The Future for Philosophy. ed. Brian Leiter. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
5 For a careful exposition of the problem of underdetermination as it threatens the moral and political principles of 
deliberative democrats like Habermas, see Heath, Joseph (2011). Following the Rules. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 149. 
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rule is a very concrete mode of governance and decision-making, which means it can easily be 
mapped onto real politics in a determinate, and thereby action-guiding, way.  Public elections, 
high court rulings, resolutions of legislative bodies, and the advisory boards of government 
agencies all make decisions by majority rule and do so with no shortage of determinacy.  No 
problem of “liberal indeterminacy” arises in these contexts of traditional, majority rule driven 
democracy.  As a result, one can see why the traditional view of democracy as majority rule 
remains in favor among some political philosophers even after the rise of deliberative 
democracy.6 
 
Three Variations on the Indeterminacy Worry 
This worry about the “liberal” indeterminacy of the deliberative view of democracy has 
only become more pronounced, varied, and theoretically sophisticated over time.  Three specific 
variations of the worry have emerged as the major forms in which this “indeterminacy worry” 
and its problem of underdetermination have been articulated.  In the next section, I briefly take 
up each variation in turn.  At this point in my investigation, I will simply introduce these 
variations on the indeterminacy worry, relegating the sophisticated expositions of their 
motivation and argumentative details to the third, fourth, and fifth chapters of this project.  In 
doing so, I hope to set the stage for framing my own response.  Once that response is framed, I 
will return to these variations on the indeterminacy worry to see how my response stacks up (and 
in doing so, will get into the details of their underlying motivations and argumentative details). 
 
1. The Pragmatic Variation 
                                                
6 Dryzek, John S. (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 39. 
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One pragmatic variation on the indeterminacy worry maintains that the deliberative view 
is simply too inefficient to serve as a political ideal.  As Christian List has observed, decision 
procedures for dealing with the possible combinations of citizen views for and against any issue 
exponentially increase as the number of citizens increases even marginally.7  As small a number 
of citizens as “10” formally yields a “dramatic combinatorial explosion” when the logical space 
of possible decision procedures is mapped precisely, List observes.8  In other words, canvassing 
all the possible viewpoints and all of the possible procedures for surveying them is a wildly 
unrealistic possibility for real democratic deliberation.  To illustrate this point, List compares the 
object of inquiry for such a task with “the number of elementary particles in the universe 
according to standard estimates.”9  In both cases, the sheer quantity of content to be surveyed is 
“dramatic” (to put it lightly). 
Formal analysis is not necessary to catch the drift of this worry, though.  Even at face 
value, the very idea of having citizens deliberate together towards a decision seems to demand a 
dramatic (if not unrealistic) amount of time, energy, and other resources.  Not only must citizens 
express their views, but they must also take the time to cite the relevant commitments which, in 
conjunction, justify those views as the supporting reasons.  Moreover, after citing those 
conjunctive commitments, they must also spend even more time and energy actually assessing 
those justifications and revising their original positions accordingly.  Since political decision-
making is frequently (if not almost always) pursued under severe time pressures (e.g., between 
Congressional recesses), it seems practically impossible to cover the three stages of this process 
of “conjunctive criticism,” by which I mean the process including (1) the expression of citizen 
positions, (2) the explication of the supporting conjunction of commitments that justify those 
                                                
7 List, Christian (2011). “The Logical Space of Democracy.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. 39:3, 271-2. 
8 List 2011, 272. 
9 List 2011, 272. 
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positions, and (3) the critique of those justifying commitments.  As a result, even without List’s 
formal analysis, the deliberative determination of political decisions seems to require “dramatic,” 
indeed excessive, practical demands.  A corresponding indeterminacy ensues. 
 Furthermore, even if these familiar pressures of time and energy are relaxed well beyond 
the norm, no formal analysis is needed to see that the amount of information that would have to 
be canvassed exponentially explodes once populations reach levels that are normal in 
contemporary democratic societies.10  With millions of citizens, the number of positions and 
conjunctive commitments that have to be canvassed during democratic deliberation is staggering.  
With all of the time and energy in the world, the cognitive capacities of the citizenry, including 
their memories, would be overtaxed.  As a result, in the context of contemporary democratic 
politics, relaxing time and energy pressures will not even be enough to offset the informational 
demands of deliberative democracy and the conjunctive criticism it deploys.  Here too, the 
inefficiency of conjunctive criticism renders the deliberative view politically impractical under 
the pragmatic conditions of real politics.   
Taken together, these pragmatic conditions yield indeterminacy in the form of 
underdetermination.  With too little time, energy, and memory, and an exponentially explosive 
amount of information to survey in the form of citizen positions, reasons, and criticism when a 
decision has to be made, too many options will still be on the table.  When the final hour is upon 
the citizenry, which position is the best response to any given problem will be impossible to 
determine, because the conjunctive commitments supporting each position are practically 
impossible to assess with equal or even sufficient vigor.  How can one choose one option when 
others have not yet been countenanced?  How does one know every position is even on the table, 
when so much time has been spent analyzing only the supporting commitments of just the first 
                                                
10 ibid. 
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few positions mentioned by speakers, especially when the reason why these speakers went first, 
rather than others, is unclear, if not simply a random matter of chance. 
 
2. The Informational Variation 
On a second, informational variation of the indeterminacy worry, deliberation is 
powerless to cope with the contradictions, logical inconsistencies, tensions and conflicts that 
saturate the conjunction of citizen commitments.  No single citizen has a logically consistent set 
of beliefs, it is often worried, let alone a group of such citizens.11  Worse yet, the “fact of 
pluralism” means that people disagree about even their most cherished and fundamental 
commitments, so deliberation cannot even proceed by restricting attention to the deepest level of 
citizen commitment.12  Moreover, this issue is aggravated by the widely held belief that the “fact 
of pluralism” is not the result of lapsed rationality on the part of citizens, but rather a 
consequence of reasonable people having reasonable views that happen to conflict.13  If tension 
in the conjunction of citizen commitments can be “reasonable” in this pluralistic way, then 
deliberative democrats lack an easy way of setting the fact of pluralism aside as a mere matter of 
theory-application, rather than political theory proper.  Thus, a serious, theoretical problem 
emerges from the informational complexity posed by contradiction, inconsistency, tension, and 
conflict among the commitments of citizens both as individuals and collective deliberators. 
These considerations reflect a deeper worry about indeterminacy to the extent that 
deliberation is hamstrung in the face of informational conditions like these.  As logicians, 
                                                
11 Freeman, Samuel (2004). “Public Reason and Political Justifications.” Fordham Law Review. 72:5, 2032-3. 
12 Gaus, Gerald (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 42-44,  Talisse, Robert 
(2005). Democracy after Liberalism. London, UK: Routledge, 37, Bohman, James and Richardson, Henry S. (2009). 
“Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and ‘Reasons All Can Accept’.” Journal of Political Philosophy. 17:3, 253. 
13 Gaus 2011, 42-4, Gutmann, Amy and Thompson, Dennis (1998). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 14. 
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philosophers, and ordinary citizens are well aware, it is difficult to come to a determinate 
decision or to determine what is justified when the information one has to deal with is rife with 
internal inconsistency.  From inconsistent premises, everything is justified (at least according to 
classical logics), while in the face of conflicting information, ordinary citizens would also agree 
that everything seems like an equally good idea.  The indeterminacy worry therefore poses an 
information processing challenge to deliberative democracy as well, one that has long been 
recognized and often portrayed as a major hurdle.14 
Here too, the indeterminacy worry boils down to a classic problem of 
underdetermination.  Logicians describe the dilemma posed by inconsistent premises as a 
problem of underdetermination because anything is justified and therefore too little determinacy 
is available to be of practical significance.  Similarly, when citizens are faced with policy experts 
and politicians who all seem to contradict themselves as well as one another, citizens struggle to 
arrive at a determinate response worth endorsing with the weight of conscience, let alone action.  
What is needed is some way to reduce underdetermination one way or another. 
 
3.  The First-Personal Variation 
Finally, a third variation on the indeterminacy worry takes issue with the method of 
inquiry associated with deliberative democracy.  For deliberative democrats, conjunctive 
criticism cannot be discourse of any kind, but rather must be of the right kind.  Discourse must 
be qualitatively “deliberative,” where this qualitative restriction is often defined in various ways.  
For example, the restriction is often defined in terms of the value of “respect” and how 
deliberation must always proceed in a respectful manner.  Alternatively and more commonly, the 
                                                
14 List 2011, 282, footnote 27. 
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restriction is defined as a limit placed on which considerations count as “public” reasons, insofar 
as they gain their rational force by appealing to commitments everyone involved already shares.   
As Gerald Gaus has gone to uniquely great lengths to argue, the indeterminacy worry 
arises here when a shift takes place from this restricted conjunction of commitments (i.e., the 
respectful ones or “public” ones everyone already shares) to the larger set of personal 
commitments people hold as individuals.15  This shift is significant because people do not 
ultimately make decisions from a restricted point of view, but rather from their “own,” first-
personal point of view.16  When it comes to decision-making, we ultimately put ourselves and 
our own individual commitments at the steering wheel, not a public “we” with a restricted set of 
commitments that excludes our own.  Much as jurors struggle to only weigh the evidence that 
was found to be admissible during court proceedings, though they are aware of other evidence 
that was not admitted into the proceedings through media exposure, so too citizens struggle to 
actually set themselves into action on the basis of public dialogue without first consulting their 
private conscience.  In other words, political philosophers cannot really expect citizens to 
proceed to make political decisions with “blinders” on to prevent their field of vision from taking 
in the private beliefs they may have that are not widely shared in public (e.g., religious ones).  
Thus, though the method of inquiry favored by deliberative democrats often begins by framing 
deliberation within a restricted point of view (i.e., the “public”), there can be no impact on what 
citizens actually do without proceeding through the stage of first-personal decision-making.  
Moving into the first-personal point of view is complicated by the fact that as individuals, we 
hold a larger number of commitments than we do as members of a “public” with solely “publicly 
shared” commitments.  Consequently, to actually transfer a publicly acceptable commitment into 
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a first-personal one capable of guiding our action, we will have to see how that public 
commitment holds up in light of our larger set of individual commitments (e.g., our religious 
beliefs).   
The specific worry about indeterminacy here is that our public commitments do not 
translate into first-personal commitments in a stable, determinate way.17  When it comes time to 
make a decision, we make those decisions in light of a larger set of individual commitments such 
that it re-opens the question of what it is we are committed to in the first place.  In other words, 
many argue that when the “total balance of reasons” is expanded from the restricted, “public” 
perspective to the first-personal perspective, what seems most justified is highly prone to 
change.18  No stability can be expected of what we accept as a public commitment when it comes 
time to make decisions based on our individual commitments as well.  In this third context, the 
deliberative view of democracy is yet again too indeterminate to be of value as a theoretical tool.  
The larger set of commitments held by any individual citizen de-stabilizes the practical 
significance of those commitments recognized publicly.  Where we want public reasoning to 
actually make a difference (i.e., in political decisions made by individuals), it is too 
indeterminate to serve that purpose. 
Here too, a problem of underdetermination appears at the most fundamental level.  
Whatever is concluded through public reasoning, that conclusion underdetermines what any 
individual citizen will actually do when the time to actually act arrives.19  The problem is that a 
conclusion drawn from a set of public reasons has an uncertain relationship to the conclusion an 
individual will draw from the addition of private beliefs to that set of public reasons.  
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Accordingly, when deliberation in the public forum ends and everyone seems to have made up 
“their” minds, the options still on the table are under-specified.  In a less technical sense, then, 
this third variation on the indeterminacy worry presents a problem of underdetermination insofar 
as the practical reasoning in the public domain under-specifies the options on the table at the 
more decisive level of first-personal decision-making. 
Given these three variations on the indeterminacy worry voiced by “leftist lawyers” 
towards democratic theorists, one can understand why the gains in dynamism routinely claimed 
on behalf of the deliberative view are also routinely criticized for their failure to translate into 
decisive, determinate politics.  In the richly suggestive words of Gerald Gaus, the problem is that 
the deliberative view “wilts under what we might call the ‘burdens of justification.’”20  Here, 
these ‘burdens of judgment’ stand for what I referred to above as the pragmatic, informational, 
and first-personal conditions of democratic deliberation.  Moreover, in light of the indeterminacy 
worry, one can also understand why some have resisted the “deliberative turn” in democratic 
theory and instead suggested that the deliberative view must at least be supplemented with non-
deliberative components from the traditional view of democracy as majority rule.  For instance, 
shortly after Gutmann and Thompson articulated their major statement of the deliberative view 
of democracy, even sympathetic theorists admitted that the actual democratic political process is 
“pervasively nondeliberative” and therefore in need of some realistic supplements.21  These non-
deliberative supplements provide the decisive, realistic determinacy needed for democracy to 
move beyond the underdetermination of conjunctive criticism so as to ‘get things done’ through 
bargaining, voting, etc.     
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Framing an Alternative Reply 
Deliberative democrats have developed numerous responses to this indeterminacy worry.  
Below, I will group their responses under three categories, based on their respective method of 
inquiry.  These categories are as follows: apologetic, critical, and diagnostic.  Here, I will only 
briefly rehearse these earlier responses to the indeterminacy worry in the three formulations 
surveyed above for two reasons.  First, the debates surrounding these responses are well-studied 
and yet remain at an impasse.22  As a result, a less well-trodden path beyond the various 
problems of underdetermination associated with deliberative democracy seems more promising 
than an in-depth engagement with these debates.  Second, I will return to these responses in 
chapter six, where I will present them in greater detail as I attempt to show where the advantages 
of my own analysis can be seen.  To avoid unnecessary repetition, I therefore postpone that 
“greater detail” of engagement with these other responses until chapter six and instead only 
briefly rehearse them here.    
As I mentioned, these replies all seek to address the constant criticism directed at 
deliberative democracy for its lack of political realism.23  Nonetheless, they do differ in their 
methods of inquiry.  In the next three sections, I will briefly rehearse each approach as a 
response to the indeterminacy worry, pointing out their methodological differences in turn. 
 
1. The Apologetic Method of Inquiry 
Consider first the apologetic method of inquiry used most commonly by deliberative 
democrats to respond to the indeterminacy worry.  This method responds to various worries 
about deliberative democracy’s lack of political realism by suggesting that it is not as unrealistic 
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and indeterminate as imagined.  Typically, this method of inquiry accepts the terms of the 
criticism, but questions the extent to which they are actually problematic.  The work of Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson is particularly illustrative of this method.  For instance, 
Gutmann and Thompson accept the terms of the second, informational variation on the 
indeterminacy worry.  As they admit, “the basic problem of democratic politics” is “how to make 
legitimate decisions for the society as a whole in the face of fundamental disagreement.”24  
Moreover, not only do they admit that such informational complexity of a “pluralistic” kind is a 
real problem, but they also agree that it is a “reasonable” one that cannot be brushed aside as a 
mere matter of theory-application.  They admit as much when they write, “The core of the 
problem is not merely that people disagree, but that some of the disagreement is reasonable.  It is 
built into the circumstances of social and political life.”25   
Furthermore, they also admit that “deliberative democracy does not provide a natural way 
to come to a definite conclusion short of consensus, which is not to be expected in most cases of 
decision-making.”26  With these words, they concede to the critics of deliberative democracy that 
the indeterminacy worry is legitimate, a “definite conclusion” is underdetermined by the 
deliberative process.  They then proceed to also concede to proponents of the indeterminacy 
worry that deliberation needs to be supplemented with the non-deliberative practices of the 
traditional view, for as they explain this concession, “Deliberative politics almost always has to 
be supplemented by other decision procedures … It must rely on other procedures, most notably 
voting, which in themselves are not deliberative.”27  In other words, Gutmann and Thompson 
also concede the first, pragmatic variation of the indeterminacy worry.  Though their deliberative 
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view focuses extensively on the need for deliberation to be “open,” they nonetheless concede 
that “unlimited opportunities to reopen questions would of course paralyze government.”28 
As mentioned at the opening of this section, though the apologetic method of inquiry 
concedes the terms of the debate, it does still “put up a fight” insofar as it pushes back on the 
extent to which the criticism leveled on those conceded terms is actually problematic.  Thus, with 
regard to their aforementioned concession to the indeterminacy worry, Gutmann and Thompson 
do push back by writing: 
The fact that deliberative democracy does not in itself define a unique method for 
bringing deliberation to a justified conclusion (short of a moral consensus) means that it 
acknowledges that no single method can justify whatever results from its 
implementation.29  
 
In other words, while they concede that democratic deliberation underdetermines a unique 
outcome most of the time, they do not agree with critics about the extent to which this 
indeterminacy is deeply problematic for the deliberative view.  Rather, as any apologist would, 
they contend that this indeterminacy is misunderstood as negative, when really it is a positive 
feature that actually (i.e., counterintuitively) testifies to the realism of the deliberative view.  It 
would be unrealistic to believe any “method for bringing deliberation to a justified conclusion” 
would be completely determinate, all of the time.  Consequently, though they concede the terms 
of the debate to their critics by allowing for the indeterminacy of democratic deliberation, they 
ultimately challenge the implication to be drawn from that indeterminacy.   
Similarly, they recognize the third, first-personal variation of the indeterminacy worry, 
writing, “Another charge of bias against deliberative democrats is that their standards of public 
reason discriminate against certain kinds of beliefs, particularly against certain religious 
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perspectives.”30  Though not focused on the first-personal indeterminacy exactly as formulated 
above, their comment nonetheless reveals an awareness that the personal and political may seem 
to stand at odds during deliberation as it is portrayed in their model.  Recognizing this 
indeterminacy about what kinds of belief qualify as legitimate inputs into democratic 
deliberation, they push back against this “charge” by questioning the extent to which it really 
poses a problem.  They write, “But it would be misleading to infer from this criticism that we 
should reject the standards of public reason.  Because of the wide range of beliefs found in every 
democratic society, it would be unrealistic to expect agreement on every controversial moral 
issue.”31  In other words, Gutmann and Thompson stand-up for the deliberative view by 
questioning the extent of the problem.  Even more unrealistic than their own view would be to 
expect agreement on “every” issue for which it is indeterminate whether personal beliefs are 
admissible as public reasons.  Thus, much as an apologist for any cause may concede a criticism 
only to say it is ultimately for the better, so too Gutmann and Thompson enact an apologetic 
method of inquiry to deal with criticism leveled at their lack of political realism. 
 Many other deliberative democrats take the same approach to the indeterminacy worry in 
its various formulations.  Amartya Sen, for example, similarly argues that the 
underdetermination of democratic deliberation “does not keep us transfixed with indecision.”32  
He too concedes the terms of the debate, writing of the reasons offered during democratic 
deliberation that “The reasons may sometimes compete with each other in persuading us in one 
direction or another in a particular assessment, and when they yield conflicting judgments, there 
is an important challenge in determining what credible conclusions can be derived, after 
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considering all the arguments.”33  In these informational conditions of underdetermination, 
deliberation may not identify a unique outcome or a complete ranking of options in terms of their 
relative worth.  After making this concession, though, Sen pushes back with regard to the extent 
to which these informational conditions are really problematic.  He writes, for instance, “This 
anxiety … overlooks the fact that nearly all appraisals undertaken as a part of normal living 
involve prioritization and weighing of distinct concerns, and that there is nothing particularly 
special in the recognition that evaluation has to grapple with competing priorities.”34  With these 
words, Sen strikes the tone of an apologist.  Yes, the indeterminacy is real, however, it is as 
normal in democratic deliberation as it is in any deliberation where decisions are regularly made 
despite these informational conditions. 
 The reason for such optimism, Sen explains, is that the “extent of incompleteness” that 
occurs when we deliberate about how to rank our options makes indeterminacy less crippling.35  
True to the apologetic method of inquiry, he takes his optimism from the extent to which the 
terms of the debate actually yield crippling indecision.  Even when citizens cannot agree on a 
complete ranking of each and every option, they can nonetheless agree that option x is better than 
option q, which are both worse than option z, despite the “gaps” left in this agreement about 
where other options may fit into the ranking.  Accordingly, Sen maintains, “there are a great 
many choices in which a partial ordering with specific gaps could give us a great deal of 
guidance.”36  Sometimes agreeing on the worst thing to do offers sufficient guidance to create a 
unified plan of action.  Other times, we can know what it would be best to do without agreeing 
on what would be second best.  Sen describes these incomplete agreements in the face of 
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informational complexity as “partial rankings,”37 a position that overlaps neatly with the position 
Gutmann and Thompson also ultimately endorse with regard to the indeterminacy worry: “By 
their nature, reasonable differences contain partial understandings.”38  
The apologetic method of inquiry also appears in the work of Jürgen Habermas.  
Habermas paints a sympathetic portrait of the demand for political realism associated with what 
he calls the “sociological enlightenment.”  By this phrase, Habermas intends to name a major 
intellectual trend in recent decades that tends to “evaporate” any apparently idealistic, 
deliberative element of democratic politics by drawing on sociological findings.  More 
specifically, the sociological enlightenment uses the knowledge generated by the social sciences 
to show that “illegitimate” power of a brute, “realist” kind tends to force its way into the very 
places political philosophers cherish most as bastions against realism and pluralism of the kind 
associated with the indeterminacy worry.39  What might seem like democratic deliberation, for 
instance, turns out to be yet another powerplay.  In an apologetic manner, Habermas admits that 
in its “normal” mode, democratic politics fits that sober, realist’s picture relatively well.   
However, he then challenges the extent to which it is problematic by questioning its 
totalizing reach.  Against the sociological enlightenment’s pessimism, Habermas contends that 
there nonetheless exist “extraordinary” moments when the trends documented by sociologists are 
scuttled and democratic politics rises to an extra-ordinary rational quality of deliberative 
politics.40  More specifically, the “reifying trends” observed by sociologists, in which people are 
treated as things (de re), rather than as rational agents, are not “an unavoidable feature of 
complex societies,” but “moments of inertia” that are punctuated by extraordinary moments in 
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which these trends are “countersteered” by people acting on latent normative presuppositions.41  
In these extraordinary moments, “normative countersteering … can compensate for the 
communicative, cognitive, and motivational limitations on deliberative politics” observed by 
critics of the deliberative view in the wake of the sociological enlightenment.42  Setting aside the 
technical details of Habermas’ terminology, the apologetic method of inquiry can clearly be 
observed in the contrasts enacted by that terminology.  One only “countersteers” when a larger 
force is being recognized while at the same time being challenged in its totality.  Like a vehicle 
headed with tremendous inertia in one direction, Habermas concedes that democratic societies 
are largely inert in their non-deliberative trends, but also like a vehicle, those trends are 
punctuated by moments when democracy is steered back onto its (deliberative) course. 
 
2. The Critical Method of Inquiry 
The second method of inquiry adopted in responding to the indeterminacy worry is far 
less popular, but still widely recognized.  According to this critical method, the constant 
criticism directed at deliberative democracy on account of its lack of realism warrants a criticism 
of its own.  Advocates of this critical method of inquiry often take inspiration from what 
Habermas’s focus on “deviation” suggests about the role of an ideal theory of deliberation and/or 
deliberative democracy.  David Estlund, for example, contends that the deliberative view can 
function as a theory in a beneficial way without having to mirror our political reality.  As he 
contends, Habermas’s work on deviation and normative countersteering suggests that the 
deliberative view functions as a “breakdown theory,” informing citizens not about the ideal 
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democracy towards which they should continually strive, but rather about the “template” they 
should use to identify points at which political reality has deviated too far from its democratic 
model.43  These breakdowns are “common and inevitable,” and call for “adjustment” to the 
contours of the template.44  However, such adjustment is very different from aspiration to 
achieve an ideal theory that is hopelessly unrealistic given current pragmatic, informational, and 
first-personal conditions.  As a breakdown theory, the deliberative view can remain 
indeterminate while still offering some guidance about those parts of a democratic society that 
have reached a crisis point that requires countersteering of the normative kind associated with 
deliberative politics. 
Additionally, Estlund argues that an indeterminate and unrealistic deliberative view can 
nonetheless play an important, causal role as an ideal theory.45  As he points out, “Reflection on 
how people and institutions should be can direct our attention and energy to determining how far 
realism can reach.  We sometimes expect too little precisely because we have no normative 
standard that forces the question of whether more can realistically be expected.”46  In this 
passage, Estlund criticizes the realist opponents of deliberative democracy for failing to give 
their own position sufficient scrutiny.  Realism is not an all or nothing quality of a theory.  Some 
theories may accept current political reality as it is.  Others may demand changes that are slight 
and within easy reach.  Still other theories may require more change and upheaval in our political 
reality.  These qualitative differences cannot be set aside behind a single criterion of “realism” 
without risking that we have little theoretical cause to consider where there might be room for 
political improvement in our political reality.  As a source for a theoretical cause for 
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reconsideration in this way, Estlund claims, the deliberative view can play a causal role without 
being fully determinate and realistic.  Short of recommending unique outcomes in particular 
political situations, the theory can at least cause us to wonder where we should take political 
reality as it is, and where we should demand more of it.  As a template for adjustment, then, the 
deliberative view remains viable in the face of the indeterminacy worry … but only if we adopt a 
critical method of inquiry that challenges the terms of the debate, rather than accepting them and 
only challenging their extent. 
Similarly, Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel defend the deliberative view by challenging 
the terms of the debate about its various forms of indeterminacy.  Many apparent criticisms that 
would be directed towards a deliberative view are themselves worthy of criticism because they 
rely on problematic categories.  More specifically, democratic deliberation seems unrealistic 
because its real life instantiation explodes neat categories like “the false dichotomy of state and 
market.”47  Cohen and Sabel adopt this critical method of inquiry towards each variation of the 
indeterminacy worry.  First, they recognize that others may contend that “in a large-scale 
political system, wide-spread participation in decision-making is organizationally or 
administratively impossible.”48  However, they contend, this pragmatic variation of the 
indeterminacy worry collapses once we cease to identify deliberative democracy “with direct 
assembly democracy and especially with the Greek polis as both the ideal and the practical 
inspiration.”49  In contemporary political reality, by contrast, problems require deliberative 
solutions that are “tailored to (constantly changing) local circumstances” and therefore more than 
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one “stable” form of deliberation.50   
Accordingly, we should not expect democratic deliberation to fit squarely into the ancient 
Greek form of the assembly, nor should we expect it to always comprise only one particular 
combination of “government” and “market” (i.e., no market, or minimal government, etc.).  In 
practices like community policing and economic development organizations, collaboration is 
coordinated through “regular discussions, disciplined reference to officially recognized 
standards,” and other hallmarks of deliberation, while the categories of state and market are 
blurred and citizens effectively deliberate despite the limited time, energy, and other resources 
with which they must deal.51  Moreover, where these forms of deliberation occur, it is not 
because people of uniform outlook and informational conditions associate with one another, but 
often the converse: “they often emerge precisely against a background of associative distress,” 
which is to say, in those places where pluralism, contradiction, inconsistency, and tension obtain 
(i.e., the informational variation of the indeterminacy worry).52  Thus though they recognize that 
the deliberative view apparently “depends on a higher degree of homogeneity among citizens 
than can reasonably be assumed in a large-scale, pluralistic democracy,” they use the critical 
method of inquiry to challenge the very terms that worry presupposes.  Deliberation in real 
politics arises precisely because of challenging informational conditions, not despite them.   
Cohen and Sabel also address the third, first-personal variation of the indeterminacy 
worry.  They recognize, “Critics of deliberative decision-making fault it for being doubly 
exclusionary.  Deliberation, they say, is a particular discursive style, with all the conventional 
indicia of the rational: formal, deductive, and unemotional.  By insisting on abstraction from the 
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personal and particular, deliberation excludes both people and information.”53  As this statement 
reveals, Cohen and Sabel are well aware of first-personal criticisms of the deliberative view.  
They understand that the “personal and particular” considerations that actually drive individual 
action would seem to be eliminated by a political praxis fixated on mutual reason-giving.  
However, they again adopt the critical method of inquiry by responding to these critics by 
questioning their assumptions:  
This objection makes two assumptions, both unwarranted.  First, that requiring an explicit 
statement of reasons implies that nothing other than reasons can be stated – as though a 
conception of deliberative justification supported a ban on undeliberative humor.  
Second, that the canonical form of deliberation is the justification of a regulation from 
first principles: the argument for progressivity in the tax system on grounds of a 
conception of political fairness.  Deliberation may take this form, but nothing in the 
concept of reason-giving requires it to do so.  Nor, more immediately, is the reason-
giving that occupies us here naturally expressed in the form of deductions from general 
political axioms.  On the contrary, deliberative problem-solving is by its nature focused 
on addressing specific problems in local settings.54 
 
In this passage, Cohen and Sabel criticize the assumptions of their critics with regard to their 
scope and narrow identification with a specific mode of reasoning.  More specifically, they first 
question the assumption that “an explicit statement of reasons” restricts the scope of our 
considerations in such a way that more “personal and particular” considerations would 
necessarily be excluded.  Instead, they suggest, there is plenty of space for alternative, more first-
personal considerations.  Critics merely assume that explicit reasoning implies a ban on all more 
first-personal considerations.  Second, they also question the assumption that the mode of 
reasoning often taken to be exemplary among philosophers is the natural expression of 
democratic reason-giving.  To posit a less personal, less first-personal mode of reasoning like 
formal, deductive, principled reasoning as the exemplar that ought to guide our conception of 
democratic deliberation is to make an assumption that the generic account of reasoning they offer 
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does not require, nor even demand.  In this way, Cohen and Sabel follow Estlund in adopting a 
critical method of inquiry in formulating their reply to the indeterminacy worry in its various 
formulations. 
 
3. The Diagnostic Method of Inquiry 
A third method of inquiry is suggested by Elizabeth Anderson’s response to the 
indeterminacy worry.  Anderson’s approach does not fit squarely into either the apologetic or 
critical methods of inquiry.  She neither offers a qualified defense of the deliberative view for its 
apparent lack of realism, nor does she respond to this lack of realism by questioning the value of 
realism or related terms in the first place.  Instead, she questions the very division on which the 
criticism rests, namely, the line drawn between the deliberative view of democracy and the 
“non”-deliberative and more practical and determinate mechanisms of majority rule.  Anderson’s 
account is of particular interest precisely because it advances beyond portraying the practices 
associated with the traditional view (e.g., voting) as a practical addendum (as Gutmann and 
Thompson were seen to treat it above).  Instead of being added on to the theory as a practical 
concession and apologetic move, Anderson tries to locate it within her political philosophy itself.  
Her proposal involves taking a cue from John Dewey’s works:  
Deliberative democrats who follow Dewey stress the provisional and experimental 
character of voting.  Voting does not make a final decision, but rather represents the 
citizens’ or the state’s legitimate decision of what to try next until something better 
comes along.55    
 
In this passage, Anderson associates herself with Dewey and his challenge to the idea that the 
majority rule practices associated with the traditional view are non-deliberative in their 
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significance.56  Instead of a brute decision-procedure, those who “follow Dewey” take an 
“experimental and provisional” approach to voting, treating it as an opportunity to revise earlier 
decisions rather than to get things done in an efficient, aggregative manner.   
This Deweyan conception of democracy is born out when Anderson writes, “Citizens’ 
collective deliberation and feedback on public decision-making is continuous and does not stop 
just because a law has been enacted.”57  In other words, what makes democracy experimental 
and provisional is that the decisions made when voting are always framed with an eye to the 
feedback they will ultimately engender. Voting is provisional in yet another sense.  Not only can 
its results be revised later, but they may also be revised precisely because they stem from 
collective decision-making, not individuals acting on their individual preferences.  When any 
kind of political decision is made by a vote of all citizens or a vote of their official 
representatives, the collective nature of voting and democracy alike means that the people 
(collectively) will always have a chance down the road to provide feedback on that earlier 
decision (regardless of whether they made it, or their official representatives).   
In this way, Anderson’s view accommodates the realities of contemporary politics, as she 
points out: “The rise of the regulatory state has entailed that administrative agencies issue 
thousands of rules pursuant to general laws.  Critical to the democratic process is participatory 
citizen feedback on proposed regulations prior to their enactment.”58  Anderson recognizes that 
modern democratic politics assigns a huge role to administrative agencies in the actual making of 
decisions.  Furthermore, direct citizen input plays a limited role in such administrative decision-
making.  Even without a direct contribution in daily political decision-making, though, 
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Anderson’s conception of majority rule mechanisms like voting allows the citizenry to still 
collectively co-deliberate by offering occasional feedback on these decisions originally made 
without their direct involvement.  
By showing how the majority rule practices of the traditional view ultimately serve 
deliberative, rather than non-deliberative purposes in democratic politics, Anderson’s method of 
inquiry amounts to a diagnostic one.  She neither accepts the terms of the debate nor criticizes 
the significance of political realism.  Instead, she embraces the need for realism wholesale, 
suggesting that one of the benefits of her view is that it resonates better with the administrative 
reality that is contemporary democracy.  Moreover, she also allows a real political practice to 
play a fundamental role in shaping her democratic theory.59  This response is diagnostic insofar 
as it locates an assumption in the realist’s criticism of deliberative democracy and responds by 
exploring the question without that assumption in place.  That is to say, she responds 
diagnostically by asking not to what degree the criticism is well-founded (i.e., the apologetic 
method), nor whether the criticism is a serious threat (i.e., the critical method), but rather 
whether the majority rule practices of the traditional view, like voting, are actually a non-
deliberative competitor to the deliberative vision of democracy.   
This diagnostic method of inquiry is significant because it stands at odds with most 
responses to the indeterminacy worry and the supposed superior political realism of the 
traditional view.60  Most deliberative democrats do indeed treat majority rule procedures like 
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voting as non-deliberative components of politics.  Many have observed that “deliberative 
democrats have often downplayed the virtues and even anathematized the aims and mechanisms 
of voting.”61  Furthermore, deliberative democrats have a long history of treating majority rule 
procedures like voting, and the traditional view more broadly, as at best a practical addendum to 
their theory that is fundamentally at odds with it in being fundamentally non-deliberative.  For 
instance, Joshua Cohen portrays voting as a practical concession when he writes, “Even under 
ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming.  If they are not, 
then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule.”62  Here, we see a 
deliberative democrat treating voting merely as a practical measure or addendum meant to aid 
deliberative democracy when it reaches an impasse.  Rawls’ A Theory of Justice also reflects a 
similar attitude towards voting as a mere practicality, as when he writes,“I assume for simplicity 
that a variant of majority rule suitably circumscribed is a practical necessity.”63 
As I mentioned before, Anderson’s diagnostic method of inquiry has only rarely been 
pursued.64  One might be surprised to discover it is so rare, but that might have to do with the 
fact that the concept of “feedback” strikes some deliberative democrats as too meager to play a 
real role in deliberative democracy.  For example, Cohen and Sabel offer an objection to a focus 
on feedback, which I quote here at length in light of its cogency: 
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actual deliberation is, by its nature, a form of information pooling: when people take 
seriously the task of providing one another with reasons and information about 
circumstances and outlooks, what is relevant to improved policy is then brought to bear 
by those in possession of it.  No similar effects on preferences or on information are 
likely to issue from non-deliberative processes subject to subsequent review.  Indeed, 
understanding the process of review as the natural forum of principle may well encourage 
strategic, as distinct from deliberative, conduct.65 
 
As they claim in this passage, casting the value of majority rule practices like voting in terms of 
a feedback process like “review” is problematic for two reasons.  First, deliberation works, “by 
its nature” when people take seriously the need to pool their respective informational resources.  
When decisions are made and then subject to a feedback process of review, the task of 
deliberation (mere review) is less engaging to citizens and therefore less likely to inspire 
collective reasoning of a truly deliberative kind.  Second, with deliberation sidelined to the 
subsidiary role of mere “review,” rather than prelude to actual decision, deliberation takes the 
political role of a mere “audit.”  Instead of encouraging citizens to adopt positions they would 
ultimately be able to back up with reasons, citizens are more likely to try to assert their power 
and get away with it by escaping audit by the will of the people.  Cohen and Sabel are not alone 
in criticizing attempts to treat majority rule as deliberative on account of its insufficiently 
deliberative credentials.  For example, Thomas Christiano has suggested that the problem with a 
diagnostic approach is that using majority rule procedures to improve upon the limitations of 
deliberation ultimately implies a rejection of the “principle of reasonableness” with which 
deliberative democracy is essentially identified.66 
 These objections to a feedback oriented account like Anderson’s could themselves be the 
subject of critical assessment.  For instance, Gutmann and Thompson claim that “reiterative 
processes in which proposals are modified through a sequence of responses and 
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counterresponses” should be supported by deliberative democrats so as to stress the 
provisionality of democratic deliberation.67  For my purposes though, these debates among 
political philosophers would sidetrack this analysis too far.  After all, my purpose in outlining 
these three methods of inquiry (i.e., apologetic, critical, and diagnostic) is not to find the method 
already in existence that has the least number of sustainable objections, but rather to locate a 
method of inquiry that is most suggestive of an overlooked line of response to the indeterminacy 
worry in its various formulations.  As I intend to show, Anderson’s diagnostic method of inquiry 
is richly suggestive along these lines.  If we follow the line of inquiry Anderson’s account opens 
up and re-think the deliberative nature of the supposedly non-deliberative, majoritarian 
procedures of the traditional view of democracy, we can tackle the indeterminacy worry in ways 
that have too often been overlooked.   
More specifically, we can see that deliberative democracy need no longer be seen as the 
indeterminate rival to the determinate politics of majority rule.  Rather, we can appreciate the 
fact that deliberative politics can borrow some of the determinacy of majority rule.  To borrow 
such determinacy without sacrificing the deliberative ethos, though, much will have to be said 
about how it is precisely that majority rule procedures factor into democratic deliberation.  To 
provide these details about the deliberative relevance of majority rule procedures, I will turn to 
their role in fostering analogical reasoning within the citizenry.  Reference to analogy, though, 
will quickly raise multiple, classic concerns about its susceptibility to psychological 
manipulation, its superficiality, and its logical and epistemic inferiority.  Calming these classic 
concerns will occupy the remainder of this project.  Chapter after chapter, a tremendous amount 
of work will need to be done to recalibrate our thinking about analogical reasoning away from 
the crass depiction of it that fills logic textbooks and critical reasoning courses and towards the 
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contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning that has been developed in philosophy, 
cognitive science, psychology, and beyond in recent times. 
However, before I can proceed to take up the suggestive line of inquiry opened up by 
Anderson’s diagnostic approach, more must be said about the underlying diagnosis itself.  In 
what way does re-thinking the deliberative relevance of majority rule procedures amount to a 
diagnosis of a problematic underyling assumption … an assumption that has somehow blinded 
decades of research on deliberative democracy to an overlooked answer to the indeterminacy 
worry?  The remainder of this chapter seeks to identify and contextualize just such an 
assumption.  
Towards a Diagnostic Response to the Indeterminacy Worry 
Across the tremendously diverse interpretations of deliberative democracy, a pervasive 
assumption might seem difficult to locate.  As many deliberative democrats themselves have 
worried, the approach has been used in so varied a manner as to render it theoretically unhelpful, 
the label even being called “almost without definite content.”68  However, the history of the 
deliberative view offers much assistance in dealing with this overwhelming diversity of 
expression.  If we look at the history of the movement as well as its more recent statements, a 
major point of continuity appears.  When deliberative democrats talk about the origins of their 
view, they overwhelmingly tend to agree that the view emerged as a rejection of the “economic 
theory of democracy,” a name drawn from the founding influence Anthony Downs’ An 
Economic Theory of Democracy had on the economic view.69  In particular, deliberative 
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democracy emerged through juxtaposition against two simplifications made by the economic 
theory of democracy (to which I shall return shortly).  Not only did deliberative democracy 
emerge through this juxtaposition, but it continues to define itself through that juxtaposition in 
contemporary expositions of the deliberative view.  However, before I can take up the 
assumption made by that historically continuous juxtaposition, the economic theory of 
democracy against which the juxtaposition is drawn must first be introduced with sufficient 
detail to allow the two simplifications that form the point of juxtaposition to come clearly into 
view. 
According to the economic theory of democracy, the traditional view of democracy as 
majority rule supplies a more or less apt characterization of democratic politics.  The task for 
“economic” theorists is to tease out the structure and implications of that traditional view by 
translating it into the terms of economics.  More specifically, proponents of the economic theory 
of democracy follow economists in turning to complex mathematical modeling to show the 
larger rationality behind the isolated, individual decisions that factor into decision-making.  
Applying that approach to the topic of democracy, proponents of the “economic theory” 
accordingly use mathematical models to investigate the same investigative target: The “larger 
rationality” behind individual decisions, albeit now in the specific context of democratic politics.   
However, to be able to define this political rationality and to measure and study it with 
the mathematical models dear to economics, some “simplification” is needed.  Downs himself 
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explicitly noted that these simplifications were necessary as simplifications.70  Though other 
major figures in this movement played an important role in the definition and study of this 
political rationality (e.g., Joseph Schumpeter), Anthony Downs more often than not was the one 
selected to play the role of the representative foil in the emergence of deliberative democracy.71  
As a result, Downs’ work affords an especially appropriate window onto the two simplifications 
that would eventually motivate the juxtaposition through which deliberative democracy defined 
itself.  Both in the interest of space and in response to the formative influence of his work, I 
therefore restrict my attention to Downs’ classic book, An Economic Theory of Democracy, to 
identify these simplifications.   
In that work, Downs defines rationality instrumentally along the lines familiar from 
vague conceptions of the “wisdom of the marketplace” espoused in popular culture.  More 
specifically, he defines rationality as efficiency in the selection of means to attain conscious 
goals, or to quote him at greater length, “the economic definition [of rationality] refers solely to a 
man who moves toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least 
possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output.”72  As this longer definition makes 
clear, rationality deals with the use of knowledge to select the most efficient (i.e., least resource-
consuming) means to accomplish ends.  Rationality is “instrumental” on this definition, because 
it applies strictly to the selection of actions that are instrumental to the achievement of ends. 
As I mentioned above, Downs himself stresses that this definition of rationality is a 
simplification in several ways.73  First, it assumes that rationality applies only to actions, that is, 
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behavior aimed at achieving an end.74  This assumption is a simplification because it excludes 
the possibility that rationality might apply to more than just the selection of means for a given 
end.  Additionally, rationality could apply to the ends themselves.  In other words, we might 
apply rationality not only to means, but to the selection of the ends they are meant to serve.  The 
simplification here, then, is the restriction of rationality to the assessment of means alone (not 
ends as well).  In short, it is a simplification to declare that ends are (to use the terminology 
deliberative democrats would later appropriate) to be treated as “givens.”  The purpose of talking 
about ends as “givens” here is to provide a richly suggestive description of the theoretical role of 
people’s ends in this model.  The aims, goals, purposes, etc. of human beings are not “up for 
grabs,” open to change, transformation, and analytical sophistication, but rather are simply just 
assumed as they are. 
Second, another point of simplification is that only one goal is permitted for each 
decision-maker (as Downs himself admits).75  Naturally, people might seem to have more than 
one goal; however, human action needs to be simplified here, Downs maintains, because 
otherwise where goals conflict, it would not be possible to calculate one course of action as the 
most efficient (and therefore rational) option.  For Downs and those who have followed in his 
footsteps, that single goal for any individual decision-maker is utility, which is simply a less 
technical way of saying efficiency in selecting courses of action per valued output.76 
As I have already mentioned, deliberative democrats define their own project precisely 
by opposing the simplifications of the economic theory of democracy advocated by Downs and 
others.  It is worth noting, then, that Downs did not offer these simplifications without some 
philosophical rationale to fill out their practical significance (contrary to the way his approach is 
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often summarized by deliberative democrats).  Though his deeper reasoning was confined to a 
footnote, Downs nonetheless writes:  
Although it can be argued that goals will be modified by the processes used to attain them, some separation 
of ends from means must be allowed or all behavior becomes disorganized and pointless … 77   
 
In this brief footnote, Downs argues that some structure of some kind needs to be taken as pre-
given, as closed (even if temporarily) to assessment.  Otherwise there would be no point of 
orientation for the evaluation of other, dissociated structures (e.g., the choice of means by 
agents).  In other words, there can be no action in the sense of behavior organized by a conscious 
agent, without some stable, pre-given structure to do the organizing.78  On pain of regress, as it 
were, something must be taken as a pre-given structure.  As Downs uses this argument, its 
application targets the static conception of conscious goals as pre-given ends: If nothing is taken 
as a pre-given structure, there is no basic point of orientation from which human behavior can 
emerge as non-random in its organization and from which any kind of theoretical treatment can 
similarly emerge.  This philosophical rationale is hardly new, being not only found in the works 
Downs cites (e.g., William Baumol), but the philosophical rationales behind political orders as 
ancient as the ideology of the Egyptian state.79    
 The simplifications relevant for our purposes do not end with the “given” nature of ends, 
though.  Recalling Downs’ definition of rationality, another simplification emerges, but this time 
with regard to the social dimension of decision-making.  Drawing on previous scholarship, 
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Downs maintains that there is no corresponding pre-given end at the social level in politics.  For 
instance, Downs cites Julius Margolis’s critique of the idea of a social good at the level of the 
state.  According to Margolis, no end pursued by government action yields benefits equally for 
all citizens.  This critique is based on the observation that any social-level end achieves a benefit 
that divides unequally by the number of citizens.  “Even national defense,” Downs notes, “aids 
some people more than others.”80  Moreover, even if some undivisible end could be located, it 
would be so meager in its guidance of government activity as to be useless.   
However, Downs does not wish to reject all possible social-level ends.  He simply rejects 
the idea that they apply equally to all citizens.  Instead, he suggests, the “happy medium”-style 
solution is to identify a social-level for the location of ends that is between the individual and the 
entire citizenry, namely, “a small group of men acting in coalition.”81  The advantage of focusing 
on coalitions is that they are small enough to make agreement “on all their goals instead of on 
just part of them” a feasible assumption for purposes of conducting analyses.82  By defining 
politics as a team-based or coalition enterprise in response to earlier scholarship (e.g., Margolis’s 
criticism of indivisible goods for the citizenry), Downs enacts a major shift in the meaning of 
democratic politics.  Instead of “rule by the people,” democracy becomes “rule by coalitions of 
individuals.”  In other words, one might think that democratic politics is concerned with the 
citizenry as a totality (i.e., the people); however, for the purpose of exploiting an economic 
framework for theorizing democracy, Downs must replace the classic democratic definition with 
his simpler alternative. 
All that remains now for Downs’ theory to become a theory of democracy is to specify a 
mechanism whereby coalitions influence government action along their preferred lines.  Here, 
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Downs turns to a “factual parameter” that lends deliberative focus to government action, namely, 
equality of franchise, or the ‘one person, one vote’ capacity of citizens in modern democracies.83  
With each citizen equipped with a vote, citizens can come together into coalitions to aggregate 
their votes, and in so doing, to achieve their coalition’s preferred course of government action.   
From Downs’ particular claims about the social dimension of democratic decision-
making, another major simplification becomes apparent.  In a comparison with the familiar, basic 
idea of democracy as “rule by the people,” Downs offers a radically simplified conception of the 
social dimension of democracy.  In familiar democratic politics, politicians and citizens alike 
regularly exhort the “will of the people,” not just the coalition interests of special groups.  In so 
doing, they attempt to simultaneously coordinate all citizens with the same considerations, the 
same “reasons.”  By contrast, Downs’ vision of democratic social coordination is not collective, 
but rather aggregative and incidental.  The mechanism of voting may “bring citizens together” 
through ends they happen to each hold individually, but that point of commonality is more a 
matter of happenstance than collective “reasoning.”  Citizens seem to do more than coalesce by 
happenstance.  As a result, they seem to be doing something at least more complex than the form 
of social coordination implied by Downs’ framework.   
If the familiar, basic idea of democracy has real political resonance in this way, then we 
are likely to find Downs’ account of the social dimension to be too radical of a simplification.  
Democracy offers greater social complexity in real politics, not to mention in its ideal of rule by 
the people, than his account allows.  In trying to translate the social dimension of democracy into 
the framework of economics, yet another simplification has been made.  Naturally, Downs would 
admit as much.  As was mentioned before, he freely concedes that his economic theory operates 
on the basis of some major simplifications.  However, he takes these simplifications to be both 
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practical necessities for any theory to get off the ground, and something like a necessary first 
move for the organization of human behavior.   
 
Pinpointing the Focus of the Diagnosis 
In the last section, I surveyed a number of simplifications executed by the economic 
theory of democracy as it was originally and influentially developed by Anthony Downs.  In 
light of that survey, we are finally in a position to pinpoint the two specific simplifications that 
will motivate deliberative democrats to set out a new approach to democracy.  The first 
simplification has to do with the idea that rationality applies only to the selection of means, not 
to ends (which are taken as givens).  The second simplification has to do with the omission of a 
collective, citizen-wide social dimension of action coordination.  Together with the 
simplification of political rationality mentioned before, the stage is set for understanding the 
“deliberative turn” that led to the deliberative view of democracy by way of juxtaposition against 
Downs’ “economic theory of democracy.”84  
Deliberative democracy is often said to have arisen as a response to the lifeless, 
mechanical vision of democratic politics that resulted from the economic theory of democracy.85  
What makes it “lifeless” is that it simplifies the dynamics, or process of change, that runs 
through democracy.  Against the first major simplification enacted by Downs’ theory, 
deliberative democrats observed that change can run through citizen decision-making when 
citizens apply their rationality to not only their means, but also their ends.  For instance, in trying 
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to decide what to do, citizens may talk about the ultimate aim of their society, lives, jobs, etc. 
with the intention of changing that aim to whatever is most reasonable (or as Downs would say, 
most efficient).  Through such discussion, the society can change in a way that violates the first 
simplification of the economic theory of democracy: Change can come through decisions based 
on dynamic ends, not static ones.   
Furthermore, against Downs’ second major simplification, deliberative democrats 
observed that change can also occur in a more dynamic, lively way when citizens make decisions 
not just as individuals or coalitions, but also as members of a larger, collective “citizenry.”  The 
familiar identification between democracy and collective social agency in the form of “we the 
people” expresses this point.  In moments of crisis, democracy can enact political change through 
decisions that are collectively framed as decisions to be equally embraced by all.86  This 
collective social agency violates the second simplification in Downs’ account.  That 
simplification reduces the social dimension of democracy to merely incidental, happenstance 
coincidence of ends among an aggregate of individual citizens who just so happen to be the 
majority.  No space is made in that reductive simplification for the larger social perspective of a 
collective, citizen-wide form of decision-making and “the people” it constitutes. 
Juxtaposed against these two simplifications executed by the economic theory of 
democracy, the deliberative view emerged through the negation of each in the “deliberative turn” 
in democratic theory.87  The first simplification was negated by expanding political rationality 
from mere means selection in which ends are pre-given to a more dynamic process of reasoning 
about means and ends alike.  In other words, suddenly both means and ends were open to 
rational evaluation.  The second simplification was negated by dropping the narrow fixation on 
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aggregation and its incidental, happenstance vision of majority rule driven politics.  In place of 
that fixation on aggregation and majority rule, a collective process of decision-making was 
placed that was collective in a more inclusive, citizen-wide way.  This collective process allowed 
for the people to socially coordinate themselves through what they shared, namely, the same 
reasons for coming to the same decisions.  Accordingly, for deliberative democrats, Downs’ “one 
person, one vote” principle did not go far enough in capturing the dynamics of democratic 
decision-making.88   
This form of equality of input is not enough because it fails to address two possibilities 
precluded by Downs’ simplifications: (1) Citizens do not approach their votes only as isolated 
individuals, but also from a collective perspective of the citizenry; and (2) Those decisions 
emerge from a more comprehensive form of political rationality that applies equally to the 
assessment of means and ends, and accordingly, renders the decision-making process of 
“deliberation” as crucial to democratic decision-making as the actual moments of decision 
themselves.  In other words, if democracy really is defined by the “equality of input” citizens 
acquire with regard to political decision-making, then Downs does not go far enough in 
recognizing that status.  To be recognized as equal participants in political decision-making, 
citizens must also be recognized as co-deliberators in the process that actually leads up to 
decisions.  This process is the “deliberative” process in which citizens (as rational beings) 
countenance reasons about which ends to have as well as the best means for realizing them, 
before making decisions.89  Downs’ economic theory of democracy pays little attention to this 
deliberative process in this more comprehensive and collective form on account of its two 
simplifications (1-2 above). 
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In summary, the economic theory of democracy and the associated traditional view of 
democracy as majority rule both confine rule of the people to a much too narrow part of the 
political process.  Before a decision is made, earlier stages of decision-making, or deliberation, 
exist.  In these earlier stages, the collective evaluation of reasons with regard to both the ends 
and means of political action occurs.  When these earlier stages of deliberation are appreciated, it 
can be seen how any particular political decision emerges from a collective process of expansive 
reasoning, or “deliberation” for short.  As Joshua Cohen concisely describes this theoretical shift, 
focusing on the deliberative reasoning behind political decision-making “offers a more forceful 
rendering than the aggregative view of the fundamental democratic idea - the idea that decisions 
about the exercise of state power are collective.”90  Here, part of what Cohen concisely describes 
is that state power is exercised by “the people” more collectively when they not only give input 
into a political decision, but also co-participate in the earlier stages of decision-making 
(deliberation) that influence that exercise of state power.  In other words, the people are more 
involved in the exercise of state power when they can influence the considerations that inform 
choices one way or another in addition to actually making choices, than when they are restricted 
to making choices in isolation from the deliberative process at large. 
As this brief overview shows, the juxtaposition against the economic theory of 
democracy and the traditional view of democracy it theorized played a defining role in the 
emergence of deliberative democracy.  This definitive role for the deliberative view has not 
waned over time.  The juxtaposition remains a living legacy in contemporary democratic theory.  
To this day, when philosophers introduce deliberative democracy, they do so by juxtaposing it 
against “aggregation,” “voting,” and other hallmarks of the rational choice approach.91  As 
                                                
90 Cohen 2009, 163. 
91 See, for instance, Bohman and Rehg 1997, x-xiii, Anderson 2009, 222, Sen 2009, 326, Cohen 2009, 163 . 
   55 
Amartya Sen points out, part of the motivation for still using this juxtaposition is that though the 
deliberative view is “widely accepted in political philosophy today,” the traditional 
understanding of democracy “is not only traditional but it has been championed by many 
contemporary political commentators ...”92  In other words, deliberative democracy’s rise still 
requires juxtaposition to the traditional view of democracy because the traditional view still lives 
and breathes beyond political philosophy proper, as in the work of “political commentators.”  
However widespread the deliberative view has become in political philosophy, then, it still needs 
to define itself by juxtaposition against the traditional, “aggregative” view that nonetheless 
dominates political thinking more generally. 
Thus, whether one cites a historical legacy or a failure of popular political culture’s 
failure to follow the deliberative shift in political philosophy, either way, a pervasive tendency is 
clearly present among deliberative democrats to define their view by juxtaposing it against the 
simplifications of aggregation.  Notice, not only is this juxtaposition cast as a theoretical 
difference, but also as an evaluative one as well.  Deliberative democracy is more “democratic” 
because it gives the citizenry a more comprehensive role in political decision-making than does 
majority rule and its associated practices.  In other words, it expands the reach of collective “rule 
by the people” by including them in more of the dynamics of democratic decision-making.  The 
term “dynamics” can now be seen to be even more appropriate as the key concept in the 
deliberative shift.  The reason it is especially appropriate in this role is that “dynamics” 
ordinarily refers to the change that occurs within a system and how it is to be understood.  
Similarly, deliberative democracy is more democratic because it provides the citizenry a larger 
role in shaping that process of change (“dynamics”) internal to the democratic system.  
Deliberative democracy allows the citizenry to participate in the crafting of reasons for and 
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against the various options from which all citizens (or their representatives) must eventually 
choose. 
The evaluative appeal of defining the deliberative view of democracy by way of this 
juxtaposition against aggregation is easy to see.  When we think of democracy as rule by the 
people, we tend to see it as a dynamic, interactive process of deliberation.  By contrast, when 
economic theorists of democracy fixate on the decisions made by citizens when isolated in 
voting booths, too much is omitted from our preferred understanding of democracy.  For 
example, to use a favorite supporting argument for the appeal of the deliberative view, we 
routinely hear about “authoritarian regimes” in which the tyrannical ruler received the majority 
of the votes.93  Whether those votes were directly coerced through physical manipulation (e.g., 
stealing the ballot box), or less directly through other means (e.g., threatening citizens not to vote 
through broadcast announcements), either way, the decision of a majority to endorse its 
authoritarian government conflicts with how we prefer to understand democracy.  Citizen 
decisions that are directly or indirectly coerced do not count as democratic in any intuitive sense.  
Rather, to be democratic, all decisions must emerge from a more dynamic process of collective 
decision-making (or deliberation), which insures that decisions are actually the will of the 
people, rather than the will of the regime or coalition with the most power.  By drawing attention 
to the larger, dynamic context we typically associate with the idea of democracy, the example of 
the majority-elected authoritarian regime offers an effective supporting argument for the 
democratic nature of the deliberative view.   
As this supporting argument shows, the deliberative view is appealing because it captures 
a basic concern, namely, the concern that on their own, majority rule decisions are just static 
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givens lacking any kind of dynamic, human context.  A mere list of electoral results tells us 
nothing about whether they emerged from a dynamic, human context of deliberation or under the 
threats of a coercive regime.  In other words, the traditional view of democracy reduces political 
governance to a mere aggregate of discrete, isolated, individuated units of preference, 
encapsulated as a tally of votes.  No space is made for considering the dynamic process of 
collective deliberation that leads many people to the same decision for the same, shared reasons.  
Consequently, no space is made for the dynamic, human context in which people are “people” 
because they decide for reasons.  An aggregate of votes is just a set of static givens with none of 
this larger human significance.  In short, the dynamically human context is missing with its 
attending process of deliberation through which individual preferences are formed and 
transformed into collectively reasoned decisions.   
Elizabeth Anderson summarizes this basic concern, when she writes that the “reason 
deliberative democrats reject ‘majority rule’ as a definition of democracy is that the latter takes 
individual preferences as unqualified inputs into collective decisions.”94  By contrast, Anderson 
maintains, “Democratic dialogue does not take preferences as given, but transforms them, not 
just in the sense of changing individuals’ minds about what each wants, but of changing our 
mind of what we want when we act collectively as citizens.”95  In this passage, Anderson neatly 
summarizes the deliberative view as a rejection of the two simplifications made by the economic 
theory of democracy: (1) Deliberative democracy “does not take preferences as given,” but rather 
allows for the dynamic process in which we change our minds about our ends or preferences; and 
(2)This dynamic process occurs at the “collective” level of social coordination in which 
“changing our mind” is the focus, not the change of mind of isolated individuals in isolated 
                                                
94 Anderson 2009, 216. 
95 Anderson 2009, 216. 
   58 
voting booths. 
With this final set of considerations, the defining role of the juxtaposition between 
aggregative approaches to democracy like Downs’ and deliberative ones becomes clear.  The 
juxtaposition matters because it carries historical precedence, still needs advocacy in our larger 
political culture, resonates with our intuitions about democracy, and thereby better captures “the 
basic idea of democracy” we find so intuitive in the first place.  Given this historical, cultural, 
and intuitive significance, we can see why deliberative democrats are united in defining their 
view by juxtaposition against the economic theory of democracy and the traditional view of 
democracy as majority rule it theorizes.  Moreover, we can also see why deliberative democrats 
typically begin the exposition of their view by turning to this juxtaposition.   
I conclude this section with a survey of concise quotations and comprehensive 
descriptions of various works by deliberative democrats in which the defining juxtaposition with 
which I have been concerned is clearly on display, as well as the way it takes issue with Downs’ 
two simplifications.  For instance, Elizabeth Anderson begins to summarize the deliberative view 
in one of her pieces by first mentioning how in democratic theory, there is a “split between two 
broad views: majority rule (aggregation of given preferences) and deliberative democracy,” 
before proceeding to define deliberative democracy negatively by way of its commitment to 
“resisting the ‘majority rule’ formula for democracy.”96  In a similar way, Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson define deliberative democracy by juxtaposition, as they present the “value” of 
the deliberative view by declaring, “To appreciate the value of deliberative democracy, we need 
to consider the alternatives.”97 They then proceed to identify “Deliberative democracy’s leading 
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rivals” with “what are known as aggregative conceptions of democracy.”98  In their very first 
description of these aggregative rivals, we see the first of Downs’ simplifications, as they write, 
“The aggregative conception, by contrast, takes the preferences as given … .”99  Here, the 
reference to taking “preferences as a given” ties back to Downs’ first simplification (1 above) 
and evidences the defining juxtaposition with which I have been concerned.  Moreover, after 
defining the deliberative view by juxtaposition in this way, they then proceed to articulate how 
the aggregative view’s approach to preferences ignores the question of whether they are 
“justified by reasons,” especially those reasons all can accept.100  Here, Downs’ first and second 
simplifications are both challenged.  The first simplification (1 above) is challenged in the way 
they articulate a criticism of taking preferences as mere givens.  The second simplification (2 
above) is challenged by the way they call attention to the need for preferences to be justified 
collectively. 
This definitive juxtaposition also appears in Sen’s introduction of deliberative democracy 
under its popular description as “government by discussion,” when he writes: 
There is, of course, the older - and more formal - view of democracy which characterizes 
it mainly in terms of elections and ballots, rather than in the broader perspective of 
government by discussion.  And yet, in contemporary political philosophy, the 
understanding of democracy has broadened vastly, so that democracy is no longer seen 
just in terms of the demands for public balloting, but much more capaciously, in terms of 
what John Rawls calls ‘the exercise of public reason.’101 
 
For Sen too, mention of the deliberative view almost immediately leads to qualified juxtaposition 
with the traditional view of democracy as ballot-driven aggregation.  So too, in one of his 
articles, Joshua Cohen introduces the deliberative view by quickly moving to contrast it with its 
traditional rival, writing: 
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Moreover, I will argue that this combination is a natural result of a particular way of 
thinking about democracy - a “deliberative” understanding of the collective decisions that 
constitute democratic governance.  Before discussing the deliberative conception, though, 
I need to fix the concerns about procedure and substance more precisely, distinguish a 
deliberative from an aggregative conception of democracy and show how aggregative 
conceptions lead to proceduralism.102 
 
Details aside, Cohen too introduces the term “deliberative” only to immediately recognize the 
“need” to distinguish the deliberative view from the traditional, aggregative view of democracy.  
Furthermore, as he proceeds to “fix the concerns about procedure and substance” he believes are 
needed to explain the deliberative view, Downs’ simplifications are quickly identified and 
associated with the traditional view.  For instance, Cohen proceeds to write of how the traditional 
view protects the equality of citizens to give their input into political decision-making, writing 
that the traditional view provides “equal consideration for the interests of each member.”103  In 
doing so, he implicitly invokes Downs’ “one person, one vote” mantra.  True to the deliberative 
message, though, he then criticizes this protection for its insufficiency relative to the process of 
political justification associated with deliberative democracy.   
In another article, he also introduces the deliberative view by juxtaposition with the 
traditional, “aggregative” view, writing: “Consider two conceptions of democracy, distinguished 
by their interpretations of the fundamental idea of collective decision: I will call them 
aggregative and deliberative.”104  Both the contrast between aggregative and deliberative 
conceptions of democracy here as well as the connection to a “fundamental idea of collective 
decision” attest to the influence of the defining juxtaposition.  In that contrast, we see the 
familiar terms of the deliberative/traditional contrast, while the reference to collective decision 
demonstrates that Downs’ second simplification has already been erased. 
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Habermas’s heavy reliance on technical vocabulary makes the role of the defining 
juxtaposition in his work less amenable to concise quotation; however, in one short piece, he 
does introduce the “model of deliberative politics” in juxtaposition to “the aggregation of 
prepolitical individual interests and the passive enjoyment of rights bestowed by a paternalistic 
authority.”105  In the more sustained exposition of this model of “deliberative politics,” 
Habermas also draws on the defining juxtaposition between the deliberative and traditional views 
of democracy, albeit this time within his own terminology.  Introducing the model of deliberative 
politics, he writes of its commitment to collective reasoning, “Deliberative politics acquires its 
legitimating force from the discursive structure of an opinion- and will-formation that can fulfill 
its socially integrative function only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable 
quality.”106  Here, we see the rejection of Downs’ second simplification, as democratic politics is 
legitimated not by the contest among coalitions of individuals, but through the “socially 
integrative function” that comes with discursive practices of citizen discussion of a certain 
rational “quality.”   
Notably, this opening synopsis of Habermas’s model of deliberative politics comes 
directly after citing Norberto Bobbio’s theory of democracy, for which “majority rule by political 
decisions” is a “procedural minimum” for democracy.107  The defining role of this juxtaposition 
against Bobbio’s more traditional view of democracy comes clearly into view when Habermas 
writes: “Hence the discursive level of public debates constitutes the most important variable.  It 
must not be hidden away in the black box of an operationalization satisfied with crude 
indicators.”108  Again, to set aside the details expressed by Habermas’s technical language, his 
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major point is that in contrast to Bobbio’s traditional theory, the model of deliberative politics 
Habermas develops takes the rational quality of discursive democratic decision-making to be the 
“important variable,” rather than a “black box” like majority rule, out of which (as we have seen) 
even as un-democratic a figure as a tyrant can emerge as the choice of the “people.” 
From this brief survey, I hope to have shown that in both its past and present 
formulations, deliberative democracy has been consistently defined by juxtaposition against the 
traditional view of democracy as majority rule.  Consequently, despite the diverse formulations 
of the deliberative view as “deliberative democracy,” “deliberative politics,” etc., a unifying 
assumption can nonetheless be identified.  All assume that deliberative democracy stands in 
marked contrast to the traditional view of democracy as majority rule.  In this way, the stage has 
finally been set to proceed to take up the diagnostic method of inquiry hinted at by Anderson’s 
work on deliberative democracy … since a pervasive assumption has now been located from 
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Charting the Way Forward 
As the overview in the last chapter has shown, from its origins to the present, deliberative 
democracy has often defined itself by juxtaposition against the traditional view of democracy as 
majority.  Majority rule’s aggregative approach, it was shown, requires two simplifications that 
are insufficiently sensitive to the dynamic human context of deliberation from which democratic 
decisions ultimately flow.  In its earlier history, its present formulations, its intuitive appeal, and 
its resonance with the basic idea of democracy … the deliberative view of democracy has 
continuously defined itself in contrast to majority rule.  This continuity and its historical, 
contemporary, and intuitive forms may surprise anyone familiar with the tremendous diversity of 
work that has been executed under the banner of deliberative democracy.  For instance, a debate 
rages over whether the deliberative view is essentially a moral view, or merely epistemological 
in its fundamental orientation, or whether it is some mixture of the two.109  Debates like this one 
have a tendency to make the deliberative view seem so fragmented, that some deliberative 
democrats have themselves suggested the label means little anymore.110  As a result, to discover 
that a defining juxtaposition against majority rule has played a continuous role in the identity of 
the deliberative view is likely to surprise many. 
With this surprising continuity now in full view, we at last have the necessary tools for 
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questioning whether the traditional view of democracy as majority rule is actually as antithetical 
to the deliberative view as it is purported to be.111  When I first raised that possibility in the last 
chapter, I suggested that this line of questioning (opened by the work of Elizabeth Anderson) 
represents a diagnostic method of inquiry, by which I meant the kind of response that answers 
the question by taking issue with an assumption or tendency that tends to distort the apparent 
problem and create a false point of contention.  However, since deliberative democracy is such a 
diversified movement in political philosophy, the prospects for such a diagnostic response 
seemed grim.  With the last chapter’s exploration of the continuous tendency among deliberative 
democrats to define the view by juxtaposition against majority rule, though, just this kind of 
“impossibly continuous” tendency has emerged.  As a result, the stage is now set for making the 
diagnosis by questioning the supposed tension between aggregation and deliberation that defines 
the deliberative view. 
How might this line of questioning be opened up, though, considering how consistently a 
line has been drawn between “aggregation” and “deliberation”?  Well, perhaps the most intuitive 
way to open up this line of questioning is to turn the very ethos of deliberative democracy back 
on itself.  In other words, one might apply the general spirit of deliberative democracy to its 
continuous juxtaposition against majority rule procedures and their associated practices.  In 
doing so, one seeks to at least temporarily “defamiliarize” what has become so taken for granted 
in thinking about deliberative democracy that it is all too familiar to those engaged with it. 
Deliberative democracy, as we have seen, is motivated by the “lifelessness” of the traditional 
view of democracy and its failure to capture the dynamism of democracy as we prefer to 
understand it.  This failure was colorfully illustrated by the example of an authoritarian regime in 
which a majority periodically votes to endorse it.  While that example fits the model of 
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democracy espoused by the traditional view, it fails to grasp the dynamic discussion, debate, and 
dialogue that characterize a legitimately democratic (because deliberative) exercise of citizen 
rule. 
Accordingly, the dynamic ethos of deliberative democracy might be turned back on its 
classic juxtaposition against majority rule procedures and their associated practices with a simple 
observation.  For all of their focus on the “dynamism of democracy,” advocates of the 
deliberative view are surprisingly insensitive to the many ways in which real majority rule 
politics are tremendously dynamic.  Election results, polls, campaign season interviews, and 
other practices are tremendously exciting ways in which people keep their finger on the pulse of 
democratic governance.  If democratic theorists ought to follow the deliberative orientation and 
become more focused on the dynamics (i.e., the process of change in the political system) of 
democracy, then ballots, polls, interviews, and other majority rule practices would seem to be a 
natural outgrowth of their point of orientation.  Assuming that these majority rule practices really 
are dynamic in this way, which is to say, they really do offer a way to keep one’s finger on the 
pulse of the people’s rule, the juxtaposition between the deliberative and traditional views of 
democracy needs to be re-thought.  As champions of the dynamism of democracy, deliberative 
democrats cannot risk failing to appreciate the dynamism of any part of political life.  To do so is 
to risk failing to really embrace the deliberative ethos, which in turn is to raise the question of 
whether deliberative democracy is a vibrant vision of political life, or a theoretical reaction to the 
economic theory of democracy.     
In this chapter, I take up this “simple observation” to de-familiarize majority rule 
procedures and their associated practices as they have become familiar to those working in 
democratic theory.  In doing so, I attempt to open up the possibility that the deliberative 
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significance of these aspects of real political life has been overlooked as a resource for 
deliberative democratic theory.  Known for their efficiency and practical determinacy, majority 
rule procedures and their associated practices would offer a much-needed antidote to the 
indeterminacy worry, if they could be incorporated into the deliberative view of democracy.  
Since this act of theoretical incorporation would overturn a long-standing assumption in 
deliberative democratic theory (per the last chapter’s analysis), this act of theoretical 
incorporation ultimately yields a diagnostic response to the indeterminacy worry (as later 
chapters will be especially keen to show).  In short, to defamiliarize the familiar light in which 
majority rule procedures and their associated practices have appeared in the history of 
deliberative democratic theory is to diagnose a suggestive, overlooked way to tackle the 
indeterminacy worry. 
As I have introduced the diagnosis in this section, it draws its inspiration from “a simple 
observation” about the alleged dynamism of majority rule practices in real politics.  Accordingly, 
to connect my diagnosis to the philosophical rationale of deliberative democracy, it will be 
necessary to start at a less philosophical, more empirical level of analysis … the level of such 
“simple observations.”  After such an empirical “first pass” at diagnosing a response to the 
indeterminacy worry through simple observations of real politics, subsequent “passes” will be 
made at a diagnosis that move increasingly further from the empirical level to a more 
philosophical, even logical level.  In doing so, what at first will come across as a rough 
observation about the latent dynamism of democracy will be refined and qualified into a 
theoretical framework for rethinking the relationship between deliberation and aggregation.   
This process of refinement and qualification will often take the popular, “analytical” form 
with its characteristic four stages of analysis in which (1) a vivid, characteristic statement is 
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made espousing a theoretical position, (2) which is followed by the rehearsal of an objection that 
will come to mind for many readers, (3) which then calls for elaboration and qualification of the 
original statement, before (4) another characteristic statement is made.  As will become clear 
later, the heavy focus on analogical reasoning that will ultimately develop across the chapters of 
this project makes this analytical form of presentation especially apt.  Analogies, like so much 
“analytical” philosophy these days, work by way of a two stage process in which (I) a “ballpark” 
perspective is characterized through a vivid, characteristic analogy, before (II) a detailed analysis 
follows in which the rigorous systematicity of that analogy is extracted and used to show that the 
analogy is far from spurious.  Indeed, as I will conclude, the very structure of this project itself, 
with the way its chapters are aligned, is meant to use the form of this project to further convey 
the same claims about the structure of analogical reasoning articulated in its content as well.  For 
now, though, I turn to the “simple observation” and empirical “first pass” at a diagnosis from 
which these later, more philosophical stages of analysis and critical self-reflection will emerge.   
 
A First Pass at a Diagnosis: An Initial Observation 
Stepping back from the intricate debates and delineations of the last chapter, I would like 
to first roughly frame the diagnosis pursued here with an observation.  If we are concerned with 
the dynamism of democracy, which is to say, if we are concerned with the process of change in 
the political system of democracy, then we are hard pressed to think of anything more dynamic 
than the rapidly shifting vortex that is real majoritarian politics.  One especially effective 
illustration of this point is the “campaign season” identified with real democratic politics.  The 
campaign season names the time in the lead-up to an election, during which candidates, 
organizations, and citizens all “campaign” to influence citizens to vote one way or another (e.g., 
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for a certain candidate, issue, etc.).  During that time (traditionally a year in the United States of 
America), the positions adopted by the citizenry with regard to particular electoral options are 
closely tracked as a predictor of the final electoral outcome.  Polls are constantly conducted, 
candidates and organizations constantly reach out to the citizenry (even at random) to get a sense 
of what is “on their mind.”  When a feel for the collective mindset of the citizenry is attained 
through polls or incisive citizen feedback, candidates and organizations and “average” citizens 
alike then try to counter-steer those considerations.112  They seek, in a word, to influence those 
considerations that might ultimately serve as reasons on election day in the process of citizen 
decision-making. 
The language I am using here to describe campaign season politics is meant to evoke the 
idea of deliberation so dear to the theoretical orientation of the deliberative view.  As in other 
work on deliberative democracy, so too my description focuses on those considerations that 
factor into decision-making that not only define any particular citizen’s political outlook, but also 
play a defining role at the interpersonal level as well.  Such considerations are standardly 
referred to as “reasons” by deliberative democrats.113  Deliberative democrats vary on the extent 
to which they believe the concept of a “reason” should or should not be theoretically defined.  
For Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel (as discussed above), the concept of a reason is to be left at 
an intuitive level to avoid worries about the concept seeming prejudiced against the ways 
different people reason about what to do.  They write: 
deliberative problem-solving is by its nature focused on addressing specific problems in 
local settings.  Giving reasons under these conditions is, generally speaking, a matter of 
offering considerations recognized by others as pertinent to solving the problem at hand.  
It is simply impossible to limit in advance the kinds of considerations that might be 
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relevant or the form in which those considerations are to be stated.114 
 
In other words, Cohen and Sabel wish to restrict the concept of a “reason” in no way other than 
to suggest that it is (1) relevant to problem-solving in “local settings” and (2) “recognized by 
others as pertinent” to that problem-solving.  In short, they wish the concept of a reason to 
simply stand for an interpersonal consideration relevant to the solution of a problem “at hand.”   
By contrast, other deliberative democrats have developed more theoretically sophisticated 
accounts of reasoning.  Despite their additional details, these accounts retain the contours 
stressed by Cohen and Sabel.  For instance, Habermas opens his major work on democratic 
theory, Between Facts and Norms, with an analysis of linguistic meaning.115  To understand the 
meaning of a position we take in our thoughts and with regard to some present problem, 
Habermas claims, is always already to consider how that position could be “discursively 
vindicated to others.”116  Here, the similarities between Habermas’s conception of reasons and 
that of Cohen and Sabel can be appreciated without too much elaboration of the complex details 
of Habermas’s theoretical framework.  In both cases, present problems are tackled not simply by 
thinking about them, but by thinking about them in ways that others could appreciate as 
reasonable, which is to say as justified in the sense that those thoughts are amenable to 
“discursive vindication” to others. 
Given this brief overview of the way “reason” is conceived by deliberative democrats, 
when I say that candidates are concerned with the collective mindset of the citizenry, I mean to 
highlight that they are interested in the collective, intersubjective, shared considerations that 
might factor into democratic decision-making, i.e., “reasons.”  For instance, candidates are quick 
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to try to correct what they see as faulty reasons for voting against them when they misspeak 
about their position or make “gaffes.”117  One false verbal expression can suddenly throw the 
dynamics of the campaign season into upheaval as citizens (talking together, not in isolation) 
radically shift in their shared attitudes towards the candidate on the basis of a shared 
understanding, or reason, implied by the gaffe.  Often, this dynamic emerges when a “gaffe” 
reveals “the disparity between the impression the candidate has been trying to create and what 
the incident seems to suggest,” which tends to attract more extended media coverage than policy-
related statements from candidates.118  Citizens and media alike focus on such events because 
they often open up questions about the implied meaning of earlier statements that were “on the 
record.”  Formal debates and town halls are generally good examples of this deliberative 
dimension of campaign season politics.  In these contexts, candidates meet one another or other 
citizens and engage in just this process of reasoning “back and forth” with regard to the 
considerations they believe ought to guide the entire citizenry’s electoral decision-making 
(contrary to Downs’ second simplification).     
Even more to the point, though, candidates are concerned to influence not just one 
another or those in attendance, or even those viewing or listening to the debate at home, in 
school, or at social establishments (bars, restaurants, airport waiting rooms, etc.).  Instead, they 
are concerned with the dynamic reach of anything they might say and how it might creep well 
beyond the immediate audience and into the citizenry at large.  In this case, the “dynamic reach” 
refers to the way any interpersonally appreciable consideration can change the perspective of the 
citizenry and/or those involved in the political system’s decision-making.119  For instance, what 
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is said may “go viral,” becoming a consideration that is rapidly communicated from those who 
may have been in attendance or in earshot of the event towards those who were not (e.g., one 
candidate referring to a file of job applications as “binders full of women,” thereby seemingly 
objectifying them).  Such a viral consideration is a clear testament to the dynamism of campaign 
season politics.  Since campaign season politics is closely associated with majority rule 
procedures like an upcoming election for a specific office, it follows that practices associated 
with majority rule clearly contribute to the dynamism cherished by deliberative democrats.    
 
Towards A Second Pass at a Diagnosis: Theorizing the Observation 
 In the last section, I tried to turn the deliberative view’s focus on dynamism back against 
its traditional juxtaposition against majority rule procedures and their associated practices.  
While my examples and discussion may have intuitively conveyed that these procedures and 
practices increase (in quantity) deliberation in a dramatic (viral) way, “something is missing” 
may seem to be missing from my description.  When a “gaffe” goes viral, the dynamism of 
democracy may increase, but it is not clear that the dynamism involves deliberation of the right 
sort.  Deliberative democrats are concerned not just with whether people “talk” more or less and 
whether that conversation spreads rapidly.  As they stress time and again, citizens need to do 
more than talk to deliberate.  They must also reason, or engage in processes of “mutual 
justification.”  In my “first pass” (the last section) at challenging the juxtaposition between 
deliberative democracy and majority rule procedures and their associated practices, this 
connection to deliberation of the right sort may have seemed weak.   
A “reason” just counted as an interpersonally accessible consideration for or against an 
option citizens may choose.  While candidates in a debate exchange “considerations” for and 
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against, they are not obviously of the right quality.  If a candidate cites a gaffe made by an 
opponent earlier in the campaign season, deliberative democrats are unlikely to appreciate that 
citation as a move in the game of giving and asking for reasons.  Nor are they likely to see any 
counter-steering on the part of citizens or officials to be rationally driven when a gaffe is the 
catalyst.120  In that case, candidates and citizens are not really mutually justifying anything by 
drawing inferences.  Instead, they are dramatizing spectacles, or images of one another, to which 
the citizenry merely reacts.121  Deliberative democrats see deliberation as a process of “mutual 
justification,” via interpersonally accessible considerations, not psychological manipulation.122  
Consequently, a spectacular gaffe is no catalyst of deliberation. 
 Accordingly, deliberative democrats might shirk at my “first pass” at a diagnosis of their 
definitive juxtaposition against majority rule procedures.  Yes, they may concede, the examples 
cited say something about the dynamic process of change that sweeps across modern politics.  
However, that process of change is not a dynamic of deliberation, but rather of spectacle and 
psychological manipulation.123  No doubt, this concern will immediately spring to mind for many 
deliberative democrats.  Thus, a “second pass” at a diagnosis is needed; this time, however, the 
point of focus needs to expand from a mere focus on dynamics to a process of dynamic 
deliberation.  The question now is not only how majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices facilitate a process of discursive change (i.e., dynamics), but do so in an inferential 
way.  In short, a second pass at a diagnosis is necessary.  The aim of this second pass is clear: To 
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Millgram. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 445-463. 
122 Mansbridge et al. 2009, 66. 
123 Habermas, Jürgen (1962). Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Darmstadt and Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, is a classic source of this 
critique from the earliest days of deliberative democracy. 
   73 
locate an inference-driven dynamism of collective reasoning, one that stems from majority rule 
procedures and their associated practices, not a dynamism of spectacle and psychological 
manipulation. 
 Here, an observation about real democratic discourse provides a helpful way forward.  
Earlier, I cited work on democratic discourse that described the attraction to gaffes in terms of 
the questions they open up about the gap between a candidate’s “on the record” statements and 
what the candidate might mean.  Frequently, these questions are framed and answered with 
analogies.  A gaffe that reveals naïveté about the financial difficulties of the average person 
(e.g., the current price for a gallon milk), for instance, quickly leads citizens to formulate 
analogies between the speaker and earlier figures negatively associated with a similar naïveté.  
Suddenly, the question is not just how the gaffe squares with “on the record” statements, but also 
to what extent the speaker represents any real change from past precedent.  If a recently retired 
politician was famous for being “out of touch” when it came to the trials and tribulations of the 
average person, the aforementioned gaffe will also raise concerns that the speaker has the same 
flaws as a candidate.   
In this section, I will explore how the prevalence of such analogical reasoning in real 
democratic discourse testifies to an inferential (and therefore rational) dynamism driven by 
majority rule practices.  In politics (and beyond), no single form of reasoning is capable of 
competing with reasoning from analogy (i.e., analogical reasoning), in the contest among 
considerations for communicational virulence.124  Here, I do not mean analogical reasoning in 
the sense made famous by John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, which is now institutionalized in 
                                                
124 Markman, Arthur B. and Moreau, C. Page (2001). “Analogy and Analogical Comparison in Choice,” in The 
Analogical Mind. ed. Dedre Gentner and Keith J. Holyoak. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 363, 
Cohen, Florette, with Ogilvie, Daniel M., Solomon, Sheldon, Greenberg, Jeff, Pyszczynski, Tom (2005). “American 
Roulette: The Effect of Reminders of Death on Support for George W. Bush in the 2004 Presidential Election.” 
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy. 5:1, 177. 
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standardized tests through questions like “Dog : Bark :: Cat: ?”125  This “Millian” model of 
analogical reasoning is restricted to the analysis of objects and their properties, not relations 
among those properties, let alone relations among those relations (although, as I noted earlier, 
Mill himself merely said that this non-relational form of analogical reasoning is the more usual 
one, rather than the exclusive form of analogical reasoning or even the best form of analogical 
reasoning).126  Where one object has properties x, y, z, by analogy we are supposed to conclude 
that another object with properties x and y should be expected to also have property z.  The 
weakness of such arguments by similarity is obvious and well known.  Frequently, objects have 
common properties, but not for any reason that could be specified.  The commonality is 
spurious, an arbitrary commonality owing to chance coincidence, not anything deep, essential, or 
structural.127   
For instance, one might scan a collection of books in contemporary languages and find a 
similar looking word (after transliteration where necessary) in these various sources and thereby 
assert a common origin for those languages on account of their similar properties.  One might 
also believe that since the languages all share a geographically contiguous region, they originate 
from a common ancestor language.  These two properties (the common word and the geography) 
would be used to draw an inference in this case; however, these points of commonality could 
easily turn out to be spurious.  Turning to a dictionary, one may find that the word means 
drastically different things in these languages, that one or more of the languages developed in 
                                                
125 This observation is made in Thagard, Paul (2006). Hot thought: Mechanisms and applications of emotional 
cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 28, and its bias can be seen in textbooks like, Hendrickson, Noel, St. Amant, 
Kirk, Hawk, William, O’Meara, William and Flage, Daniel (2008). “Complex Passages: Descriptions, Explanations, 
and Arguments,” The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook for Critical Thinking. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
7-9. 
126 Mill, John Stuart (2006). A System of Logic. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc., 393-396. 
127 See the discussion of John Haugeland’s work in chapter five, which presents this idea in an intuitive manner.  It 
is worth noting that the idea has played a central role in thinking about probability for a long time, as for example in 
von Mises, Richard (1957). Probability, Statistics and Truth. Mineola, NY: Dover, 18-20. 
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isolation from the others, or that the grammatical differences among them are so drastic as to 
make the inference absurd.  Just because many languages in the world now use stray English 
words does not mean those languages have a common origin.  As a result, having a similar word 
in common cannot provide a reason for analogically inferring that other properties among these 
languages must be the same (e.g., their origin).  A single word commonality would be poor 
evidence that a set of languages share a common origin from a single, earlier language. 
 
The Contemporary Perspective on Analogical Reasoning (CPAR.i-iii) 
By contrast, contemporary work on analogies is not concerned with sets of isolated 
features highly prone to spurious commonality, but rather with the entrenched systematic 
relations among those features.128  Taking up each term from this description one by one, I will 
try to briefly shed enough light on this contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning to 
apply it to the present concern.  That concern is the extent to which majority rule procedures and 
their associated practices are deliberatively dynamic in a reason-oriented way.  I will refer to this 
description as the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning, by which I will have in 
mind the following: 
The Contemporary Perspective on Analogical Reasoning (CPAR): Analogies are used to 
“reason” when they  
 
(i) Pinpoint entrenched, systematic relations among the features of two domains, in 
such a way that  
 
(ii) the entrenched, systematic relations from a familiar, “source domain” can be 
inferentially extended to a less familiar, “target domain,” which  
 
(iii) thereby demonstrates that framing the target domain in terms of those relations is 
not a spurious inferential move. 
                                                
128 Bartha, Paul F. (2010). By Parallel Reasoning. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 70. 
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In this “second pass” at theorizing the empirical observation from the last section, I will develop 
this contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR), taking up each part (i-iii) in turn 
by focusing on its key terms. 
 
CPAR.i: “Relations” 
Beginning with the first (i) part of this description, I will take each key term up in turn in a 
separate section.  Notably, the term “relation” here (CPAR.i) is not the logician’s, but rather the 
simpler idea of a property between properties or a “structural property.”129  By this phrase, I 
mean to highlight the way in which analogy is not merely the horizontal comparison between 
two domains (one to the left, one to the right) of their discrete features (i.e., properties) and 
whether they are shared.  This horizontal model is exemplified in the following “Millian” 
analogy: 
(left)        (right) 
Domain 1: English      Domain 2: Hungarian 
feature x (word)       feature x’ (word) 
feature y (geography)      feature y’ (geography) 
feature z (Indo-European origin of language)   feature ? (same origin?) 
 
Figure 1: An Example of the Horizontal Model of Analogical Reasoning 
 
In this example, 2 properties found in English and Hungarian alike (a word, and a geography like 
“European”) are used to to infer a third property (an Indo-European linguistic origin) from 
English to Hungarian.  At face value, the inference seems spurious.  Do we really want to use a 
single word and massive geographical region as a basis for an analogy?  Likely not, as it would 
be a spurious inference when drawn at such a superficial level. 
                                                
129 For a more precise description of this concept, see Bartha 2010, 66. 
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In contrast with such a “Millian” analogy, the contemporary perspective on analogical 
reasoning (CPAR) deals with the horizontal comparison of vertical relations in one domain with 
the vertical relations in another.  In other words, analogy deals with how features relate to among 
another in two domains in potentially (i.e., inferred) analogous ways.   
(left)         (right) 
Domain 1: English       Domain 2: German 
feature x: “is”         feature a: “ist” 
 
↕ suppletion        ↕ suppletion? 
 
feature y: “am”        feature b: “bin” 
 
Figure 2: An Example of the Vertical Model of Analogical Reasoning     
 
In this example,130 the inference drawn is that the quirky, irregular morphology of the verb TO 
BE (‘to be’) in English, and the quirky, irregular morphology of the verb SEIN (‘to be’) in 
German, both reveal what linguists call suppletion of a particular kind (namely, with a Proto-
Indo-European origin).  Here, no property is held in common, which is to say, we do not find the 
same feature on both sides of the analogy.  No features are horizontally aligned.  Rather, a 
vertical relation among different features in each of the two languages is aligned instead.  
“Suppletion” is a linguist’s term for describing the abstract relation among features of a language 
related to the way the verb “to be” is declined.  As such, it obtains among different features of 
each language in each language’s own domain.  In this way, suppletion is a vertical relation in 
that domain.  It is not merely the horizontal extension of a property or feature from one domain 
to another.  If that were the case, German would simply use the verb “is”.  Instead, we find 
different features (is, am, ist, bin), which are related together by the same vertical relation (i.e., 
suppletion) in each domain. 
                                                
130 Drawn from Pollack, Elisa (2008). “The Indo-European Roots of the German Verb SEIN ‘to be’*” PostScript 
Vol.25, 98. 
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For another example of this more contemporary perspective on analogy, consider how the 
concept of a “wave” has long been used to explain how the different features of water and sound 
interrelate in an analogous way.131  Here, the two domains are water and sound (rather than 
English and German).  In both of these domains, we can observe a relation among the features of 
the domains that is “wavelike,” insofar as the features in the domains move in concentric circles 
that do not “break up” one another as they move outwards, unless an obstruction gets in the way 
of this process.  Accordingly, we might schematize the analogy as follows: 
Domain:  1. Water   2. Sound 
 
Features:  not a solid   not a solid 
    ring-like    ring-like  
    propagation does not break up propagation does not break up 
    propagation is concentric  propagation is concentric 
breaks up with obstruction  breaks up with obstruction 
 
Vertical Relation (↕): wavelike    wavelike? 
 
Figure 3: Another Example of the Vertical Model of Analogical Reasoning  
 
In this example, being “wavelike” draws an analogy between water, which has dynamics that we 
understand relatively well from ordinary life, and sound, which has less obvious dynamics, on 
the basis of how the ring-like features observed in their movement vertically relate to one 
another (i.e., concentrically), rather than in the “Millian” way of drawing an inference based on 
the large number of directly observed properties the two domains hold in common (i.e., a cat and 
dog both have tails, legs, fur, etc.). 
 
CPAR.i: “Systematic” 
Another term from first part of the Contemporary Perspective on Analogical Reasoning 
                                                
131 Example is drawn from Holyoak, Keith and Thagard, Paul (1995). Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 11. 
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(CPAR.i), is “systematic.”  The “systematicity” referenced in the contemporary perspective on 
analogy means “higher-order,” or having to do with a larger, “relational network.”132  One might 
think of systematicity as a meta-relation or higher-order relation, which is to say, a relation that 
holds not among multiple observed properties (e.g., ripples in water or sound) or other features, 
but rather multiple relations that connect observed properties (e.g., wavelike propagation of a 
pattern) or features.  Above, I have used a vertical arrow (↕) to signify the kinds of relations over 
which systematic meta-relations obtain at a higher order.  In short, the vertical relation that is 
analogically inferred from one domain to another is not among features (as in the above 
illustration), but among the relations among those features.  Consequently, it is a meta-relation 
or higher-order relation. 
(left)         (right) 
Domain 1        Domain 2 
feature w        feature a 
↕ relation1        ↕ relation1 
feature x        feature b 
 
 ↕↕ relation2 ? 
 
feature y        feature c 
↕ relation1        ↕ relation1 
feature z        feature d   
 
Figure 4: An Example of the Systematicity of the Vertical Model of Analogical Reasoning 
 
As this illustration shows, the vertical relations (↕) are related to one another through a higher-
order, or “meta”-relation (↕↕), which systematizes the relations among the features in a domain 
rather than just the features themselves.  In other words, meta-relations are relations2, with each 
additional level of systematicity meaning an additional level of “meta”-relation being built up 
                                                
132 Bartha 2010, 66-7. 
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from the relations originally among features of a domain (i.e., relation1, relation2, relation3, etc.).  
In short, systematicity is simply a relation to the nth power, where n stands for the number of 
levels that separates the systematic relation from the kinds of relations found among features 
(i.e., systematicity is represented by the superscript numbers in the series relation1, relation2, 
relation3). 
Environmental reform offers a prime political example of this systematicity in analogical 
reasoning.  As Thomas Rudel has tried to explain environmentalist reform efforts, they begin 
with isolated individuals and groups all acting defensively against a large-scale trend in their 
environment that threatens an established way of life and associated skill set.133  For instance, an 
aggregate of people long engaged with fishing and long practiced in the associated skill set may 
recognize that their catches are decreasing, which is to say, they may recognize a larger trend 
that impacts their own individual benefits.  Accordingly, they may come together and try to 
change how they fish by establishing guidelines.  These isolated efforts are “defensive” insofar 
as they are based on the benefits these isolated, local individuals and groups would accrue by 
banding together, unlike more “environmentalist” efforts which aim to benefit all.  What these 
defensive agents of reform have noticed, you might say, is that in each of their own domains 
(e.g., Fishing Area 1 early in the day, Fishing Area 2 later in the day, etc.), certain features relate 
in such a way that a declining fish population is easily observed.  Talking with one another, they 
may then recognize (more systematically) that this relation in each domain is the basis of a larger 
trend, or meta-relation (i.e., relation3), of a declining population of fish in the fishery on which 
they all rely.  Later on, members of this community may be contacted by an environmental 
biologist or environmental organization, which may then say that the larger trend in their fishery 
                                                
133 Rudel, Thomas (2013). Defensive Environmentalists and the Dynamics of Global Reform. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 19. 
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(the meta-relation of declining fish population) is also observable in other fisheries both near and 
far, which leads to an even more systematic, meta-meta-relation.  At this point, Rudel claims, a 
shift takes place in the kinds of guidelines that are formulated that nonetheless emerges with 
political significance because it builds on an initial threat to the way of life and associated skills 
of fishing.134 
To see how this systematic reasoning constitutes a form of analogy, we need only briefly 
imagine the kinds of discussions and deliberations that would occur at each of these levels.  
When those engaged in fishing in the various smaller regions initially speak with one another, 
they may draw analogies: “Much as he just said he is witnessing declining success in that part of 
the bay, so too I am seeing the same elsewhere in the bay.”  By comparing the way the features 
of each individual’s preferred fishing spots instantiate the same relations, a group may recognize 
a higher-order, more systematic meta-relation of decline in their fishery (relation3).  Later, when 
speaking with the environmental biologist, the biologist may say that what they are describing is 
similar to what has been observed in other fisheries, with the result being that all involved may 
infer an even larger, less local or even global meta-meta-relation (relation4) of decline in 
fisheries around a region or the world (relation5).  Increasingly systematic, analogical 
comparison not among the properties of each domain(i.e., the “Millian” model of analogy), but 
rather among the relations discovered among the features of each domain, provides the basis of 
their inferential reasoning. 
 
CPAR.i: “Entrenchment” 
However, as Paul Bartha has argued, systematicity of relations is not enough to make 
                                                
134 Rudel 2013, 20. 
   82 
analogical reasoning as strong as it needs to be.135  A major problem for any theoretical treatment 
of analogy is the starting point description of any two domains, or “inputs.”  Frequently, the 
quality of inference to be drawn is heavily dependent on how the domains are first described.  
Some descriptions easily elicit an analogical inference that is relevant to a current problem and 
therefore of a high quality.  Other times, an initial description elicits strange and bizarre 
analogical inferences based on initial descriptions which are not richly suggestive, “hand-tailored 
inputs.”  More specifically, computer programs based on a number of analogical theories do an 
excellent job of identifying important systematic relations among domains when experimenters 
give them suggestive and intuitive initial descriptions.  When those descriptions are made less 
intuitive, though, the same computer programs pick up irrelevant and unimportant systematic 
relations.   
For instance, in an attempt to refute Galileo, the astronomer Francesco Sizzi cited the 
proliferation of the number seven in the enumeration of the parts of natural systems like the 
number of “windows” in the head (e.g., nostrils, ears, eyes, mouth), the days of the week, 
number of metals, etc.136  On the basis of this claim, Sizzi concluded that the number of planets 
must also be seven.  Though these natural systems would seem to exhibit a common structure, 
we would object to Sizzi’s analogical conclusion.  The inputs into his analogy have been 
manipulated to be more suggestive than they should be, insofar as other natural systems that 
contradict his claim have been omitted (not to mention that we would object on other grounds 
from our contemporary perspective).  Similarly, computer programs can be tricked into drawing 
analogical inferences when the inputs are manipulated to be narrowly described or to exclude 
contradictory domains.  As this examples shows, the problem with systematicity is that “high-
                                                
135 Bartha 2010, 70-71. 
136 Bartha 2010, 22-23, 70-75. 
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order relations are cheap” (to use Bartha’s rich phrasing).137         
In light of this worry, the third term in my description of contemporary perspectives on 
analogy, namely the entrenchment of systematic relations, becomes significant.  By 
“entrenchment,” I mean a history of past success.  This definition has acquired wide recognition 
ever since Nelson Goodman tried to deal with a similar problem of “hand-tailored” inputs in 
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.138  In that work, Goodman famously came up with a hand-tailored 
word, “grue,” which neatly mirrors the use of the more intuitive words “green” and “blue” in our 
reasoning, but which any reader will nonetheless find absurd as an identical replacement for 
those terms.139  In other words, much as Sizzi hand-tailored his description of the natural world 
to make an absurd conclusion seem logical, so too Goodman hand-tailored the term “grue” to 
make it seem like a logical equivalent to “green” and “blue.”  As Goodman himself proposed, the 
problem of hand-tailored inputs generating bizarre inductive inferences (and by extension, 
bizarre analogical inductive inferences) can be dealt with by comparing the relative 
entrenchment of the predicates (or terms) contained in the rival hypotheses.  Green and blue have 
a strong history of past success in our reasoning.  They have factored into successful inferences 
many, many times.  By contrast, the hand-tailored term “grue” has no track record of successful 
past use in our inferential practices.  When entrenchment is allowed to supplement our other 
criteria for reasoning, Goodman maintains, we are able to explain why we balk at the use of 
“grue” when we could be using green and blue.  Entrenchment is an important factor in 
reasoning. 
Similarly, Bartha claims that systematic relations need to be approached in terms of their 
successful history of “prior association” for analogical reasoning to avoid the problem of “hand-
                                                
137 Bartha 2010, 70. 
138 Goodman, Nelson (1983). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
139 Goodman 1983, 74. 
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tailored” inputs.140  It is not enough for an analogy to inferentially map a systematic relation 
from one source domain to another target domain.  Rather, in the source domain, the systematic 
relation must not only obtain, but must also meet some set of evaluative preconditions that 
establish a standard of success for the kind of systematicity it purports to demonstrate.  Only 
when the systematicity in the source domain has a record of success established in this way, is it 
a viable candidate for analogical inference to a target domain.  For instance, if the systematic 
relation in the source domain is a deductive relation among some set of sentences, that relation 
must already be established in terms of the evaluative precondition of validity for its extension 
by analogy to be viable.141   
Similarly, if the relation in the source domain is a causal one, those evaluative 
preconditions relevant to causality must already be established prior to analogical extension.  For 
example (to use one recent theory of causality), there must be something like high probabilistic 
dependency among the relata and an explicit specification of a mechanism by which that 
probabilistic dependency is determined.142  In this way, the “hand-tailored” inputs problem can 
be avoided.  Sizzi’s analogical inference is clearly lacking in appeal because the relation of 
“sevenness” he attributes to natural systems has no prior association with successful past 
inferential use according to any evaluative precondition.  Rather, its complete dearth of prior 
association in past reasoning makes it counter-intuitive and obviously contrived. 
For my purposes, the term “entrenchment” better captures Bartha’s point than his own 
phrase, “prior association,” in three ways.  First, unlike the phrase “prior association,” 
entrenchment more vividly captures the idea of embeddedness in past practices.  Something that 
                                                
140 Bartha 2010, 103. 
141 Bartha 2010, 103. 
142 Williamson, Jon (2009). “Probabilistic Theories of Causality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation. ed. Helen 
Beebee, Chris Hitchcock and Peter Menzies, 185-212. 
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is entrenched carries the sense of depth that comes with anything we would call a “trench” 
ordinarily, whereas prior association carries the very weak degree of connection and risk of 
superficiality that comes with talk of “mere association.”  Second, entrenchment also usefully 
illustrates the underlying idea behind prior association by way of its own use in the past few 
decades of philosophy.  What was once a term of art has become a common term in many 
arguments across disparate domains of philosophy in which something like “entrenchment” is 
thought to be a solution to vexing problems in the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and 
more.143   
Third, entrenchment is better because it provides an intuitive, entrenched bridge back into 
the domain of politics by way of its political resonance.  In the political domain, entrenchment is 
in many ways the name of the game.  Politicians and citizens do not just exchange reasons in 
terms of shareable considerations for and against options.144  Rather, they debate the relative 
entrenchment of those considerations for and against.  For example, in the face of an economic 
crisis, those advocating a “Keynsian” financial stimulus to catalyze economic recovery will work 
diligently to highlight the successful track record of financial stimulus packages in past political 
decision-making and the economic consequences that followed.  They will point not only to one 
such past success, but to as many as possible.  Moreover, much of their point in doing so will be 
to reduce the risk that they are “hand-tailoring” their description of the current crisis to make a 
“Keynsian” solution seem intuitive.  A very strong past track record strengthens the case that 
similar circumstances in the past have called for a similarly successful response. 
Here too, analogy is the key because entrenchment signifies a track record of similar 
                                                
143 Haugeland, John (2012). Dasein Disclosed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 245-254, Kutschera, 
Franz von (1978). “Goodman on Induction.” Erkenntnis 12:189-207, Kahane, Howard (1965). “Nelson Goodman’s 
Entrenchment Theory.” Philosophy of Science. 32:3/4, 377-383, Roper, James E. (1982). “Models and 
Lawlikeness.” Synthese 52: 313-323. 
144 See above discussion of “reasons”, including Cohen and Sabel 2009, 205, Habermas 1996, 13-19. 
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success across time.  Just as in the past green and blue successfully fulfilled our expectations for 
color terminology, so too they should do so in the present; whereas “grue” lacks a track record 
from which analogies can be drawn of this kind.   
 
CPAR.i: Putting the Terms Together 
To see how these key terms (“entrenchment” and “systematicity”) fit together into the 
first part of the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.i), it may be helpful to 
consider the example provided by “feedback loops.”  A feedback loop names a process in which 
systematic relations emerge at ever higher levels as time progresses and lower-level relations 
become more entrenched.145  In this case, the systematicity is not only constituted by multiple 
levels of relations and meta-relations and meta-meta-relations and so on (e.g., relations1-n).  This 
kind of systematicity, often referred to as being “inter-level” (“IL” for short) in its structure, is 
only one dimension.   
Additionally, this inter-level structure is connected temporally, with relations appearing 
over and over until their entrenchment reaches such a high level that they “feed back into” meta-
relations.  With “feedback” of this kind, the emergent meta-relations are not just inter-level (IL) 
in character, but also “inter-temporal” (“IT” for short).  They are, by their very nature, the kinds 
of things that presuppose entrenchment across multiple events or times.  In this case, repetition 
over time allows systematicity to emerge, which is to say, it allows higher-level relations and 
meta-relations and meta-meta-relations to emerge.  The following figure may be helpful for 
                                                
145 In-depth philosophical analyses of this phenomenon include the classic, Andrew (1976). Teleology. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, as well as more recent work such as Mayr, Erasmus (2011). Understanding 
Human Agency. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Yeomans, Christopher (2012). Freedom and Reflection. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, Craver, Carl F. and Darden, Lindley (2013). In Search of Mechanisms. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, Elster 2007, 14-15. 
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visualizing such entrenched, emergent systematicity: 
Inter-level “Systematicity” (CPAR.i.IL) 
Level of Systematic Relation (corresponding to * numbers) 
****meta-meta-relations among those meta-relations among those relations among features 
***meta-relations among those relations among features 
 **relations among features 
*features 
 
Inter-temporal “Entrenchment” (CPAR.i.IT) 
Inter-Temporal Episodes (corresponding to superscript numbers) 
Time1    Time2   Time3 
       ** (relations) 
 *(features)   *   *  
    
 
“Feedback,” or the Emergence of Inter-Level Systematicity (IL) through the Entrenchment of Inter-
Temporal (IT) Features & Relations 
 
First Sequence of Events (Time1-Time3) 
Time1    Time2   Time3 
 ****(meta-meta-relations)  ****   **** 
 ***(meta-relations)  ***   *** 
 **(relations)   **   ** 
 *(features)   *   * 
 
Second Sequence of Events      
 Time1001    Time1002   Time1003   
 ****    ****   ****   
 ***    ***   ***   
 **    **   **   
 *    *   *   
 
Third Sequence of Events 
 Time2000    Time2001   Time2002   
 ****    ****   ****   
 ***    ***   ***   
 **    **   **   
 *    *   *   
 
Figure 5: An Example of a “Feedback Loop” 
 
As these illustrations are meant to show, systematicity often emerges over time and as a result of 
sufficient repetition of features or relations in a domain (i.e., entrenchment).  Each level is 
recognized only after the earlier level has been “mastered,” repeated many (or even thousands) 
of times.  Here, during the first episode (Time1), only features are observable (i.e., only “*” is in 
black, while the higher levels of systematicity are light gray, showing that they are not present in 
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the domain yet).  During the second two episodes (Time2-3), the higher-level relations (**) 
among these observed features change from light gray to a darker gray.  Then, “fast-forwarding” 
to episode number one thousand and one, the first level of relations (“**”) turns black, with the 
higher, meta-relations (“***”) changing to a darker gray.  By the time episode two thousand and 
two rolls around, the final, meta-meta-relational (“****”) level itself eventually turns black.  
Finally, the highest level of systematicity in the domain under investigation has emerged in full 
force.  In short, over time, the inter-level relations (IL) have systematically emerged as each 
lower level becomes entrenched (IT) enough for a higher level to then emerge as a consequence. 
Pattern-based skill acquisition and application provides a concrete context in which to 
observe a feedback process of this sort.146  From repeated exposure to classical Greek 
architecture, students may learn to recognize the architectural features (*) known as the column, 
pedestal, and entablature.  They may then recognize certain relations (**) among these features, 
for instance, that the width of the features is aligned at very specific points, which the students 
had never realized before.  Surveying classical architecture more generally through a long, 
repetitious process of study, they may realize that among the architectural structures surveyed, 
those structures that possess this alignment (**) at very specific points are the most pleasing.  As 
a result, they may come to recognize an even more systematic relation of “pleasing balance” 
(***) among classical structures.  Studying more recent architecture, these students may realize 
that as lightweight materials become more dominant, the pleasing, balanced alignments of 
classical architecture tend to disappear.   
Upon recognizing this a more systematic relation (****) between the weight of the 
materials and the achievement of a pleasing balance in the structure, students may then find 
                                                
146 For an extensive account of pattern-based skill acquisition and its role in human cognition generally, see 
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themselves suddenly (emergence!) tempted to make woeful claims about the declining standards 
of architecture at the even more systematic level of human history (*****).  In learning to first 
recognize a pattern of alignment in classical Greek architecture, these students acquired a skill 
that they later applied at ever higher levels of architectural criticism and study to eventually find 
themselves making sweeping generalizations about a global trend in architecture.  This process 
in which a pattern was first recognized and then redeployed time and again illustrates a feedback 
process at work.  As the students learn to recognize and then look for the pattern through ever 
more episodes of architectural observation, they simultaneously develop the systematicity of 
their understanding of architecture (for better or worse, in this case).   
Analogy pervades woeful, historically sweeping claims of the kind eventually found in 
this last example.  For instance, critics may lament the demise of architectural standards by citing 
extremely well-entrenched exemplars like the Pantheon.  Alternatively, when speaking to an 
audience familiar with the city of Philadelphia or American architectural history, such critics 
might cite the Merchants’ Exchange of Philadelphia, which is likely to be well-entrenched for 
such an audience.  Furthermore, such critics might really try to make their case by citing both of 
these examples.  In doing so, the heavy lifting in their argument is executed by the entrenchment 
of their initial understanding of the systematic relations found in architectural observation.  
However, as we will see in the last three chapters of this project, though analogy often plays a 
role in such massive generalizations, it can also be astonishingly sensitive, sophisticated, and 
precise. 
  
CPAR.ii: Inferential Extension of Relations 
 The second part (ii) of the Contemporary Perspective on Analogical Reasoning is both 
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the most obvious and the most sophisticated.  Inferentially extending a vertical (meta-)relation 
from one domain (e.g., a local fishery) to another domain (e.g., a distant fishery), is such a 
routine practice in our everyday and even academic reasoning that it seems easy to accept.  
As routine and familiar as the practice of analogical reasoning is, though, there is a risk that with 
this familiarity may come a tendency to forget what was discussed in the last few sections.  
Analogical inference is not a mere extension of something found in one domain to another 
perceived to be similar; rather, the inference is extended because of the systematicity (IL) in each 
domain and the superior entrenchment (IT), or prior association, in the source domain.   
For instance, domains involving tools like surgery (scalpels) and warfare (hatchets and 
tomahawks) are understood systematically with sufficient entrenchment that people routinely 
invoke those tools in analogies.  One favorite, related analogy invokes familiarity with surgery 
and scalpels to better understand that a relation of “cutting” among features in a target domain, 
like a budget, should be understood to be cutting of a particularly skillful and precise kind.  Thus, 
one might say that the way to cut a budget is with a scalpel, not a tomahawk, which is to extend 
our systematic, entrenched understanding of the way cutting occurs in a source domain with the 
target domain of budget cuts. 
Bartha’s terminology, referenced above, goes a long way towards underlining the present 
point.  Analogical inference is not a mere inferential extension on the basis of a prior similarity 
(i.e., “Millian” resemblance among the features in two domains), but an inference drawn on the 
basis of systematic (IL), entrenched (IT) understanding of the source domain (CPAR.i).  Bartha 
stresses this point by developing a terminology of “preconditions” in attendance with the idea of 
systematicity.  We know features in a source domain to systematically relate because we know 
that the relation is causal, and with that causal character, we also know that certain preconditions 
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must be met for the relation to be respected (e.g., probabilistic dependencies among the relata).147  
Applied to the previous “budget cutting” example, an analogy works because we have a 
systematic grasp of a domain, which is to say (in Bartha’s terms), we have an understanding of 
the preconditions that have to be met in the source domain for the inferred relation to obtain.  
With the scalpel analogy, we know what it means to have “surgical” cutting because we already 
understand it to be a kind of skillful, precise cutting that takes enormous amounts of training to 
do successfully.  Here, this understanding of the skill and training behind “surgical” cuts is 
dependent on a grasp of the training and skill understood to be its preconditions.  Thus, the 
inference among source and target domains in analogical reasoning is an inference that does not 
merely take one thing and extend it to another, but does so on the basis of a systematic, 
entrenched understanding of the preconditions for the relata in the source domain. 
Given this assumption about the uneven grasp discussants of budget cuts have of the 
source (surgerical tools) and target (budgeting) domains in an analogy, another significant sense 
in which analogy is inferential emerges, namely the inferential “leap” that characterizes it 
according.  To use the helpful phrasing of Richard Holyoak and Paul Thagard, the uneven grasp 
of the source and target domains leads analogical reasoning to take the form of “mental leaps.”148  
Our entrenched grasp of the systematic relations in the source domain means we take ourselves 
to have a firm foothold there for reasoning.  By contrast, the target domain is the subject of 
analogical inference precisely because we fail to have the same level of entrenched, systematic 
understanding.  Thus, when we draw an analogical inference from the source domain to the 
target domain, something equivalent to a “leap” occurs as we move from the sure footing of the 
source domain and “leap” into a more or less unknown domain.  The leap is mental, in their 
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words, because it has to do with cognition.  Nonetheless, though the leap may seem bold, it is not 
for that reason unconstrained by rationally substantive criteria like entrenchment.   
  
CPAR.iii: Non-Spuriousness Condition 
The final part of the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.iii) is a 
natural outgrowth of the second part discussed in the last section.  If the analogical inference 
extends from a domain we systematically understand in an entrenched manner to a target domain 
we do not, then it should be expected that the burden of proof, as it were, is that the relation 
being inferred is not a spurious one.  As I mentioned earlier, people often doubt whether 
analogies are the basis of good reasoning because they are prone to admitting too many 
generalizations.  The hand-tailoring of inputs to an analogical computer program lent support to 
this worry.  Depending on how “intuitive” researchers wanted to make the information inputted 
into an analogy locating computer program, they could sway the computer program towards 
equally intuitive and sound analogies, or highly problematic, spurious analogies based on 
dubious generalizations.  In other words, analogies can seem like a safe space for reasoning 
when the features over which they obtain are hand-tailored inputs picked by researchers or 
politicians to be intuitive.  However, when we leave such carefully manicured contexts, too 
much seems to be permissible. 
Notably, though, once the bar is raised to the level of entrenched, systematic relations 
(CPAR.i.IL-IT), the kind of spuriousness that plagues “Millian” analogical reasoning 
dramatically reduces.  For instance, in our reasoning about English and Hungarian above (Figure 
1), we located a systematic, meta-relation among some of the features that was shared by both 
languages (i.e., the “Indo-European” origin of the languages).  However, as the example was 
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meant to show, this meta-relation was extremely spurious.  A single word held in common 
between English and Hungarian, combined with a shared European geography is too little 
evidence and too lacking in systematicity (let alone entrenchment) to support the analogical 
inference that the two languages share a common Indo-European origin. 
By contrast, the “suppletion” observed in English and German by linguists is more 
systematic and therefore less irksome (see Figure 2 above).  Similarly, entrenchment works to 
reduce the threat of spuriousness by demanding that we attend to the track record of a relation we 
are considering extending inferentially.  We are unlikely to let Sizzi get away with using 
“sevenness” as a basis for analogical reasoning, since it is so lacking in entrenchment that we 
will balk at its use to draw inferences over scattered domains.  Finally, the preconditions built 
into the ideas of systematicity and entrenchment work to counteract spurious analogical 
inferences as well.  It is one thing to say, as Sizzi might, that he can think of many past examples 
(entrenchment) of systematic “sevenness” in the workings of the universe, but it is another to ask 
him to specify what exactly the preconditions are for this relation.  Is the relation the kind to 
have causal preconditions (e.g., probabilistic dependencies)?  Looking at Sizzi’s examples, we 
would quickly realize that the probabilistic dependencies of causal reasoning are lacking, as 
“sevenness” plays no consistent role in the workings of the domains picked out by his examples.  
 
Applying the Contemporary Perspective on Analogical Reasoning 
In the last section, I surveyed the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning 
(CPAR.i-iii) because I thought it would help dispel a worry about my first “pass” at describing 
the dynamism of democratic politics.  That worry arose from the sense that analogies drive 
dynamic democratic deliberation, but they do not drive it in a rational way.  Instead of allowing 
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citizens to make rational inferences, analogies provide a means for citizens to be emotionally 
manipulated.  The last section will have gone some way to dispel that worry by highlighting the 
sense in which analogical reasoning is a form of inference (CPAR.ii) that is heavily constrained 
by concerns with systematicity, entrenchment, and abstract relations in a source domain 
(CPAR.i), as well as concerns to critically guard against spuriousness (CPAR.iii). 
Returning to a past example of political analogy may help to convey this sense of rational 
constraint and inference.  Earlier, I mentioned how people often used the “Great Depression” as 
a source domain for understanding how the citizenry ought to respond to the target domain of the 
“Great Recession” of 2008.  Importantly, one of the ways in which that similarity is assessed is 
in terms of systematicity among the features of the past, source domain and the current, target 
domain.  Arguing that a “Keynsian” response to the Great Depression should also be attempted 
in the Great Recession requires more than pinpointing similar features of each domain (e.g., 
massive lay-offs from jobs, stock market crashes, etc.).  In addition to that superficial, “Millian” 
form of analogy, citizens are likely to debate the systematic relations (and meta-relations) among 
those features in each domain to assess the viability of drawing an analogy from one domain to 
another.  How did a change in one feature (e.g., monetary policy) change other features (e.g., 
lending rates) and thereby other features (e.g., leveraging of banks) and then still others (e.g., 
banks that are “too big to fail”)?  How did the relation among those features in different nation 
states change other relations, say among the relative popularity of different political parties (e.g., 
authoritarian regimes)?  In the present, can analogous changes be observed that testify to the 
existence of similar systematic relations among these features and their relations and meta-
relations?  For instance, where nations have “austere” monetary policies (e.g., curbed spending), 
is the political support for authoritarian regimes changing in a way that mirrors the support such 
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regimes received when the same monetary policies were followed during the Great Depression?  
This example, drawn from recent real politics, is meant to illustrate one of the distinctive 
characteristics of analogical reasoning in politics.  Not only is it distant from “Millian” analogy 
with its fixation on feature similarity, but it is also thoroughly systematic and entrenched in its 
focus and therefore deeply constrained in a rational way quite immune to emotional 
manipulation.  In the Great Depression/Great Recession example, the relations mapped from one 
domain to another are systematic meta-relations many times over.  They are systematic relations 
to the nth power.  A “monetary policy” is itself a meta-relation based on the numerous relations 
among features of central bank activities and their systematic connection.  So too “mass lay-offs” 
are an abstract meta-relation among various employment sectors and their systematic 
interrelation.  For citizens to discuss the relationship between monetary policy and mass lay-offs 
is therefore an extremely high-order, “meta-meta”-relation of massive, entrenched systematicity.  
This level of abstraction only becomes more dramatic when discussion rises to the even more 
abstract, even higher-order discussion of how monetary policy ultimately influences support for 
certain kinds of political regimes.  Accordingly, the way analogy factors into real democratic 
politics is at an almost wildly abstract level. 
However, for all of the extreme abstraction of analogical reasoning in real politics, it is 
also very concrete in one important way.  When it comes to the source domain, analogical 
reasoning proceeds on the assumption that citizens are extremely familiar with the source 
domain and its systematicity.  In other words, analogical reasoning assumes that the source 
domain is sufficiently familiar, sufficiently entrenched in some regard, for it to be helpful in 
understanding the target domain.149  For instance, in the Great Depression / Great Recession 
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analogy, the analogical inference to be drawn assumes that people are familiar with the Great 
Depression.  More specifically, discussants may assume a strong familiarity because of a shared 
history curriculum that studied the Great Depression or a shared knowledge of the event as 
described in a canonical literary work like The Grapes of Wrath.  By contrast, the target domain 
is assumed to be insufficiently understood at present and therefore in need of the past to supply 
an informative analog for understanding the present.  In the midst of a rapidly evolving Great 
Recession, for instance, the assumption is that the familiar case of the Great Depression can 
provide some guidance for understanding a sudden economic crisis in the present.  Indeed, the 
very phrase “Great Recession” builds an analogical link between the 2008 economic crisis and 
the Great Depression by way of its reference to a “Great” economic crisis.   
Furthermore, in building this analogical link, the resulting understanding of the 2008 
economic crisis does not become crass and crude, but rather richly systematic.  As a number of 
economists (including several who saw the 2008 crisis coming) have claimed, those who failed 
to draw such an analogical link were the same economists, politicians, and citizens who were 
disastrously blind to the very possibility of anything like the Great Recession happening.150  
Their claims, which were to gain so much attention after the economic crisis erupted, boldly 
establish the difference between a “Millian” interpretation of analogical reasoning and the 
contemporary perspective I have outlined above (CPAR.i-iii): The mere use of two similar terms 
(a common word, a common European geography) in the two domains does not constitute the 
basis for the analogical inference, though a deeply entrenched, systematic grasp of a domain 
does. 
This last example shows how analogical inference is rationally constrained by a thicket of 
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systematicity, abstraction, and entrenchment.  As a result, it may dispel some worry about my 
“first pass” at describing the rational dynamism of majority rule practices in real democratic 
politics.  However, one might object that such rationality comes at the cost of surrendering the 
very dynamism that inspired the approach of this chapter in the first place.  Returning to the 
contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning, a response to this objection can quickly be 
located.  There, in discussing the nature of the inference of analogical reasoning, I cited Thagard 
and Holyoak’s “mental leap” terminology.  This phrase is meant to depict some of the dynamism 
of analogical inference, insofar as we move away from an entrenched domain and into a less 
understood, target domain.  In the former domain, we understand its systematicity in an 
entrenched way.  It is embedded in our understanding through an entrenched track record of 
experiential depth.  By contrast, the target domain is not entrenched in our understanding.  Thus, 
to inferentially extend systematic relations across such differences in entrenchment is to make a 
“mental leap” in our cognition … a short and sweet form of reasoning if ever there were any. 
Clearly, the language of a “mental leap” out of secure experiential entrenchment and into 
a fresh terrain is meant to convey a rich, lived dynamism.  We are not simply talking about two 
domains we understand more or less well, but also our lived, experiential history of 
entrenchment in one domain, in stark contrast to the other.  Accordingly, if analogical reasoning 
really involves something like a mental leap from a familiar domain’s abstract systematicity to 
an unfamiliar one, then we can understand why I earlier referred to the prevalence of analogies in 
real politics as the “best testimony” to the dynamism of real democratic politics.  In real politics, 
the people really do take a “leap” when an analogy goes “viral” and quickly transforms where 
many citizens stand with regard to a topical issue calling for urgent action.  In a time of crisis 
like a burgeoning economic collapse, a politician may call upon the citizenry to make a “mental 
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leap” by dynamically extending their grasp of an entrenched domain to understanding the 
moment of crisis (e.g., the Great Depression/Recession analogy).  Furthermore, when a good 
analogy enters the public discourse, it tends to catalyze a dramatic increase in deliberation as 
people weigh in on its accuracy and try to test out the systematicity of the relationn it purports to 
identify.   
For example, a single analogy can turn a citizenry and its elected representatives, as well 
as their appointees, heartily towards military action, as when the “Domino Effect” proliferated 
democratic discourse in the United States of America and quickly and dramatically reshaped the 
decisions made by citizens and officials alike to support military intervention in places thought to 
be susceptible to a regime change.151  With this analogical “leap,” the abstract systematic relation 
in the source domain was that of sequential status change.  People were thoroughly familiar with 
that relation from playing the game of dominoes.  In that game, once one domino changes its 
status from upright to tipped over, the rest acquire the same status sequentially.  Since the game 
of dominoes is so popular and well-known for this tipping relation, there is no shortage of prior 
association in the source domain.  Moreover, the relation of sequential status change is an 
abstract, systematic relation.  It deals with multiple entities in the source domain and how a 
change in one, systematically changes the status of other entities that are contiguous with that 
entity (e.g., neighboring dominoes).  By analogy, it was thought that nation states contiguous to 
one another would change their ideological status once one of them “tipped over” to a different 
ideology.  The result would be a sequential “chain reaction” of regime change. 
Perhaps an even better appreciation of the definitive role of analogy in the dynamism of 
democratic deliberation can be seen in the case of “swift-boating.”152  This political neologism 
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stands not for the deployment of analogy to make a political point, but rather for the re-
deployment of an analogy already widely recognized by the citizenry, so that the analogy now 
serves to undermine its original, typically salutary purpose.  For instance, a U.S.A. Presidential 
candidate once drew an analogy between his brave wartime service in a type of military outfit 
known as a “swift-boat,” and the similar kind of [brave] service he would offer during a war as 
U.S.A. President.  A group opposed to his candidacy then re-deployed this analogy by severing 
its prior association with bravery and turning it into an analogy for the candidate’s past and 
present efforts to manipulate purported acts of heroism for political gains.  Their efforts were 
widely recognized as a “viral” and transformative part of that particular campaign season and 
were deemed a major influence in that candidate’s electoral loss.   
Not only did the analogy “go viral” and increase the potency of democratic discourse 
during that time period, but it dramatically increased the quantity of citizen deliberation by itself 
becoming a topic of discussion.  Books, articles, weblogs, and citizen conversation exploded as 
people discussed the analogy’s accuracy and value by assessing its underlying systematicity and 
how it was being analogically mapped across the political domain.  As a result of this viral and 
explosive influence, this “swift-boating” re-deployment of an earlier analogy not only led to the 
coinage of a neologism (“swift-boating”), but also to its own re-deployment when other 
analogies were made on its basis (“Romney-boated”) in later political campaigns.  Moreover, 
though this particular analogy may be new, its reasoning is not; it has been argued that the 
analogical re-argumentation “swift-boating” implies is clearly on view in much earlier times, 
including ancient Athenian democracy.153 
As these examples are meant to convey, the prevalence of analogies in real politics 
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actually is (true to my earlier claim) the best testament to the deliberative democratic dynamism 
of majority rule procedures and their associated practices.  For instance, with this last set of 
“swift-boating” examples, a clear connection back to this claim has been identified.  In the case 
of swift-boating, I described how campaign season politics, which consists of a set of practices 
associated with majority rule procedures (i.e., election day), plays a fundamental role in 
increasing the quantity and dynamic potency of democratic deliberation.  Having just pinpointed 
one set of examples in which an analogy went “viral” and led to an “explosion” in democratic 
discourse (e.g., books, articles, weblogs, conversations) during a campaign season, I hope to 
have given some credence to my earlier claim that analogy and democratic dynamism go hand in 
hand.   
More importantly, though, the topic of political analogy takes us beyond “practices 
associated with majority rule procedures” to majority rule procedures in their own right.  During 
a campaign season, citizens do not simply debate political topics, nor do they simply weigh the 
options on the ballot in terms of reasons “for and against” each individual option (to again use 
Joshua Cohen’s conception of democratic reasoning).  Rather, overwhelmingly, most of what 
citizens do is evaluate the options on the ballot as pairs or sets.  For instance, the two most 
popular candidates may represent “a two-headed monster,” such that voting for either will not 
deal with the underlying problem of contemporary politics (i.e., the “monster” itself).154  Here, 
an analogy is used to evaluate a pair of ballot options together.  Notably, this analogy is a real 
one that went “viral” during one campaign season and itself became a topic of increased 
democratic discourse in such a way that the related electoral results were thought to have 
depended heavily upon it (i.e., the source of the analogy was blamed by many for skewing the 
electoral results).  Similarly, ballot options are often framed analogically in terms of political 
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parties.  A vote anywhere on the ballot for party x instead of party y is often described by 
analogy as a vote for abstract political entities that one could never really vote for, since they are 
not actually represented on the ballot.  For example, voting for one party rather than another is 
said to be a vote “for terrorism” or “for oppression” or for other abstract political forces that are 
not conceivable as candidates or ballot proposals … except by analogy. 
  In other words, citizens do not see each option on the ballot (e.g., each candidate) as an 
option with its own considerations for or against, or in terms of its own individual “pros and 
cons” which are to be added together to rank and select the winning options.  Instead, they 
approach them analogically, drawing on well-entrenched systematic relations to frame an 
unfamiliar and sparsely defined set of options from which they choose.  On a ballot, one may see 
a list of names with or without sparse accompanying information like party affiliation or current 
elected status.  By and large though, the options are a very sparsely described and constantly 
changing object of deliberation that (almost by their very nature) call out for analogical 
treatment.  During a campaign season, candidates and issues suddenly emerge and time is of the 
essence in dealing with the field of options that emerges just as suddenly as a result.  It only 
seems natural (very natural) that in these circumstances, citizens turn to their firm grasp of 
familiar, entrenched, systematic relations from other areas of their lives for guidance on how to 
deliberatively frame the options delivered by majority rule procedures. 
From this tendency to frame options as non-discrete pairs or sets, the third part of the 
contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.iii) derives its political relevance.  In 
politics, deliberation is routinely concerned with the spuriousness of relations.  Citizens want to 
know whether relations that factor into deliberation are based on real, deep connections, or are 
just arbitrary or incidental.  More specifically, they want to know whether a relation between any 
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two elements of a domain (i.e., features or other relations) can survive a process of “screening 
off.”155  By this process, I mean the evaluation of purported relations by removing one element 
from a domain to see whether the other element, to which it is purportedly connected, is affected.  
For instance, critics of gun control often claim that with fewer guns in the hands of the citizenry, 
crime will increase.  On the basis of this relation, they draw the conclusion that gun control is a 
bad idea.  In response, citizens may deliberate by first seeing what would happen to crime rates if 
they “screened off” citizen gun possession in a political domain.   
To this end, they may reform their own gun control policies experimentally, or what is 
more likely, they will look to other political domains where citizen gun possession has actually 
been removed from the political equation and whether that removal has had any impact on the 
crime rate.  In doing so, citizens will be deliberating analogically, as they will look to other 
political domains to infer how the relations between gun control, crime rates, and public policy 
should be understood in their own political domain.  Recent debates about gun control in the 
United States of America have followed exactly this course.  Notably, advocates of gun control 
countered the “armed citizenry is a safer citizenry” position of their political opponents by 
drawing an analogy between their own political domain (U.S.A. politics) and another political 
domain, namely, Australia, where the element of an armed citizenry was removed in recent 
political history without a related increase in the crime rate.  By analogy, many inferred, the 
United States of America would actually have a decreased crime rate if it were to institute stricter 
gun control similar to the way it was instituted in Australia.  In response, still a third group of 
citizens might point out that by analogy with other nations, the declining crime rate in Australia 
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could be “screened off” from gun control policies, since other nations simultaneously saw 
declines in their crime rates at that time, but without any related change in gun control policies in 
more strict or liberal directions.  In doing so, this third group of citizens would be exploring the 
possibility that the Australian analogy draws a spurious inference on account of weakly 
systematic reasoning. 
Another example may reveal how the third part of the contemporary perspective on 
analogical reasoning (CPAR.iii) contributes not only to the inferences drawn during democratic 
deliberation, but also to its dynamism.  In a recent U.S. Vice Presidential debate, one candidate 
claimed that an incumbent administration was misguided in its thinking about military power.  
To support that claim, the candidate mentioned how the number of military technologies of one 
particular kind (battleships) had decreased under the administration, which would accordingly 
suggest a de-prioritization of the military in an administration that was increasing spending on 
other technologies (e.g., “green” technology) and also increasing spending overall.  The 
systematic relation under discussion had three features: Spending on military technology, 
spending on non-military technology, and overall spending.  The systematic relation was that as 
overall spending increased, spending also increased on non-military technology, while it 
decreased on military technology.  The inference to be drawn by citizen deliberators listening to 
the debate, then, was that the incumbent administration was not “pro-military” because though 
they were spending money, they preferred to spend it on non-military programs.   
The rival candidate, though, checked this purportedly systematic relation with an analogy 
that “went viral” by testing for spuriousness.  The analogy had to do with another military 
technology that had been phased out through decreased spending on it, but which no one would 
say had to be supported for any administration to count as “pro-military.”  That analogous 
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military technology was “horses.”  Decreased spending on the “dated” military technology of 
“horses” had occurred over time, and yet no one took that decrease to be symptomatic of any 
kind of systematic “pro” or “con” attitude towards the military in general.  The technology was 
simply out of date and needed to be phased out.  By analogy, so too the decreased spending on 
battleships under discussion should not be understood as “anti-military,” in light of the 
systematic relations unearthed by the analogy to horses.  Immediately afterwards, the analogy 
went “viral.” It was repeated as a catalyst for ramped up citizen discourse of an inferential (or 
rather, critically inference-blocking) kind.  Through such spuriousness-checking, analogical 
reasoning was seen to offer a critical tool with tremendous dynamism. 
 
Summarizing the Second Pass 
Through these remarks, I have tried to demonstrate how the contemporary perspective on 
analogical reasoning (CPAR i-iii) not only increases the quantity and drama of democratic 
dynamism, but also does so in a way that is inferential enough (and suitably constrained by 
rational considerations) to be deliberative.  Clearly, when analogies are used critically or 
constructively to deal with entrenched, systematic relations, inferential reasoning is occurring, 
rather than the kind of psychological manipulation that worries many about inferential reasoning 
of the “Millian” kind.  Moreover, the inferential “mental leaps” (CPAR.ii) of analogical 
reasoning reveal a prominent bridge between concerns for dynamism (the leap part) and 
deliberation (the inferential part).   
A further point needs to be recognized, though, and this point is one that was mostly tacit 
in the prior examples.  When discussing the role of analogical reasoning in a Vice Presidential 
debate about battleships and horses, or the earlier example of gun control policies to be enacted 
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by Congress, a connection to majority rule procedures and their associated practices is implicit, 
but significant.  What makes the Vice Presidential debate a source of viral, dynamic deliberation 
is that it occurs between candidates for an office to which citizens will shortly elect one of them.  
Similarly, what makes gun control deliberation about crime rates and public policy so dynamic is 
that citizens and elected officials alike are considering how the votes cast by those elected 
officials will be deliberated upon later when the citizenry goes to the polls.  In other words, the 
dynamism of democratic deliberation is analogical, but it is also deeply interconnected with the 
anticipated use of majority rule procedures and associated practices like recall votes hovering on 
the horizon.  Thus, the application of the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning 
(CPAR) hopefully reveals not only the dynamism and deliberative quality of analogical 
reasoning in democratic discourse, but also its deep alliance with the majority rule procedures 
with which the deliberative view is usually juxtaposed (as was shown in the last chapter). 
Accordingly, we might therefore conclude that majority rule procedures and associated 
practices are critical to the dynamism of democracy in three ways (a-c).  First (a), the 
anticipation of majority rule procedures catalyzes democratic deliberation by dramatically 
increasing its quantity.  There simply are more formal and informal opportunities and exercises 
of interactive citizen deliberation when majority rule procedures and associated practices are on 
the horizon, than would otherwise be the case (e.g., far more debates and bar stool dialogues 
during a campaign season than otherwise).  Second (b), the deliberation that does occur is not 
only of greater quantity, but also of greater potency as well.  The considerations on offer during 
campaign season events have a tendency to “go viral” and become pervasively shared reasons in 
a rapid, “over-night” way.  Third (c), these quantitative and qualitative contributions (a-b) to the 
dynamism of democracy tend to have a preferred form, namely, analogy.  A good analogy during 
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a formal debate can both (a) ignite citizen discussion en masse and (b) “go viral” in a way that 
brings a sweeping change to the political system.  Taken together, these three dimensions of 
majority-rule driven, democratic politics testify to their impressive contribution to the dynamism 
of democracy without rasing worries about their deliberative quality (i.e., inferential structure). 
For ease of future reference, I would like to briefly pause and consider a helpful analogy 
for encapsulating these three dimensions (a-c) of the democratic dynamism of majority rule 
procedures and their associated practices.  This analogy has to do with the similarities between 
the vision of real democratic politics just described (a-c) and the idea of a “creative outlet.”  With 
regard to a creative outlet, we can see each of the three dimensions just mentioned clearly at 
work.  For instance, teachers sometimes refer to creative outlets when they supply students with 
paint brushes, paints,and blank canvas.  In doing so, they intend to (a) dramatically increase the 
quantity of creative self-expression among the students by supplying them with a uniquely 
effective opportunity to be creative, to give an “outlet” for human self-expression.  While they 
might believe that students have other opportunities to creatively express themselves in the 
classroom, they nonetheless provide the painting supplies as a creative outlet precisely because 
they believe those supplies are uniquely effective at channeling student self-expression to a far 
greater degree.   
Moreover, not only do they think the painting supplies stimulate a greater quantity of 
creative self-expression than other options, but they also tend to believe that the resulting 
increase in creativity will be of a (b) more “dramatic” quality.  Students express themselves 
creatively in the classroom in myriad ways, as when they organize their desks in specific ways or 
choose some classroom materials over others.  However, the painting supplies are described as a 
creative outlet because the quality of creativity catalyzed is different.  For instance, what a child 
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paints may be hung on the wall of a home or classroom for years or decades because it is a 
uniquely, qualitatively superior window into the child’s character or the character of the school’s 
student population.  As years pass by and the child develops, the painting may then become a 
reference point for understanding later successes and failures, as when a biographer refers to the 
youthful paintings of a person and tries to read into those creative expressions some early 
expression of what was to come.  In choosing childhood paintings over pictures of how the 
student organized a desk or chose to play, the biographer seems to imply that the teacher was 
right to see in the painting supplies a creative outlet of a more dramatic quality. 
Set in parallel, the practices associated with a creative outlet mirror the first two points 
(a-b) I made about the contribution of majority rule procedures and their associated practices to 
the dynamism of democracy.  In both cases, we find (a) a major increase in the quantity of some 
activity (i.e., deliberation or creativity), and (b) a more dramatic quality in the pursuit of that 
activity (e.g., viral remarks from the campaign trail or biographically insightful paintings).  As I 
mentioned before, my point in discussing this parallel is to establish the basis for a helpful 
analogy of my own.  In short, this analogy states that majority rule procedures and their 
associated practices are like the “deliberative outlets” of democracy.  More precisely, this 
analogy follows from the structural alignment (a-b) between the dynamics of majority rule 
procedures and their associated practices, on the one hand, and the dynamics of creative outlets, 
on the other hand.  In both the political and the creative context, there is an (a) increased quantity 
of activity that is of a (b) qualitatively dramatic kind.  The difference is the activity in question, 
which is to say, whether the case is one of deliberation or creation.  Structurally (a-b), though, 
both excel at catalyzing a dramatically potent, vastly increased amount of their respective 
activities.   
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However, this parallel is illustrative in still another way.  The very idea of a creative 
outlet is analogical.  We do not think of painting supplies as an “outlet” in the literal sense of 
providing a hole through which some flowing water, electricity, or air escapes.  Rather, a 
creative outlet is an outlet by analogy.  Knowing what we do know about “outlets” in the more 
familiar sense (e.g., electrical outlets), describing painting supplies as a creative version of that 
literal outlet is illustrative.  We can quickly gather why some teachers are supplying paints, etc. 
when they explain their actions by drawing an analogy between these materials and “outlets,” 
albeit for a creative flow, rather than an electrical one.  Recall my [c] third observation about the 
role of analogy in real democratic politics.  There, I observed that analogy plays the role of the 
preferred form through which democratic dynamism is dramatically increased [a-b].  Insofar as 
an “outlet” can be referred to in human affairs only analogically, the phrase “deliberative outlet” 
helpfully illuminates the focus on analogy that emerged from my reflections on the dynamics of 
real democratic politics during campaign seasons and beyond.  As a result, the phrase 
“deliberative outlet” helpfully conveys even the (c) third point referenced above, and thereby, 
makes the phrase even more effective as a concise expression for future reference.  When I refer 
to “my deliberative outlets proposal” from here on out, I therefore have in mind these three 
points (a-c) about the dynamic contribution of majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices, to deliberative democracy.  For sake of greater precision in reference, I will use the 
variables “a-c” in conjunction with the abbreviation “DOP” (deliberative outlets proposal) to 
refer to these three points (e.g., DOP.a-c). 
To see how this deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c) differs from other expositions of 
the deliberative view, I would like to grapple with a suggestive remark made by Amartya Sen in 
his exposition of deliberative democracy.  As Sen points out, part of the motivation for still using 
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the juxtaposition between deliberative democracy and the traditional view is a sociological one.  
Sen claims, the juxtaposition is needed because even though the deliberative view is “widely 
accepted in political philosophy today,” the traditional understanding of democracy “is not only 
traditional but it has been championed by many contemporary political commentators ...”156  In 
other words, deliberative democracy’s rise still requires juxtaposition to the traditional view of 
democracy because the traditional view still lives and breathes beyond political philosophy 
proper.   
By contrast, with the deliberative outlets proposal in hand (DOP.a-c), we would be slow 
to see the actions of these political commentators as a threat to the deliberative view or even a 
rival.  Rather, they appear to be on to something more philosophically interesting than Sen’s 
remarks would seem to indicate.  From the perspective on politics I have outlined above (DOP.a-
c), we no longer see these political commentators as simply demonstrating an age old, 
recalcitrant obsession with majority rule procedures and associated institutional practices.  Their 
focus no longer strikes us as a traditional bias towards institutions (Sen’s “niti-oriented 
institutional understanding of democracy”), which is adopted simply because it reflects a 
political reality.157  Moreover, these political commentators no longer seem to be ignorant of the 
“basic idea of democracy” mentioned above and cited by Sen and so many others, according to 
which “Balloting alone can be thoroughly inadequate on its own, as is abundantly illustrated by 
the astounding electoral victories of ruling tyrannies in authoritarian regimes …”158   
Rather, one finds that these commentators are themselves well aware of the larger 
deliberative context that lends majority rule procedures and their associated practices real, 
dynamic, deliberative, and fundamentally “democratic” significance.  For instance, the political 
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commentator Sen singles out as a representative of an improperly traditional view of democracy, 
Samuel Huntington, offers up a “deliberativist” perspective in a passage shortly after the earlier 
one cited by Sen as evidence for his critique:  “We all know that military coups, censorship, 
rigged elections, coercion and harassment of the opposition, jailing of political opponents, and 
prohibition of political meetings are incompatible with democracy.”159  In other words, even the 
political commentator Sen himself worries about as a contemporary advocate of the traditional 
view of democracy demonstrates a firm grip on the deliberative ethos and Sen’s contention that 
democracy and tyranny are deeply disconnected. 
 
A Case Study 
The deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c) changes our perspective on such 
commentators at a more profound level, though, than these brief comments reveal.  Exploring 
this profound change of perspective in the particular case of these commentators will help to 
connect the reflections of this chapter together in a way befitting the chapter’s “conclusion.”  
Thus, I will conclude this chapter with a further, more in-depth exploration of how our 
perspective on the political commentators Sen mentions has changed, that the chapter’s key 
lessons can usefully be seen to come together. 
If we no longer see the works of these political commentators as anti-deliberative, our 
perspective as deliberative democrats is likely to become a more sympathetic one.  We are more 
likely to see the focus of political commentators on majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices as an obvious focus on the most dramatic (DOP.b) and effective (DOP.a) catalysts 
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(DOP.c) of citizen deliberation in the ways discussed above under the name of the deliberative 
outlets proposal.  For instance, when commentators are drawn to electoral results and recent 
polls, we would no longer see them as beholden to a narrow-minded notion of democracy that 
implies the possibility of a democratic tyranny; rather, we would see the appeal of electoral 
results and polls as the natural consequence of believing that majority rule procedures and their 
associated practices provide an excellent window into the dynamics of the democratic system as 
it currently stands in a state of active movement.  In a poll, citizens may react to a given 
statement in analogous ways (DOP.c), allowing commentators and then their readers to see 
whether any considerations are widely shared “reasons” informing the will of the people.   
Moreover, when the same poll is conducted again in the future, a trajectory can be 
gauged for the extent to which any consideration has “gone viral” and swept across the political 
system with a visceral dynamism (DOP.b).  Such rapid change is also open to analysis in terms 
of whether it demonstrates a sudden increase in the quantity of citizen deliberation about the 
related political content (DOP.a).  Finally, both in the poll questions and the commentator’s 
analysis of the poll results, one constantly finds analogies being drawn (DOP.c), and later on, 
citizens steering their own decision-making by drawing analogies between their own situation 
and the situation represented in earlier polls.  In many ways, the task of the political 
commentator reflects the major thrust of my deliberative outlets proposal.  When political 
commentators are faced with a bevy of poll data, they work hard to locate and disseminate 
helpful analogies (DOP.c) for understanding the shared considerations these majority rule 
associated practices reveal to be dramatic catalysts (DOP.a-b) of democratic deliberation.  
Indeed, it is especially noteworthy that of all the political commentators Sen might single out as 
exemplars of the abiding popularity of the traditional view of democracy, the one he singles out 
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(Samuel Huntington) is by and far more famous for using an analogy that appeared half a century 
earlier between the well-trodden “clash of cultures” and a burgeoning, global “clash of cultures,” 
which itself was riffing off of an earlier title by Arnold Toynbee.160  In short, Huntington is 
exemplary of the extent to which political commentary is the practice of analogy-crafting 
(DOP.c) towards dramatic (DOP.b) and catalytic (DOP.a) ends. 
What makes attributing this more sympathetic and “deliberative” vision to political 
commentators philosophically interesting, though?  The answer, I would like to suggest, is 
related to the problem of underdetermination and indeterminacy identified in the last chapter.  
Tracing this connection will provide a basis for responding to the central problem of this project, 
namely: How can diagnostically dissolving the juxtaposition between deliberative democracy 
and majority rule procedures and their associated practices help with the indeterminacy worry 
described in the first chapter? 
To roughly summarize the use of the concept as it was introduced in the last chapter, 
underdetermination is the problem we face when there are “all sorts of possible interpretations” 
that fit some target of inquiry, though some are ruled out.161  For instance, we may find that a 
body of evidence underdetermines what we ought to believe about a case.  Too much is 
consistent with it.162  More specifically, we may have data regarding how much money a person 
had when entering a store and how much the various items cost at the store.  With this data, we 
can determinately believe that certain purchases were not made (e.g., no item that costs more 
money than the person has ever had, like a famous painting, could have been “purchased.”).  
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However, though some such beliefs can be determinately adopted, a set of possible beliefs 
remains with two characteristics: (m) all of the beliefs are consistent with the data (e.g., 
purchasing ten items at one dollar or one item at ten dollars, when someone has at least ten 
dollars); (n) we have no clear sense of determination among these beliefs regarding which to 
select over the others.  When we cannot arrive at a specific belief from a set of equal contenders 
(m-n), but we can nonetheless determine that certain beliefs are off the table, we find ourselves 
confronted with underdetermination: A mixture of “some determination” (of belief), but not 
enough “determination” to select a single belief as the winning candidate.  In other words, 
underdetermination (at least in one common usage) stands for the problem of selecting a single, 
best option from a set of equally good candidates.  Generically speaking, the problem of 
underdetermination is a selection problem. 
Returning to the topic of those “political commentators” mentioned by Amartya Sen, we 
can see that a selection problem confronts them in full force.  To the extent that these 
commentators do indeed operate within the deliberative view, they are concerned not with the 
individual reasons each individual citizen individually holds in isolation, but rather those shared 
reasons that lead the citizenry to shared decisions through a dynamic process of shared 
reasoning.  Given this deliberative orientation, political commentators are interested to discover 
the shared reasons of the citizenry in two ways.  First (e), they will look to the citizenry to 
discover which considerations are currently shared.  For example, do a majority of citizens share 
the belief that a certain candidate is not electable and on the basis of the same consideration (e.g., 
birthplace)?  Second (f), the political commentators will look to the citizenry to discover those 
considerations that are perhaps not currently of widespread concern, but are expected to become 
so as the dynamics of democratic deliberation unfold.  For instance, during a campaign season, 
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commentators may reflect on how a rarely observed characteristic of a candidate is likely to 
eventually become widely known in one way or another (e.g., through an official debate), and 
thereby become decisive in the election.  Thus, to offer political commentary on the current state 
of democratic deliberation or on some future state at time t (e.g., election day), commentators 
will have to reflect on the shared reasons of the citizenry at both of these levels (e-f). 
When pursuing shared reasons in either of these ways, though, a selection problem arises.  
While a political commentator may have all kinds of “data” to use in figuring out which reasons 
are currently shared by the citizenry (e) or will be shared at time t(f), that data is likely to be 
insufficiently determinate.  The available “data” of observations, poll results, citizen interviews, 
editorial comments, letters to the editor, citizen responses at town halls, etc. is likely to be 
consistent with a tremendous number of deliberative “considerations” and ultimate, “election 
day” decisions in two ways.  First (g), this consistency may obtain because of the content of the 
data, as when it is too meager, generic, abstract, etc.  Finding out that a majority of citizens 
believe “structural change” is necessary, for instance, may be determinate enough to imply no 
vote will be cast for some candidate standing opposed to any and all forms of change; however, 
it is indeterminate (and therefore underdetermines a result) when it comes to selecting one 
candidate as the likely choice, given this consideration.   
The problem is that “structural change” (by its content) is too abstract to produce a 
selection from the candidates that would be consistent and optimal.  Alternatively (h), the 
consistency may stem from a proliferation of contradictions in the data, which (“logically”) 
implies anything.  If the data comes in and suggests that the citizenry trusts one candidate more 
than the other, but also believes that all candidates are liars, then suggesting that this data 
specifies one candidate as the likely candidate for selection on election day is just as well-
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founded by the data as selecting another candidate.  From contradictory “data,” anything seems 
to follow.  Adapting terms from the first chapter on the indeterminacy worry (e.g., the 
“informational” variation on it), I will refer to these two qualities (g-h) of the “data” as its 
informational complexity.  Together, they present familiar circumstances of underdetermination.  
While some interpretations are determinately inconsistent with the data, many are not, given 
their informational complexity. 
Political commentators are squarely faced with the problem of underdetermination posed 
by this kind of informational complexity.  Formal events like polls, interviews, debates, and town 
hall gatherings all produce an enormous amount of information (or “data”) that can be used to 
figure out which considerations are the shared reasons currently informing (or ultimately set to 
inform) the decision-making of the citizenry.  Just taking the verbal exchanges between citizens 
(and their representatives) into consideration as a set of sentential expressions, one finds a 
massive array of information which, when organized into a conjunctive set, is rife with 
informational complexity.  Candidates routinely contradict their past statements as they attempt 
to grapple with the issues, let alone as they try to navigate the spontaneous responses of the 
citizenry in town halls and other formal events.163   
Similarly, the enormous amount of informal interaction among citizens provides an even 
larger array of information which (again) taken as a conjunctive set of sentential expressions, is 
also rife with informational complexity.  For instance, when a past, current, or future politician 
informally appears at a local eatery or community event, “data” is produced in the form of 
myriad casual remarks that is often set into the informational context of their official statements 
in provocative ways (e.g., the gaffe).  Either way, the political commentator is faced with a 
tremendously complex set of information consisting of “data” that is rife with (g-h) vague, 
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generic, and abstract content suffering from all kinds of contradictions. 
If all of that “data” is collected and set side by side, we might ask, in conjunction, how 
does its tremendous quantity and informational complexity allow commentators to get any kind 
of grip?164  How can commentary proceed to identify the reasons that currently (e) or will 
ultimately (f) shape the decisions of the people, given such informational complexity?   
Real political discourse supplies a ready response to this problem of underdetermination 
(and the indeterminacy worry more generally): Judgment.  When the “facts” (i.e., “data”) 
underdetermine a decision, the necessary response is routinely described as a “judgment call.”  
For instance, the British Prime Minister David Cameron called upon his nation to make a 
“judgment call” in the face of a body of limited evidence that suggested chemical weapons were 
being used in Syria.  This evidence was limited in the sense that it included no “single smoking 
piece of intelligence” that could lend any “certainty” to a single course of government action (or 
inaction).165  Nothing in the evidence convinced Cameron “that I am right and anyone who 
disagrees with me is wrong.”166  What was needed was a leap of judgment, or “judgment call,” in 
which a stance is taken about what “is more likely,” rather than what is “100% certain.”167  
Similarly, political commentators look at the “data” of democratic deliberation and make a 
“judgment call,” just like politicians.  In both cases, as one past political official and current 
political commentator put it: “It’s more of a judgment call.  There’s no specific metrics that you 
can use.”168  When trying to identify the reasons of the people, political commentators have no 
                                                
164 Yet again I am alluding to the discussion of John Haugeland’s work in the fifth chapter. 
165 Mason, Rowena (2013). “Syria Crisis: David Cameron Says British Military Attack Must Be ‘Judgment Call’” 
The Guardian, Thursday, August 29, 2013. 
166 Cameron, David (2013). “Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons.” House of Commons, London, United 
Kingdom, August 29, 2013. 
167 ibid. 
168 Quoted in Heim, Joe (2013). “A Growing Role for the President: America’s Consoler in Chief.” Washington 
Post, Wednesday, May 22, 2013. 
   117 
choice but to make a dynamic leap of judgment, akin to the “mental leaps” of analogical 
reasoning.   
By extension, where political commentators work full time on their response to the “data” 
of democratic deliberation, the citizenry can even more easily be expected to turn to judgment.  
With even less time for political data collection and evaluation, the tremendous quantity and 
informational complexity of the “data” of democratic deliberation is even more of a problem of 
underdetermination for the citizenry than it is for commentators.  With less time and other 
resources for processing that data, judgment is an even greater necessity.  In the face of 
underdetermination and limited time and energy, much of the change that will filter through the 
political system and lead up to decisions will take the form of “judgment” of this vague and 
dynamic kind.  Thus, to the extent that deliberative democracy is concerned with the dynamics of 
citizen decision-making, this dynamic leap of judgment makes a crucial contribution to the basic 
idea of democracy that is so dear to deliberative democrats.  In other words, to the extent that the 
people really do collectively rule, they do so by dealing with a political form of 
underdetermination in similar ways. 
The above analysis of analogical reasoning in democratic politics sheds light on this 
response to the problem of underdetermination and the indeterminacy worry associated with it.  
As my deliberative outlets proposal is meant to show, the dynamism (DOP.a-b) of an inferential 
democratic deliberation is deeply analogical (DOP.c).  Since analogy is constituted by “mental 
leaps” of the kind described by Thagard and Holyoak, it makes sense that underdetermination is 
dealt with by “dynamic leaps of judgment” in which “judgment calls” are made.  Any analogy is 
a judgment call of sorts, insofar as knowledge from one domain that is systematically understood 
in an entrenched way is inferentially extended to another, less familiar domain (CPAR.i-ii).  
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Admittedly, our systematic understanding and its entrenchment are often lacking in “metrics” 
and thereby seem “ineffable.”  Sometimes we are, after all, talking about relationsn with large 
numbers of sub-relations and features.  The analogy many citizens and experts draw between the 
Great Depression and the Great Recession is of this character.169  They do not grasp its 
intricacies in a way they could easily explain.  However, consistent with Bartha’s demands of 
analogical reasoning, they do understand some of the preconditions for its systematicity (e.g., 
causal claims require strong probabilistic dependencies, or spuriousness needs to be considered 
as a viable threat).    
Of course, if there really are “no metrics that you can use,” if “judgment calls” really do 
deal in something the naive citizen struggles to articulate, then at the same time that we 
appreciate the contribution judgment makes to the dynamism of democracy, we also come to a 
natural resting point in our analysis.  Judgment is widely said to be the very kind of capacity that 
resists, deflects, and precludes analytical treatment … even by philosophers.170  Whether we are 
talking about the judgment needed in politics, or other areas of practical decision-making, the 
ineffability of that process is well known.171  Thus, to appreciate that a problem of 
underdetermination squarely faces not only politicians and political commentators, but the 
citizenry more generally, is simultaneously to lead this investigation to the topic of judgment as 
well as to a natural point past which little progress seems likely.   
In making a second, more theoretical “pass” at characterizing the overlooked democratic 
dynamism of majority rule procedures and their associated practices, as well as how this 
dynamism deals with indeterminacy, this last point about judgment may therefore seem like a 
                                                
169  Gorton 2012, 200-209. 
170 Larmore , Charles (2001). “Moral Judgment,” in Judgment, Imagination, and Politics. ed. Ronald Beiner and 
Jennifer Nedelsky. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 47-64. 
171 Larmore 2001, 60-63. 
   119 
worthy concluding remark.  In the face of (1) pragmatic indeterminacy where our time and 
energy is limited, or (2) informational indeterminacy in which our considerations conflict 
interpersonally and intrapersonally, or (3) even first-personal indeterminacy in which we are 
unsure how a consideration fits into our larger set of personal beliefs, analogical leaps of 
judgment offer a worthy tool for cutting through the indeterminacy and making a knowledgeable 
inference.  Majority rule procedures and their associated practices are extremely valuable here, 
as they supply commentators and citizens alike with pairwise groupings of options that invite 
analogies from better understood domains that allow citizens to leap over underdetermination 
and indeterminacy and into deliberative decision. 
Intuitive as this response to the indeterminacy worry may sound, though, many 
philosophers are likely to bristle at it as a worthy response for two reasons.  When deliberative 
democrats write about reason-giving, what they describe is how citizens reason from “principles” 
no one could “reasonably reject” or that everyone would “share” or actually does “share.”  
Reasons are not simply given, but are typically cast in terms of appeals to principles as their 
motivating, justifying source … not analogies.  Such principled reasoning is much stronger in its 
derivation of conclusions about what is permissible or necessary as a course of action on any 
given circumstance, in comparison with analogical inductive reasoning. 
Second, while deliberative democrats prefer to focus on principles for deriving citizen 
reasoning, they also sometimes explicitly allow a space for “judgment,” which means perceiving 
the particulars of a particular context and adjusting the application of principles to the particular 
demands that result from that perception.  Thus, some might bristle at my deliberative outlets 
proposal stems from the comparative weakness of analogical arguments, the second reason is 
that some deliberative democrats may question the extent to which my proposal really advances 
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beyond what others have already said is necessary under the name of “judgment.”  In the next 
chapter, I will take up these two concerns as the basis for a third, particularly philosophical (even 
logical) “pass” at a diagnosis.  As I hope to show, the theoretical framework developed so far 
contains some starkly different points of orientation for democratic deliberation that will be 
shown in subsequent chapters to deal with these concerns (and in doing so) to set-up the fifth 
chapter’s investigation of the indeterminacy worry in its three variations (1-3) discussed above. 
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Chapter Three: Two Classic Challenges to Analogical Reasoning 
 
 
Summarizing the Last Chapter 
 In the last chapter, I made two attempts at a single claim.  Majority rule procedures like 
voting are the central catalyst of democratic deliberation, especially in light of the analogical 
form that deliberation tends to take.  To better express this idea, I developed an analogy between 
my proposal and the more familiar idea of a creative outlet.  Much as a creative outlet stimulates 
a dramatic increase in creative activity, I suggested, so too majority rule procedures act like 
deliberative outlets.  When an election is on the horizon, an increase in deliberative activity 
occurs, as evidenced by the very notion of a campaign season with all of its debates, forums, and 
bar stool arguments.  More specifically, the quantity and quality of democratic deliberation are 
all deeply impacted by the presence of majority rule procedures like voting (see DOP.a-b above).  
Furthermore, analogies play a key role in making that increased deliberative activity happen 
(DOP.c).  The pairwise options on a ballot, including pairings of candidates, positions on issues, 
etc. are especially well-suited to catalyzing democratic discourse, insofar as the very structure of 
these pairwise options invites analogical comparison with other domains of experience also 
structured around pairs.  For instance, to say that two candidates are but “two heads on the same 
monster,” is to draw an analogy with the two-headed monsters that populate a domain quite far 
from everyday politics.   
This proposal stands in stark contrast to the way practices like voting are typically 
juxtaposed against the deliberative dimension of democratic politics.  Voting is typically seen as 
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an alternative to deliberative decision-making in politics, a kind of “second best” option when 
deliberation breaks down.  By contrast, my deliberative outlets proposal focused not so much on 
what practices like voting achieve on the day of their use, but rather the way their anticipation in 
the near or distant future catalyzes democratic deliberation (especially in its analogical form).  
As the analogy with creative outlets was meant to reinforce, it is the anticipation of an election 
that catalyzes deliberation (via a campaign season), not just the political activities of “election 
day” itself. 
However, it is easy to see why other democratic theorists have not developed positions 
analogous to my deliberative outlets proposal.  Many philosophers and democratic theorists will 
bristle at the way I lean heavily on the role of analogy in campaign season discourse to make my 
proposal seem realistic.  Analogical reasoning is too flabby, vague, and lacking in rigor to excite 
anyone about a theoretical proposal that leans heavily upon it.  Accordingly, one of my major 
concerns in the last chapter was to stress that analogical comparison between a familiar source 
analog and the pairings on a ballot allows for rigorous reasoning.  Contrary to what is often 
assumed, analogies can be inferred in terms of their systematicity, rather than just by way of a 
simple extension of properties from one domain to another (which I referred to as the “Millian” 
conception of analogical reasoning owing to its long association with John Stuart Mill’s 19th 
century logic textbook).  This last point about the rigor of analogical reasoning is significant 
because analogy is often said to be more like psychological manipulation, and less like the 
rigorous inference championed by advocates of a deliberative view of democracy.  As Paul 
Bartha observes, there is a “growing conviction that much of what takes place under the heading 
‘analogical reasoning’ is not really inference but rather something akin to perception.”172  My 
stress on the systematicity of analogical reasoning offered a response to this “growing 
                                                
172 Bartha 2010, ix. 
   123 
conviction,” stressing the rigor made possible by the systematicity that analogy maps across 
domains so as to clearly emphasize that it is not a means of psychological manipulation.  I 
therefore hoped that this emphasis on the systematicity of analogical reasoning would counter 
the “growing conviction” that analogical reasoning is mere psychological manipulation.  With 
that worry allayed, I claimed, my “deliberative outlets” proposal could hopefully be appreciated 
for what it offers, namely: A much needed shot of determinacy for the deliberative approach to 
democracy.   
At this point, it may be worth recalling why a “shot of determinacy” is needed in the first 
place.  Recall the problem I labeled the indeterminacy worry, which stems from the frequent 
worry that deliberative democracy offers a poor guide to real political decision-making.  I used 
an instance described elsewhere to frame this worry: The image of the ‘liberal lawyer.’  This 
person learns of the democratic idea as defined by the deliberative approach, and though 
persuaded, nonetheless bemoans its lack of relevance to the kind of advocacy work carried out 
by a “liberal lawyer.”  When it comes to figuring out a specific course of action to pursue in light 
of the deliberative democratic vision, this liberal lawyer contends, the deliberative approach is 
only weakly helpful.  The approach can help a liberal lawyer realize, for instance, that a few 
options are off the table because they violate the democratic vision (e.g., coercive measures to 
give voice to the oppressed).  However, for real, living political agents like a liberal lawyer, 
taking a few options off the table is of only minor benefit.  This proverbial liberal lawyer wants 
real, practical guidance about what to choose to do, not how to slightly narrow the options from 
which choices can be made. 
In more precisely characterizing this problem, I described how it amounts to a problem of 
underdetermination.  Deliberative democracy determines some narrow results (e.g., some narrow 
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set of options like coercive ones are off the table).  However, that level of determination is not 
enough.  Its narrow amount of determination is under-whelming to the liberal lawyer or any other 
citizen driven by the democratic idea.  For instance, knowing the principles of reciprocity and the 
reason-giving requirement sometimes identified with deliberative democracy will provide an 
under-specified guide to political problem-solving.  More needs to be done to lend citizen 
decisions some greater determinacy, to make them not under-whelming, but decisive.  In 
particular, such decisiveness is needed because underdetermination takes three significant forms, 
or variations, which I labeled as the pragmatic, informational, and first-personal variations.  
Regarding the first, pragmatic variant, the deliberative ideal comes across as incredibly 
inefficient.  The reasoning from principles of reciprocity, for instance, is too time consuming, in 
part because it leaves so many options on the table to wade through.   
With the second, informational variant, the deliberative ideal underdetermines a specific 
course of action in the face of “informational complexity,” by which I mean pervasive pluralism, 
inconsistency, and even self-contradiction, both among the citizenry in general and even citizens 
individually.  Finally, regarding the third (3), “first-personal” variant, the deliberative ideal 
seems to do little to actually determine what we ought to do.  No matter what we figure out when 
deliberating collectively from the perspective of “we the people,” decisions are ultimately made 
by individuals who cannot help but consider their own, non-collective, private, individual beliefs, 
desires, and personal histories in making decisions.  Accordingly, the results of democratic 
deliberation offer only vague suggestions for what “we the people” ought to do, rather than an 
actual determination of what should be done. 
My deliberative outlets proposal (abbreviated as “DOP” above) was meant to go some 
way towards defusing this underlying problem of underdetermination and the three, variant 
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forms of the indeterminacy to which it gives rise.  In the face of (1) pragmatic indeterminacy, 
where our time and energy is limited, or (2) informational indeterminacy, in which our 
considerations conflict interpersonally and individually, or (3) first-personal indeterminacy, in 
which we are unsure how a consideration fits into our larger set of personal beliefs, I argued, 
analogical leaps of judgment offer a worthy tool for cutting through the underlying 
indeterminacy and making a specific, knowledgeable inference.   
To better illustrate my argument, I took up the example of “political commentators” 
discussed by Amartya Sen.  When political commentators are faced with majority rule 
procedures and their associated practices (e.g., polls, electoral outcomes), they find themselves 
faced with pairwise groupings of options.  Crucially, these pairwise groupings can be made 
meaningful in countless number of ways.  A pairing of candidates, for instance, may be 
interpreted as a “referendum” on one candidate’s most famous policy statement.  Or the pairing 
may be interpreted as a choice between two strategies for military intervention in a burgeoning 
conflict.  Equally, the pairing might seem to be conducive to interpretation from countless other 
angles.  The point is that the actual majority rule procedure with which political commentators 
are faced tends to underdetermine its political meaning.  A major task for political commentators, 
then, is to cut through the countless options for interpreting the pairing of options and to figure 
out how to comment on those options in a meaningful way. 
To meet this major task, I claimed, political commentators do what anyone would be 
expected to do: Explore how the pairwise grouping of options on a ballot invites analogies from 
a better understood, (source) domain (CPAR.ii).  The similarity between the pairing of the 
candidates, for instance, will very often invite consideration of an analogous, historically prior 
pairing of candidates.  The countless other possible interpretations will fall by the wayside as this 
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resonant historical analog invites political commentary, often in ways that seem impossible to 
ignore.  Consequently, in responding to this invitation to analogy, commentators are able to 
“leap” over the underdetermination and indeterminacy presented by their political world.  
Analogy offers a “deliberative leap” towards a determinate interpretation, despite the 
underdetermination with which commentators are faced.  More importantly, what makes these 
deliberative leaps effective is often not a superficial similarity of (“Millian”) features, but rather 
entrenched, systematic similarities (CPAR.i). 
For instance, a recent poll result may be consistent with hundreds of interpretations, like 
any other majority rule driven “data.  However, the results of a poll may strongly remind a 
commentator of a lesson learned long ago.  The options, for instance, may elicit a reminder of 
how two similar types of response were available during an earlier economic crisis, and the clear 
lesson of history is that one type of response should be preferred to the other.  In the face of such 
a clear lesson of history, how to interpret the poll results will be (analogically) determinate, not 
underdetermined.  In this case, not only the commentator’s personal history (CPAR.ii), but also 
the systematic structure of the majority rule driven data itself (e.g., its pairwise grouping) does 
the work (CPAR.i).  The way a pairing of options strikes the commentator as a choice between 
two optional types of response, for instance, where each type is understood in terms of 
entrenched, systematic relations among an enormous number of economic mechanisms, is 
crucial to understanding my point.173  The analogy between past and present domains is driven 
not by a mere surface resemblance among their features, but likely more so by highly complex, 
systematically related events characteristic of both domains (e.g., legislated market deregulation 
followed in similar time intervals by a “bubble” mentality in the market).  Thus, no poll result is 
as simple as a choice between option 1 and option 2; rather, the pairing it offers will elicit 
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analogical mapping because the options are systematically understood as typical, being 
systematic, because optional types of response. 
If we appreciate this “typical” systematicity, we can see how my deliberative outlets 
proposal actually offers two additional sources of determinacy for democratic deliberation, each 
presented in one “pass” at formulating my proposal in the last chapter.  In the “first pass” (1), the 
additional determinacy of majority rule procedures and their associated practices is highlighted.  
Voting and other majority rule driven practices are widely praised for their capacity to get 
decisions made with greater determination than mere deliberative discussion.  In the “second 
pass” (2), the determinacy of “deliberative leaps” is highlighted.  In the face of optional 
outcomes both real and expected that emerge from determinate, systematically structured 
majority rule procedures and their associated practices, analogy can provide a clear way forward. 
 
The Need for an Additional Source of Determinacy 
 With these two sources of determinacy highlighted, the time may seem to have come to 
really tackle the indeterminacy worry head-on and at greater length.  However, in this chapter I 
establish the need for a “third pass” at formulating my proposal.  Two potential challenges to my 
proposal may lead people to bristle at its heavy focus on analogy and reject my proposal as a 
result even before evaluating its details.   
According to the first, “deductivist challenge,” as I will call it, analogy may involve 
inference, but it is inference of the wrong sort.  In other words, some people will accept that my 
focus on systematicity (CPAR.i) successfully defuses a very common worry about analogical 
reasoning, namely, the “growing conviction that much of what takes place under the heading 
‘analogical reasoning’ is not really inference but rather something akin to perception,” as Bartha 
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describes it.174  However, even if the inferential nature of analogical reasoning in a democracy is 
accepted, many will object that it is the wrong kind of inference.  To these philosophers, 
analogical reasoning engages in inductive argument, which is to say, analogy starts with some 
particular context (the source domain) and then infers its features to a second, equally particular 
(target) domain (CPAR.ii).175  The evidence used to make this induction (i.e., to move from one 
particular to another particular) is extremely limited.  One might worry that in other contexts, the 
inferred features would prove to be spurious or accidental.  Like two cases in which a guess 
came out to be true, analogy seems (at least on a “Millian” reading) to operate in a restricted 
domain of inquiry.  Instead of taking into account all domains, it limits its scope to just two 
domains.   
However, with such a restricted scope, analogy seems to always run a high risk that if we 
were to look to other domains, our analogy would easily fall apart.  In the last chapter, an 
analogy drawn between English and Hungarian regarding their origins lent weight to this 
concern about the high risks of analogy.  Both English and Hungarian may have a shared word 
and may share a European geography.  If we were to infer that these common features point to a 
common origin in an earlier Indo-European language, though, we would be drawing a spurious 
connection between them.  Stepping back and comparing English and Hungarian with other 
languages that share words with them and a European geography, we would immediately see our 
mistake.  Hungarian looks a lot like Finnish, but these two languages look radically different 
from other European languages of the present day.  Thus, only when we restricted our analogical 
reasoning to just two domains, English and Hungarian, did the two languages seem to have a 
strong commonality.  With a larger evidence class including other languages, though, it seems 
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downright ridiculous to retain that earlier suspicion about a common origin. 
Thus, if we are going to make inferences from one particular case to another, one might 
declare, we had better expand the evidence to include many, many more examples to make it 
persuasive.  In response to such a declaration, I drew attention not only to the systematicity of 
analogical reasoning, but also to its focus on spuriousness (CPAR.iii).  This practice of checking 
for spuriousness just is the same as checking for accidental similarity.  Thus, from the 
contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning I described (CPAR), people do not simply 
extend an analogy and “sit back.”  Rather, the extension of an analogy is always checked for 
spuriousness.  In this way, analogical reasoning is a rigorous, systematic practice, even if it is 
inductive.   
However, when philosophers worry about the kind of inference carried out by analogy, 
they are not concerned with these questions about evidence strength.  Instead, they wonder: Why 
would we want to base democratic deliberation on this inductive form of inference in the first 
place?  More specifically, they wonder, when an alternative, deductive form of inference exists 
that is immune to questions about the strength of its evidence class, why not use that stronger, 
deductive form of inference?  In other words, why should analogy be preferred to a stronger 
competitor?  In the first part of this chapter, I take up this challenge from proponents of what I 
will call (following Wesley C. Salmon) “deductivists.”  Unlike my focus on analogy, a focus on 
deductive inference when modeling democratic deliberation is extremely pervasive, even 
orthodox.  Deliberative democrats routinely describe citizen decision-making in “deductivist” 
terms when they portray it as a principled form of deliberation, one that begins not with some 
particular context, but rather with a universal proposition, belief, principle, norm, etc., such as a 
principle of respect or reciprocity.  In being “deductive,” which is to say, universal in its initial 
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scope, principled deliberation does not have to worry about spuriousness or accidental 
similarities among two particular domains (i.e., CPAR.iii is unnecessary).  Its “deductive” 
orientation protects principled deliberation from questions about spuriousness.  Given this 
superiority, what I will call the “deductivist’s challenge” arises, which asks: Why should a rare 
focus on analogy be so important to deliberative democracy, when a stronger competitor (the 
deductivist’s principled deliberation) is available? 
  The second potential challenge to my proposal, which may lead people to bristle at its 
heavy focus on analogy, is what I will call the “humanistic challenge.”  By “humanistic,” I mean 
not only the long-standing traditional usage of the term, which is associated with the studia 
humanitatis (humanistic studies), but especially the meaning of the term intended by the person 
who originally coined it: Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer.176  On the traditional meaning, 
“humanistic” is associated with the study of a set of subjects that expanded upon an earlier, 
medieval course of study (i.e., the trivium, which included grammar, rhetoric, and logic) to 
include the disciplines of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy.177  In this 
traditional usage, the label “humanist” is closely used to signify those who not only taught these 
subjects or studied them, but also those who (more importantly) also stressed the significance of 
their study.  Literary and historical resources from the ancient past were treated not as merely 
instrumentally valuable “stepping stones” to more advanced studies in other disciplines (e.g., 
theoretical philosophy, theology), but also as intrinsically valuable as well (for reasons that have 
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varied widely historically).178    
This heavy stress on the larger, non-instrumental significance of studying these 
disciplines carries over from the way Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer originally used the term 
in his educational reform efforts in Bavaria during the 19th century.179  For Niethammer, 
humanism did indeed stress “the importance of a secondary educational system based on the 
Greek and Roman classics,” which shows the continuity between his original use of the term and 
its traditional use today.180  However, he too stressed that the literary and historical resources 
associated with the studia humanitatis were not mere “stepping stones” on the way to other 
educational efforts in theology.  Rather, these resources play an essentially dialectical role in 
education.  Their purpose is to use the literary and historical resources of antiquity as abstract 
objects with which students tarry in a way that drives the development of their inner potential 
both further along and in ever-wider orbits.181  Thus, Niethammer’s “humanists” envision 
engagement with literary and historical resources not as a stopping place along the way to later 
studies, but rather as the dialectical pole in a cyclical educational process that develops human 
potential further only as it returns again and again to the difficulties of historically distant Greek 
and Roman classics (as well as their grammar, poetic structures, etc.). 
Hans-Georg Gadamer uses the term “humanism” along these original lines in his analysis 
of the “Guiding Concepts of Humanism.”182  In this context, Gadamer discusses Niethammer’s 
close friend and ally in his educational reform efforts: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  Notably, 
in a work Hegel wrote during his time as a high school principal dedicated to implementing 
Niethammer’s educational reforms, Hegel pays especially close attention to what Gadamer 
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believes is one of the “guiding concepts of humanism:” Bildung.183  In this work, Hegel not only 
places a heavy stress on the significance of studying the literary and historical resources of 
antiquity, but also stresses their role as a dialectical pole in the educational development  
(Bildung) of students.   
Hegel writes, “Besides, with the mechanical elements in the learning of a language there 
is closely connected the grammatical study whose value cannot be too highly assessed,” which 
provides “so to speak the single letters or rather the vowels of the spiritual realm, with which we 
begin in order to spell it out and then learn to read it.”184  As this statement clearly conveys, 
Hegel places a very heavy stress on the significance of the study of grammar in much larger 
educational processes (Bildung).  This significance is “dialectical” insofar as what seems like a 
mere means to later study (grammar), is compared with “vowels,” which are not learned and cast 
aside as one progresses educationally, but rather used to make all later stages of education 
intelligible.  Just as one cannot read or write theology or speculative philosophy without drawing 
on one’s earlier lessons about vowels from primary school, so too, Hegel claims, the literary and 
historical resources of the ancients (especially their languages) must continually be drawn upon 
if later studies and activities are to be intelligible.  Grammatical study supplies the “vowels,” he 
suggests, with which the “spiritual realm” is made intelligible.   
 Some work by deliberative democrats is more “humanistic” insofar as it shares with 
“humanism” (in both the traditional and original uses of the term) the belief that many later, 
more “spiritual” activities are only made intelligible by recourse to literary and historical 
resource such as narrative, personal history, moral imagination, rhetoric, and linguistic 
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expression.  In the context of deliberative democracy, such humanism amounts to the claim that 
political activities like citizen deliberation can only be made intelligible in a determinate way if 
we take these resources into account.  Apart from knowing how someone might narratively 
construct his or her own personal history, we cannot make intelligible, determinate sense of what 
we observe in their external behavior.  Deliberative democracy needs to be humanistic if it is to 
avoid indeterminacy, they maintain. 
  For my purposes, though, what is particularly important about this work in deliberative 
democracy is that it has a great deal to say about the central role of “judgment” in democratic 
deliberation.  Here, judgment is a human capacity people use to deal with what is more or less 
explicitly identified with the indeterminacy that runs rife in political life.  For some of these 
deliberative democratic theorists, this capacity for judgment is essentially tied up with 
“humanistic” concerns such as narrative, personal history, and moral imagination … sometimes 
even in ways that are explicitly tied to the literary and historical resources so ardently 
championed by humanists centuries ago.  This humanistic work on judgment raises a challenge 
for my proposal.  To what extent, devotees of this work will want to know, does my talk of 
“deliberative leaps” add anything new or important to what has already been said about the 
problematic indeterminacy in democratic deliberation, albeit under the heading of “judgment” 
rather than analogical reasoning?   
As I hope to show, both of these challenges to my proposal are not as “challenging” as 
they would seem to be for the same exact reason.  Both challenges frame democratic deliberation 
in exactly the same terms, terms that Gerald Gaus has blamed as a source of the hopeless 
indeterminacy in democratic theory today.  While my proposal may seem to assume the same 
framework for deliberation, it at least offers an improvement over this earlier work by 
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incorporating the famously determinate, majority rule practices to which the deliberative view of 
democracy has for too long been opposed.   
In doing so, it may seem that my proposal’s focus on analogy “wins by default,” simply 
beating out its competitors because of the additional bit of determinacy it manages to lend to the 
deliberative approach via its incorporation of majority rule and analogical leaps of judgment.  In 
the next chapter, though, I will challenge the apparent continuity between the framework 
assumed by these two challengers and my own, analogical framework.  The result will be a 
“third pass” at formulating my deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c).  However, prior to 
elaborating my proposal along those lines, the need for a “third pass” must first be set up by 
considering the two reasons introduced above regarding why others may “bristle” at my 
proposal, namely: The Deductivist’s Challenge and The Humanist’s Challenge. 
 
The Deductivist’s Challenge 
As I mentioned above, many deliberative democrats will bristle at my heavy focus on 
analogy.  Even if we allow that analogy is a source of inferential reasoning, it is not clear that it 
is the right kind of inferential reasoning.  Where analogy is inductive, most deliberative 
democrats describe citizen reasoning in deductive terms instead.  As Eric Schechter observes in 
his textbook on logic, in our ordinary, “nonmathematical English, an inductive argument is one 
that goes from the specific to the general, while a deductive argument is one that goes from the 
general to the specific.”185  Clearly, my proposal fits Schechter’s “ordinary language” definition 
of inductive argument (especially CPAR.ii).  When citizens engage in analogical reasoning, they 
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start with some specific context (i.e., the source domain), and then infer a systematic set of 
relations from that specific context to another, specific context (i.e., the target domain).  Only at a 
later stage (CPAR.iii), when citizens check for the spuriousness of the inference, does the 
general applicability of the systematic set of relations under discussion become an object of 
concern (indeed, if at all).   
By contrast, the way others describe democratic deliberation clearly fits Schechter’s 
definition of deductive argument.  Deliberation begins with generally applicable “principles,” 
which are then applied to a specific decision that has to be made.  Whether the decision is related 
to such different topics as education or security, general principles of reciprocal respect and 
equal treatment are to be applied.  We see this deductive orientation across the various works of 
deliberative democratic theory.  For instance, after invoking the “reason-giving requirement” 
with which Gutmann and Thompson identify the deliberative approach to democratic theory, the 
very next sentence strikes a deductive tone: 
The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their representatives to give 
should appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of 
cooperation cannot reasonably reject.186 
 
In this quotation, Gutmann and Thompson immediately shift from talking about “reason-giving” 
as constitutive of deliberation (as discussed above), to principled reason-giving as the preferred 
form of reasoning.  As this rapid shift to talk of principles reveals, Gutmann and Thompson 
believe that general principles should play a guiding role in democratic deliberation that is not 
secondary, but rather principal.  Such an attitude reflects Schechter’s definition of the deductive 
approach to argument, insofar as it places the general before the particular in the order of 
reasoning. 
 Similarly, in describing both the deliberative view and how it emerges in response to one 
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of its founding texts, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, Joshua Cohen writes:  
Citizens, in turn, judge their representatives in the first instance by reference to principles 
of justice and only secondarily by how well those representatives represent other interests 
than the basic interest in assuring justice.187 
  
In this short statement, Cohen succinctly expresses the same preference for a principled form of 
reasoning that was evident in the Gutmann and Thompson quotation.  Cohen stresses explicitly 
that “in the first instance,” deliberation is oriented around general principles like Rawls’ 
principles of justice.  More specific interests among representatives and citizens only enter 
deliberation as secondary concerns.  This language of first and secondary reference points in 
citizen judgment mirrors the deductive order of argument that appears in the account developed 
by Gutmann and Thompson.  Cohen makes the same point more directly in other statements, 
including when he writes, “The principles of justice are intended for the use of citizens in a 
democracy,” as well as when he states, “The principles of justice, then, are intended to guide the 
judgment of citizens - who, as a group, are the ultimate authority in a democracy … .”188  As 
these statements demonstrate, Cohen is very explicitly concerned to stress the primary role of 
general principles in guiding not only democratic theory, but real citizen judgment as well. 
Other deliberative democrats also use Rawls’ principles of justice to articulate their 
vision of democratic deliberation in deductive terms.  For example, Seyla Benhabib explains the 
role of what she calls (following Habermas) “normative constraints” in her “discourse theory” of 
democratic legitimacy and public deliberation by comparing how these constraints work in her 
theory with the role of the first principle of justice from Rawls’ founding text in his own political 
philosophy.  Benhabib writes, “The normative constraints of practical discourses would occupy 
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the same place in discourse theories of legitimacy and public space as the Rawlsian basic 
liberties and rights specified under the first principle of justice occupy in his theory ...”189  In 
other words, Benhabib’s normative constraints “occupy the same place” in her deliberative 
democratic theory as does Rawls’ first principle of justice in his own theory.  As Cohen’s 
discussion of Rawls’ principles of justice demonstrated, those principles follow the deductive 
order of argument.190  Accordingly, Benhabib’s explanation of her democratic theory by 
comparison with Rawls’ shows that even those working with an alternative, “discourse” 
approach to democracy nonetheless retain a preference for deductive argument. 
 As this brief survey of various deliberative democratic theorists shows, theories of 
deliberative democracy tend to mirror the structure of deductive argument as defined by 
Schechter.  Deliberation begins with general principles before moving to the specifics of any 
particular decision that citizens have to make.  It is worth stressing that deliberative democrats 
attribute this deductive orientation not only to their theoretical work, but also to their vision of 
real citizen deliberation.  General principles of justice and respect are not relegated to abstract 
theorizing by these deliberative democrats.  As Joshua Cohen articulates this point, “Generally 
speaking, one of the essential roles of political philosophy is to provide practical guidance, 
‘guidance where it is needed’,” the latter phrase being a quotation from Rawls.191  As Cohen 
adds, “Now in a democracy, final political authority lies in the hands of equal citizens,” which 
means that any practical guidance must ultimately be guidance for the citizenry.192  Connecting 
the dots between the need for principles in political philosophy and the citizenry’s need for 
guidance, Cohen concludes, “The principles of justice, then, are intended to guide the judgment 
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of citizens - who, as a group, are the ultimate authority in a democracy.”193  In short, the general 
principles discussed by political philosophers are meant to guide the specific, real deliberation of 
the citizenry.   
 This discussion shows that deliberative democrats really do tend to describe citizen 
reasoning in deductive terms, rather than the inductive terms assumed by my analogical account.  
This stark contrast is worth noting, because it explains one of the main reasons other deliberative 
democrats may bristle at my proposal and its heavy focus on analogy.  Inductive arguments are 
prone to spuriousness, while deductive arguments are not.  An analogy from one case (source 
domain) to another (target domain) naturally raises the question of whether other cases could be 
found, or whether the analogy depends on a spurious, “fluke” similarity between the source and 
target domains.  For instance, we may observe that in one context our horoscope offered helpful 
guidance.  As a result, when we hear of another person in a similar situation (i.e., context), we 
may infer that this person should also look to astrology for guidance.  However, if we looked 
beyond that one case to other similar contexts in our lives, we would realize that our horoscope 
rarely shows any observable relationship with what was the right course of action (or would have 
been).   
Similarly, one might worry that analogies are very much like horoscopes.  They too are 
prone to the spuriousness of accidental correlation.  In large part, this susceptibility to spurious, 
accidental correlation stems from an inherent weakness of inductive argument.  For in induction, 
we move from the specific forwards.  As a result, the basis of our argument (its “evidence class”) 
is always open to the question, “Why did we start with one specific source domain rather than 
another?”  In the horoscope example, the specific source domain we use presents itself by mere 
fluke chance, not necessity.  Personal luck or sheer contingency constantly lurks behind 
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inductive argument as a potential explanatory factor that would undermine any resulting 
inference completely.  In short, the deeper worry is usually that the structure of the source 
domain is too context-specific.  To have one case (source domain) and to analogically extend it 
to another (target domain) to get some practical guidance risks serious myopia.  We might ask, 
have we actually looked further to see if the relationship observed in the source domain isn’t 
highly context specific … perhaps even to the point where, as with a horoscope, we would see 
that it is but a fluke?   
By contrast, principles are to be preferred as guides to decision-making because they 
transcend any one particular context, or even a handful of particular contexts, cases, or 
examples.  For instance, according to one very popular understanding of principles, they gain 
their appeal from being “a priori,” which is to say, they obtain prior to experience in two 
potential ways.194 First, they may have something to do with the very meaning of some subject 
matter.  To understand the subject matter just is to grasp the principle.  For example, one might 
say that to understand what it means for someone to be a “person” is also to grasp a principle of 
equal respect.  Second, one may find that whatever particular experience one is to ultimately 
have, it can be said prior to that particular experience that a principle will inevitably be grasped 
when the experience does happen.  In other words, we may grasp a principle “a priori” when we 
possess it as a kind of tacit knowledge; until we become experienced with the world, we are not 
yet aware of what we know.  For instance, we might all grasp a principle of respect, but it takes 
our experience with other people to actually engage that principle, since it otherwise remains 
only tacit.   
 As these examples of a priori principles demonstrate, part of the appeal of principled 
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reasoning is that its guiding light is not specific, contextual, and therefore at risk of being 
contingent and spurious.  Instead, the guiding light of deductive argument consists of context-
transcending, generally applicable considerations.  These general considerations may be tacit 
knowledge or embedded in the very meaning of the subject matter under discussion (i.e, the 
considerations may be a priori).  However, what matters is that these general considerations are 
indeed general principles, or deliberative guides to any relevant decision.  In being general along 
these lines, principles are immune to worries about accidental correlation and spuriousness.  
They do not base decisions on an open “evidence class” that can always be doubted and 
questioned with regard to its contingency.  Given this superiority over inductive argument, as 
well as the antecedent preference for deductive argument among deliberative democrats, one 
reason why others may bristle at my proposal becomes clear: Why should anyone prefer an 
inductive, analogy-driven account of democratic deliberation when stronger, deductive, 
principle-driven accounts offer a superior alternative? 
 
The Intellectual Backdrop to Deductivism   
I have tried to motivate this challenge from proponents of deductive reasoning by 
investigating its philosophical basis in concerns about evidence strength, accidental correlation, 
and the a priori.  However, before I address this challenge, it will be helpful to explore the larger 
intellectual backdrop that informs this challenge from proponents of deductive reasoning in 
politics.  The value of exploring this intellectual backdrop is that it will do more to explain the 
pervasiveness of deductive reasoning among deliberative democrats than any survey of 
exemplary quotations could ever achieve.  Consequently, exploring this intellectual backdrop 
will further motivate the challenge posed by proponents of deductive reasoning in politics to my 
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inductive, analogy-driven account. 
The intellectual backdrop I have in mind has already been identified and analyzed at 
some length by Wesley C. Salmon under the name of deductivism.195  As Salmon uses this term, 
it stands for the belief that deductive argument is to be favored over inductive argument.  
According to Salmon, deductivism is the legacy of Euclid’s Elements, to which philosophers 
have looked for a model of ideal reasoning for millennia.  This historical genealogy may seem 
extravagant in its sweeping reach from the present to the ancient world.  However, Salmon is not 
the only person to have noticed the remarkable influence of Euclid on models of ideal reasoning 
both today and in centuries past.  Others have noted, for instance, that, “No work, except the 
Bible, has been more widely used, edited, or studied.  For more than two millenia it has 
dominated all teaching of geometry, and over a thousand editions of it have appeared since the 
first one printed in 1482.”196   
To understand Euclid’s influence on deductivism, one need only notice how perfectly the 
order of inquiry in the Elements mirrors the order of argument Schechter defines as deductive.  
More specifically, in the Elements, Euclid begins with a set of axioms, or “self-evident truths,” 
which are assumptions from which consequences are then derived.197  As Salmon describes this 
approach, Euclid begins his work in geometry by assuming a set of “primitive ‘propositions,” 
and then proceeds to identify “derived ‘propositions’.”198 Since the primitive propositions, or 
axioms, are “self-evident,” Euclid can be said to begin his investigation with what is assumed to 
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be generally true, and then proceeds to “deduce” other, derivative propositions that are more 
particular.   
As Salmon and many others have long pointed out, this process of deduction, so long 
taught by reference to Euclid’s Elements, is essentially characterized by its focus on truth-
preservation across the steps of inquiry.199  From a general truth, more specific propositions can 
be derived as true propositions, because they preserve the truth of the initial, primitive 
propositions (e.g., Euclid’s axioms).  Notably, truth-preserving deduction manages to preserve 
truth only because it is what logicians refer to as a demonstrative inference, which is an inference 
“whose premises necessitate its conclusion; the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are 
true.”200  In other words, deduction works by taking up general propositions assumed to be true 
and then demonstrating that if those propositions are indeed true (as assumed), the propositions 
deduced from it must also, by necessity, be true. 
To better understand the significance of calling an inference demonstrative, it will be 
helpful to explore at greater length what makes a demonstrative inference capable of 
necessitating a true conclusion from true premises.  In other words, what is it about 
demonstrative inference that gives it this capacity to preserve truth?  Salmon answers this 
question with admirable concision in the following passage: 
Inferences of this type purchase necessary truth preservation by sacrificing any extension 
of content.  The conclusion of an inference says no more than do the premises - often 
less.  The conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true because the conclusion says 
nothing that was not already stated in the premises.  The conclusion is a mere 
reformulation of all or part of the content of the premises.  In some cases the 
reformulation is unanticipated and therefore psychologically surprising, but the 
conclusion cannot augment the content of the premises.  Such inferences are 
nonampliative; an ampliative inference, then, has a conclusion with content not present 
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either explicitly or implicitly in the premises.201 
 
In this passage, Salmon pinpoints the very heart of deductive reasoning … and deductivism 
thereby.  The demonstrative inference associated with deductive argument manages to preserve 
truth “because the conclusion says nothing that was not already stated in the premises.”  
Deductive reasoning merely “reformulates” the content of the premises.  When, as in the 
Euclidean ideal, our premises are a set of self-evident, universally true or context-transcending 
propositions like principles, deductive reasoning proceeds to simply preserve the truth of that 
content as it derives additional propositions inferentially.  Deduction preserves truth by 
sacrificing the extension of its content in favor of simply “reformulating” it.  In the logician’s 
terminology, deduction is truth-preserving because it is non-ampliative.  By this phrase, it is 
meant that deduction does not “amplify” the content from which it sets out on the path of 
investigation, but purposely restricts the amplification of that content to purchase necessary truth 
preservation.  The term “reformulation” is meant to convey this point. 
In light of this discussion of the basis of deductivism, the motivation behind proponents 
of deductive reasoning in politics can be better appreciated for its full logical force and historical 
pedigree.  For centuries, Euclid’s Elements has been used to teach people about the truth-
preserving capacity of demonstrative, non-ampliative, deductive inference.  Because deductive 
argument starts with general truths which are then merely “reformulated” in more specific terms, 
without amplifying the content at all, the inferences generated are admirable, even ideal ones.  If 
we accept the initial starting point of any deductive argument, we cannot reject the related 
conclusion for a very easy to appreciate, logical reason.  The conclusion is a mere 
“reformulation” of the initial starting point.   
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By contrast, the inductive inferences we draw with analogies are thoroughly ampliative.  
After all, as the second part of the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.ii) 
revealed, analogy works by extending the systematic relations we know well from one domain, 
where we have an entrenched grasp of them, to a second, target domain.  This analogical 
extension is thoroughly ampliative because it involves taking what we know from one specific 
domain and engaging in “the extension of its content,” rather than in simply “reformulating” it.  
In doing so, though, a logical weakness can now be seen to arise.  Analogical reasoning cannot 
necessitate truth-preservation across the steps of investigation, from source to target domain, as it 
were.  Preservation cannot be achieved because analogy involves moving from a well-known, 
well-observed source domain to a less-known, less or even un-observed target domain.  In other 
words, with analogy we are usually trying to extend our knowledge to the unobserved or less 
observed through purposeful amplification.  We thereby extend the content of our knowledge as 
well.  We say more than is included in the content of the source domain.  We do not simply 
“reformulate” the content of that domain, but instead analogically extend its content.  Truth 
cannot be preserved because we are (inductively) taking a “mental leap” (to use Thagard’s 
phrase) into a less well-known space. 
This contrast regarding the relative amplification of content during deductive and 
inductive argument, respectively, illuminates the real force behind the challenge posed by 
proponents of deductive reasoning in politics, or “deductivists,” as I will now refer to them.  
People who bristle at my focus on analogy may object to my proposal not only because its focus 
on analogy is prone to certain weaknesses (e.g., spuriousness, an open evidence class), or even 
because they believe good decision-making should start with the general and then move to the 
particular.  Rather, they bristle at my analogy-driven proposal because it abandons a tried and 
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true method of reasoning that has a long track record of success that may reach back as far as 
Euclid’s geometry.  This tried and true method is the method of nonampliative reasoning that 
merely reformulates the content from which reasoning proceeds.  Given its rich history, as well 
as the historical and geographical access humanity has had to this method through access to 
Euclidean geometry, and given also its well-documented, logical underpinnings, such 
deductivists clearly bristle at my proposal on account of the “leap” it demands of citizens and 
democratic theorists alike.  They do not want leaps in deliberation, but long, elegant chains of 
deductive reformulation and nonampliative reasoning.   
Of course, the “leaps” I advocate are essentially the same as the leap away from 
nonampliative reasoning and into the “mental leaps” of wildly ampliative, analogical reasoning.  
Though I may have established successfully that analogical reasoning has advanced beyond the 
crude form frequently associated with John Stuart Mill’s highly influential System of Logic, 
deductivists may still bristle at my proposal because the entrenched systematicity of analogical 
reasoning is not the tried and true systematicity of deduction … that is, the careful reformulation 
of self-evident principles of reason or intuition (e.g., principles of respect and reciprocity 
championed by deliberative democrats) across long, elegant chains of reasoning.  Rather, the 
systematicity of analogical reasoning is the systematicity of the “guess and check” worldview of 
contemporary cognitive science, rather than the classical systematicity of geometric proof. 
In light of this larger intellectual backdrop, the larger rationale behind the objection to my 
proposal identified in this section may best be described as the “deductivist’s challenge.”  
Essentially, this “challenge” to my proposal is motivated by the belief that anyone should bristle 
at my proposal’s focus on inductive, analogical reasoning, because citizens should be engaged in 
deliberative demonstration (i.e., nonampliative inference, the reformulation of principles), rather 
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than deliberative leaps.  In short, my proposal errors in opting for a nonclassical, cognitive, 
entrenched systematicity instead of the historically beloved classical systematicity long taught 
and revered through Euclidean geometry. 
 
Deflating the Deductivist’s Challenge 
 In defense of my proposal, several weaknesses internal to the deductivist’s challenge 
might be identified; however, for present purposes, one weakness is especially serious.  The 
overarching target of the current project is to defend deliberative democracy against the 
indeterminacy worry.  As I described this worry, many have been concerned that deliberative 
democracy is such an indeterminate theoretical tool, that it actually offers little real guidance for 
real politics.  This worry about the indeterminacy of deliberative democracy has taken three 
forms, which I labeled above under the following titles: (1) pragmatic indeterminacy; (2) 
informational indeterminacy; (3) first-personal indeterminacy.   
In brief, these three forms might be summarized as follows.  According to the first, 
pragmatic form of the indeterminacy worry, some contend that deliberation is so time 
consuming, that a real life deliberative democracy would never be able to actually make 
decisions in a sufficiently timely manner to be successful as a political system.  Others express a 
concern about the informational indeterminacy of deliberative democracy, claiming that 
deliberation offers only vague, unhelpful guidance in the face of the pluralism and self-
contradiction that pervades modern societies.  As a result, the practicality of deliberative 
democracy disappears when it is applied to modern societies.  Finally, still others claim that 
whatever happens under the name of “democratic deliberation” has so vague and indeterminate a 
connection to the first-personal perspective from which citizens actually make real, life-changing 
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decisions as to render it practically insignificant.  This concern is the third, first-personal form of 
the indeterminacy worry. 
 Given the overarching target of the present project, the “biggest threat” to the 
deductivist’s challenge would be that it not only fails to offset the indeterminacy worry in one 
form or another, but worse yet, actually contributes to it.  In this section, I will turn to the 
arguments Gerald Gaus develops to support the third (3), “first-personal” variant of the 
indeterminacy worry.  In doing so, I intend to show that this “biggest threat” is a real threat, one 
that identifies a real weakness internal to the deductivist’s approach to deliberation, and 
therefore, the “challenge” they direct towards my deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c) as 
well.  More specifically, I will explore Gaus’s claim that the indeterminacy arises not despite the 
principled, universalistic form of reasoning championed by the deductivist and so many 
deliberative democrats alike, but precisely because of this principled, universalistic form of 
reasoning.   
In addition to deflating the deductivist’s challenge, this response also serves two 
methodological purposes in the larger course of the present project.  First, by deflating the 
deductivist’s challenge, it leads naturally into the next challenge to my project that needs to be 
dealt with, namely, the humanist’s challenge.  Second, it provides an important motivation and 
set-up for the next chapter’s third, philosophical formulation of my deliberative outlets proposal.  
This connection to the next chapter emerges naturally from the fact that my response to the 
deductivist’s challenge in this section will do little to argue that my own focus on inductive, 
analogical argument is superior to the deductive one.  Instead, my response merely deflates the 
challenge advanced by the deductivist, showing that as long as the indeterminacy worry is a 
major concern, the deductivist has little reason to bristle at my proposal.  Being a mere deflation 
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of the deductivist’s challenge, a stronger defense of my focus on inductive, analogical argument 
may still seem like a gaping hole in my analysis.  Consequently, the present response to the 
deductivist’s challenge sets up the need to develop a third, more philosophical formulation of my 
deliberative outlets proposal in the next chapter (DOP.a-c).  However, since that formulation can 
only proceed after the philosophical structure of deductivism has been analyzed, the present 
sequence of investigation is necessary to both motivate and set up the topic of the next chapter. 
Before I turn explicitly to Gaus’s arguments against the use of principled reasoning by 
deliberative democrats, it may be best, for explanatory purposes, to preface that more technical 
discussion with a description of its guiding intuition.  The intuition goes as follows.  We might 
usually think that in a democracy, in which different people with different beliefs come together 
to figure out a solution to a problem, deliberation is unlikely to get anywhere if people simply 
take turns describing all of their beliefs and desires.  First, that kind of global exchange of 
information is impractical, being impossibly time consuming (i.e, pragmatic indeterminacy).  If 
we surveyed every belief that is potentially implicated in what we take to be relevant to solving a 
problem, deliberation would become a practical impossibility.  For instance, we might find it 
necessary to describe even very simple and obvious beliefs that we take for granted, such as the 
belief that water is an effective way to combat conventional fires in homes or forests.  Second, it 
might seem to make collective agreement on the best decision less likely.  Discussion would 
devolve into debate about beliefs that might seem to have nothing to do with the problem, but 
which are highly divisive.  For example, if people are deliberating about a policy related to 
sidewalk safety in their community, and if a citizen mentions a metaphysical belief about the 
nature of the self or the afterlife, deliberation is likely to become side-tracked and to even 
stagnate in divisive disagreement about these practically irrelevant beliefs. 
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 Thus, when deliberative democrats invoke principles as the starting point or fundamental 
reference points for framing democratic deliberation, they could easily be seen to be helping the 
cause of deliberation.  What they seek is a starting point that is both relevant and non-divisive.  
Citizens will start from common beliefs, not simply all of their beliefs, and more importantly, 
they will start with context-transcending beliefs that apply regardless of any particular political 
situation’s details.  Whether the deliberation is focused on sidewalk safety in their community or 
public displays of political speech on private property, principles like equal respect still apply.202  
Proceeding forward from these principles to the global sets of beliefs citizens hold individually 
more generally, there will be some kind of constraint, or as Benhabib describes it, some kind of 
“normative constraint” that keeps deliberation focused.  If deliberation begins with a reference to 
equal respect, for instance, citizens may find that this principle, which all can be expected to 
endorse so long as all seek fair terms of cooperation, precludes mention of certain beliefs.  A 
divisive belief about the relative superiority of some persons will not be expressible without 
violating the principle.  As a result, instead of having massive, global sets of beliefs with 
indeterminate relevance to the problem at hand, principles provide a starting point that lends 
greater determinacy to deliberation by narrowing down the range of content that can be entered 
into deliberation. 
 As Gaus observes, though, this “principled” starting point may intuitively seem to 
simplify deliberation and structure it more determinately, but that intuition is misguided.  To see 
why, Gaus invites us to consider the divergent implications such principled starting points have 
for two individuals, Alf and Betty, whose beliefs and desires overlap at some points, but diverge 
at other points.203  One might better understand Gaus’s approach if one thinks of a Venn diagram 
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for these two individuals.  According to this diagram, each of these individuals would have a 
circle representing total beliefs and desires, and those two circles would be set atop one another 
such that an area of overlapping beliefs/desires can be seen, but without eliminating divergent 
areas representing beliefs and desires that are not held in common.   
 
 
Figure 6: Venn Diagram of Gaus’s Example 
 
Gaus assigns the name “Alf” and “Betty” to these two individuals (which I have done in the 
diagram above).204  He refers to the overlap between their respective “circles” of beliefs/desires 
with the Greek letter “χ” (Chi, pronounced “kaɪ”).  He then refers to the area representing Alf’s 
divergent beliefs/desires with the Greek letter “α” (Alpha), with Betty’s respective divergent 
beliefs/desires area represented with the Greek letter “β” (Beta).  Accordingly, Alf’s 
beliefs/desires are equivalent to χ+α, while Betty’s are equivalent to χ+β. 
 As Gaus points out, democratic theorists rarely observe the divergent implications for Alf 
and Betty that would arise if both began by recognizing a shared belief from χ, such as a 
principle, and then proceeded to a second stage of deliberation in which the principle’s bearing 
on the larger set of beliefs they do not share is considered.  In other words, the situation Gaus is 
describing is one in which two individuals begin with some shared belief (Stage 1 of 
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deliberation), and then proceed to a second, “first-personal” stage of deliberation in which they 
also take into account all of their beliefs, even those not shared (Stage 2 of deliberation).  
Formally described, this two-stage deliberation moves from χ to χ+?, where “?” stands for the 
larger set of beliefs each individual holds privately, or “first-personally” (e.g., for Alf, χ+α).  To 
see the rarely observed, divergent implications Gaus wishes to draw attention towards, he asks us 
to consider the two “implausible” conditions that would be necessary for different individuals 
involved in this two-stage deliberation to converge in their ultimate conclusions when 
deliberating. 
According to the first condition (i), convergence could be achieved if, contrary to the 
implications of the above Venn diagram, individuals involved in deliberation actually had the 
same exact sets of beliefs.  In other words, if Alf and Betty had identical beliefs (if α=β), the shift 
from the first, “shared” stage of deliberation to the second, “first-personal” stage, would yield a 
convergent result.  Gaus declares that this possibility can safely be set aside since it amounts to 
treating deliberators as nothing more than “perfect clones.”205  In short, if democratic theory is 
concerned with “real people in general, not just perfect clones,” then (i) will readily be rejected 
as a preposterous impossibility.  Citizens of a democracy, or even real agents in general, never 
begin deliberation with an identical set of beliefs.  Thus, (i) can safely be set aside.   
By way of the second condition (ii), convergence could be achieved only if, as Gaus 
summarizes the idea, “what they initially believed had no effect on their final set of beliefs.”206  
This summary needs to be “unpacked” for many philosophers, because “it has been attractive to 
many in the history of epistemology.”207  To unpack this summary, Gaus asks us to allow for 
absolutely impractical assumptions about the rational capacities of those individuals involved in 
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the two-stage process of deliberation described above.  For instance, in the case of Alf and Betty, 
he allows us to assume (even though it is also a practical impossibility) that Alf and Betty “Each 
suddenly has the highest possible powers of reasoning (whatever that means), each sees all the 
inferences from his or her fully held beliefs and can see precisely, and immediately, the 
maximally coherent and consistent set of beliefs that result.”208  Highlighting how practically 
impossible this assumption is, Gaus quotes Isaac Levi, who described such “Herculean” 
reasoners as the equivalent to “philosophical moonshine.”209   
Part of what makes this assumption so ridiculous, Gaus points out, is that we have to 
assume that the norms, criteria, ideals, etc. with which Alf and Betty guide their reasoning are 
completely shared.210  The Herculean assumption only works if we believe that these guides for 
reasoning belong to χ, rather than to the non-shared sets of beliefs each holds apart from one 
another.  In a world in which specialists in epistemology, let alone logic, divide over the criteria 
that should guide reasoning (e.g., is “relevance” logically essential to ideal reasoning?), this 
supposition does indeed form a kind of “philosophical moonshine.”  Even Socrates seems to 
have changed his mind, from the early dialogues to the later ones, about the guidelines we should 
adopt in reasoning.211 
Nonetheless, Gaus asks us to consider this “Herculean” possibility as the basis for 
convergence among Alf and Betty as they deliberate.  In their Herculean form, we would expect 
Alf and Betty to both start out with some shared principle from χ, and to then rationally reflect 
on its bearing on other shared beliefs in χ.  Being identically Herculean reasoners, we would 
thereby expect that Alf and Betty would ultimately transform χ into a “maximally coherent set,” 
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or an idealized version of χ Gaus refers to as “χ*”.  Turning to the same exact content, χ, with the 
same exact rational capacities, they would ferret out inconsistencies (especially with their initial 
principle), bring every belief into rational coherence, and converge on the absolute, “maximally 
coherent set.”  This expectation seems intuitive and obvious, given our Herculean assumption 
about Alf and Betty.   
However, a problem arises when we turn our Herculean Alf and Betty to the next stage of 
deliberation (Stage 2’s “first-personal” deliberation, or χ+?).  When Alf and Betty transform their 
“first-personal” beliefs by applying their identically Herculean rational capacities to α and β, 
respectively, will the “same outcome” result?  Will the outcomes of their Herculean efforts at 
Stage 2 also converge, as they did at the first stage?  Will χ+α and χ+β be identical?  Gaus 
articulates three possibilities in this scenario: 
(i) Alf rejects all of α and Betty rejects all of β; (ii) whatever elements of α that Alf 
retains, Betty adopts and whatever elements of β that Betty retains, Alf adopts; (iii) Alf 
and/or Betty retain some elements of his or her belief set that the other does not adopt.212 
 
In the first (i) case, Herculean reasoning has transformed χ+α and χ+β into χ*, creating total 
convergence by simply jettisoning “first-personal” beliefs en masse.  In the second (ii) case, we 
get a new, identical set of beliefs in place of α and β, which is to say, we get convergence into a 
new set through idealized transformation of the beliefs into a maximally coherent set (we might 
call it “γ*” to reflect both its difference and its idealization).  In the third (iii) case, total 
convergence is not achieved. 
 It is easy to see how the first possibility (i) is a poor response to the problem created by 
this scenario.  Simply jettisoning “first-personal” beliefs and sticking to χ* may render beliefs 
consistent, but it is unlikely to manifest the idealized reasoning we have in mind when we think 
of Alf and Betty as Herculean in their rational capacities.  Rationality is more than “whittling” 
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down one’s beliefs to make them consistent.  To simply attain consistency by believing less, by 
claiming to no longer have as many beliefs, and therefore, no longer have as much room for error 
in the form of inconsistency, is not to be an ideal, Herculean reasoner.  Rather, we would expect 
a rational Hercules to have more than two consistent beliefs.  To use the term Gaus exploits to 
make this point intuitive, “richness” matters in moral psychology.213  A rational Hercules is 
someone with lots of beliefs that have been rendered consistent, not someone who feigns no 
belief about anything except for a small handful of consistent commitments. 
The second (ii) possibility, Gaus summarily rejects as a general possibility in human 
deliberation for the same reason he believes (and we are likely to intuit) that the third possibility 
(iii), will proliferate in a scenario like this one, namely, there obtains a fundamental difference 
between: 





(k) bringing them into accord with χ* by simply letting them be (because they already  
cohere with χ*). 
 
In other words, we may turn to the task of making our beliefs consistent only to discover that 
they are (j) in need of serious revision because they conflict, or we may discover (k) that our 
beliefs are already consistent.  To make one of these discoveries rather than another is no small 
deal, Gaus maintains.  To change our beliefs and to find them perfectly acceptable in their 
consistency “as is” are two qualitatively different discoveries during deliberation.  Given this 
qualitative difference, a fundamental difference obtains when answering the question posed by 
χ*+? Ultimately leads us to discover a need to (j) change what we believe to make it cohere with 
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χ*, and when that question leads us to (k) discover no change is necessary because our beliefs 
already cohere. 
 If we allow for this fundamental difference, we can see why this second possibility (ii) is 
so unlikely or rare in human deliberation.  Stage 2’s Herculean transformation will mean 
different things for different individuals, so long as they differ at all in their respective, unshared, 
individual, private beliefs.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that different people will arrive at the same 
exact beliefs, which is to say, the second possibility (ii) will obtain.  If the implications of 
applying χ* diverge in their meaning or significance for individuals with even slightly divergent 
sets of first-personal beliefs, some will resist implications that call for change, while others will 
welcome those implications on account of the fact that their personal beliefs already cohere with 
them.  For instance, if part of what χ* implies is a specific belief about the causal efficacy of 
prayer, then if Alf is a committed practitioner of prayer, he will balk at revising his religious 
beliefs to make them reflect that specific belief about the causal efficacy of prayer.  By contrast, 
if Betty has always maintained that people are delusional when they expect their prayers to 
impact the world, she will welcome the implications of χ* for her own, individual, “first-
personal” set of beliefs.  As a result, the implications of χ* for Alf and Betty are divergent 
implications.   
 
Strengthening Gaus’s Point 
To fully grasp the force of Gaus’s point, though, more needs to be said about the deeper, 
human point he is making.  The phrase “divergent implications” can seem cold and logical.  
Gaus’s point, though, is supposed to carry a kind of “existential force.”  From their “first-
personal” points of view, the experience of deliberation for Alf and Betty will be tremendously 
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different or “divergent.”  To discover during deliberation that one needs to change what one 
holds dear is a very different experience, from the first-personal point of view of the deliberator, 
from discovering that (oh look!) one had the correct beliefs all along!  Philosophers sometimes 
use the technical term “phenomenology” to refer to this first-personal, experiential dimension of 
deliberation.214  Here, the term “phenomenology” stands for the richly experiential, first-
personal, lived dimension of the acting person.  In other words, here the “phenomenological” 
dimension stands for the point of view of the person who really makes the decision from which 
an action (e.g., voting) actually follows.  Thus, to re-describe Gaus’s point as being concerned 
with phenomenologically divergent implications, as I will do here, is to explicitly stress that the 
difference is not a logical one, but rather a richly experiential, lived difference between Alf and 
Betty during their experience of decision-making. 
However, often people balk at any arguments focused on the phenomenology of 
deliberation.  People may ask, why should anyone care about the experience of deliberation?  
Don’t arguments focused on phenomenology presuppose all kinds of questionable and 
contentious assumptions about freedom of the will, or the irreducible nature of human 
consciousness to brain states?215  When the metaphysical problem of the freedom of the will is 
not just a scholarly topic of debate, but a topic in popular culture as well, to invoke the 
phenomenological dimension of these divergent implications may seem like a contentious move.   
Thus, if, as I have just claimed, the full, existential force of Gaus’s point can best be grasped by 
tying it to the “phenomenology of deliberation,” this skepticism about the significance of human 
phenomenology needs to be addressed.   
Fortunately, as I intend to use the term “phenomenology,” where one stands in these 
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topics doesn’t render the “first-personal” dimension of deliberation with which I am concerned 
insignificant.  This statement may seem surprising.  Isn’t “phenomenology” as the experience of 
deliberation essentially tied up with where people stand in debates about human consciousness 
and the role of the will in determining behavior?  Against this popular tendency to connect the 
experiential aspect of phenomenology with specific stances in these contentious debates, I would 
return our attention to the first-personal aspect as it appeared in my description of real 
democratic deliberation in the second chapter.  When the citizenry thinks about majority rule 
procedures and their associated practices, I argued, it is not only their actual day of use, but also 
the anticipation of their use that lends them real political and deliberative significance.  With an 
election “on the horizon,” a campaign season of ramped up discourse, debate, and dialogue is 
catalyzed.  In other words, how the citizenry anticipates an election is essential to understanding 
how they experience it as deliberative, rather than as a mere practical necessity (as deliberative 
democratic theorists tend to portray practices associated with majority rule). 
Where that analysis asks that we approach political deliberation in terms of its 
anticipatory structure, I would now ask that we do the same with the first-personal deliberation 
associated with the term “phenomenology.”  How is the first-personal, phenomenological 
dimension of deliberation a matter of human anticipation?  Historically, some of the most 
influential figures working on phenomenology have often answered similar questions by 
considering how we engage entities in the world typically in terms of some “prior anticipations. 
For instance, Edmund Husserl saw human anticipation as a way to deal with the limited 
perspective of “straight-forward perception.”216  As Victor Biceaga colorfully conveys Husserl’s 
phenomenological approach, if perception was not always already laden with prior anticipations 
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about what we are about to perceive, then a sudden turn of the head would create “perceptual 
shock” as we would encounter an unexpected and very different perceptual field all of a 
sudden.217  Similarly, when we see an object, we only see one side of it in straight-forward 
perceptual terms.  However, because we are typically always already anticipating how the other 
sides of the object would look as we move around it, the object reveals itself to us in a richer way 
than would otherwise be possible.  The meaning of the object is more fulfilling, expansive, and 
revelatory, when it is constituted in association with what we anticipate from further engagement 
with that object.218  As Biceaga concisely states the significance of such prior anticipations for 
Husserl’s philosophy, they provide the “defining mark” of phenomenology, at least in the 
context of Husserl’s work.219 
In the present context, I will adapt the term “phenomenology” from this traditional, 
Husserlian usage to explicitly mark out where I believe prior anticipations play an important role 
in what might otherwise seem like a narrow, more “straight-forward” process of decision-making 
(i.e., Stage 1).  In doing so, it can more readily be seen that collective deliberation of a Herculean 
form (χ*) is just as narrow as the “straight-forward” perception of an object from one side.  
Recall that the object has other sides, the anticipation of which was said to sometimes increase 
the richness of engagement with it.  Analogously, during collective deliberation, we may arrive 
at a Herculean form of agreement on some set of beliefs about what to do; however, that 
engagement is always enriched by our anticipation of how our other beliefs will impact that 
collective set.  We do not simply and totally silence the relevance of our other commitments 
when we deliberate collectively as Herculean reasoners.  Such a total silence would be hard won, 
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if not psychologically impossible.   
Even more significantly, silencing our anticipation of the effect of deliberation on our 
other commitments might be described in terms of a profound inauthenticity (in the sense of the 
term passed down by Romanticism to non-technical usage, rather than the sense of the term as 
defined in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy).220  To “cling” to one narrow set of 
considerations (i.e., the shared ones, or “χ”) while other, deeply relevant, personally significant 
ones suggest themselves as important to us in the form of a nagging question ( χ*+?), is to only 
“feign” a genuine understanding of those considerations.221  To the extent that we understand 
their meaning by ignoring their larger significance, we do not genuinely understand them at all.  
One is not treating the collective, shared considerations that occupy the first stage (Stage 1) of 
deliberation as one’s own, to the extent that one creates a barrier between those considerations 
and the other commitments one holds dear.  One fails to “appropriate” the process of Herculean 
reason as one’s own reasoning or deliberation.   
Roughly cast in terms of such inauthenticity, one can start to see more clearly why 
Gaus’s point poses a serious, existential threat as much as a logical threat.  Insofar as our other 
commitments capture ways in which things matter to us, something first-personally significant is 
lost if the first, collective, Herculean stage of deliberation (Stage 1) is conducted in total isolation 
from its anticipated effect on what matters to us individually (Stage 2).  Just as something about 
our engagement with objects would be lost if we did not anticipate our engagement with their 
other sides, so too something about deliberation is lost when we bracket its anticipated effect on 
what matters to us individually.  What is lost?  In a word, its “phenomenology” is lost.  
Moreover, with this loss there is not only a problem of inauthenticity, but a problem of 
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determining individual courses of action.  If people must deliberate in isolation from any 
anticipated resonance with what matters to them broadly speaking, how can we expect the results 
of that deliberation (Stage 1) to actually be decisive in determining what will ultimately be done? 
The existential grip or human dimension of Gaus’s point now comes into clearer view.  
What he is pointing out is not just a logical consequence, nor is it just an issue related to human 
consciousness or willpower.  Rather, the point is simply that when deliberating collectively, 
people simultaneously anticipate how that deliberation will impact their other commitments, 
many of which are deeply significant to them personally.  Alf may giddily anticipate that his 
other beliefs are almost “ahead of their time,” while Betty anticipates a rough ‘experience’ of 
belief revision.  Alf may breathe a sigh of relief as collective deliberation settles to a close, 
anticipating (as he did throughout) that his other commitments will remain intact.   
Or perhaps if Alf is scheduled to present his educational research at a conference next 
month, he may be anticipating during the deliberative process (Stage 1) that the research’s policy 
implications do not need to be revised.  By contrast, Betty does not breathe a sigh of relief, but 
feels a pang of anxiety about how she is going to explain herself to friends familiar with her 
passionate dismissal of equality of opportunity as an ethical ideal every time it comes up in the 
news or casual conversation.  As these contrasts between the anticipated implications of the 
collective deliberation (Stage 1) between Alf and Betty are meant to vividly illustrate, the 
implications of collective deliberation for people can be divergent in a deeply personal, 
phenomenological (i.e., anticipatory) way.  One way of concisely capturing this 
phenomenological divergence is to describe it as the result of an open-ended question about what 
is implied by collective deliberation (Stage 1) for what matters to deliberators individually.  The 
previous notation, “χ*+?,” was meant to effectively capture precisely this open-ended question.  
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For Alf, his anticipation of how that question (χ*+?) will be answered (i.e., χ*+α) diverges 
radically from Betty’s anticipation of how that question will be answered (i.e., χ*+β).   
Notably, the way I am using “phenomenology” as a term here to describe the human, 
existential grip of Gaus’s point is unlikely to shift much in significance, depending on where 
people stand in contentious debates about the freedom of the will or the nature of human 
consciousness.  For instance, those subscribing to the causal force of human will power often 
describe the manifestation of that causal force in phenomenological terms.  For them, the 
exercise of the will just is the capacity that allows us to anticipate certain behavioral and 
psychological changes (or inertia).  When the will issues a decision, then beliefs and overt 
behavior are anticipated to change.  As Robert Brandom declares, “Having a rational will … can 
be understood as having the capacity to respond reliably to one’s acknowledgement of a 
commitment (of a norm as binding on one) by differentially producing performances 
corresponding to the content of the commitment acknowledged.”222  In the other words, those 
who, like Brandom, concern themselves with human willpower leave ample space for 
phenomenology in their account, insofar as they tie the very meaning of having a will at all to 
anticipated impact on “performance.”  More concisely stated, to the extent that what we 
acknowledge with a decisive act of the will actually “makes a difference,” Brandom maintains, 
we are being rational creatures, for as he writes, “we are rational creatures exactly insofar as our 
acknowledgement of discursive commitments (both doxastic and practical) makes a difference to 
what we go on to do.”223 
 Alternatively, some people object to framing human action around the causal force of 
human will power as Brandom does.  The phenomenology of deliberation I am describing 
                                                
222 Brandom, Robert (2001). “Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning,” in Varieties of Practical Reasoning. ed. 
Elijah Millgram. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 477. 
223 ibid. 
   162 
nonetheless occupies an important place in this alternative philosophy of action as well.  Though 
it is not identified with a distinct faculty that is added to the process of deliberation to initiate 
action in a causal chain of events, it still appears as a real dimension of a larger process of action 
lacking linear structure, but being phenomenologically structured none the less.224  According to 
this philosophy of action, complex patterns of behavior unfold from myriad psychological 
considerations without a clear, linear path that can be traced to some psychological moment that 
“caused” that behavior.  Much as a musician’s improvisational solo unfolds a complex 
behavioral pattern from merely thinking a bit about the relevant scale to be played and which 
fingerings on the instrument fall within that scale, so too action is sometimes seen to stake out an 
indirect, nonlinear relationship of self-activity, rather than a linear causal path from 
psychological content to behavior.   
For present purposes, what matters is that even without a single, decisive, willful moment 
of action in which behavioral and psychological changes come to be expected, a 
phenomenological dimension still obtains.  The musical improviser may be so well-studied, 
trained, and habituated in the use of a given scale, that a solo within the confines of that scale 
flows without much thought beyond deciding which scale to adhere to.  Nonetheless, even that 
brief consideration about which scale to adhere to is enough to create expectations about what is 
anticipated to follow as a result.  Even an action as spontaneous as an improvised musical solo 
performance is still laden with anticipation as the person “lets go” and engages in musical self-
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expression, considering little more (perhaps) than the key.  Furthermore, as one proponent of this 
philosophy of action, Charles Larmore, observes, this spontaneity is no less significant though it 
lacks the decisive exercise of willpower, “there is something priceless in the experience of being 
wholly ourselves, of giving ourselves over so entirely to our feelings or actions that we no longer 
look at ourselves through someone else’s eyes.”225  In other words, the anticipated behavior that 
follows from “letting go” during a musical solo performance is still very important, 
experientially, because it has a priceless sense of surrender to some force within ourselves, be it 
our “feelings or actions.” 
Moreover, even if one stakes out a radical position with regard to not only the reality of 
willpower, but even consciousness, the phenomenology I am describing remains a significant 
dimension in human action.  Inspired by computational models of neurobiology, some people 
deny that “consciousness” is a very helpful or even meaningful term for describing human 
decision-making.226  If we were to just stick to descriptions of brain states and patterns of neural 
activity, it is said, we would gain a remarkably richer and more accurate understanding of human 
decision-making than we do by invoking the mysterious, amorphous concept of consciousness.  
Advocates of this “eliminativist” attitude are often used as devil’s advocates against any 
philosophical analysis that depends heavily on phenomenology to make its point.227  However, as 
I have sketched the meaning of phenomenology above, it fits quite snugly into even this radical, 
eliminativist, neurocomputational account of human decision-making.  On this view, people will 
not be described as having (phenomenological) anticipations about which they are conscious, or 
that they consciously expect when they will a course of behavior or change of belief.   
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Nonetheless, from a neurocomputational perspective, decisions are made in ways that are 
thick with anticipation.  Humans make decisions with brains that have roughly 1014 synaptic 
connections.228 As sensory excitation is delivered to this network of synaptic connections, some 
of those connections tend to be excited together, unlike others, and eventually form activation 
patterns.  These activation patterns are synaptic connections that are highly prone to excitation 
when any signal reaches part of the network above a certain threshold.  In other words, the brain 
over time naturally develops a tendency to more easily trigger certain patterns of neural activity 
than others.  Thus, when adult human beings approach a problem to make a decision, they 
always already come to it with a set of easily triggered activation patterns in the background of 
their engagement.  When neural excitation (e.g., visuals, speech, imagined scenarios, etc.) enters 
this background network of activation patterns, that excitation will be met with a predisposition 
to specific forms of neural activity rather than others. 
As Paul Churchland describes this process of deliberation, this confluence of 
predisposition and excitation is effectively described as the meeting up of anticipation or 
expectation and sensory deliverances.  When a certain phrase from another speaker is heard, it is 
met with the predispositions of a background of activation patterns in ways that rapidly trigger a 
wider pattern of neural activity that fills-out its significance and enriches its meaning.  To hear 
someone invoke “property rights,” for instance, is to immediately predispose one to anticipate 
other statements on that person’s behalf in no small amount of time (e.g., regulations directed at 
workplace safety violate a “sacred right”).  In this way, the “meaning” of what our senses deliver 
during deliberation is heavily dependent on what we are predisposed to anticipate from those 
sensory deliverances, based on the training of our nearly countless (1014) synaptic connections 
over time.  As Churchland observes, when we deliberate together, “One must learn to anticipate 
                                                
228 Churchland 2007, 67. 
   165 
the normal unfolding of this ongoing commerce” that is the meeting point of sensory excitation 
and neural predisposition.229   
Notably, insofar as the “individual profile” of these long-accumulated, background 
predispositions constitutes our moral character, they are extremely important to each human 
being personally.  Their slow accumulation across millions of synaptic connections means that 
each predisposition cannot be changed at the drop of a hat, nor through a “sudden conversion.”230  
These are essential to who we are, as they shape how we approach any given decision, and thus, 
are to be taken seriously as a significant, defining factor in deliberation … even if 
“consciousness” plays no role in how that process of deliberation is understood.  In this way, 
these background predispositions acquire the stature of “epistemic assets” (to use a rich phrase 
from Gaus to which I will turn at greater length later), just like any other initial considerations 
that people proudly bring to bear on a deliberative scenario.  Consequently, even from a 
neurocomputational perspective that denies the helpfulness of talking about consciousness, let 
alone willpower, the anticipatory dimension of human deliberation I am referring to here under 
the name of “phenomenology” remains crucial to the process of decision-making.  If people 
adopt a thoroughly neurocomputational approach to human deliberation, the “phenomenology” I 
am describing here still remains central (if not more central).   
 
Further Strengthening Gaus’s Point 
By surveying these varied philosophies of action and their varied positions on the 
metaphysics of the will and the nature of consciousness, I have tried to fend off possible worries 
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that Gaus’s point about phenomenologically divergent implications is heavily dependent on 
contentious views in theoretical philosophy.  As a result, I hope to have prevented some 
otherwise obvious objections to Gaus’s point from arising.  However, more can be said to further 
substantiate the threat posed by phenomenologically divergent implications.  Gaus himself, for 
instance, further substantiates his point by invoking a commitment to what he calls, “the 
principle of conservatism,” which is a streamlined version of a more expansive claim developed 
in his earlier work, namely, “The Principle of Conservation of Beliefs.”231  Gaus marshals a 
number of supporting quotations from other philosophers to pithily express the rationale behind 
this principle in both of these forms.  One of these supporting quotations is especially 
illuminating.  In this quotation, Gilbert Harman argues,  
Your initial beliefs and intentions have a privileged position in the sense that you begin 
with them rather than with nothing at all or with a special privileged part of those beliefs 
and intentions serving as data.232   
 
In this quotation, the rationale behind phenomenological divergence is illuminated by connecting 
it to the initial starting point of deliberation.  When we deliberate, our starting point is the beliefs 
we already have (or the pertinent ones at least).  Starting with those beliefs, rather than “nothing 
at all” is very important, even crucial, to the process of deliberation.  We start with those beliefs 
not because we just so happen to have them, but because we assume they have a “privileged 
position” in the sea of possible considerations that might be brought to bear on an issue or 
problem.   
This observation’s guiding rationale is expertly revealed by the contrast Harman uses to 
concisely capture its force.  The alternative to assigning a privileged position to our initial beliefs 
is to start with “nothing at all,” i.e., from “scratch” in our deliberations.  To start from scratch in 
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deliberation seems not only wildly impractical (e.g., time consuming), but more importantly, to 
infringe upon an important experiential dimension of deliberation.  We begin deliberation not as 
people with “nothing at all” to offer as initial considerations, but rather, with something worth 
contributing.  That “something” may be as unsophisticated as the knowledge that conventional 
fires at homes or in forests are effectively fought with water; or it may be highly sophisticated 
knowledge, even “counterintuitive” knowledge about the fact that taking on more debt 
effectively combats financial crisis in a national economy, but not in home finances.  Either way, 
our initial beliefs have a “privileged position” which we experience as being privileged.  In the 
phenomenology of deliberation, what we initially believe may (j) require revision, or (k) be 
correct after all, but that ultimate outcome will yield different deliberative experiences for people 
depending on what they were proud to “privilege” initially when deliberation began.   
 Harman’s illuminating contrast explains why Gaus describes the substantiating rationale 
behind phenomenological divergence with the phrase “conservation of beliefs” and the term 
“conservativism,” when he claims that his point rests on larger epistemic principles.  Given the 
need to avoid starting with “nothing at all,” we should reasonably expect some conservation of 
beliefs in our deliberation.  Gaus further clarifies this “conservative,” substantiating rationale in 
his own words, when he writes, “Now I think this must be roughly right; though we want 
coherence, we seek to purchase it as cheaply as possible, by giving up as few beliefs as 
possible.”233  The “conservative” element in the principle underlying phenomenological 
divergence is in many ways a practical principle.  Gaus offers an intuitive encapsulation of this 
substantiating rationale by articulating it as a commitment to experiencing our beliefs not as 
brute logical entities, but rather as “epistemic assets.”  Each belief is an epistemic asset because 
we treat it as a benefit we seek to accrue, all the while training a constant eye on the related 
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costs, just like a “smart consumer.”234   
Gaus explores this idea of an “epistemic asset” approach to beliefs at some length, 
ultimately teasing out its significance for debates in epistemology related to intuitionism and 
foundationalism.  For present purposes, though, this “intuitive” encapsulation of the rationale 
behind phenomenological divergence is sufficient.  It helpfully substantiates the claim that Alf 
and Betty encounter a serious, human issue when their beliefs call for different amounts of 
revision.  There is a markedly different deliberative experience, or phenomenology, when one (j) 
has to change one’s initial beliefs, versus when one (k) discovers that those initial beliefs are 
already correct.  The experience is different, and significantly so, because we approach 
deliberation not with empty hands, but rather with some initial set of beliefs we assume to be 
privileged among the sea of possible considerations that could be brought to bear on the topic of 
deliberation.  Loosely speaking, the point is that phenomenologically divergent implications are 
a real problem because we privilege our current beliefs over every other possible belief … we are 
“proud of them.”  We would rather start with our initial beliefs as “something” worth considering 
than “nothing at all.”  In this sense, deliberation begins with an assumed conservation of beliefs 
as epistemic assets that should be changed minimally, not simply cast back into the sea of 
considerations as just more content to be canvassed eventually. 
Axel Honneth further illuminates the human side of these phenomenologically divergent 
implications, our “epistemic assets” are not only “beliefs” about the world, but also beliefs about 
the social world.  Honneth writes, “For people who enjoy moral respect, obligations arising from 
social relationships normally act as limiting conditions on their moral deliberations … .”235  
People who are recognized and thereby respected in their social spheres (e.g., the family, 
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community, work, etc.) enter practices of collective deliberation with related beliefs about what 
they owe to others in these social spheres.  These beliefs may involve “norms of parenthood, 
collegiality, or friendship that determine our personal identity … .”236  They are particular to our 
social spheres and the relationships we have within those times and places.  Particular as they 
may be to these contexts, though, they cannot simply be bracketed out of collective deliberation.   
As Honneth argues, once we “ignore this context, as soon as we act as if we were not 
already committed to certain elementary norms, the fiction of an uninhibited subject arises, one 
that must derive all its principles from the abstract perspective of universal humanity.”237  To 
deliberate about universally acceptable principles and commitments with which to solve a 
problem (i.e., to pursue χ*), while ignoring our first-personal commitments, creates a social form 
of phenomenological divergence as well in the form of a “fictional subject” without a personal 
identity or obligating relationships.  To be Herculean reasoners, we must bracket not only our 
other, “first-personal” beliefs related to our individual lives, but also “first-personal” beliefs we 
have about our social world and what we owe to some others in that variegated space of highly 
divergent social roles.  Thus, to ask that someone bracket “first-personal” beliefs will create a 
socially significant form of phenomenologically divergent implications as well.  We must forget 
the norms of parenthood, collegiality, friendship, and social identity for the time being; however, 
what is decided while those socially relevant “first-personal” beliefs are bracketed will mean 
highly divergent things for people with divergent social roles.   
As a result, whatever aims are established during Herculean deliberation “will ultimately 
lack any personalized character,” which Honneth argues runs a number of risks, including 
tendencies towards “social isolation,” “abandonment of all personal identity,” the forgetting of 
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“immediate obligations,” and other “pathologies of moral freedom” associated with the “rigid 
moralism” of Herculean reasoners.238  Such “pathological” risks help illuminate the problem 
posed by phenomenologically divergent implications.  Herculean reasoning demands not only 
that we bracket those epistemic assets related to what we know about the world or our own past 
lives, but also the “value that social relationships and attachments have for the totality of a 
person’s life.”239 
 
Gaus and Deductivism 
 We can now see why Gaus’s arguments are relevant to meeting the deductivist’s 
challenge.  As I mentioned earlier, Gaus’s analysis is focused on the third (3), “first-personal” 
variation on the indeterminacy worry.  As this discussion of the phenomenology of deliberation 
shows, he is very much concerned with the first-personal dimension of decision-making.  With 
regard to the deductivist’s challenge, this concern is relevant because he exploits it to show an 
internal weakness within any account of deliberation that begins with a shared belief … as the 
principled deliberation championed by deductivist deliberative democrats surely does.  More 
specifically, even if we start with the most wildly unrealistic, Herculean deliberators anyone can 
imagine, a form of “first-personal” indeterminacy will erupt from the internal assumptions of 
principled deliberation.  Instead of allowing us to safely set aside those beliefs that divide us, 
deliberation that sets out from shared terrain creates a phenomenological divergence among 
those individuals involved because they are “proud” of their initial beliefs.  The implications that 
arise when the principle is applied during deliberation will demand divergent, 
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phenomenologically easier or harder changes to the initial beliefs every citizen brings to 
decision-making with a certain amount of pride.   
Given this phenomenological divergence, we should then expect that when citizens turn 
from their shared considerations to what they each, individually, personally believe-d at the onset 
of deliberation (i.e., Stage 2), indeterminacy will erupt.  For some citizens like Alf, what was 
believed (j) requires little revision.  For others like Betty, (k) massive revision to what was 
initially believed is called for.  In the face of these divergent experiences at the second stage of 
deliberation, the question of what has been decided during deliberation is completely re-opened.  
Someone like Alf, we can safely assume, is going to simply continue with the trajectory of 
collective deliberation and act on what was decided there.  After all, it implies exactly what Alf 
believed already.  By contrast, for someone like Betty, the question will be completely re-
opened, regarding what to actually adopt as a course of action.  In the face of a collective 
decision that requires the wholesale abandonment of her epistemic assets (i.e., initial beliefs), or 
even just major revision to them, someone like Betty is very likely going to find it necessary to 
re-start deliberation all over again.  In short, however successful citizens like Alf and Betty may 
be at arriving at a collectively endorsed set of beliefs (χ*), their convergence on those beliefs 
says nothing determinate about the decision each will make individually when they step back 
and allow their “first-personal” beliefs back into deliberation.  Convergence at χ* yields only 
convergence at χ*, not at χ*+?.   
This point is worth repeating.  We often like to think that if people reasoned collectively 
from a shared principle as their first premise, a determinate outcome for their own particular 
decisions would be forthcoming.  Even more so, we like to think that if they reasoned in this way 
with identical, Herculean rigor, then the resulting convergence in shared beliefs, χ*, would give 
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us a clear sense of what each would decide individually.  For instance, if collectively deliberating 
citizens Alf and Betty arrive at χ*, and that set includes a decisive consideration about how to act 
politically (e.g., whether to revolt), we would expect the actions each would pursue individually 
afterwards to reflect that decisive consideration and to be convergent as well (e.g., both Alf and 
Betty would revolt).  However, if Gaus is right, divergent implications will arise the moment Alf 
or Betty considers to any degree the implications of this convergence on their initial beliefs, 
which are epistemic assets.  Alf may suddenly find what was a “decisive consideration” is too 
distasteful in its consequences for his religious practices (i.e., some of his epistemic assets), 
which ask that one respect tradition and not overthrow it.  Betty by contrast, may find that revolt 
fits neatly with her spirituality (or lack thereof), but that engaging in revolution is markedly at 
odds with her belief in the force of the better reason to dictate change.  Once this divergence 
between Alf and Betty is observed, what was a decisive consideration collectively will have 
different, phenomenologically diverse bearings on how each will decide individually to act.  Alf 
and Betty may now seem likely to jettison the decision they would have made when only χ* was 
under consideration; however, it is indeterminate whether other, “first-personal” beliefs will 
change their views yet again.  As a result, the phenomenologically divergent implications of 
principled convergence among Alf and Betty reveals a deep indeterminacy in the course of their 
deliberation. 
Gaus organizes this set of reflections under the title: “Sensitivity to the Initial Set: The 
Root of Indeterminacy.”240  What this set of reflections identifies is the way in which different 
people are “sensitive” to the initial set of propositions from which deliberation proceeds.  Even if 
that initial set is an agreed upon principle of the sort promoted by deliberative democrats like 
Gutmann and Thompson, or if it is an ideally coherent set of beliefs like χ*, either way, 
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individuals are “sensitive” to the phenomenological uptake of that initial set in divergent ways.  
Moreover, this sensitivity is the “Root of Indeterminacy” because it takes even the most 
idealized, determinate convergence among Herculean reasoners and still manages to render its 
deliberative outcome indeterminate.  What is “decisive” among Herculean reasoners is not 
decisive enough to determine (to render determinate) the results of deliberation for individuals 
with realistic sets of (divergent) beliefs.  In light of these connections, Gaus’s “summary” 
statement quoted above now makes sense, having been sufficiently “unpacked.”  The problem 
with principled democratic deliberation is that it assumes that for a citizenry, “what they initially 
believed had no effect on their final set of beliefs.”241  Earlier, I said above that “we like to 
think” that people would converge in their decisions, if they began with a shared principle and 
reasoned in a Herculean manner.  Now, Gaus tells us, the problem with principled democratic 
deliberation is that as much as we “like to think” along these lines, as much as it “seems” right to 
think along these lines, it is wrong to assume that our initial starting point has no effect on the 
final set of beliefs that will determine what we decide because all beliefs are epistemic assets.  
Phenomenological divergence will ensue as a result of our initial divergence in beliefs.  Thus, it 
would be wrong to assume that principled deliberation somehow offers a way around the 
problem of divergent initial belief sets among participants in deliberation.   
I will refer to this fundamental point behind Gaus’s reflections by a name that I believe 
better captures its thrust: 
Neutral Starting Point Thesis. No starting point can be equally basic to both collective 
and first-personal deliberation (including “principles”).  
 
The reference to a “neutral starting point” here, I believe, effectively captures the fundamental 
point Gaus makes about any attempt to locate a neutral starting point in practical philosophy.  To 
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the extent that it is “basic” in one dimension, the starting point cannot be equally basic to both 
the shared and “first-personal” sets of beliefs over which deliberator(s) reason.  The phrase 
“neutral starting point” is especially helpful for referring back to Gaus’s fundamental point, 
because deliberative democrats are so often invoking shared beliefs as preferred starting points 
for deliberation.  In the above example drawn from Gutmann and Thompson’s work, for 
instance, it was noted that they quickly shift from defining deliberative democracy by way of its 
“reason-giving requirement,” to talking about how citizens “should appeal to principles that 
individuals who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject.”242  In 
doing so, their shift makes clear that they take principles to be a preferred “starting point,” and a 
“neutral” one at that, insofar as they are supposed to be “un-rejectable” from a certain 
perspective.  Similarly, when Joshua Cohen describes the task of political philosophy and 
deliberative democratic theory as the provision of principles that can “guide” real democratic 
decision-making, his reference to “guidance” reflects the assumption that these principles will 
have a determinate upshot for real deliberators, regardless of their initial belief sets.  In doing so, 
he fails to recognize that what he takes to be basic to a collective process of citizen deliberation 
is indeterminate in its practical consequences for the decisions individuals will actually make as 
political agents.   
As these two examples illustrate, the Neutral Starting Point Thesis advanced in Gaus’s 
work pinpoints a deep, problematic indeterminacy at the heart of principled deliberation.  
Consequently, to suggest that my analogy-driven, “deliberative outlets proposal” is inferior to an 
alternative, more popular way of framing deliberation in terms of principles is to miss the heart 
of the matter under investigation in the present study.  The indeterminacy worry, including its 
third, “first-personal” variant form, is the overarching concern in the present project.  Thus, to 
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suggest that analogy is inferior to a “principled” alternative account of democratic deliberation 
will only make sense if principled deliberation is superior in its determinacy.  My rebuttal may 
seem weak.  It may seem to amount to the claim that if principled deliberation is no more 
practically determinate than analogical reasoning, then we have no reason to prefer a theory of 
deliberative democracy that uses it over any other.  However, as I hope to show below in my 
“third pass” at a formulation of my proposal, not only is principled deliberation poorly skilled to 
deal with the indeterminacy worry, it, not analogical reasoning, is actually the inferior form of 
reasoning for dealing with indeterminacy of a “first-personal” variety as well.  Before I take up 
that claim, though, I turn to another potential objection to the priority I have assigned to 
analogical reasoning, namely: The objection that analogical “leaps” in deliberation offer little 
advantage over the leaps of “judgment” deliberative democrats have long identified in their 
accounts already. 
 
The Humanist’s Challenge 
In the last section, I considered how a focus on principled deliberation might seem to 
displace analogical reasoning as a preferred form of democratic deliberation; however, by 
drawing on Gerald Gaus’s work, I tried to show how principled deliberation offers a very 
problematic resource for dealing with the indeterminacy worry.  This worry, it will be recalled, 
(especially in its third, “first-personal” variant form) inspired my focus on analogical reasoning 
in the first place.  Unlike other deliberative democratic theories, which are simply focused on 
“reason” plain and simple, my heavy focus on analogical reasoning was meant to combat worries 
about the impracticality of democratic deliberation by both bringing it “down to earth” and 
reconciling it with more determinate and decisive majority rule mechanisms and associated 
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practices.  In doing so, I claimed, the dynamism of deliberative democracy would be better 
realized as well. 
In this section, I consider how deliberative democrats might yet again object to the 
special treatment I assign to analogical reasoning, but from a less technical direction.  Much has 
already been said by deliberative democrats about the need for “judgment” in the exercise of 
democratic deliberation.  This prior work on the crucial role of “judgment” in our attempts to 
make determinate sense of the idea of deliberative democracy is “humanistic” in a number of 
ways I pointed out in the first section of this chapter.  As “humanism” is traditionally defined, its 
proponents champion the contribution made by literary and historical resources to seemingly 
unrelated activities (e.g., politics).  Furthermore, as the term was originally coined, it was 
intended to convey the belief that these resources are not only important, but also essential to the 
very intelligibility of those later, seemingly unrelated activities.  To redeploy Hegel’s analogy, 
literary and historical resources are the “vowels” with which all later activities – including 
political ones – are made intelligible in a determinate way.   
This prior work on “judgment” by deliberative democrats is similarly humanistic insofar 
as it claims that the idea of deliberative democracy will be vague and indeterminate (as the 
indeterminacy worry alleges) until we allow some space for the narrative, personal history, and 
moral imagination with which literary and historical resources have long been associated by 
humanists.  In many ways, this prior, “humanistic” work by deliberative democrats seems to 
overlap with what I have said in my exposition in the last chapter.  Accordingly, one might 
object that the special role I offer to analogical reasoning is not really an advance beyond 
discussions of “judgment” that have long occurred in the relevant scholarly literature on 
democratic deliberation. 
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The sense in which what I offer is not really an “advance” over previous accounts is 
especially evident in my focus on the “deliberative leaps” that characterize analogical reasoning.  
More specifically, much of the dynamism of democratic deliberation that was highlighted by my 
analogical focus stems from the way citizens (and their representatives) respond to the 
underdetermination that pervades political life with leaps of judgment, especially when an 
election is on the horizon.  When time and energy are limited and the “data” with which one 
must form a decision is informationally complex and enormous in quantity, a leap of judgment is 
a reasonable response (and a dynamic one as well).  The very idea of a “leap” of judgment or 
“judgment call” is meant to convey that this deliberative task is dynamic in a very unique way.  
The issue here is that though deliberative democrats have indeed had little positive to say about 
the deliberative significance of majority rule procedures and their associated, they have at times 
nonetheless recognized the need for “judgment” in deliberation.   
More specifically, many deliberative democrats have already observed that for all of their 
elaborate and lengthy discussion of the fundamental and definitive principles identified with 
deliberative democracy, those principles are restricted insofar as they must also be accompanied 
by “judgment.”  Again, while no one has tied this process of judgment to the democratic 
dynamism of majority rule procedures and their associated practices, the space of judgment in 
democratic deliberation has often been observed.  Consequently, the issue confronted by my 
deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c) is that it has misstated the gap in deliberative democratic 
theory to which it is addressed.  Deliberative democrats have sufficiently appreciated the need 
for judgment in democratic life, and thereby the philosophical problem I have unveiled, namely, 
underdetermination.   
Before responding to this second way of objecting to the special role I assign to 
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analogical reasoning, it is worth surveying a bit of what has already been said by deliberative 
democrats about the need for judgment.  Indeed, what judgment means in this setting is specified 
to varying degrees by deliberative democrats (which itself may be an act of judgment, as will 
become clear below).  For some deliberative democrats, little is said beyond the mere invocation 
of judgment.  Jon Elster, for instance, opens his analysis of one particular deliberative 
democratic setting, namely “constitution making,” with an almost immediate invocation of the 
need for judgment.243  By constitution making, Elster means the process of deliberation among 
elected peers through which a constitution is selected.  One of the characteristic features of a 
constitution of this kind, Elster claims, is that it “regulates the most fundamental aspects of 
political life.”244   
Almost immediately after introducing his topic, Elster expresses a concession to 
judgment: “what is and what is not fundamental is to some extent a matter of judgment.”245  In 
other words, no sooner does Elster introduce his topic and its characteristic features than he 
immediately concedes some space to the practice of judgment.  In doing so, he makes it very 
clear that what he is saying about the fundamentals of a political situation like constitution 
making cannot be taken as given, but must be filtered through a process of judgment which 
makes the particular decision about what is and is not “fundamental.”  Despite his concision, 
Elster nonetheless identifies judgment with a capacity for identifying the fundamental in a 
particular context of political deliberation (here: constitution making).  After making this 
concession to the space of judgment, he then promptly moves on.     
 Other deliberative democrats write far more extensively about the practice of judgment.  
Joshua Cohen, for example, writes, “the application of the principles of justice themselves calls 
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for judgment.”246  Even when principles are available to guide deliberation, Cohen claims, their 
application calls for additional considerations of “judgment” to actually make their application 
intelligible.  He immediately offers an example to clarify: 
… the application of the principles of justice themselves calls for judgment, for example, 
about the kind of constitution that best ensures the protection of political and personal 
liberties, about whether a proposed law infringes too deeply on a fundamental liberty, or 
about when efforts to ensure fair equality of opportunity have gone too far.  Consider 
current debate in the United States about campaign finance.  Translated into the terms of 
justice as fairness, the disagreement is about whether and how to restrict a liberty 
protected by the first principles - the right to political speech - to ensure the fair value for 
political liberty which is also required by the first principle.247 
 
Here, Cohen describes how even with the principle of “justice as fairness” in hand, the 
application of that principle still involves an additional deliberative process of “judgment” to 
make it apply to a particular decision.  Like any principle, this one must be “translated” into a 
problem-solving context where its implications are sometimes not only divergent in practical 
consequences, but also need to be weighed against one another.  In the context mentioned here, a 
principle requires a balancing between two liberties that flow out of that principle, but which 
stand in tension such that there is currently a debate and point of disagreement.  As with Elster, 
the idea here is that judgment is the process of combining our concern with fundamentals (here, 
principles) with the particular details of a situation to arrive at particular decisions.  Has the 
application of a principle of justice gone “too far” in a particular decision?  Would a particular 
decision infringe upon a principle “too deeply”?  These kinds of questions concern the way in 
which fundamentals “apply” in particular decisions, and “judgment” is just the name for this 
process of application of fundamentals to particular decisions. 
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Benhabib’s Exposition of the Humanist’s Challenge 
 Seyla Benhabib has developed one of the most extensive treatments of judgment in the 
setting of deliberative democracy.  Like Cohen, Benhabib also believes that judgment is needed 
to translate principles into a particular context of decision-making, to make particular decisions 
by applying principles to the particulars of a political setting.  Benhabib begins with the 
invocation of the deliberative view, writing,  
In a democratic polity agreement among citizens generated through processes of public 
dialogue is central to the legitimacy of basic institutions.  Such dialogues submit the 
rationale behind the major power arrangements of societies to the test.  Insight into the 
justice or injustice, fairness or unfairness of these arrangements gained as a result of such 
dialogic exchanges results in public knowledge won through public deliberation.248 
 
In this passage, Benhabib rehearses the familiar tenets of the deliberative view of democracy, 
according to which a “democratic polity” is concerned with the use of dialogue to test the 
rationale behind various political structures, resulting in “public knowledge won through public 
deliberation.”  However, as she proceeds to note, “when we reach this judgment as a result of 
participatory politics we not only have the assurance that we can support our position by 
principled argument but also, and more importantly, we form a judgment having submitted our 
opinion to the test of the judgment of others.”249  Here, Benhabib declares her support for the 
popular focus on “principled argument” among deliberative democrats, but she also (like Cohen 
and Elster) concedes that principled argument is not the strict and sole determinant of 
deliberative outcomes.  In addition, she adds, a “faculty of judgment” must be cultivated to form 
an “enlarged mentality,” the latter expression being one she borrows from Hannah Arendt’s work 
on Kant and judgment.250  Her more detailed account will help pave the way to subsequent stages 
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of this project, so I dwell on it at greater length here than the other accounts mentioned above. 
 To understand Benhabib’s treatment of judgment, it is crucial to see that it emerges as a 
response to the limited determinacy of principled argument in democratic decision-making that 
was just observed.  As Benhabib claims, democracy is notable for its transfer of power from 
experts, with their special knowledge and extensive experience, to a public that diverges in these 
matters.251  From this common observation about popular rule, it follows that democratic politics 
cannot be a domain of expert knowledge and experience, but must instead orient deliberation 
around considerations that are accessible to a “public” or demos (people), being “universal” in a 
sense.  Principles naturally fit into this vision of deliberation.  Since principles have a context-
transcending reach and generality, they are well-suited to orient a “public” by a commonly 
accessible standard, rather than a group of experts oriented around considerations that are by 
their very nature elite. 
 Judgment enters the picture here because Benhabib acknowledges a form of “interpretive 
indeterminacy” in the use of principles as public standards for deliberation.252  The “multiplicity 
of contexts and life-situations with which practical reason is always confronted”253 create a 
barrier to the straight-forward use of principles to determine the outcome of deliberation outright.  
In creating such a barrier, the particulars of a given context of deliberation ask us to “take 
seriously the claims of community, gender, and postmodernism” regarding the ability of an 
autonomous individual to act rightly in the world by simply putting universal, rational principles 
into action.  Other persons matter not only as co-deliberators with equal access to universal 
propositions like principles.  They also, like ourselves, act in light of their own “life histories,” 
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which call out for “empathy, imagination, and solidarity.”254  The “claims of community, gender, 
and postmodernism” are resonant with this deference to personal narrative or life histories.  We 
cannot simply act on principles without also imagining the life histories of others with whom we 
are involved, empathizing with those who have suffered, or acting in solidarity with our co-
deliberators.  Interpretive indeterminacy is the phrase Benhabib uses to refer to this barrier to the 
straight-forward use of principles in deliberation, and it is the process of overcoming this barrier 
that she associates with “judgment.” 
 The deeper question here is why Benhabib believes judgment, by which I mean the 
process of overcoming the barrier of interpretive indeterminacy, is necessary for principled 
deliberation.  Why can’t we simply act on our principles in a straightforward manner?  
Benhabib’s response to this problem has two major components.  First (1), she claims that 
interpretive indeterminacy is a barrier because without knowing the particular details of a 
context, we cannot tell the difference among particulars involved in a decision.  Benhabib uses 
the term “individuation” to refer to this first component.  In deliberating, we need to know the 
difference between ourselves and others.  Here, “individuation” by reference to personal histories 
is essential to being able to tell how persons with equal rational capacity are nonetheless not 
identical beings when it comes to decision-making.255  If we deliberate with the same universal 
principles and the same universal rational capacities, then it seems to follow quite naturally that 
we do not really need to empathize with others or imagine their life circumstances.  This point 
resonates with Gaus’s arguments against deductivist democratic deliberation.  If we do not 
appreciate that each person has “epistemic assets” initially, when deliberation begins, which have 
not only a logical force, but a phenomenological dimension as well, we fail to recognize why 
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empathic understanding is important for deliberative success. 
Furthermore, we also need to defer to our life histories to individuate the actions that we 
deliberate upon and ultimately decide to do.256  To be able to tell the difference between one 
action and another, we rely heavily on our personal narratives of our life histories.   The reason 
we need to defer to these narratives to individuate actions is that often an overt behavior is 
consistent with more than one description of its intention.257  Someone may be said to vote for a 
particular candidate because that candidate espouses a common set of egalitarian principles with 
the voter, or because the voter will receive more government subsidies if that candidate goes into 
office.  To know whether the person is voting in a principled or self-serving manner, i.e., what 
the person is doing when voting (their action), we therefore need to individuate among these 
actions.  For Benhabib, this individuation is tackled by reference to personal histories.  For 
example, if we know the voter in the current example to have been a lifelong, ardent, unceasing 
champion of egalitarianism, we will use the principled description.   
As this example clearly shows, we use narrative content to figure out which principles are 
relevant for describing an action.  Without reference to the lifelong egalitarianism of this 
particular voter, we would not be in a position to make a particular decision about how to 
describe the overt behavior of the individual (i.e., who was voted for).  Knowing someone to be a 
lifelong champion of egalitarian principles makes it easier to individuate a principled form of 
behavior, from a strategic, self-interested one.  Similarly, in deliberation more widely, our 
particular decisions are made in a principled way by using the particulars of a context to figure 
out which principle is relevant.  An “indeterminacy” exists with regard to the numerous ways of 
individuating the options from which we must choose when deliberating.  “Interpretation” 
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overcomes the barrier posed by this indeterminacy by turning to the particular for guidance on 
the decision.  Judgment, then, is the use of such interpretation to pick the relevant principles for 
framing decisions.258   
The second (2) component of Benhabib’s response is that she sees this interpretation as 
also fundamentally an interpersonal process of consideration.  As she writes,  
In other words, what I do, which course of action I decide upon, involves some 
interpretive ability to see my act not only as it relates to me but as it will be perceived and 
understood by others.  I must have enough moral imagination to know the possible act 
descriptions or narratives that my action can be subsumed under.259  
 
Not only does narrative content help us overcome the indeterminacy posed by the individuation 
of any particular action, but that narrative content also matters insofar as it takes an interpersonal 
form.  For instance, we consider not only how our behavior may best be described by reference 
to our long cherished egalitarian principles, but also by reference to how others would assess 
those principles as more or less “long cherished” reference points for describing our behavior as 
“principled action,” rather than “strategic action.”  Accordingly, in our voter example, the 
individuation of a principled vote from a strategic one is carried out by considering all of the 
diverse people who might appreciate or fail to appreciate the principled life history behind the 
behavior.  “Moral imagination” is called for here, not straight-forward application of principles 
to particular decisions.  We need to think through, empathize, imagine, and reflect upon the 
viewpoints of others to understand the behavior as significantly one kind of action rather than 
another.260 
 Furthermore, as Benhabib observes, the interpersonal dimension is essential to the ways 
in which we learn about ourselves through the collective process of individuating actions.  After 
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the onset of behavior, we often discover something about ourselves.  We gain some “self-
knowledge” when others help us realize how that behavior fits into our personal life histories.  In 
acting, we “become the object of the tale of others,” as they attempt to describe our behavior 
with descriptions that fit it into various narratives about our life histories.  The results of such 
tales and our openness to acknowledging them is that “sometimes we do not know what our 
intentions are or may have been until our actions have become a part of the world.”261  Others 
can help us see how our behavior is best described one way rather than another.  Thus, in our 
prior example, the principled voter may quickly form a decision about how to vote and vote 
accordingly, never really thinking in very great detail about the reasons behind that behavior and 
how it constitutes an example of principled action.  Nonetheless, the voter may later learn from 
others that this rapid deed was actually a very principled one, especially given many temptations 
to act more selfishly by behaving in alternative ways.  In response, the voter may say that those 
alternatives were never even considered or evaluated.  The voter may also say that reasoning was 
never really very elaborate.  However, self-knowledge will still be gained when that behavior too 
is individuated under an act-description of principled “egalitarianism” at work. 
 These two components (1-2 above) of Benhabib’s response to interpretive indeterminacy 
explain why she believes “judgment” is necessary for the application of principles.  We cannot, 
as she declares adamantly, simply subsume particular decisions under universal principles.  True 
to the various critiques advanced by earlier theorists against principled rationalism, our 
capacities for imagination, empathy, and solidarity are essential to human action.  These 
capacities allow us to figure out which principle to use and how to describe our behavior as 
various individuated actions, which we “know how” to do by taking into account narrative 
content from an interpersonal array of perspectives.  Benhabib summarizes this point, when she 
                                                
261 Benhabib 1992, 128-9. 
   186 
writes,  
The assessment of morally relevant situations cannot be explained in light of the 
subsumptive model of judgment; the identification of morally correct actions requires 
moral imagination of possible act descriptions and narratives under which they fall; and 
the interpretation of one’s intentions and maxims entails comprehension of narrative 
histories - both one’s own and those of others.262   
 
As this passage succinctly states, the reason “why” the application of principles requires 
judgment is that we cannot even identify behavior as morally correct action (we cannot 
individuate behavior under one of the many normatively loaded, principled descriptions 
available) without reference to “narrative histories.”  These narrative histories are interpersonal 
because they are “both one’s own and those of others.”  Benhabib helpfully labels this set of 
lessons under the heading of a “phenomenology of moral judgment.”263 
 Clearly, Benhabib lends a great deal of detail and sophistication to the topic of 
“judgment” as it relates to collective deliberation.  Moreover, she also applies the results of this 
more detailed and sophisticated account of judgment in her work more directly dedicated to 
deliberative democracy as an ideal, building explicit bridges to that earlier research by describing 
it as what she has “indicated elsewhere.”264  Indeed, in her work on deliberative democracy, her 
analysis often mirrors the order of investigation of her discussion of her investigation of the 
phenomenology of moral judgment.  For example, after introducing “the deliberative model of 
democracy,” she then turns to framing it in terms of principles which are said to require a 
situated interpretation in terms of imagination, empathy, and solidarity.  She states, for instance, 
that her approach “formulates the most general principles and moral intuitions behind the 
validity claims of a deliberative model of democracy,” these principles being “norms,” which she 
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parenthetically defines as “general rules of action and institutional arrangements.”265  Here, her 
references to “general principles, “norms” and “general rules” all mirror her earlier starting point 
in principled universal propositions and norms. 
Moving ahead, we learn, however, that these principles cannot be applied in a straight-
forward manner.  For example, we hear again in this work of what we “have learned from all the 
criticisms of rationalism in the last three centuries,”266 and that on the basis of these criticisms, 
judgment is necessary for the application of these principles.  More specifically, we learn that an 
interpersonal application of these principles is necessary.  For instance, in the case of rights, the 
normative content they provide is different from “a Kantian deduction of the concept of right” or 
“a Rawlsian construction of the ‘original position,’” insofar as it privileges “practical debate as 
… the appropriate forum for determining rights claims.”267  In this statement, Benhabib 
delineates her own position by arguing that claims involving rights are determined by an 
interpersonal process of “practical debate,” rather than simply through a subsumptive “deduction 
of the concept of a right” or an abstract process at a remove from actual interpersonal relations.  
Here, the second (2), interpersonal component of Benhabib’s response to interpretive 
indeterminacy comes to the fore.  The content of rights is determined by a process of 
interpersonal judgment among persons, not in abstracto. 
The additional detail and sophistication of Benhabib’s account of judgment marks a 
significant change from the more cursory remarks by Elster and Cohen.  However, the structure 
of her account maps onto the contours of their remarks quite well.  As with Cohen, here too we 
are learning that principles cannot be applied to a decision without being “translated” into the 
particular context of that decision.  For Cohen, that translation required weighing the various 
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implications that derive from the principle and assessing points of tension through debate.  
Essentially, judgment involves combining our concern with fundamentals like principles with a 
debate about their implications for the details of a particular situation and the decision it 
demands.  These debates involve questions of degree (“too far”) and depth (“too deeply”).   
Similarly, Benhabib stresses the role of interpersonal assessment, though she expands 
that concept to include more than just “debate.”  Additionally, she is sensitive to the need for 
interpersonal assessment to include narrative content.  In expanding the concept along these 
lines, she believes deliberation attains a quality of judgment that is defensible against the 
criticisms of principled decision-making leveled by critics of rationalism over the past three 
centuries.  Though far more concise in his statement, Elster’s remarks about judgment share the 
same structure.  Like Cohen too, he stresses that judgment involves our capacity to apply 
fundamentals, like principles, to particular decisions by interpersonally assessing questions of 
degree and depth.  For all of these philosophers, then, judgment is perhaps best defined as the 
application of fundamentals like principles to particular decisions through a process of 
interpersonal assessment. 
 
Deflating the Humanist’s Challenge 
This brief survey of work on judgment among deliberative democrats raises a question 
for my own focus on analogy.  Does my focus on analogy, like Benhabib’s focus on narrative 
content, simply add more detail to a claim already made by a number of deliberative democrats?  
Have I not simply suggested that in addition to narrative content, we should also consider the 
role of analogy in the process of judgment that translates the fundamental concerns of the 
citizenry (i.e., principles) into particular contexts of decision-making?  If so, to what extent does 
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my focus on analogy do anything more than add detail to a well-developed idea already found in 
the work of others?  Essentially, the question being raised here for my own focus on analogy is a 
challenge to say what is really “news” in my account for the many deliberative democratic 
theorists who are already sensitive to the role of judgment in political deliberation.  As I 
attempted to characterize these deliberative democratic theorists, their guiding idea is a 
“humanistic” one.  Like the “humanists” who were originally associated with the trivium in 
classical liberal arts education, so too these deliberative democratic theorists stress the 
significance of literary and historical resources for the attainment of excellence in any human 
practice, be it politics, decision-making in general, or even theoretical work.  For instance, when 
Benhabib writes that “the identification of morally correct actions requires moral imagination,” 
she makes a humanistic point (again, assuming this definition of the term).268   
Given this association with a humanistic orientation, the question now posed as a 
challenge to my focus on analogy might most vividly be described as the humanist’s challenge: 
What is ‘news’ in my account to those deliberative democrats who already espouse a humanistic 
orientation towards deliberation?  To what extent, devotees of this humanistic work on judgment 
will want to know, does my talk of “deliberative leaps” add anything new or important to what 
has already been said about the problematic indeterminacy in democratic deliberation, albeit 
under the heading of “judgment” rather than analogical reasoning?    
I have two responses to this question.  The first of these responses shares the same 
concern with the indeterminacy worry that I expressed in the last section.  This work on 
judgment by deliberative democrats, I contend, offers surprisingly little support for deliberative 
democracy in the face of the variant forms of indeterminacy with which I am so concerned in 
this project.  More specifically, the divergent implications identified by Gerald Gaus as a 
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problem for deliberative democracy are not seriously offset by this work on the need for 
judgment.  Consequently, the threat to my account posed by this work on judgment is deflated.  
My second response to this question will be addressed in the next chapter.  There, I will take up 
the problem posed by this question more directly and offer a “third pass” at my proposal.  In 
doing so, I will highlight the philosophical difference between my deliberative outlets proposal, 
with its heavy reliance on analogical reasoning (especially CPAR), and prior work on democratic 
deliberation. 
Before moving on to the that third pass, though, I first need to reflect on the sense in 
which this work on judgment by deliberative democrats does surprisingly little to offset the 
indeterminacy worry and therefore is deflated as a challenge to my deliberative outlets proposal 
(DOP.a-c).  The most obvious continuity with my analysis in the last section is that the structure 
of judgment replicates the two stage (Stage 1 & 2) process of deliberation described by Gaus and 
identified as a source of indeterminacy.  Judgment still shares with principled deliberation the 
same starting point, namely: “an initial set of propositions,” which deliberators are supposed to 
share.  As a result, judgment can be said to begin with what was labeled as “χ” above, a common 
set of shared principles and other propositions.  The process of judgment itself then proceeds to 
“translate” χ into a particular setting in which a decision has to be made by way of interpersonal 
assessment.  At this time, Benhabib tells us, the personal life histories of those involved play a 
crucial role.  Importantly, we figure out what to actually do in a particular context of decision-
making by taking into account this personal narrative content.  This point is important, because it 
very clearly underlines the sense in which each person’s own, personal, individual, private set of 
propositions is ultimately the decisive matter.  Benhabib’s discussion of the individuation of 
action by reference to interpersonal assessment of narrative content underscores this point still 
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further.  To draw on the example I used above, we cannot even describe actions, we cannot even 
individuate one action as principled or strategic, as egalitarian or selfish, without reference to 
individual life histories and their associated “first-personal” perspectives.  As a result, the “first-
personal” really is the decisive matter in deliberation for Benhabib.  What it means to deliberate 
towards a decision about how to act in a describable way, rather than how merely to behave, is 
defined by the “first-personal” stage (Stage 2) of deliberation, called “judgment.” 
At this point, the perfect replication of the indeterminacy-yielding kind of deliberative 
judgment described by Gaus comes into full view.  To say that the “first-personal” segment of 
judgment is decisive is equivalent to agreeing with Gaus that (Stage 1) χ is not enough to 
determine the outcome of deliberation, i.e., action.  Another stage in the sequence of deliberation 
(i.e., Stage 2) is needed, namely, “χ + the first-personal,” (i.e., χ + ?)  To use the variables 
selected by Gaus for the “first-personal” perspectives of Alf and Betty, namely α and β 
respectively, we can rephrase this point as follows.  What it means to engage in judgment is to 
translate χ into a particular context of action.  This translation proceeds by incorporating the 
first-personal, narrative content of each person’s perspective into decision-making.  In the case 
of Alf and Betty, this process of translation involves moving from a Herculean χ to the context of 
action, which is to say, χ+α and χ+β, respectively.  Rephrased with Benhabib’s own terminology, 
we begin with shared principles and then move into the interpersonal and narratival 
interpretation of those principles.  If we now combine her description of the stages of judgment 
with Gaus’s variables for representing the stages of deliberation, the perfect replication of the 
two processes of decision-making pops into view: Beginning with shared principles (χ), we then 
take up the process of interpreting their bearing on a particular decision by communicating and 
reflecting on our individual life histories (e.g., α, β).  At this second stage, judgments are formed 
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(χ+α and χ+β) about the action each person (Alf and Betty, respectively) will individually take. 
Once we appreciate this replication of the same 2-staged deliberative structure, we can 
see how very little this work on judgment does to offset the indeterminacy worry.  The 
phenomenological divergence that applied to principled deliberation is only further underscored 
by Benhabib’s insistence that individual life histories are crucial to turning deliberation into 
action.  From a shared principled, each individual will find that divergent life histories mean 
divergent implications for their body of personal beliefs (e.g., α or β).  For example, deliberation 
might proceed from a shared principle that maintains, universally, that all human beings have a 
dignity that makes them equal as persons.269  Consider how Alf and Betty might have divergent, 
first-personal life histories.  If Alf has, during his life history, struggled to be recognized for his 
equal intellectual capabilities in a society that tends to think very little of the intellectual 
capabilities of people like him, he will have a set of first- personal beliefs (α) about his own 
history and its meaning.  Among these beliefs (α), some may be that in the past, he deserved 
equal recognition from others for his intellectual capabilities, and accordingly, he deserved equal 
investment in his intellectual development.  For instance, when a school would not permit him 
access to advanced coursework in mathematics because “people like him aren’t capable of 
passing the class,” he perhaps came to believe (α) that all people, on account of their equal 
dignity, deserve equal access to educational resources. 
Betty, by contrast, has struggled to convince others that on account of her traumatic 
childhood, she deserves more educational resources than others have been given access to or are 
even able to get access to in a current system.  Certain words and phrases associated with 
encouragement and evaluation, even when offered with good intentions, cue traumatic responses 
                                                
269 This example draws on a “divergent” implication identified in Wood, Allen (2014). The Free Development of 
Each. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 252-274. 
   193 
on her part and lead her to “overreact,” making her doubt her own abilities and quit tasks before 
she would otherwise accomplish them.  Getting others to recognize this need has been a lifelong 
struggle that has often required justifying the assignment of resources to her that took away from 
educational offerings to others.  For instance, a teacher was unable to teach an elective 
mathematics course because of the teacher’s heavy investment in teaching Betty in a very 
specific manner during separate tutorial sessions.  Consequently, Betty has beliefs about this 
personal history and what it means (β).  Among these beliefs is the idea that resources should not 
be distributed to students equally, but rather unequally and in proportion to specific needs.  A 
student with a traumatic childhood deserves a disproportionate amount of a faculty’s time and 
energy in comparison with students lacking such trauma, but otherwise similar. 
Both Alf and Betty are able to agree that all people have a dignity that makes them equal 
as persons (χ).  Betty thinks that she has the same worth as her peers who also graduated from 
the school she attended.  Alf also thinks that his peers at school had the same dignity.  Thus, 
when a particular decision needs to be made about the educational system they both attended, 
they might (Stage 1) begin to deliberate about what to do by starting off with this shared 
principle (χ): All people have a dignity that makes them equal persons.  Moreover, they may 
even agree (as unlikely as it may be) to the same criteria for reasoning (e.g., same logical 
criteria), though perhaps after some discussion.  These criteria would therefore be added to their 
shared beliefs arrived at during the first stage of deliberation: χ*.  Additionally, they may agree 
about all manner of facts about the educational system they both attended.  For example, they 
may agree that it was rife with injustices, biases, and other problems in its distribution of 
educational resources.  Some of these points of agreement may also be the result of discussion.  
Either way, these considerations might also be added to χ*.  Something has to be done, they 
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further agree, and come to the conclusion that they need to volunteer their services at the school.  
Their shared principle of respect for all people at the school as equal persons leads them to this 
action.   
However, when it comes to actually rationally planning how to put this conclusion of 
their deliberation into effect, suddenly, phenomenological divergence erupts and indeterminacy 
explodes.  Alf’s life history (α) suggests that everyone needs equal access to educational 
resources.  As a result, he states that they ought to enter the school and advertise their availability 
as volunteers equally to all of the students, perhaps with signage or with an announcement on the 
school broadcast system.  By contrast, Betty’s life history (β) leads her to believe volunteering 
should first be targeted directly to those who need it most.  Whatever volunteer hours they have 
that are not taken by those who need it most should then be offered to those of less dire, but still 
significant need.  If any volunteer hours remain, a similar process of offering their volunteer time 
to those of greater need first should be maintained until all hours are distributed or all students 
have been contacted. 
As their different strategies suggest, Alf and Betty put their shared commitments (χ*) into 
action in highly divergent ways.  More importantly, though, their strategies seem to be clearly 
determined by their first-personal beliefs about their life histories (α or β, respectively).  Indeed, 
their first-personal beliefs determine their strategies so obviously that it raises the question of 
what contribution their shared commitments (χ*) are even making to the determination of their 
actions, or at least to the rational plans they are making about what to do.  In other words, it is 
not clear that χ+α and χ+β are so different from α and β.  Indeterminacy emerges here in 
precisely the way Gaus imagined.  From a shared principle, action is not directly determined or 
even determined in any meaningful way.  The results of the first stage of deliberation (Stage 1), 
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no matter how Herculean and idealized (χ*), under-determine actual decisions people make 
about what in fact to do.  Both of their strategies are equally consistent with their shared principle 
of respect for the dignity of persons and even its associated beliefs.  Here, the natural rebuttal is 
to say that at least they agree to counteract the injustices in their educational system; they at least 
agree not to donate money to the biased members of the faculty.  The elimination of optional 
courses of action in this way does seem significant, as was mentioned above in our earlier 
discussion of the role of principles in deliberation and deliberative democratic theory.  However, 
indeterminacy remains in abundance because underdetermination obtains.   
Of greater significance still is how very much this underdetermination aligns not only 
with Gaus’s analysis, but also with the way the process of judgment is described.  As Cohen said, 
the questions addressed by judgment are whether any particular plan of action or event has gone 
“too far” or has infringed upon a principle “too deeply.”  In other words, the questions addressed 
by judgment just are the questions we ask when we actually determine what to do.  The 
vagueness of these phrases, “too deeply,” and “too far” makes it very clear that judgment is little 
more than a label for the problem of underdetermination in democratic deliberation.  More than 
one course of action is consistent with acting on principles of justice.  We are therefore left with 
vague, indeterminate questions that seem only capable of vague, indeterminate answers about 
what is “too far” and “too deep” an infringement. 
Benhabib’s response at this point might simply be to suggest that deliberation has been 
cut off too prematurely in my example of Alf and Betty.  To determine what they actually ought 
to do, they should share their life histories (α and β).  This narrative content, when it is given an 
interpersonal expression, provides an interpretive response to the indeterminacy that she 
recognizes as natural to principled deliberation.  If Alf heard Betty’s story (β), and they 
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evaluated its meaning together, they could much better determine what to do.  Interpretive 
indeterminacy would be offset by actual interpretation.  We figure out how to offset the risks of a 
rationalistic focus on principles by deferring to narrative content and reflecting on it 
interpersonally.  Only then can we become sensitive to issues of oppression through acts of 
imagination and empathy.  Thus, Alf would imagine himself in Betty’s shoes, something he had 
never done before.  He would think about the way trauma impacts cognitive functioning, 
imagining a way of life he had hitherto never really considered as a perspective on the world.  He 
might then agree to Betty’s strategy and suggest, instead, that they contact teachers and ask about 
their neediest students. 
However, by the same tactic, Betty might empathize with Alf’s story of struggle to get 
equal access to educational resources (α).  He might therefore find that Betty agrees with him.  
They should plan to advertise their services broadly.  I say “however,” here, because we seem to 
be back in Joshua Cohen’s incredibly vague, underdetermined and indeterminate space of 
judgment.  What can we say, philosophically, that would lend any kind of detail or structure to 
the results of this discussion between Alf and Betty?  Are we not back in the terrain of vague 
questions of “too far” and “too deeply”?  Interpretation seems to only recognize the 
indeterminacy of principled deliberation, rather than actually offset the problematic 
underdetermination at its heart. 
This difficulty can be given a still more precise analysis.  If we agree with Benhabib that 
the response to the problem of underdetermination here is an interpersonal reflection between 
Alf and Betty about their own narrative histories, then we seem (yet again) to have some options 
eliminated by the theory, but no real guidance regarding the remaining options (i.e., we have the 
problem of underdetermination).  On the one hand, Alf and Betty could share their stories and 
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agree that something has to give in their first-personal perspectives (α and β, respectively).  
Something does have to change.  However, their shared commitments (χ*) offer no guidance on 
which beliefs from their first-personal perspectives (α and β) need to change.   
Worse yet, as Gaus was shown to demonstrate above, whatever does need to change is 
going to mean very different outcomes for each of them.  If they agree to offer their volunteer 
services equally, Betty will be suppressing all kinds of heartache about the problems of a society 
that offers its resources in an egalitarian manner.  The times in the past that she argued so 
vehemently against egalitarianism as a basis for denying her special resources, or the times she 
challenged those who criticized her teacher for helping her instead of teaching that elective 
course, provide a horizon to her deliberation with Alf that will make adopting Alf’s strategy very 
different phenomenologically from the way adoption of the same strategy will impact Alf.  Thus, 
we can see why Gaus believes that we might as well consider deliberation to have started anew 
when first-personal considerations are taken up in deliberation.   
For Betty, the phenomenologically divergent implications that arise from principled 
deliberation raise the question, all over again, of whether Alf’s strategy is really the right one to 
act on.  When she walks into the school, freshly printed signs in hand, and memories begin to 
flash back regarding her time at the school, she will be able to ask herself, all over again, 
whether Alf’s strategy is really the right course of action for putting their shared beliefs into 
effect.  The beliefs with which she initially entered deliberation with Alf, which maintain that 
equality of access is the wrong heuristic for guiding thinking about justice and resources, were 
very hard won.  They stand for years and years of daily responsiveness to her environment.  
Consequently, when memories flood her mind as she walks down the hall with freshly printed 
signs in hand, part of what she is experiencing (i.e., the phenomenology of her deliberation), is 
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remembrance of how those initial beliefs were hard won epistemic assets, not mere starting 
points for discussion. 
Even more to the point, we are likely to expect that in rationally planning how to put 
those shared beliefs into effect, the phenomenological overload of gushing memories Betty 
encounters when she walks into the school is very likely to cause her to change strategy.  A rich 
past trumps a collectively reasoned conclusion, it often seems.  Moreover, not only is it very 
likely that she will change the plan, but it is also probably very rational for her to do so as well.  
When she walks in that door and her memories flood her mind, she is very likely to come to the 
conclusion that despite Alf’s excellent arguments earlier, “he is wrong.”  His strategy will 
backfire.  It will not offset the injustices at the school.  Once all students have equal access, those 
who need it least (the most advantaged) will take up so many of their hours in aggregate that the 
remaining hours for those most needy will be inadequate to the depth of their needs.  Her 
phenomenology trumps her reasoned conclusion with Alf because it seems to say something 
more reasonable about their plan than anything they discussed when they debated their strategy 
together earlier and shared their personal histories. 
 
Judgment as a Label for Underdetermination in Politics 
As I hope this example reveals, adding “judgment” to principled deliberation does little to 
offset its latent indeterminacy.  What we end up with, rather, is merely a label for the problem of 
underdetermination that results from principled deliberation.  Principles may narrow our range of 
options for deciding what to do in a particular situation, but they do little to actually determine 
our specific courses of action.  Like Betty in the hallway with her printed signs in hand, people 
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more generally seem to give more weight to the rich phenomenology of their first-personal 
considerations in deciding on particular courses of action than they do principles and other 
abstract, universal considerations.  The result is a recapitulation of the Neutral Starting Point 
Thesis.  No content that is basic to a process of collective decision-making is basic in a 
determinate way when it comes to individual action.  Again, like Betty in the hallway, the latter 
process more or less starts the sequence of deliberation about what in fact to do all over again, 
albeit perhaps with a slightly narrower range of options to choose from.     
The relevance of Gaus’s worries about indeterminacy has been investigated at some 
length in this section.  However, it may nonetheless be worth concluding this chapter with some 
of Gaus’s pithy remarks about deliberative democracy, just to further underscore the points made 
here.  As Gaus describes deliberative democracy, it is “A current fascination in contemporary 
political theory” that is “held captive by the highly idealized picture in our mind’s eye of the 
Athenian polis: why can’t we again be like that? (Was it ever like that?)”270  As these remarks 
make abundantly clear, Gaus is skeptical of deliberative democracy because of its “idealized” 
basis.  This “current fascination” garners more detailed criticism when he observes,  
Deliberative democracy supposes that our differences in evaluative standards are, as it 
were, only on the surface.  Once we reason together and talk things through, deliberative 
democrats hold that our value orderings will be transformed; the range of disagreement 
will so radically narrow that the problems of social commensuration will become fairly 
insignificant, if not vanish altogether.271 
 
In this passage, Gaus criticizes the idea that democratic deliberation could sufficiently narrow 
our range of differences to the point where people could really agree on a course of action.  In 
the terms used above, he is criticizing the faith deliberative democrats have in the capacity of a 
citizenry to arrive at anything like χ*, such that it would prevent the divergent beliefs among the 
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citizenry (e.g., α and β) from plugging up the process of political decision-making with non-
collective considerations.  This idea, as he describes it, is a supposition that the standards we use 
to evaluate are only different “on the surface.”  When it comes to decision-making, where we 
differ is the kind of superficiality that would be changed with a sufficiently in-depth discussion.  
As Gaus declares, “Surely, though, this is a fantastic claim,” a declaration he supports by 
drawing attention to the fact that even deliberative democrats themselves recognize that 
deliberation never sufficiently narrows our options to allow for a decisive determinacy in 
political life.272   
Above, the “problem of underdetermination” has come to serve as a label for this worry 
about indeterminacy.  Though our principles may eliminate some options (e.g., Alf and Betty 
will not donate money to the most biased faculty members at their school), they do not narrow 
our range of choices down sufficiently to allow us to determine our course of action.  Alf and 
Betty’s divergent strategies about how to put their shared beliefs into effect is a case in point.  As 
Gaus concludes, due to this underdetermination, “democratic procedures simply are not up to the 
task of collective commensuration.”273   
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Chapter Four: The Logical Interpretation of Political Judgment 
 
 
Towards a Third Pass 
In the last chapter, I considered two challenges to my proposal’s focus on analogy.  The 
first, which I called the deductivist’s challenge, questioned the value of orienting deliberative 
democracy around the inductive argumentation associated with analogical reasoning, rather than 
the deductive argumentation that is identified with the principled reasoning regularly preferred 
by deliberative democrats.  The second challenge, which I called the humanist’s challenge, 
observes that much of what I am saying is so similar to what has been said earlier by those 
deliberative democrats concerned with the role of judgment in politics, that it is unclear what is 
really “new” in my focus on analogy.  In response to these challenges, I tried to deflate the 
challenge they really pose to my proposal.  Advocates of these challenges employ the use of the 
very same conceptual framework that Gerald Gaus pinpoints as the source of deliberative 
democracy’s indeterminacy.  As a result, these two challenges cannot be a serious threat to any 
proposal that is trying to move beyond the framework that is responsible for the problematic 
indeterminacy of deliberative democracy (as my own proposal does).   
Of course, deflated as a “serious threat,” these challenges may nonetheless remain a 
source of concern.  Deflating the force of any challenge is not as satisfying a response as actually 
meeting the challenges head on.  The question that remains, then, is what my proposal achieves 
that marks a serious improvement over the focus on principled deliberation and judgment in past 
work on deliberative democracy.  Does my proposal’s focus on analogy “win by default,” simply 
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winning some additional bit of determinacy for the deliberative approach?  Or does my focus on 
analogy offer a significant advantage over these two competing visions of democratic 
deliberation?  In this chapter, I attempt to affirm the second possibility.  More specifically, I 
argue that in practical deliberation, we would do better to employ inductive … not deductive … 
inference.  As a result, deliberative democrats should welcome an inductive model of democratic 
deliberation like the one advanced by my proposal.  To support this contention, I develop an 
insight from Michael Dummett, who has observed that in “practical life,” the humble, inductive 
logic of the “common [person]” is actually logically stronger than the deductive logic assumed 
by my proposal’s competitors.  This logical insight derives from a problem Dummett calls the 
“degeneration of probability.”  I then use Dummett’s insight to offer a logical motivation for the 
superior practical determinacy of my analogical approach.  To further substantiate this insight, I 
turn to other resources outside the philosophy of logic for additional support. 
In the last chapter, I tried to counter worries about the heavy focus on analogy in my 
deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c) by deflating two challenges.  Analogical reasoning, I 
recognized, is likely to be frowned upon by many philosophers who, trained in logic, are aware 
that it is “usually” less preferable than deductive forms of reasoning, especially of the more 
principled form.  Such philosophers are likely to worry that for as much practical realism as my 
proposal may carry, it risks selling the citizenry short of their rational capacities.  I called this 
worry the “deductivist’s challenge,” associating it with a long intellectual tradition that has often 
gained its inspiration and educational foothold in the “deductive” methods of Euclidean 
geometry.  Why frame deliberative democracy around an inferior form of reasoning (inductive) 
involving analogies when we can aim higher and push for a principled (deductive) form instead?  
Similarly, I recognized that some will say that whatever practical limits may seem natural to 
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principled reasoning can be counteracted by acknowledging the role of judgment in democratic 
deliberation.  Accordingly, the principled form’s superiority can easily be salvaged from any 
practical concerns about its determinacy (e.g., Gaus’s criticism and the Neutral Starting Point 
Thesis).  I called this worry the “humanist’s challenge,” a label I also drew from the close 
alliance between the way of thinking behind this challenge and an intellectual tradition, namely, 
“humanism”(as the term was originally defined when coined by Friedrich Immanuel 
Niethammer).274 
However, as I hope to have shown by drawing on Gerald Gaus’s work, the indeterminacy 
worry remains in full force in the face of such high-flown “deductivism” (to use Wesley 
Salmon’s term), even when it is combined with a humanistic supplement in the form of 
“judgment.”  Principles seem largely restricted to narrowing our range of options when making 
practical decisions.  They do not, however, tell us anything more specific about how to (1) 
choose among those options that are consistent with them; (2) select those beliefs that should be 
changed in the face of disagreement (e.g., the conflicting strategies of Alf and Betty).  As Gaus 
argues, when it comes to making actual decisions that determine action, our first-personal, 
phenomenological considerations carry a particularly heavy weight.  For some reason, this first-
personal content seems to play a more decisive, determinate role.  When Betty enters the school 
hallway, with freshly printed signs in hand, and her memories flood her mind, it seems both 
probable and rational that she will change her plan and revise her strategy for acting on the 
principle of respect she shares with Alf. 
The problem of underdetermination here identified seems particularly intractable because 
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in some ways we know more about what to do than just what our principles deliver.  The 
discussion of “judgment” among deliberative democrats is supposed to point in this direction.  
Elster, Cohen, and Benhabib are aware that in the face of underdetermination, we do have some 
kind of capacity for ferreting out differences among our options and selecting a specific course of 
action.  The problem is that the considerations that engage this strange kind of capacity for 
judgment seem inherently vague.  Cohen speaks vaguely of matters of degree and depth.  
Benhabib puts her faith in a vague, interpersonal communication and the consideration of our 
individual narratives.  These comments reveal a latent sense that we know more than we can say 
with our talk of principled justification and Herculean efforts at deliberation.  Thus, the problem 
of underdetermination for democratic deliberation is even more intractable because we actually 
know that something more has to be said, but we simultaneously recognize that it is the kind of 
subject matter that is by its very nature vague.   
Thus, it may come as no surprise that Benhabib cites Charles Larmore’s article on “Moral 
Judgment” as “an illuminating discussion of moral judgment.”275  In that article, Larmore 
concludes, “In the light of what appears to be the intrinsic recalcitrance of moral judgment to 
theoretical analysis, we might consider returning to the 17th and 18th century idea of natural 
limits to human understanding, an idea which (no doubt unfortunately) seems to have 
disappeared from subsequent philosophy.”276  In this quotation, Larmore declares that we cannot 
offer a satisfactory analysis of moral judgment (or judgment more broadly) because it eludes, by 
its very nature, theoretical explanation.  There is good reason for it to elude theoretical 
explanation, though.  Larmore observes:  
This inability to arrive at a general theory of judgment should not surprise us, however, if 
we reflect upon our very idea of what it is to have a theoretical understanding of some 
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form of intentional activity.  Having a theoretical understanding of some intentional 
practice … consists in having reconstructed the rules, both explicit and tacit, which 
characterize that practice.  The distinctive feature of moral judgment, however, appears to 
be - if our experience of it is any guide - the way in which it transcends the explicit or 
tacit rules upon which it only partially depends.277 
 
In this passage, Larmore clarifies his major conclusion about moral judgment.  In our experience, 
judgment cannot be reconstructed with any set of rules, be they explicit or tacit.  Since 
theoretical explanation today consists of a reconstruction with rules, our capacity for judgment 
(i.e., our vague capacity for dealing with underdetermination) is distinguished by its resistance to 
theoretical explanation.  To round off this conclusion he adds: “theory can carry us only so far in 
our attempt to understand the nature of moral judgment.  To go further, we must turn, above all, 
to the great works of imaginative literature.”278  With this final note, we can see why Benhabib 
finds his analysis of moral judgment so illuminating.  If the problem of underdetermination for 
democratic deliberation is even more intractable because we actually know that something more 
has to be said, but we simultaneously recognize that it is the kind of subject matter that is by its 
very nature vague, then turning to literature seems like a natural way to both acknowledge this 
limitation and deal with it.  Since Benhabib puts such heavy stress on moral imagination, this 
turn to literature is a natural fit.   
 
A Logical Insight 
 In the face of this difficulty, I would like to explore the philosophical basis for a third 
pass at my deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c).  The point for a third formulation of my 
proposal has arrived because the major difference between my proposal and other work by 
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deliberative democrats, including those for whom “judgment” is essential to decision-making, 
now comes into clear view.  In the face of this vague human capacity to deal with 
underdetermination, I believe far more can be said.  We do not have to take Larmore’s lead and 
concede that this part of deliberation referred to as “judgment” simply transcends theoretical 
understanding.  More resources are at our disposal than Larmore, and by extension, Benhabib 
and other deliberative democrats, would recognize.   
What are these additional, overlooked resources?  A clue is actually written into the very 
words Larmore uses to deliver his conclusion: “if our experience of it is any guide.”  Larmore 
uses our past experiences with judgment to arrive at his claim about the inarticulable nature of 
judgment.  More specifically, he frames his claim by calling upon the reader to stop and consider 
what we can infer about judgment, if our past experience of judgment is any kind of guide, 
whatsoever.  Fundamentally, Larmore’s statement takes a very particular form.  He begins with 
our particular past experiences, which he describes as shared.  He then proceeds to ask us to 
consider how a general claim about judgment can be inferred on the basis of these shared 
experiences.  Fundamentally, the form of this line of reasoning is to begin with specific, shared, 
past experiences, and to then draw an inference from them that is of a general nature: Judgment 
is by its very nature inarticulable.   
The essential point here, I hope, should suggest itself by analogy with discussions from 
the last chapter.  Larmore is asking us to move from the specific to the general; from a set of 
similar past experiences, to a general claim inferred from those past experiences.  In a word, he is 
asking us to carry out an inference that is analogous to the inference carried out by analogies, 
namely: Inductive inference.  As Schechter described this form of inference in “nonmathematical 
English,” induction means moving from the particular to the general when reasoning; by 
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contrast, deductive inference moves from the general to the particular.  Thus, when it comes to 
the topic of judgment and its challenging vagueness, Larmore asks us to use inductive argument, 
which is associated with analogy, to say something determinate about it.  In doing so, he 
provides a clue to how we might deal with the problem of underdetermination in deliberation, 
namely: Use inductive reasoning! 
For a third pass at my deliberative outlets proposal, I will consider how the inductive 
nature of my focal point, analogical reasoning, provides an unprecedented resource for dealing 
with the problem of underdetermination in democratic deliberation.  As I mentioned above, other 
deliberative democratic theorists focus heavily on the need to initially orient deliberation around 
the general (especially principles), and to then move into the space of the particular.  In doing so, 
they frame democratic deliberation in a way that cleanly maps onto the two stage process of 
deliberation as Gerald Gaus describes it and with which “deductive” reasoning is ordinarily 
identified in “nonmathematical English.”  As was shown in the last chapter, the problem with 
this two stage process (Stage 1 & 2), as Gaus argues, is that it suffers from serious 
underdetermination.   
By contrast, my deliberative outlets approach describes the process of democratic 
deliberation in terms of “deliberative leaps,” where analogy is used inductively to move from 
one particular context to another particular context.  Thus, earlier work by deliberative democrats 
relies heavily on deductive reasoning, whereas my proposal shifts that focus to inductive, 
analogical reasoning.  A very helpful way of labeling this difference was explored above, 
namely, Salmon’s description of “deductivism,” which is a pervasive tendency in the history of 
philosophy to follow the example of Euclid and show a heavy preference for deductive 
techniques over inductive ones.  Applied to this “third pass” at my deliberative outlets proposal, 
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this label allows me to say that what my proposal does is challenges the “deductivism” of 
deliberative democratic theory.  The clue provided by Larmore’s statement, then, is just the idea 
of such a shift in deliberative democratic theory away from using deductive techniques and 
towards an unprecedented focus on inductive ones ... like analogy. 
The idea of using analogy to shift our vision of democratic deliberation away from 
“deductivism” may at first seem extravagant, a construct of grandiose philosophical speculation.  
To that end, one might try to further substantiate the idea by adding greater detail to Salmon’s 
idea, especially in ways that make it relevant to democratic theory.  For instance, one might point 
to the influence of Kant on deliberative democrats and explore the way in which they understand 
reasoning to be a rule-governed procedure in ways that mirror his use of Euclid’s geometry.279  
That kind of project, however, is itself a grand one, being well beyond the limited scope of the 
present work.280   
Fortunately, Michael Dummett provides an alternative, less historically-situated 
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motivation for using analogy to enact this shift in deliberative democratic theory.  This 
motivation arises from a logical insight.  In mathematical work (e.g., Euclid’s Elements) of the 
kind that Salmon believes inspires deductivism, Dummett observes,  
we do not aim to make assertions save on conclusive grounds; when proofs are defective, 
they have to be rectified.  We cannot claim to be certain of all our results; but our lack of 
certainty turns on the difficulty of ensuring that a complicated proof is conclusive, not on 
our acceptance of arguments we know to fall short of being conclusive.281 
 
In this passage, Dummett observes one of the distinctive characteristics of mathematical 
reasoning.  In mathematics, we only make assertions on the basis of “conclusive grounds.”  In 
other words, we start from certain propositions like the “self-evident” ones with which Euclidean 
demonstration begins.  As a result, any uncertainty that enters into mathematical reasoning is not 
a question of what we “accept,” but whether we executed our reasoning correctly.  At this point, 
Dummett makes the same point about the nonampliative nature of mathematical reasoning that 
Salmon makes with regard to deductivism, writing, “Hence, it is sufficient, for mathematical 
purposes, that a principle of inference should guarantee that truth is transmitted from premisses 
to conclusion.”282  Like Euclidean demonstration and the deductivism it inspires, mathematical 
reasoning can achieve its purposes by simply insuring that any inference preserves the truth of 
the propositions (i.e., “premisses”) from which it sets out on the path of inquiry. 
However, outside mathematics, our uncertainty is different.  “Most of our beliefs are 
perforce based on grounds that fall short of being conclusive,” Dummett writes.283  Unlike 
Euclid, we do not begin with a set of conclusive axioms, but rather with beliefs that “fall short of 
being conclusive,” being of varying degrees of probability.  For instance, when Betty enters the 
school with her freshly printed signs in hand, she may enter thinking Alf is “probably right” that 
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his strategy is the superior one; however, when her past experiences flood her with memories as 
she walks the halls, she inductively infers that Alf is actually “more likely” to be wrong about the 
best strategy for putting their principle into effect.  At this point, Dummett offers a penetrating 
logical insight about the problem of using deductive, Euclidean-style reasoning in the context of 
“most of our beliefs:” 
but a form of inference guaranteed to preserve truth is not, in general, guaranteed to 
preserve degree of probability … the conjunction of two statements will usually have a 
lower probability than either.284  
 
Here, Dummett observes that when we ask someone to accept one merely probable belief in 
conjunction with another, merely probable belief, we actually ask that person to accept 
something that is even less likely than either of those beliefs being true on their own.  For 
instance, if Alf can only convince Betty of his strategy because it is probably the case that all 
students will get equal access to educational resources if they are advertised to everyone at once, 
she may find that statement is to some degree probably true.   
But if he also has to convince Betty, in conjunction with that statement, that posting 
printed signs one morning counts as “advertising to everyone at once,” he is asking her to agree 
to an even less likely point of view.  The logical point here is actually a very simple, formal 
point.  The conjunction of two probabilities is usually a lower probability.  Asking someone to 
agree that a financial stimulus is probably the best available source of economic recovery during 
a current economic crisis is one thing; asking someone to also agree that the current political 
climate is suitably equipped for the execution of that stimulus is another, more demanding and 
therefore less probable request.  Dummett refers to this formal point as the “degeneration of 
probability,” as it shows how the conjunction of increasing numbers of merely probable claims 
steadily decreases the probability of them being true in conjunction with one another. 
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 Taking this formal point about the logic of probabilistic reasoning, Dummett then offers 
an insightful application to the real world.  Even the most “Herculean” of reasoners, sticking 
with ironclad devotion to the rules of logic, will suffer from the degeneration of probability as 
the chain of reasoning develops.  Dummett writes, “The ‘ideal’ subject, starting from beliefs 
whose probability is close 1, will end up with beliefs with probability negligibly greater than 0 
… .”285  No amount of Herculean, rational perfection can save us from probabilistic 
degeneration.  Even if we begin with firm principles we suspect are nearly certain (probability 
close to “1”), degeneration will ensue once reasoning progressively incorporates more and more 
merely probable beliefs, leading us to conclusions that are only “negligibly greater than 0” in 
their probability.  We cannot preserve the degree of commitment from a nearly certain, initial 
principle, as our reasoning proceeds in any context that involves any merely probable reasoning.  
The mathematical approach, in which we first concern ourselves with opening with strong 
commitments like self-evident truths, and then proceed to preserve that level of commitment 
until we reach a conclusion about what to do, is illogical.   
 Dummett then applies this logical point to what we should want in the real world: “the 
man of common sense, initially adopting beliefs with a much weaker evidential basis, but 
reasoning from them only to a meagre extent, will finish with far fewer false beliefs than he.”286  
The average person does better than a Hercules, logically speaking, by first starting with even 
weaker beliefs than a Hercules, and then restricting the number of conjunctive claims.  The 
contrast here might be better specified by comparing what is different between the 
“mathematical”/deductivist/Herculean, and “common sense”/inductivist approaches to 
deliberation at each stage.  At the first stage (Stage 1), the mathematical model begins with a 
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strong opening premise, like a principle about which we are close to certain, though we might 
say we are not absolutely certain because we remain open to the possibility that it is wrong or 
that certain probable provisos would be necessary for its acceptance.287  At the second stage 
(Stage 2), reasoning proceeds by trying to preserve this level of strong commitment, as one 
would expect to do in a deductive vein, until a conclusion is reached.  For instance, in a 
deliberative context, we might first begin by seeing if people agree that it is generally the case 
that it is better to “help people than to harm them” (principle).  After that initial generalization is 
accepted as a pretty firm commitment, we then engage in some “interpretive” work.  We might, 
for example, suggest that the justice system “usually” (i.e., probably) offers an opportunity to 
either “help or harm” criminals.  The justice system can use its resources either to help criminals 
“correct” their bad dispositions, or can harm them by simply punishing them without any 
intention to help them (to put the principle to work).  Finally, we might conclude, given our 
levels of commitment to these two statements, should we not act to insure that our justice system 
is a corrective one by signing a specific petition?  In this example, levels of commitment are 
being preserved across the steps of deliberation.  With the high probability of the opening 
generalization, followed by the high probability of what is suggested about the corrective 
capacity of the justice system, we then try to preserve an equally high level of commitment from 
the first, to the second, and finally to the conclusive third position.     
 By contrast, the person of “common sense” described by Dummett does not start with 
anything as high in probability as the help/harm principle mentioned in the last example.  Nor 
does the “common sense” deliberator then proceed to preserve that level of commitment until a 
conclusion about what to do is reached.  Rather, the common sense deliberator reasons sparingly 
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from the start.  For instance, some citizens involved with law enforcement may first (Stage 1) 
suggest that in their experiences, it is often the case that those persons who perpetrate crimes 
really struggle to foresee the consequences of their actions when they plan and execute their 
problematic behavior.  The citizens may continue (Stage 2) by claiming that these persons also 
sometimes repeat that problematic behavior after they are caught and go through the justice 
system.  It seems probable then, the citizens add (Stage 2 cont’d), that just like when these 
persons were caught the first time, that the problem is again a failure to foresee consequences 
when planning and executing behavior.  As a result, if we are serious about “fighting crime,” the 
citizens may (Stage 2 cont’d) conclude, one reasonable course of action would be to figure out a 
way to help these persons learn to foresee consequences, to beat the vicious cycle they are stuck 
within, be it through educational, experiential, medical, or other means.   
Notice in the second example, that these citizens express themselves in very “qualified” 
ways (as linguists describe this manner of expression).  They speak of what is “often” the case, 
what “sometimes” happens, what “seems probable” and finally, “one” reasonable course of 
action in response to these observations.  One can get the sense that these citizens are (1) aware 
of how little they know and (2) aware of how little extension it permits towards a definitive 
course of action.  The former humility comes through in expressions like, “in my experience, it 
often seems the case,” whereas the latter humility takes the form of conclusions like “one” 
course of action that might be taken.  Even more to the point, these citizens are likely to use 
vivid past experiences in law enforcement to frame their reasoning.  Once, they may say, they 
witnessed several people commit a crime that showed an almost impossible short-sightedness in 
terms of foreseeing consequences.  For instance, tales may be retold of attempts to rob a bank 
that was on the same block as the police station, or to steal the parking meters from a police 
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station’s public parking lot.  From these particular experiences, more general claims about other 
domains may then be inferred: What is needed in each of these particular places (or generally), is 
a way to counteract such behavioral short-sightedness, they may say.  In this analogical setting, 
the two forms of humility are even clearer.  Citizens talk of a particular experience and what 
seemed to be true (e.g., consequences had not been foreseen), and then extend the limited 
understanding of that particular context to another, particular domain.  When the extension is 
particular to specific domains in this way, it is especially humble in its inferential extension of 
what is known about the source domain. 
 According to Dummett, this “common sense” humility offers a superior mode of 
reasoning over the “mathematical” variety in the last example.  The citizens of the last example 
are aware that they know what is of limited probability and accordingly that they must be sparing 
in how they apply it to practical matters.  By contrast, the “mathematical” approach of 
deductivism tries to preserve a high degree of commitment across the stages of deliberation.  
From a strictly logical perspective, Dummett tells us, we should do better with “common sense” 
humility than “mathematical” deductivism.  Thus, he writes, “In practical life, truth is valued 
chiefly as a guide to action; and then the principal remedy for the degeneration of probability in 
the course of inferential reasoning is to employ it sparingly.”288  A humble, “sparing” extension 
of our humble knowledge is the best way to deal with the logical difficulty posed by the 
degeneration of probability.  Recalling our logical vocabulary from above, we can rephrase this 
point to say that humble ampliative reasoning of the kind associated with analogical reasoning is 
(practically speaking) logically stronger than nonampliative reasoning of the sort associated with 
the kind of “deductivism” that defines so much deliberative democratic theory. 
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The Logical Interpretation of Political Judgment 
The significance of Dummett’s analysis for understanding the limited practical appeal of 
deductivism is startling.  To the extent that even a wildly idealized, Herculean group of reasoners 
includes any merely probabilistic beliefs, their Herculean efforts are, logically speaking, weaker 
than the efforts of a mere “commoner,” someone who has far humbler initial beliefs and far 
humbler extensions of those beliefs as well.  Accordingly, from a logical perspective, what we 
want in “practical life” (including political life) is a shift away from deductivism and its truth-
preserving approach to deliberation.  In this way, Dummett offers a logical basis for motivating 
the shift I have been proposing in this work, that is, a shift away from deductivism in deliberative 
democratic theory and towards the inductive reasoning of analogy-driven deliberation.  I will 
refer to the perspective on judgment resulting from this shift as the logical interpretation of 
judgment.  To the extent that deliberative democracy is a theory to be made concrete in “practical 
life,” it is also a theory that should envision citizens as co-deliberators usually engaged in the 
humble extension of their humble knowledge, rather than being engaged in the principled 
deduction of decisions. 
Furthermore, this logical motivation for shifting away from deductivism provides a 
response to the problem of underdetermination in deliberation as well.  If we recall, that problem 
arose from the transition between two stages of deliberation.  During the first stage (Stage 1), 
some shared principle or principled set of beliefs was identified (χ*).  With the inception of the 
second stage (Stage 2), citizens individually took up their private belief sets (e.g., α, β, etc.).  In 
doing so, they discovered that the conclusions of the first stage seemed to lose much if not all of 
their deliberative significance, once the much anticipated second stage began.  In other words, 
the determinacy of those conclusions as a basis for selecting a course of action dissolved in the 
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process of combining the two sets of beliefs (χ*+?).  With Dummett’s logical insight, we can far 
more easily see why this problematic underdetermination arises.  When these two sets of beliefs 
are added together, each citizen is faced with an enormous class of commitments, all set in 
conjunction with one another.  For example, for Alf, he goes from some single principle or some 
small set of Herculean commitments (χ*), to an enormously large class of commitments that 
includes the massive array of all of his first-personal contents (χ*+α),.  Given Dummett’s logical 
insight, though, the transition here is a perfect recipe for the degeneration of probability.  To use 
Dummett’s own term, the shared set is “sparing” in its number of commitments (χ), being as 
small as a single shared principle.  By comparison, the second set is countlessly large, being 
constituted from every single thing first-personally believed (e.g., Alf’s personal beliefs). 
The problem with this second, innumerable set of commitments is succinctly captured by 
Dummett, when he writes, “the probability of the conjunction of all of anyone’s beliefs is likely 
to be extremely low, even when they are not actually inconsistent.”289  In other words, even if we 
are rational Hercules and we have arrived at a perfectly consistent set of personal beliefs (which 
we might call α*, to use the symbol above for Herculean beliefs), that does not insure that those 
beliefs are all true of the world.  Our beliefs may be perfectly justifiable by way of rules and 
norms of reasoning, but that does not make them true.  They remain, fundamentally, probable.  
Less metaphysically, though, and certainly less contentiously, Dummett is here observing that 
the innumerable beliefs that constitute anyone’s “first-personal” set of beliefs is never going to 
be 100% certain across every single belief.  If we grant this more pragmatic point alone (let alone 
Dummett’s more metaphysical one), we can see the implication of his observation for the 
problem of underdetermination in deliberation quite clearly: No matter how Herculean our 
initial, shared commitments are (χ*), the addition of an innumerable array of first-personal 
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considerations which are merely probable rapidly evaporates their practical significance.  The 
degeneration of probability insures this outcome.  From a nearly certain, Herculean set of beliefs, 
we end up with a set of beliefs that is only “negligibly greater than 0” when we add anything as 
diverse in its probabilities and massive in its sheer number as someone’s “first-personal 
perspective.”   
Thus, the problem of underdetermination in deliberation is really just the problem posed 
by the degeneration of probability.  When the “first-personal” perspective is “diverse in its 
probabilities” and “massive,” the initially strong set of beliefs we have is “swamped” radically 
transformed.  Furthermore, even if we allow that most of a person’s private beliefs are not 
actually relevant in a way that they all must be included, the problem becomes acute in exactly 
the way predicted by Gaus.  If our Herculean efforts produced an initial set of beliefs (χ*) that 
has divergent implications for Alf and Betty, it is because those beliefs that are first-personally 
relevant have divergent implications for the probability of χ*.  For instance, Alf may feel fairly 
confident about his beliefs regarding the educational system he attended, having long studied it 
professionally as an education scholar.  Accordingly, the strategy he suggests for tackling the 
injustices in that system is based on a set of beliefs with a very high set of probabilities.  By 
contrast, we might say, Betty has happily turned her back on the details of that system since 
graduating from school.  What she believes about the system, as a result, seems to run a great 
risk of being outdated.  Consequently, she may hold those beliefs at a far lower level of 
commitment.   
If we compare the probabilities of their perspectives, each individually in conjunction 
with their shared commitments about the need to reform the school, what we may thereby 
discover is that Alf’s are (on the whole) closer to certainty, closer to a probability of “1,” than are 
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Betty’s.  In short, χ*+α and χ*+ β are divergent in their assigned probabilities.  As a result, what 
is asked of Alf and Betty by implementing χ* is very different.  For Alf, it involves doing 
something he feels quite confident is the right thing to do.  Betty, on the other hand, finds herself 
contemplating a set of commitments (χ*) she has agreed to in a Herculean session of deliberation 
with Alf, but which loses its probability dramatically when set into conjunction with her first-
personal commitments (χ*+ β).  Therefore, we should only expect, given Dummett’s logical 
insight into the degeneration of probability, that for Alf the uptake of their agreement remains 
decisive for what he will do, while Betty finds herself awash in indeterminacy and 
underdetermination.  In short, Betty faces a divergent implication from Alf, because she cannot 
really determine what to do based on probabilities that are only negligibly greater than “0.”  
Betty and Alf have divergent implications because the degeneration of probabilities has 
divergent implications for them. 
Earlier, I tried to encapsulate Gaus’s criticism under a single heading, namely, the 
Neutral Starting Point Thesis.  What is basic to a collective point of view, this thesis stated, is 
not equally basic to a “first-personal” one.  With the degeneration of probability, we can 
appreciate the logical basis of this thesis.  We often think that what is deepest, or most “basic” 
plays a crucial role in determining our choices.  Our deepest commitments, values, principles, 
concerns, etc. are supposed to be important to understanding the decisive conclusions of our 
deliberations.  Yet, when we add the much larger or individually divergent conjunctive set of 
“first-personal” contents, they lose their “basic” force, that is, their capacity to be determinate of 
what we do in any deep and abiding way.  The Neutral Starting Point Thesis identifies this 
problem for collective agency.  Nothing that seems neutral with regard to the first-personal can 
have the determinate force of what is “basic” when it suffers from the degeneration of 
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probability.  The reason for this loss of determinacy is easy to see.  As in the case of Betty as I 
most recently described it, her issue is a sudden loss of faith in the very probability of what she 
had endorsed during collective deliberation.  However much we idealize any set of initial beliefs, 
once a gigantic set of other, merely probable beliefs is added, we lose faith that those initial 
beliefs are really worthy guides to decision-making. 
 
A Lingering Deductivism? 
One response to this logical motivation for my shift away from deductivism is to simply 
“stick to the guns” of deductivism.  Consider the classic, “tidy” deductive argument that begins 
with a belief that is not merely high in its probability, but rather certain, and then proceeds 
across other certain beliefs, preserving certainty until a conclusion is reached.  Would such an 
argument not easily sidestep the degeneration of probability, and therefore, provide a safe haven 
for principled reasoning in democratic deliberation?  Here, I would only remind the reader of a 
very obvious problem for principled reasoning, namely, the “interpretive indeterminacy” 
Benhabib was so concerned with above.  Any overt behavior is consistent with a very large 
number of principles, making the deliberative force of those principles highly suspect.  Even 
more to the point, whatever our principles say, they often fail to say it with the same words we 
find ourselves forced to deal with in a particular context.  For instance, in the above example, we 
may accept a general principle to help others, not harm them.  However, it is an act of 
interpretation to figure out how this principle applies to the context of a justice system.  We need 
to first interpret the system as being capable of “helping” and/or “harming” persons sent to it for 
“correction” or “punishment.”  To what degree do the resources available fit the description of 
being “helpful”?  That question is surely going to involve probabilistic assessments.  For 
   220 
example, deliberators will find themselves talking about how “usually” rehabilitative treatment is 
more “corrective” and “helpful” for those convicted of crimes than alternatives.  What we mean 
by “usually” will involve some kind of probability, not to mention what we mean by “corrective” 
and “helpful.”  Does something helpful “usually” itself involve people consciously working for 
the good of others?  Or does it “usually” succeed in delivering that good when it works hardest to 
present itself as “tough on crime,” being a kind of “tough love” for those convicted of crimes?  
As the quotation marks abounding in these examples are meant to reveal, each of these terms is 
bound up with probabilities, and therefore, an indication that the degeneration of probabilities is 
a real risk. 
Another connection back to our earlier discussion of interpretive indeterminacy is 
suggested by the abundance of quotation marks in the last paragraph.  In their discussions of 
judgment, we found that Joshua Cohen and others were dealing with exactly these kinds of 
indeterminacies.  To what “degree,” Cohen asks, is a principle better served by one course of 
action than another?  How “deep” an infringement is carried out by one action as opposed to 
another?  These are questions that seem to involve gradations of significance.  As a result, they 
reflect my point in the previous paragraph: Principled judgment cannot avoid probabilistic 
assessments.  When Cohen talks about the need for judgment, he is talking about the need to be 
sensitive to the probabilistic assessments that have to be made.  Judgment just is the attempt to 
make decisions in the face of probabilities.  Thus, my interpretation of “judgment” as 
deliberative democrats describe it boils down to the following claim: When they speak loosely of 
judgment, what they really mean is that at some point, deliberation must deal with the 
assessment of probabilities, and as a result, shift away from deductivism in attempting to deal 
with the logic of probability.  When Larmore writes, “if experience is any guide” to judgment, 
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what he hints at is that judgment is the space where we turn to experience and induction, rather 
than deductivist techniques, to orient deliberation about what to do.  According to Allen Wood, 
even so principled a theory as Kantian moral and political philosophy has long suffered for its 
failure to heed this lesson which, he claims, Kant was fully aware of.290 
 
Supporting Evidence for the Logical Interpretation of Political Judgment 
Recent empirical research supports this logical interpretation of political judgment.  In 
his book, Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock explores the results of extensive 
experiments he conducted on political judgment.291  As he interprets good judgment in politics, 
much of its concern is to predict future political events.  His results are often surprising.  For 
instance, he finds that between recognized “experts” and non-expert “dilettantes” and computer 
algorithms, there is little difference in respective rates of success for predicting future political 
events.292  Anyone who has ever doubted whether the category, “expert” tracks an improved 
capacity to make predictions in an area of expertise will welcome these results.  Past suspicions 
about the class of “so-called experts” and their influence on political life seem confirmed. 
However, he observes, when one looks inside the disappointing results of experts, one 
finds that sub-groups of experts achieve very different results.  More specifically, those experts 
who advocate “one big thing,” tend to muddle the results of the entire class of “experts” with 
their poor performance rates.  By contrast, those experts with a more diversified, balanced set of 
ideas, or “tricks of the trade,” demonstrate remarkably higher success in political event 
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prediction than the “one big idea” cohort as well as dilettantes.293  Adopting terminology 
developed by Isaiah Berlin, Tetlock describes the former, “one big thing” experts as hedgehogs, 
and the latter, wily experts in “tricks of the trade” as foxes.294  To put this terminology to use, one 
can summarize Tetlock’s chief finding as follows.  The class of “experts” is no better at political 
judgment than dilettantes and computer algorithms … but that is only because hedgehog experts 
are so very bad at political judgment.  If we separate the hedgehogs and the foxes, it is easy to 
see that hedgehogs are responsible for the bad scores of experts as a class, while foxes excel at 
political judgment when hedgehogs are not dragging down their scores. 
How do these empirical results support the logical interpretation of judgment?  Consider 
how hedgehogs are deductivists and foxes are not.  The superior experts with a diversified set of 
ideas, or “foxes,” were “skeptical of deductive approaches to explanation and prediction.”295  
Instead of trying to preserve the truth of “one big thing” by deriving conclusions from it for 
every political judgment (as a deductivist would), these wily experts “see explanation and 
prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible ‘ad hocery’ that requires 
stitching together diverse sources of information.”296  In other words, foxes are experts who do 
not initially orient their judgment around what they know to be the most certain (as a deductivist 
might with a general principle), but in a more humble way.  Foxes stitch together “diverse” 
sources of information into an ad hoc solution, making a patchwork, rather than an elegant line 
of deductive reasoning as in a geometrical proof.   
The “one big idea” hedgehogs, on the other hand, suffer in political judgment tasks 
because they are intent to “aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into 
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new domains.”297  They are “deductivists” in their attempt to begin with the general and then 
move to the particular context of judgment.  There is a clear resonance between these findings 
and the logical interpretation of judgment I have been advancing.  Foxes use far humbler 
epistemic content to arrive at political judgments, relying on “tricks,” whereas hedgehogs begin 
with their deepest commitment (the “one big thing” dearest to them) and then proceed to deduce 
a conclusive judgment as a result.  In this way, foxes are like the “ordinary” persons Dummett 
describes … both kinds of reasoners rely on a “short and sweet” approach in their reasoning, 
rather than the long, elegant chains of deductive reasoning historically associated with the 
geometrical proof. 
Notably, these differences between foxes and hedgehogs are not content-sensitive, but 
rather a question of “style,” method, or “logic” that emerges across diverse circumstances.298  
Whether they occupied the left or right sides of the political spectrum, whether they were hard 
“realists” about the political world or avid proponents of international coordination, and whether 
they believed that humans are resilient in the face of natural scarcity, or doomed when 
confronted with deep natural problems, the “cognitive-stylistic subspecies” referred to as “foxes” 
did better.299  Perhaps even more astonishing is his finding regarding the “professional vs. 
dilettante” dichotomy.  Regardless of whether one has a “professional background” in politics or 
is a mere dilettante dabbler, foxes do better.300 Furthermore, not only did a lack of professional 
background provide no hurdle to excellence in political judgment, the different topics (e.g., 
political, economic, national security) were dealt with equally well by foxes.  This shows that 
their “tricks of the trade,” ad hoc deliberation is better across disparate topics, not just one 
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domain.301  Through a careful analysis of expert exercises in political judgment, Tetlock 
concludes, the initial results showing no real difference in ability between experts and dilettantes 
are found to be deceiving, as they “mask systematic, not just random, variation in forecasting 
skill.  Some cognitive-stylistic subspecies of humans [namely, foxes] consistently outperformed 
others.”302  To use a classical distinction, it is not the content of what foxes think, but their 
logical style that makes them so good at political judgment.  Hélène Landemore concisely 
summarizes Tetlock’s “convincing conclusions” as follows: 
Foxes’ knowledge of many little things, their ability to draw from an eclectic array of 
traditions and to improvise in response to changing events make them better forecasters 
than hedgehogs, who know only one big thing, toil devotedly within one tradition, and 
impose formulaic solutions on ill-defined problems.303 
 
The hedgehog “imposes” one general (i.e., “big”) idea in a formulaic manner … regardless of 
content, while the fox practices an eclectic, improvisational way of responding to problems. 
These astonishing results lend empirical support to the logical interpretation of political 
judgment and Dummett’s related point about the “commoner” versus the deductivist.  We 
actually do better in practical life if we base our judgments on more humble grounds, than we do 
if try to orient our judgments initially on as certain a basis as possible.  To pick up on an earlier 
claim I advanced above, starting points matter (as the Neutral Starting Point Thesis maintains).  
Dummett’s “commoner” is a fox, to use Tetlock’s cognitive-stylistics, while the deductivist is a 
hedgehog concerned to preserve certainty across the stages of deliberation.  Tetlock’s findings do 
not stop there in providing resonant, empirical support for the logical interpretation of political 
judgment developed above, though.  Additionally, he discovered that foxes were “diffident about 
their own forecasting prowess, and … rather dubious that the cloudlike subject of politics can be 
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the object of a clocklike science.”304  Like Dummett’s “commoner,” foxes demonstrate a 
humility in their reasoning, being defined by their lack of certainty about the judgments that 
result from their sparing, humble inferences.  For instance, in our example involving citizens 
with a background in law enforcement, what we find is a highly qualified set of epistemic 
commitments (“usually,” “often,” “in my experience”) being extended in a very qualified way to 
reach a political judgment (“one course of action might be”). 
By contrast, hedgehogs “display bristly impatience with those who ‘do not get it,’ and 
express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the 
long term.”305  This description of “big idea” hedgehogs reflects Dummett’s point about the 
dangers of someone who tries to preserve the near certainty of an opening commitment across a 
chain of practical reasoning: The degeneration of probabilities will ransack the epistemic quality 
of the resulting conclusion.  More importantly, Tetlock points out, not only is the epistemic 
quality of the resulting conclusion degenerated, but the hedgehog remains confident.  This 
confidence makes sense, given the logical interpretation of political judgment developed above.  
If people believe political judgment is similar to mathematical inference, then we should only 
expect them to have as much confidence in their conclusive judgments as they have in their 
initial, nearly certain, general premise.  In other words, if people are deductivists in their 
approach to political judgment, then we should very much expect them to be confident because 
they believe certainty has been preserved.  After all, that preservation is the defining feature of 
their logic.   
Indeed, so defining is this feature of their logic, that one can “test for deductivism” by 
inquiring into how certain people are about their first or more general premise.  Recalling 
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Schechter’s summary way of distinguishing deductive and inductive logics, this test makes sense 
because deductivists tend to (1) start with the general, (2) start with what they are certain is true, 
and then (3) attempt to preserve that initial, general truth across the stages of their reasoning.  
Thus, in applying this test for deductivism, we might find for example that an interlocutor begins 
with a broad generalization about human nature (e.g., “All people act out of selfish motives.”).  
Inquiring into how certain the interlocutor is about that opening generalization, we may then hear 
that the interlocutor is absolustely certain about that generalization.  In such a case, this rough 
and ready test shows that we are dealing with a deductivist.  Such a test would be useful because, 
as Tetlock writes, in identifying deductivism, we are also identifying the hedgehog style of 
reasoning: “hedgehogs wove tighter mental connections between their abstract theoretical beliefs 
and specific opinions about what was possible at particular times and places.  Their trademark 
approach was deductive.”306  To be a hedgehog in one’s manner of forming political judgment is 
to take deduction as one’s trademark approach.  Furthermore, the test would also be useful 
because once it allows us to identify hedgehog, deductive styles of reasoning, we can be 
sensitive to the risk that style of reasoning faces in the context of political judgment.  One of 
Tetlock’s observations nicely summarizes the ways in which his research empirically connects 
our discussions of deductivism and political judgment.  Even when he tries to finesse the data to 
make it as amenable to hedgehogs as possible, he nonetheless is forced to observe, “The results 
reinforce the notion that hedgehogs pay a steep price for their confident, deductive style of 
reasoning.”307   
For my purposes, one last, yet very important finding analyzed by Tetlock needs to be 
mentioned.  This finding shows that the use of analogies was not relegated to either foxes or 
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hedgehogs.  Rather, the important point about analogical reasoning is that it can be a source of 
excellence in political judgment, but only when people are “disposed to qualify tempting 
analogies by noting disconfirming evidence.”308  In the terminology I developed in the second 
chapter, the crucial point is not that analogies are good or bad, but rather that they must factor 
into an entrenched, systematic form of reasoning (CPAR.i), one that is concerned to check for 
“spuriousness” (CPAR.iii), rather than to simply extend an analogy in a “Millian,” “one-shot.”  
Any failure to appreciate the systematicity of analogical reasoning, as well as its ultimate need to 
check for spuriousness, I claimed, was tantamount to adopting a very primitive, simplistic, and 
unfortunate vision of analogy’s role in human reasoning.  This unfortunate vision, I mentioned, 
has already been tied by Paul Thagard to the historical legacy of John Stuart Mill’s work on 
logic.  Furthermore, I pointed out how that legacy remains alive and well in contemporary 
textbooks on critical reasoning.  As a result, we can say that Tetlock’s results confirm not only 
the value of shifting away from deductivism, as I have proposed, but also the value of replacing 
it with a more contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR being, after all, the 
contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning).  Sensitive to this more contemporary 
perspective, we can join Tetlock in appreciating the fact that good political judgment is routinely 
analogical, but only in a “contemporary,” rather than “Millian,” way.  Tetlock drives this point 
home succinctly, when he writes, “By now, we should have acquired the foxlike habit of being 
wary of the sound of one analogical hand clapping.”309 
 
Analogy and the Logical Interpretation of Political Judgment 
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This connection between the logical interpretation of political judgment and analogy is 
worth substantiating with further empirical evidence, because the bias against analogical 
reasoning is so very pronounced in our intellectual culture (especially among philosophers 
trained with “Millian” logic textbooks).310  In his study of “How Scientists Really Reason: 
Scientific Reasoning in Real-World Laboratories,” Kevin Dunbar tried to see how excellence in 
reasoning takes form in scientific laboratories.311  More specifically, he immersed himself in this 
setting, “spending extensive periods of time in real scientific laboratories,” where he “followed 
all aspects of particular scientific research projects, including planning the research, executing 
the experiments, evaluating the experimental results, attending laboratory staff meetings and 
public talks, planning further experiments, and writing journal articles.”312  What he discovered 
may surprise many deductivists, as those advocating deductivism have a common tendency to 
look to science as an exemplar for human affairs.  In this “totally novel database,” Dunbar 
discovered that analogies proliferated.313 
However, his more specific findings about the use of these analogies is even more 
interesting.  For instance, he found that scientists use analogies very commonly to “change their 
minds” about their research programs, hypotheses, etc.  When a research program hits a hurdle 
and produces evidence that is inconsistent with a hypothesis, Dunbar observed:  
Local analogies were very frequently used … to map the unsuccessful problem with 
which they were working to another similar experiment that was successful.  The scientist 
would then determine what the difference was between the successful and unsuccessful 
experiments and substitute the different components from the successful approach into 
the unsuccessful approach.314   
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In this passage, Dunbar describes a very straight-forward process of analogical reasoning.  In this 
process, scientists reason their way towards a new plan by analogically substituting components 
from a similar experiment into their own research, changing it in the process and (ultimately) 
leading to success where the analogy holds up.  In other words, scientists use analogies in a very 
“contemporary way,” (CPAR) insofar as they not only extend local analogies to deal with 
problems (CPAR.ii), but also then study the quality of that inference, assessing whether it “holds 
up” (CPAR.iii).  In doing so, they use analogies in a contemporary way because they are 
concerned to not only draw inferences (CPAR.ii), but also to test for spuriousness (CPAR.iii). 
While Dunbar concedes that this use of analogy to guide a way forward in the face of 
problems is not a “very sophisticated type of reasoning and certainly not the type of reasoning 
that has been the focus of much cognitive research” (much as we should expect in the wake of 
Mill’s legacy), he nonetheless adds, “However, the use of local analogies is one of the main 
mechanisms for driving research forward … This type of reasoning occurred in virtually every 
meeting I observed, and often numerous times in a meeting.”315  In other words, however biased 
we may be against analogical reasoning, his “novel” set of data demands that we set that bias 
aside and simply recognize that when it comes to change in the actions of scientists, analogy 
proliferates as the form of reasoning that actually drives that change in action.  To borrow some 
of the terminology developed above, the point here involves the dynamics (or process of change) 
that occurs in the way scientists think, and therefore, in how they plan and execute their actions.  
Accordingly, the point made by Dunbar is that however biased we may be against the simplicity 
of analogical reasoning, we are nonetheless forced by his evidence to recognize that analogies 
drive the dynamism of rational action in science. 
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Furthermore, Dunbar often found that more expansive, regional analogies played a 
significant role when scientists “were working on elaborating their theory and planning new sets 
of experiments.”316  With these regional analogies, researchers map “over an entire system of 
relations,” which “proved a very powerful tool” for planning future research because it 
capitalized on the fact that it was used “only after the scientists had already started to formulate a 
model of the entire process that they were investigating.  Hence, the scientists had a system of 
relations and mechanisms in their own domain that they could then map to another domain.”317  
As with the first part of the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.i), so too 
with regional analogies, an extremely rich systematicity is mapped, rather than a “Millian” set of 
superficial features.  As Dunbar additionally points out, regional analogies that are massively 
systematic in this way are important because often scientists are studying a domain in which 
“little is known about many basic components,” (e.g., retroviruses).318 
Finally, a third, long-distance form of analogy was used among researchers, but not to 
solve problems or plan new research, but rather to educate new members of a research team or 
“bring home a point.”319  By drawing an analogy from two highly disparate domains, researchers 
were able to make “the exact point clear” that was being discussed, so that new members of a 
research team could understand.  This last form of analogy is especially interesting because it 
highlights the social function of analogies.  As Dunbar later realized, “The social structure of the 
laboratory appears critical to whether analogies will be used.”320  When a research team has 
“highly similar backgrounds and consequently drew from a similar knowledge base,” analogies 
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were less common.321  However, where research team members were very different in their 
backgrounds, analogies proliferated.  A “homogenous” group, Dunbar observes, has less need for 
analogies.  Furthermore, not only does analogy use relate to the homogeneity of a group, it also 
relates to the social stature of a person in that group.  As Dunbar learned (and against our 
“Millian” biases), the most senior and expert members of the research team were actually the 
most likely to use analogies!322   
This last point returns our analysis to Tetlock’s study and the logical interpretation of 
judgment.  As with Tetlock’s study, so too Dunbar finds that analogical reasoning that is 
“contemporary” in taking spuriousness seriously abounds in the real world.  When it comes to 
actually making plans for future experiments, or figuring out a way past a problem, those very 
real, practical decisions are made into rational decisions by reference to analogies.  Furthermore, 
“experts” are not distinguished by their use of deductive techniques, but very much the opposite: 
Analogies do the “foxlike” work of educating others, especially others with whom we do not 
share a similar background or level of domain-specific knowledge.  In short, expertise in 
practical life and hedgehog-style deductivism make uneasy partners.  The force of conceptual 
change, the force that drives the dynamics of practical reasoning (at least in science), is the force 
of analogical reasoning, not principled deliberation.  In demonstrating the value of shifting away 
from deductive techniques and towards inductive, analogical ones, these studies thereby support 
Dummett’s contention that practical life is (logically speaking) better suited to the “commoner,” 
than to the deductivist.  As a result, these studies combine with Dummett’s logical insight into 
practical reasoning to provide a double-edged (logical & empirical) motivation for shifting away 
from deductivism and towards (inductivist) analogical reasoning in matters concerning practical 
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life (i.e., the logical interpretation of political judgment). 
 
Clarifying Implications 
 At this point, the shift towards the logical interpretation of political judgment enacted by 
my deliberative outlets proposal may seem well-motivated.  On both logical and empirical 
grounds (the “double-edged” motivation mentioned above), deliberation seems to do better to 
shy away from the deductive techniques of hedgehogs and mathematical reasoners.  However, I 
suspect that many a philosopher will still bristle at this suggestion on account of three remaining 
concerns, which I take up here to both further support my proposal and to clarify it. 
The concerns are as follows.  First, they may still bristle at my focus, clinging to the idea 
that deductive reasoning nonetheless seems capable of eluding the issues canvassed in the last 
section.  If citizens stick to certain premises or truths in their reasoning, they may still declare, 
then the degeneration of probabilities can be avoided.  Second, even if they do engage in 
probabilistic reasoning, it isn’t clear why analogy deserves special treatment (or exaggerated 
focus) as it does in my deliberative outlets proposal.  Third, some deliberative democrats will 
worry that without a deductive basis for all citizen reasoning, there will be no moral constraint 
on citizen deliberation.  As a result, my proposal will be rejected for its failure to retain the moral 
foundation of deliberative democracy.  Clarifying what my proposal really implies under each of 
these headings will hopefully prevent a set of related misunderstandings and potential rejoinders 
from arising unnecessarily. 
 
1. The Persistence of Deductivism 
 Regarding the first of these concerns, I will offer two rejoinders.  The first rejoinder is, in 
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a way, “apologetic” (to re-use the terminology developed in chapter one for the three different 
approaches to defending the determinacy of deliberative democracy).  What my proposal 
suggests is not that deductive reasoning should be dropped, wholesale, from accounts of 
deliberative democracy.  Instead, it recommends a shift away from framing democratic 
deliberation in terms of a process that proceeds from an initial set of principles (or other 
“general” considerations) and into the particularities of a decision.  A “shift away” from 
deductivism need not take the form of a radical and total break.  Thus, my first rejoinder is just 
an apologetic note, which states that those who still retain a prominent deductivist streak need 
not see my deliberative outlets proposal as a total departure from earlier work.  The two 
approaches (deductivist and inductivist) can co-exist happily.  All I am proposing is that we shift 
our nearly total focus away from principled deliberation when giving accounts of real citizen 
deliberation. 
 My second rejoinder is less apologetic.  To the extent that some deliberative democrats 
retain deductivist sympathies, they may wonder how much of a difference my proposal really 
makes.  What, they may contend, really is the level of need for alternative, analogical techniques 
in citizen deliberation?  If citizens avoid merely probable premises in their reasoning, they can 
safely surpass the degeneration of probability.  Here, I would return to the central theme of this 
project.  My concern here is not with just any form of citizen reasoning, but rather with the kind 
that can circumvent the underdetermination posed by the indeterminacy worry.  Deductive 
constraints are not effective at individuating actions, as Benhabib was seen to argue above.  
More importantly, though, I would contend, democratic deliberation cannot have a real world 
grip on citizen decision-making if it is not overwhelmingly caught up in probabilistic reasoning.   
My reason for stating this contention is actually a simple one with a long history of 
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philosophical support.  Recall the earlier example in which Betty enters the school, printed signs 
in hand, and changes her mind about the best strategy for acting on the principles she and Alf 
endorsed.  In that case, she came to believe that (rationally speaking) Alf’s plan for putting their 
principle into effect was not a reasonable one.  The key terms here are “plan” and putting 
principle “into effect” in a way that is “reasonable.”  The phrase I used earlier for this amalgam 
of ideas was that of “rational planning.”  Alf and Betty decide what to do by choosing a strategy 
for putting their principle and other shared commitments into effect.  This strategizing about 
putting abstract ideas into practical effect is the process of rational planning.  Alf and Betty are 
reasoning about what to do by making a plan that will “carry out” or realize what they have 
reasoned about. 
When Betty enters the school, much of what changes about this plan (rationally) is that 
she no longer believes its underlying strategy will be an “effective” one.  She does not think, 
however, that this change is based on an absolute certainty.  Rather, with memories of her time at 
the school flooding her mind, she comes to realize how improbable it is that the strategy will be 
effective.  This improbability is tied up with the limited capacity she has to actually divine the 
future.  The freshly printed signs, after all, are still in her hand.  She has not put them up.  Rather, 
it is what she sees around her in the hallways and remembers that makes her change her mind.  In 
ways analogous to her own past, she comes to believe, those students most in need now will 
continue to suffer her same fate despite the volunteer resources her and Alf intend to offer.  This 
change in probability is a change based on an analogy drawn between her own past and present 
circumstances.  As Dunbar discovered in the laboratory, here too actual changes of mind are 
driven by analogy.  Furthermore, the change initiated in this belief about the probability of their 
strategy succeeding is a change in prediction.  Looking into the future, Betty reasons, it seems 
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improbable that the strategy will succeed.  Where her and Alf predicted success during their 
collective deliberation, she now predicts abject failure. 
Wesley C. Salmon describes these concerns with future success as “predictive 
aspects.”323  This phrase helpfully conveys the sense in which our reasoning may have greater, 
lesser, or no concern with predicting the future as it works its way towards a decisive conclusion.  
However, as Salmon points out, it seems very hard to believe that our reasoning can offer any 
“guide to life” without this predictive aspect.324  As he observes, “we sometimes find ourselves 
in situations in which some practical action is required, and the choice of an optimal decision 
depends upon predicting future occurrences.”325  In political life, I would contend, this 
“sometimes” described by Salmon is more like an “almost always.”  How often, I would ask, do 
we engage in political deliberation with an aim towards optimal decisions that do not depend on 
predicting future occurrences?  In many ways, these questions are meant to point to a 
commonality in our practical lives.  Only very rarely do we seem to be involved in anything like 
a non-probabilistic form of deliberation.  Such deliberation would require that no “predictive 
aspect” enter into our reasoning.  We must be, strictly speaking, completely and narrowly 
focused on certainties. 
The real problem for such narrow deliberation, though, is not just that it is uncommon … 
perhaps even impossibly so.  Rather, the real problem is (yet again) actually a logical one.  As 
Hans Reichenbach observed, “the ideal of an absolute truth is a phantom, unrealizable; certainty 
is a privilege pertaining only to tautologies, namely those propositions which do not convey any 
knowledge.”326 The logical problem with restricting reasoning to certain beliefs, Reichenbach 
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declares, is that the conclusions of our reasoning will amount to little more than tautologies, 
which is to say, our conclusions will merely restate the content of our premises.  This mere 
restatement, of course, is equivalent to the nonampliative inference patterns we identified with 
deductivism earlier.  Thus, Reichenbach’s point is to say that, logically speaking, we can only 
use truth when we want nonampliative results for our reasoning.  Truth is the domain of 
nonampliative, which is to say, truth-preserving inference.   
However, Reichenbach boldly declares, if our reasoning really does wish to “convey any 
knowledge” in arriving at its conclusive judgments, it cannot be nonampliative.  It needs to do 
more than preserve truth for a number of reasons, one of which is especially significant.  To the 
extent that we arrive at judgments we hope to test in experience, we allow a “predictive aspect” 
into our reasoning.327  Testability is only possible on the condition that we are dealing with the 
kind of reasoning that is capable of predictive success and failure.  As Reichenbach once 
captured the gist of this point, “there is no logical compulsion” that drives predictions.  
Predictions contain a “surplus meaning” because the future is indeterminate in ways that “baffle” 
attempts to turn it into a nonampliative process of (quasi) tautological truth-preservation.328  
Thus, testability cannot occur without predictions to test, and those predictions cannot be 
determined by the compulsion of nonampliative inference.  Something about the future, in all of 
its indeterminacy, must be added into our inferences.  This additional factor is its uncertainty, the 
sense in which it stands at a remove from anything guaranteed absolutely by our current state of 
belief.329  Inductive reasoning is just the response to this situation.  We use the past to make 
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predictions about the future by means of induction.  To the extent that we make rational plans 
that aim to be judged successful or unsuccessful at a future time, we cannot settle on a narrowly 
deductivist approach to deliberation. 
Accordingly, my rhetorical questions from earlier can now be rephrased.  How often, I 
asked, do we deliberate without any “predictive aspect” to our reasoning?  In light of these 
remarks from Reichenbach, we can now see that (logically speaking) we are really asking, how 
often do we deliberate in ways that aim for a conclusion that will be judged successful or 
unsuccessful at a future time?  How often do we deliberate in ways we believe ought to be 
immune from testing?  Is such narrowly deductivist deliberation much of any presence in 
“practical life” (to use Dummett’s phrase)? 
Further reason to doubt that such narrowly deductivist deliberation is present in practical 
life emerges from Candace Vogler’s work in the philosophy of action.  Vogler’s work offers a 
less logical, more “lived” response of these questions, one that comes out strongly against 
deductivism.  Looking at the various considerations that factor into our deliberation, Vogler 
discovers two essential kinds.  One kind is “interminable,” which is to say it does not terminate 
in a “natural stopping place.”330  Other considerations are, by contrast, “terminable,” insofar as 
they have a means-end or part-whole structure that can be tracked along the steps of its 
execution, with various “stopping places” along the way to the ultimate fulfillment of the process 
they identify.331  Terminable considerations, she adds, are terminable because their executive 
unfolding allows us to make means-end or part-whole calculations about them.  They have a 
“calculative form,” to use the phrase she adopts.  In terms of the vocabulary developed in chapter 
two above, terminable considerations are those that deal with entrenched, systematic relations in 
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a domain (CPAR.i.IT-IL).   
While Vogler makes many arguments that apply to the present discussion, one of her 
claims is especially important for appreciating the inescapability of probability in real 
deliberation.  We do not deliberate “just because,” that is to say, in an arbitrary way.  Rather, 
Vogler maintains, we deliberate because we believe it is or should be a stage along the way to 
action in a given context.  A problem arises, and we respond to it by thinking that part of our 
response to the problem should be deliberation.  We believe our deliberation is a means to a 
proper response to the problem’s solution (as an end or goal).  In her words, we deliberate 
“because the process was a means to, or part of, deciding what to do.”332 
Even more importantly for our purposes, Vogler believes that when we do engage in the 
kinds of narrowly deductivist considerations Reichenbach believes are so impossible in practical 
life, even then, we entertain those considerations precisely because we believe they too are an 
important step (part or means) in deciding what to do.333  Deductivist reasoning may concern 
certain, universal propositions and certain, nonampliative inferences with truth-preserving 
conclusions.  Nonetheless, we engage in such reasoning in practical deliberation only when we 
believe it is a step, part, or means to action.  In other words, the “interminable” and universal 
truths of deductive reasoning only concern practical deliberation insofar as they can be 
incorporated into a calculative form.  Vogler captures this point well, when she writes,  
This end, the end of figuring out what to do, must be in place to guide and constrain the 
operation of practical reason in a bona fide episode of practical deliberation.  This end is 
what marks one’s attempt at a practical deliberation as a failure if one winds up with no 
idea what to do … The antecedent specification of your end (namely, deciding what to 
do) is presupposed in our very description of your thought process as an episode of 
practical reasoning.334   
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Here, Vogler makes abundantly clear a deep point about the nature of practical deliberation.  We 
must first presuppose that even our deductive reasoning is “an episode,” a part, means, or 
otherwise trackable segment in the execution of action, if we are to count it as practical in its 
import.  Of course, we can presuppose a calculative form only because we expect (i.e., we 
predict) that this deductive episode will have a certain kind of effect.  For instance, we may 
predict that engaging in deductive reasoning will secure a better outcome than any other form of 
reasoning.  In doing so, however, we have already presupposed a “predictive aspect” in even our 
most narrowly deductive efforts.  Accordingly, we only ever deliberate (even deductively) when 
we are already making predictions about the future (e.g., that this deliberation will actually 
impact our future behavior).335  Of course, any such “predictive aspect” necessitates a 
probabilistic form of reasoning. 
 If Vogler is right, practical deliberation is “practical” because it presupposes a predictive 
aspect.  We engage in practical deliberation when we predict that it could make a mark on our 
ultimate behavior, for instance, by improving it (e.g., making it driven by deductive reasoning) 
one way or another.  As a result, the idea that a deductivist approach might sidestep the 
degeneration of probabilities makes no practical sense in the context of democratic deliberation 
either.  To the extent that democratic deliberation is concerned with what ought to be done, it is 
(necessarily) based on this same “predictive” presupposition.  Sticking to certain truths and being 
Herculean in our reasoning offers no escape from the degeneration of probabilities, and 
therefore, no escape from the need to shift towards an inductive approach in our thinking about 
democratic deliberation.   
In his work on “political judgment,” Raymond Geuss makes an analogous point, writing, 
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“‘Understanding’ itself, however, is not usually an end in itself, but a means to something else, 
usually to some kind of action.”336  In this statement, Geuss suggests the same point about the 
calculative nature of judgment in politics: It is rarely “an end in itself,” being a means (that is, 
part of a “calculative form,” which is to say, CPAR.i) towards something else.  Moreover, he 
adds, such political judgments are distinguished by a “prediction-aspect” that cannot be 
separated from their “evaluation-aspect,” because the two are so “interconnected.”337  Here, 
Geuss masterfully unifies the above discussion.  His talk of a “prediction-aspect” is helpfully 
reminiscent of Salmon’s “predictive aspect,” while at the same time he stresses (like Vogler) the 
sense in which the evaluative force of practical reasoning cannot be teased apart from this 
predictive aspect. 
 In an interesting (and easy to remember) application of this idea, Geuss critiques the way 
much moral philosophy is done in terms what I will call belief management.  Geuss writes: 
Of course, no one would want to prevent human agents from trying to bring their own 
moral beliefs into some kind of order, and making of them a “system.”  However, it is 
important not to confuse this rather narcissistic activity with anything that might be called 
trying to engage cognitively (in the widest possible meaning of the that term) with the 
real world.338 
 
In this passage, Geuss offers a colorful application of his earlier idea.  If we, like Vogler, agree 
that political judgment presupposes a “calculative form,” then we can see that Herculean efforts 
to bring our beliefs into some kind of systematic order are only practically significant when 
some kind of impact (better or worse) on our action is predicted.  As a result, while systematicity 
is a perfectly fine goal for human reasoners when they treat it as an episode in the execution of 
action, such systematicity is not an end in itself that ought to occupy much concern among 
practical philosophers, let alone the “commoners” described by Dummett.  As an end in itself, 
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systematicity is a “narcissistic” activity, Geuss colorfully suggests, not a form of cognitive 
engagement “with the real world.”  With this suggestion, he offers a colorful application of the 
above analysis.  Like the idea of a narrowly deductivist deliberation, Geuss helps us to see, the 
idea of systematizing our beliefs has no “real world” bearing on practical life without a 
predictive aspect.  Belief management without any predictive aspect is a narcissistic affair. 
 
2. Why Really Fixate on Analogy? 
At this point, the second question mentioned above arises, namely: Must the shift towards 
induction, prediction, and probabilistic reasoning developed above take the analogical form to 
which it is assigned in my deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c)?  What is so special about 
analogies, it may be contended, that we should prefer to focus on them in our democratic theory?  
My response to this question follows readily from shifting away from deductivism and towards 
the logical interpretation of political judgment.  According to Dummett, a “commoner” does 
better (logically speaking) in the humble exercise of probabilistic reasoning than does a 
mathematical Hercules or deductivist.  Given his terminology, though, a very pragmatic problem 
arises.  Mere “commoners” only very rarely seem adept at quantifying the probability of their 
commitments.  The average person can hardly say which numerical probabilities should be 
attached to each of the beliefs specified in their humble reasoning, let alone actually assess those 
probabilities!  Worse yet, in a deliberative democracy in which citizens share their reasons, we 
can hardly expect mere “commoners” to be able to share their probabilistic reasoning, if they 
cannot be expected to have a quantitative facility with the contents of that reasoning.   
Indeed, as Wesley Salmon observes with regard to political deliberation, the citizenry 
rarely has numerical values to assign to probabilities such as those relevant to atomic warfare’s 
   242 
“fallout.”339  For instance, when citizens and their elected representatives debate unconventional 
forms of warfare like atomic weapons, antipersonnel land mines, and  “cluster bombs,” the 
predictive aspect mentioned by Salmon and Geuss saturates their discourse.  Key claims related 
to the acceptability of these weapons relate to predicted effects, including the radioactive 
aftermath of atomic weapons and the damage it is expected (or predicted) to “likely” produce.  
Similarly, when it comes to mines, much of what has motivated a shift away from their use 
among governments is non-governmental advocacy, which has focused on the formerly 
unexpected, and now (thanks to the citizenry!) expected loss of limbs among innocent children 
years, or even decades, after the conflict that motivated the use of those mines has subsided.340 
Objections to cluster munitions are also dependent on predictions about more or less probable 
consequences of their use (e.g., poor precision in targeting and therefore higher risks of 
unexpected civilian casualties).341  As these three examples show, many issues of widespread 
popular concern depend heavily upon a predictive aspect to reach an optimal decision.  However, 
if Salmon is right, and the “commoner,” or average citizen, rarely has a quantitative grasp of this 
predictive aspect, the “pragmatic problem” I mentioned above does seem incredibly significant.  
How is the humble practical deliberation of Dummett’s “commoner” even possible? 
Internal to these examples is a clue.  When scholars and citizens alike advocate against 
atomic weapons, antipersonnel land mines, and cluster munitions, we often discover that they 
begin their advocacy by first mentioning vivid past examples of the effects of these 
unconventional weapons.  More importantly, they begin with examples others would likely not 
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have expected, for example, that weapons used to target enemy combatants might still pose an 
active threat decades after a conflict; the enormous historical and geographical reach of radiation 
in the aftermath of atomic warfare; the unexpected loss of children’s limbs decades after a war 
ended; the loss of limbs and lives among children who mistook an unexploded submunition from 
a cluster bomb for a toy, given its toylike shape and appearance.   
How might advocates expect these examples to help others understand the predictive 
aspect of their arguments against the use of these unconventional weapons?  Quite simply, they 
expect others to gain a qualitative grasp of probabilities by drawing analogies between these 
vivid examples and other experiences more familiar to their audiences (CPAR.ii).  People are 
familiar with the relentless curiosity of children and how anything like the small, shiny, round 
appearance of a submunition is especially attractive to their curiosity.  Furthermore, people are 
familiar with the ways in which radioactivity has unexpected risks, perhaps from past 
experiences with getting x-rays or hearing about the dangers of x-rays.  Time spent working in 
the yard, on the farm, or as a child playing at an unused property will make the audience familiar 
with the ways in which objects deposited years, even decades earlier have a tendency (high 
probability) to still be around long after they initially had a purpose being deposited there.   
In short, in being familiar with these past experiences, citizens are also familiar with their 
probabilities (CPAR.i).  They may be unable to give a quantitative value to these probabilities, 
but they can nonetheless provide qualitative evaluations by drawing analogies (CPAR.ii).  It 
seems probable, they would agree with these advocates, that anything toy-like in the manner of a 
submunition would pose a threat to children.  It seems probable, they would agree with these 
advocates, that anything like the long-abandoned detritus in a field, yard, or long unused property 
will still be around long afterwards.  It seems probable, they would also agree with these 
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advocates, that what they know to be probable about the risks of radioactive materials from 
public advocacy about old x-ray machines can be extended to the risks of atomic warfare’s 
aftermath.   
Just as importantly, not only do the “commoners” constituting the audience of such 
advocacy reason this way, but even the “expert” advocates do as well.  Sometimes they do know 
quantitative assessments of probabilities, but very often they analogically extend what they know 
about the probability of cluster munitions risks in one conflict to another.  A current conflict 
becomes the object of much outcry because the cluster munitions are used yet again, despite 
what is known to probably be true of their impact in light of the similarities between the present 
conflict and a past one.  As others have documented in the domain of scientific inquiry, experts 
are masterful in making “reasonable qualitative assessments of the strengths of the various 
factors, classifying them as strong, moderate, weak or negligible.”342  Indeed, given Dunbar’s 
findings about the prevalence of analogical reasoning among experts in particular, we might 
draw the apparent connection and realize: Practical deliberation by “commoners” and experts 
alike needs to be carried out analogically, because analogies provide a much needed, qualitative 
alternative to quantitative measures of probability.  Given the way ordinary people and experts 
alike excel at reasoning about physical probabilities related to things like ecosystems (things 
which are otherwise extremely difficult to analyze), we have good reason to pause whenever 
skeptics totally dismiss the ordinary citizen’s reasoning abilities.343  Such information should 
provide only further support to Dunbar’s findings against skeptics of qualitative probabilistic 
reasoning.    
Paul Bartha has explored the idea that analogies provide a measure of probability along 
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these lines through a formal, Bayesian representation of the corresponding pattern of 
reasoning.344  For present purposes, the intricacies of his approach are perhaps best set aside.  
Whether inductive reasoning is best approached through Bayesian conditionalization is a subject 
of debate in and of itself, let alone as a method for understanding the analogical variety of 
inductive reasoning.345  Consequently, it is perhaps better to simply draw attention to some of the 
ideas advanced by Bartha that are particularly relevant to understanding how analogy allows us 
to assess probabilities in a qualitative manner.   
One of these ideas connects back to Dummett’s logical insight.  Bartha sees the function 
of analogy to be an assessment of the “face value” plausibility of a hypothesis, which he believes 
can be construed (through a Bayesian approach) as a probabilistic form of assessment that occurs 
in two parts.  First, analogy begins by taking up a hypothesis and “assigning it nonnegligible 
prior probability;” second, the analogical argument then seeks to justify that assignment of prior 
probability.346  Here, the idea (roughly) is that analogical reasoning begins by first extending an 
initial assignment of probability to a hypothesis, which it then (in the second stage) seeks to 
justify.  In terms of the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning developed above 
(CPAR), Bartha’s idea is that we first inferentially extend (CPAR.ii) an assignment of prior 
probabilities to a claim about the systematicity (CPAR.i) of the target domain, based on our 
familiarity with the probabilities of the source domain.  After this initial assignment, we then 
proceed to check for spuriousness (CPAR.iii).   
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The result is a qualitative form of reasoning about probabilities in which we: (1) 
Inferentially extend some “nonnegligible” set of probabilities, and then (2) check that extension 
for spuriousness.  Bartha’s use of the phrase “nonnegligible” helpfully connects the present 
discussion back to Dummett’s insight and my logical interpretation of political judgment.  
Dummett had insightfully pointed out that the degeneration of probability threatens every 
deductivist approach to practical deliberation, turning its proud, Euclidean efforts into results 
with a probability only negligibly greater than “0.”  By contrast, Barth’a idea here explains how 
analogical reasoning can get past that threat, namely, by (1) qualitatively assigning a greater (i.e., 
nonnegligible) probability than any deductivist is likely to achieve in the face of the degeneration 
of probability, and then (2) checking that assignment for spuriousness. 
Bartha’s idea also helpfully sheds light on the examples of political advocacy above.  
Advocates for restricting the use of cluster munitions, for instance, begin by first assigning a 
prior probability to the idea that these munitions pose a danger to children in ways that were 
likely unexpected otherwise.  In doing so, they hope to begin deliberation with a “nonnegligible” 
probability (something Dummett revealed to be well beyond the hopes of deductivists).  By then 
examining the toylike features of submunitions from “cluster bombs,” including their shape and 
appearance, advocates then proceed to make this initial assignment of probability better justified.  
Furthermore, they may also cite quantitative statistics or provide more examples, case histories, 
or personal testimonies to lend this assignment of prior probabilities even more argumentative 
force.  Of course, the idea is not to reveal a necessary, systematic relationship between the use of 
cluster munitions in warfare, the properties of their submunitions, and their serious threat to 
innocent children; rather, advocates aim to reveal the already familiar, high probability of this 
systematic relationship.  In a word, advocates wish to extend the highly probable, systematic 
   247 
relations in a source domain with which citizens and officials are familiar from other experiences 
(e.g., their own childhoods, teaching, childrearing, etc.) to a target domain where the probability 
of those systematic relations are not well-understood by “commoners” (CPAR.ii). 
A second idea advanced by Bartha is that we can concisely capture this two-part process 
of (1) qualitative probability assignment, and (2) justification through the evaluation of its 
spuriousness, with the idea of extending expectations about the “epistemic ballpark” in which the 
target domain’s systematicity can be evaluated.347  The idea here is especially relevant because it 
ties in so well with our discussion of the “predictive aspect” and “calculative form” of practical 
deliberation developed above.  According to Bartha, what happens when we extend prior 
probabilities to a systematic relation in the target domain is that we extend some expectations 
about it.  More specifically, we extend the probabilities from the familiar, source domain, to 
analogous systematic relations in the unfamiliar, target domain.  However (in keeping with 
CPAR.iii), we do so with an eye towards justifying that extension by exploring its potential 
spuriousness.   
The eye we keep on that justification, though, is not completely devoid of structure.  Part 
of what we extend is some expectation about what it would take for the target domain to 
ultimately retain/gain the prior probabilities extended to it.  From the familiar source domain, we 
get some concrete expectations of what we should predict, as probable, when we turn to the 
process of evaluation and justification.  If we recall Vogler’s discussion of practical reasoning 
and her claim that it is defined by its “calculative form,” Bartha’s idea becomes even more 
concrete.  To have a calculative form is to have “trackable” expectations for how we can execute 
an action and rationally plan it.  Connecting this claim to Bartha’s second idea, we can see that 
his point is a “calculative” one.  When we use analogies to qualitatively extend prior 
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probabilities, what we do is extend the probabilities along with a set of trackable predictions, or 
a “plan,” for how those probabilities will ultimately be justified.  We suggest a “ballpark” 
estimate of the probabilities that should be assumed in the target domain, as well as a plan for 
their evaluation in terms of some expected steps for evaluating the assignment of those prior 
probabilities. 
Returning to our previous examples may help explain this last point.  When an advocacy 
group opens with an analogy to suggest that cluster munitions are usually bad in unexpected 
ways, they simultaneously set up expectations (a plea) for how that suggestion might be justified 
(as non-spurious).  For instance, if their opening analogy is a vivid series of photographs of 
maimed children, the expectation will be set up to explain why only children are systematically 
related to these horrific, unexpected and yet highly probable consequences.  Setting up this 
explanatory expectation means they will make a plan, when organizing to present their advocacy 
work to an audience, to at some later point explain how the toylike nature of submunitions 
increases the probability of children being uniquely (even if accidentally) “targeted” by cluster 
munitions.  The ballpark estimates of the probabilities assigned by their opening analogy are 
“nonnegligible,” but only with a trackable plan to justify them in tow.  In short, in practical 
deliberation, the advocacy group is concerned to predict the effect of their opening analogies in 
terms of how they will impact the probabilities the audience assigns to children being hurt by 
cluster munitions, while at the same time predicting that this expected effect is conditional on 
justifying their initial assignment of prior probabilities at a later point in the presentation.  The 
“ballpark” probabilities assigned and assessed are intrinsically tied to a plan, that is, a means for 
tracking the expected success of these deliberative considerations. 
A well-developed body of computational research exists on the ways in which artificial 
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and human intelligences use analogies to assign prior probabilities along these lines, as well as 
those factors that make these assignments ultimately more or less justified.  This research is 
worth mentioning here because it makes the above analysis not only more realistic, but also more 
intuitive.  In an attempt to offer a synthesizing overview of this research, Douglas Hofstadter and 
Emmanuel Sander have highlighted the inescapability of these qualitative, analogical 
assessments, as well as the ridiculousness of trying to even suggest that in real life we might do 
anything but rely on analogies for this purpose.348  They write, for instance,  
what usually matters in everyday life is how likely something is rather than how logically 
deducible it is … To live one’s life in this world, one has to trust one’s own judgments 
about what is and what isn’t likely, far more than worrying about fine points of logical 
validity.349 
 
In this passage, they underscore the idea, developed in the analysis above, that “what usually 
matters in everyday life” is probability, not logical deduction.  They add, though, that this focus 
on probability can be seen in the way we worry more about likelihood than we do the “fine 
points” of logical validity.  In other words, people focus on assessments of probability more than 
they worry about adhering to the canons of deductive logic.   
The reason they offer for this rejection of narrow deductivism is that “every thought that 
anyone has, no matter how tiny it is, no matter how spontaneous or mindless it might seem, is an 
outcome of this kind of mental activity that has no logical validity.”350  It would be “grossly 
pedantic,” they declare, if one were to hesitate to accept the analogical inferences about 
probabilities that pervade our daily affairs.351  They offer a pithy example to this effect, writing, 
If A. were to ask Z. a question as innocuous as “How are your fries?”, then Z., in order to 
be strictly logical, would have to reply, “Well, the six I’ve partaken of so far were most 
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savory, but since I haven’t tasted any of the others on my plate, I have no basis for 
commenting on how they are.”  In some theoretical sense, Z.’s answer may be defensible, 
but anyone sane would find it grotesquely pedantic … The analogy between the already-
savored fries and their yet-to-be-ingested cousins would seem too compelling to allow 
any other answer even the slightest chance of coming to mind.352 
 
In this little example of deductivism at work, Hoftstadter and Sander point out the absurd, 
“grotesquely pedantic” nature of anyone who would attempt to live a life of deductivism and not 
reason probabilistically through analogy.  To not use the past fries to assign a prior probability to 
the other fries on one’s plate is to oppose an inference that “would seem too compelling” not to 
be made.  However, one implication of this quotation needs to be qualified, if not corrected.  The 
idea that the narrow deductivist “Z.’s answer may be defensible” should be countered to prevent 
misunderstanding.  If Z. only wishes to rely on certain conclusions when reasoning in some 
generic sense, it is justifiable to use the phrase “may be defensible.”   
However, if Z. is engaged in practical deliberation about what to do, the phrase is amiss.  
If Z. is trying to figure out whether to eat the other fries, or what it would be best to say to A., the 
“predictive aspect” of that deliberation will indeed mean that the narrow deductivist answer 
should not be given the “slightest chance of coming to mind.”  The reason here is a practical 
reason with a “calculative form.”  To offer the strict deductivist answer would probably have the 
effect of leading to a misunderstanding between Z. and A.  So too, the narrow deductivist 
reasoning would probably lead to undesirable effects if it were allowed to “come to mind” when 
trying to figure out what to eat next.  Z. might, for instance, be stuck between eating the 
remaining fries and eating anything else available on the table (e.g., the contents of a bread 
basket) if he let deductivist thoughts even come to mind.  To treat the remaining fries as lacking 
any prior probabilities is to adopt a practical strategy that will predictably cause ourselves more 
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practical “headaches” in life than would otherwise be the case.  The “calculative form” of 
practical reasoning precludes the practical reality of such narrow deductivism. 
 Some of the more detailed results of this computational research on analogy are 
especially effective windows onto the intuitiveness of my focus on analogy, as it has been 
explained and justified above.  For example, specific factors have been identified that allow these 
researchers to evaluate the quality of different analogies and to predict how others will evaluate 
them as well.353  These factors include the number of previously observed cases that factor into 
the analogy, the diversity of the sample used to make the analogy, the diversity of the previously 
observed cases themselves, and the typicality of the members of the sample.354  For instance, 
analogies drawn on the basis of many past experiences are stronger than the same analogy that 
only selects one of those past experiences as its source domain.  Furthermore, if among those 
past experiences, the systematic relations that interest us actually relate in each of those 
experiences to very different things (e.g., one to people, the other to dogs), the analogy will be 
weaker.  Two sets of analogous lab results conducted on television viewers and internet users, 
for example, are less persuasive than the same number of lab results, with analogous 
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conclusions, that are both conducted on just one or the other of these samples.  Or again, if those 
lab results are conducted using highly atypical “television viewers,” such as people who watch 
television by using binoculars to see what their neighbors are watching, we are likely to rate 
them below those same results discovered for a more typical sample of television viewers. 
 The value of mentioning some of these specific results is that they lend further credence 
to my proposal and the sense in which analogy does offer an opportunity for “commoners” to 
practice probabilistic reasoning in a plausible and intuitive way.  One might be skeptical that 
analogies can provide anything as complex as a qualitative guise for highly complex quantitative 
thoughts related to all manner of complex statistics.  However, I believe the strength of my 
position is that it actually manages to retain the possibility that people can be skilled at 
something without having an articulable grasp of its guiding expectations.  More importantly, 
though, I believe this for the same reason that Richard Holton does with respect to human 
deliberation more generally, namely: “The psychology literature is full of examples.”355  In one 
example Holton cites, subjects played a computer game driven by a “fairly complicated 
algorithm,” which they learned to use “to predict,” with ever greater speed, where to expect an 
item to appear.356   In doing so, they came to react in ways that were “faster than their conscious 
processes could track,” and therefore constitutive of “predictive skills that worked in the absence 
of any conscious judgment.”357  If Holton is right in his interpretation of this experiment (as well 
as the many others with which psychology is “full”), Dummett’s “commoners” are indeed 
extremely capable of complex quantitative reasoning.  However, that capacity is not innate, but 
rather something that comes with the accumulation of experiences, of trial and error, of past 
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situations sufficiently analogous to present ones to offer prior probabilities for what to expect.358  
Thus, this research goes a long way in making the probabilistic nature of analogical reasoning 
not only empirically realistic, but also intuitive as well.  What we expect from the “commoner” is 
not only a predictive skill, but a skill that is difficult to articulate (“unconscious”) as well. 
 Finally, a last body of empirical research, though not computational, may also be worth 
mentioning to further underscore the practical plausibility and intuitiveness of my focus on 
analogy.  In a rare study of the “Vietnam Decisions” made in the 1960’s about whether the 
United States of America should engage in military intervention in Vietnam, Yuen Foong Khong 
discovered that analogy was a constant force.359  Among the transcriptions of conversations 
related to those decisions, analogies to past historical events and experiences played a pivotal 
role in structuring deliberation about what to do and (ultimately) also played a role in 
determining what was actually done.  Indeed, Khong is so persuaded by the contribution of 
specific analogies, that he argues that specific analogies provide a better explanation of the “final 
choices of American policymakers” than alternative explanations, including the famous 
“containment” explanation.360  For instance, he points out that a reference to “MacArthur’s 
mistake” in Korea repeatedly appears in the pages of the relevant documents, which was used to 
assess the comparative probability that China would enter the conflict in Vietnam upon 
executing each of the different strategies under discussion by policymakers.361  For present 
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purposes, the interesting point here is simply that an analogy (“MacArthur’s mistake” in Korea) 
was used to assess probabilities in a case of practical deliberation in politics … and with 
decisive, “real world” results. 
 
3. Morality without Deductivism? 
All of this talk of probability has hopefully rested many deductivist biases; however, 
another remaining worry may cause people to still bristle at my proposal.  For many deliberative 
democrats, democracy rests on a moral basis.  Principles come first because deliberative 
democracy envisions democracy as a fundamentally moral enterprise, one governed first and 
foremost by a principle of respect among persons for their equality as co-deliberators in the 
process of making decisions about laws that will mutually bind them.362  Here, I would offer 
three points, one of which restates an earlier claim.   
The first point (1) returns to Candace Vogler’s argument.  According to Vogler, 
principles can only be “practical” determinants in our action when we expect (or predict) that 
they will be practically determinative.  When we see principles as probably taking part in some 
larger process (i.e., a part-whole, means-end, calculative form), only then, are they “practical.”  
One can easily retain a “principles first” approach to the moral core of deliberative democracy 
while also accepting that when it comes to democratic practice, what does the determining of 
actual courses of action is past experience. 
The second (2) point I would make is even more conciliatory, as I would say that this 
moral core of deliberative democracy is not expunged, necessarily, by my analogical focus.  
Rather, we must simply be explicit about the predictive aspect of this moral core.  If deliberative 
                                                
362 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 21-26. 
   255 
democracy is thought to rest on respect among agents as co-deliberators, it is to some degree 
because we expect that it should play a part in a larger process of democratic governance.  
Accordingly, the moral core of deliberative democracy may itself best be understood as a prior 
probability, one based on our past experiences with the exercise of power as individuals and as a 
species.  Through these past experiences, we have learned that it is very probably better to orient 
our collective decision-making around mutual recognition of one another as free, equal, and 
rational beings, than it is to ignore this rational equality.363   
Some may object to the inductive nature of this claim.  More specifically, some will 
object that past experience (which is thoroughly empirical) should have nothing to do with the 
moral core of deliberative democracy.  After all, isn’t it the legacy of Kant to ask that we bracket 
our individual experiences (the “empirical”) when it comes to understanding any human practice 
with a “moral core”?  In response to this question, it is worth returning to the first of the two 
points (1 above) I just made … albeit with a focus on their relevance to Kant’s practical 
philosophy and the Kantian legacy in political philosophy.  In the case of Kant’s own practical 
philosophy, closer attention to his works reveals a tremendous affinity between the first point I 
just made and related theses Kant himself advances.  Kant shares with Vogler a similar 
conception of the “practical” part of practical philosophy.  To the extent that principles are 
“practical” determinants of actions, rather than components in a process of mere ratiocination (to 
use Jennifer Uleman’s richly illustrative distinction), Kant too believes that the lessons of past 
personal experience need to play a role.364   
Kant does indeed keep the moral core of any human practice separated in a “sphere quite 
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different from the empirical.”365  Empirical considerations about what has been and what we may 
(inductively) expect to come true in the future, based on past personal experience, cannot be the 
“determining ground” of what is moral in human practices for Kant.  The reason they cannot 
play that moral role is that they offer an unreliable “measuring-rod” for making moral 
discriminations, as well as an unreliable motivational “mainspring” for actually pushing people 
to moral behavior.366   
However, Kant also admits that even when decisions are made on the basis of a moral 
core that is in a “sphere quite different from the empirical,” it must be admitted that “it cannot 
possibly be a matter of indifference to reason how to answer the question, What is then the result 
of this right conduct of ours? Nor to what we are to direct our doings or nondoings, even granted 
this is not fully in our control, at least as something with which they are to harmonize.”367  In 
other words, like Vogler, Kant admits that a human practice with a moral core cannot have 
practical significance apart from its relationship to an empirically-realizable state of affairs.368  
When envisioning “right conduct” and its pure moral core, we cannot be “indifferent” to what 
will empirically result from it in the world.  The impossibility of such indifference resonates with 
my own analysis above.  Alf could not help himself from envisioning the empirical effects of his 
“pure” reasoning with Betty about the “moral core” principles that ought to guide their collective 
reasoning; he could not help but think about the effect of their reasoning on the upcoming 
presentation he had already prepared and whether it would need to now be revised.  Thinking 
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about the pure moral core that ought to guide our action is a part of a larger process that has an 
empirical effect on the world (e.g., whether one has to revise one’s presentation).   
Similarly, Kant stresses that a non-empirical vision of the moral core of human practices 
is no reason to be indifferent to the empirical effects of right conduct.  Right conduct is indeed 
practical and action-guiding to the extent that it is part of a larger process (CPAR.i.IL-IT) that 
will (as Vogler argued) necessarily have an effect on the world.  Recent work on Kant’s 
extensive writing about virtue and character further attests to his sensitivity and awareness of the 
need to consider not only the non-empirical moral core of human practices, but also the empirical 
parts of those practices as well.369  Virtue, Kant allowed, is not innate and non-empirical, but 
rather an acquired disposition.  As Anne Margaret Baxley expresses his view, “for Kant, virtue is 
a moral strength of will known only through the obstacles it is able to overcome.”370  The 
formation of virtue requires not ratiocination, but learning what to expect from the world and 
how to overcome it … the inductive use of past experiences to “strengthen” the morally dutiful 
will.  Consequently, my proposed way of tying the moral core of deliberative democracy to 
learning from past experiences and prior probabilities is not actually so at odds with Kant’s 
larger practical philosophy, as it might first appear. 
The political philosophy of John Rawls may supply another way of framing a response to 
such a “Kantian” worry about my reliance on past personal experience.  According to Hélène 
Landemore, a “subtle shift” occurred in Rawls’ thinking.  In his earlier work (e.g., A Theory of 
Justice), he pursued principles that could serve as “a foundation of any ideal just society,” a 
pursuit that was “fraught with truth-like moral claims” and often seemed “to take for granted that 
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there were ‘right’ answers” to the questions he explored.371  In his later work (e.g., Political 
Liberalism), Landemore believes that Rawls attempts to “transcend disagreement about the right 
and the wrong” in ethics and politics not by bracketing personal experience or championing 
truth-like moral claims about the foundation of any ideal society; rather, Rawls realizes that his 
theory must “renounce truth, replacing it with a metaphysically lighter notion: the reasonable.”372  
Furthermore, Landemore writes, “the later Rawls does not think that his theory of justice is the 
right one, let alone the true one, but merely the best for us – where ‘us’ is defined as the 
members of modern, constitutional democracies like the United States.”373   
I cite Landemore’s reading of Rawls’ philosophical project because it helps to 
contextualize a fascinating distinction Rawls develops in his later work between the “order of 
deduction” and the “order of support” in public reasoning (incidentally, Rawls references “the 
axioms of geometry” to spell out this idea, which makes it especially relevant to the above 
discussion of deductivism).374  This distinction makes what Rawls declares to be “an important 
point,” namely, that the “order of support” is “another matter” from deductive argument.  The 
order of deduction has to do with how statements are to be connected in an orderly manner that 
makes their connection “clear and perspicuous,” providing a “certain unity” that is 
“illuminating.”  By contrast, the order of support has to do with the reasons that actually “justify” 
a normative conception and “make us confident that it is reasonable.”   
The two orders may be “isomorphic,” Rawls allows, but he nonetheless maintains that 
they might be different.  We might try to present a political vision in a clear, perspicuous, 
unified, and illuminating way by stressing the need to set aside personal experience as a concern 
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and first focus on the “moral core” of the vision and its deductive arrangement into a theoretical 
system.  Rawls’ early work might be said to offer just that kind of elegant exercise in the 
corresponding order of deduction.  From two principles, he attempts to systematically arrange 
our intuitions about justice.  In his later work, though, Rawls tries to transcend many threatening 
forms of disagreement and get at what would actually justify and make us confident in a political 
vision.  This order of support eschews contentious talk of truth and other language associated 
with a “moral core.”  Instead, it focuses on what could be politically efficacious … that is, what 
could really determine politics through its deliberative significance.  What has this potential?  
Not a purist’s order of deduction of the political vision from the principles of a “moral core,” but 
rather a foxes’ order of support, which uses past personal experience and associated “ballpark” 
prior probabilities to gain our confidence in its reasonableness. 
Through this distinction, Rawls suggests another way to respond to the “Kantian” worry 
sketched above.  Worries about how the “moral core” of deliberative democracy squares with my 
investigation can be set-aside as the legitimate concerns of the “order of deduction.”  These 
concerns can still be debated between those who believe (like Kant) that what comes first in the 
order of deduction is non-empirical, and those who take a more thoroughly empirical approach to 
that moral core.  However, that debate occurs in a different space from the discussion of how 
deliberative democracy is to be approached within the order of support.  No matter how Kantian 
one may be in the order of deduction’s debates, when it comes to the “order of support” that 
actually determines what is reasonable in democratic deliberation, it can be accepted that 
democratic deliberation is analogical.  It can be accepted that, from within the order of support, 
our need for probabilistic assignments and their availability to “commoners” in a qualitative 
form makes analogical reasoning the preferred mode of democratic deliberation.  Accordingly, 
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“Kantian” deliberative democrats can retain their belief that in the theoretical “order of 
deduction,” a moral basis defined by principles comes first, while nonetheless embracing my 
proposed shift away from deductivism in the order of “real world” support identified with actual 
democratic deliberation.   
Of course, not all deliberative democrats are “Kantians” when it comes to moral 
philosophy.  Fortunately, two of the other major traditions in ethics – consequentialism and 
virtue ethics (to use labels some consider now to be quite outdated and unhelpful) – are equally, 
if not more consonant with my proposal.  In the case of consequentialism, this consonance is 
especially evident in Douglas Portmore’s recent presentation of a “commonsense” 
consequentialist moral philosophy.375  Portmore acknowledges that classic utilitarian moral 
philosophies suffered from a glaring flaw related to their “utterly absurd implications.”  Chief 
among these, he believes, is the implication that the choice of one action over another is morally 
required because of a miniscule difference in the amount of utility that would be maximized by 
one action in comparison to the other.376  As he writes, “the mildest of pleasures for the briefest 
of moments” makes for an absurd tipping point in moral evaluation.   
Nonetheless, Portmore believes consequentialism can be saved and made highly 
attractive through a number of moves, several of which are highly consonant with the themes of 
this project.  Perhaps chief among them is the idea that consequentialism selects the winner when 
ranking optional courses of action, not by comparing their outcomes, but rather by comparing 
their “prospects.”377  The prospect of an action, he explains, “is a probability distribution over the 
set of possible outcomes associated with that action.”378  For Portmore, the fate of 
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consequentialism as a moral philosophy rests in part on changing its traditional focus on 
outcomes in favor of looking at how agents use probability distributions to make their moral 
evaluations.  Clearly, Portmore’s language resonates with the focus on probability in this project.   
Furthermore, Portmore’s “commonsense” consequentialism also reflects larger themes of 
this project, insofar as he stresses that moral evaluation occurs not with regard to discrete 
choices, but rather whole sets of actions.  Notably, when Portmore talks about such “whole sets 
of actions” factoring into moral evaluation, he treats these sets as partially embodying Vogler’s 
“calculative order.”  Among the discrete actions in a larger set of actions with which moral 
evaluation is concerned, Portmore maintains, some of those actions are commonly parts of other, 
larger action sequences.379  In this way, Portmore asks that consequentialist moral evaluation be 
recast in terms of the kinds of systematic relations that are a central concern in the contemporary 
perspective on analogical reasoning explored above (CPAR.i.IL).  Moreover, he also allows that 
within these sets of actions, the actions not only relate systematically by occupying different 
levels (i.e., CPAR.i.IL), but also in their temporal ordering (i.e., CPAR.i.IT).380  Fittingly, 
Portmore stresses that the process of intending any given set of actions should not always be seen 
as the formation of a discrete intention for some preferred outcome over others.  Additionally, it 
must sometimes take the form of a “schedule of intentions,” which allows that moral actions 
unfold over time (IT) and at many levels (IL) as stages in a larger course of action, with our 
intentions tracking that unfolding process all along.381 
In the case of virtue ethics, the more “empiricist” readings of Aristotelian ethics recently 
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on the rise are especially consonant with my proposal.382  Paul Nieuwenburg offers one such 
“empiricist” reading of Aristotelian ethics.383  Nieuwenburg argues against “a fairly general 
consensus” about how to interpret ethical inquiry in Aristotle’s ethics, tracing its popularity to 
the legacy of specific translators and interpreters, and in doing so, illustrating its prevalence.384  
According to this prominent reading, Aristotelian deliberation begins with a set of “phenomena” 
[phainomena], which are interpreted as merely reputable beliefs (endoxa).385  Ethical inquiry 
then proceeds to test them, because reputation is obviously no real ground for acceptability.   
Against this consensus interpretation, Nieuwenburg carefully teases out the 
“observational thrust of the term phainomena” (“phenomenona”) ultimately arguing that the 
initial phenomena from which ethical inquiry sets out are actually familiar ones.386  Principles 
are always principles “of something,” some subject matter with which we are familiar.387  When 
philosophers like Parmenides present a familiar subject matter in an abstract way that is divorced 
from its familiar “facts,” the process “annihilates” (anaireini) the principle.388  If we begin with 
the perceptible, the phainomena, we can avoid the “weakness of thought” that plagues attempts 
to move from abstract metaphysical statements (i.e., what I have called Stage 1 above) back into 
the domain of experience (i.e., Stage 2) that ultimately is responsible for making any idea 
“reasonable.”  The facts of the matter related to any subject must come first, not abstract 
principles that need to later be applied back to the facts of the matter to which they are supposed 
to lend guidance.  In short, it is our familiarity with a subject matter, the phainonena, that sets-up 
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the parameters for ethical inquiry, the “facts of the matter,” or standards for what inquiry should 
aim to achieve.389  In doing so, the phainomena allow us to use a common experiential backdrop 
to structure ethical inquiry.  With such a backdrop, Nieuwenburg claims, numerous aporia and 
perplexities can be avoided, including confusions about weakness of the will to which 
philosophers like Socrates were seen to fall prey by Aristotle.390 
The overlap between this “empirical” reading of Aristotle and the present proposal is 
relatively easy to see.  Analogies allow us to use a familiar backdrop to establish prior 
probabilities and to create an expected, trackable plan for the assessment of a claim.  Similarly, 
Nieuwenburg’s reading of Aristotelian ethical inquiry presents it as first beginning with 
observationally familiar phainomena, and only then assessing whether a claim “harmonizes” 
with the parameters implied by those phainomena.  The facts of the subject matter are the key to 
successful inquiry, because without their predictions, we lack a trackable plan for assessing the 
success of anything ... including ethical deliberation about what to do!   
The point here is already familiar, in many ways, from Vogler’s work on practical 
reasoning.  Just as Vogler claims that principles only matter if they are a “part” of a larger 
calculative form (“whole”), so too this “empirical” reading of Aristotle presents a similar study 
in the need for principles to be “familiar” in parameter-setting ways, if they are to actually apply 
to the facts of the matter, i.e., life.  The familiar resemblance between Vogler’s claim and 
Nieuwenburg’s reading of Aristotle is perhaps unsurprising, considering Vogler’s reliance on 
Aquinas and Aristotle to orient her own thinking about the subject matter of practical reasoning.  
Indeed, as she has written recently of a trend in moral philosophy she calls “analytic virtue 
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ethics,” this way of orienting ethical inquiry around familiar types is a growing trend.391  If 
Vogler is right, then a growing number of moral philosophers will find a resonance between their 
approach to the moral core of practical life and the approach to democratic deliberation pursued 
here, which further supports the fit between my proposal and expectations many might have for 
the moral core of democracy, broadly speaking.392 
The third (3), final – and decisive – point, I would make here is less conciliatory and far 
more to the point.  As Thomas Aquinas once argued, in moral life, principles are secondary.393  
Conscience may indeed give us access to universal moral principles and an attending store of 
moral knowledge.  We may not need experience to know the universal truths of morality or the 
moral core of deliberative democracy.  Induction and probability may be separated from the 
“moral core” of these practices.  However, contrary to what the Stoics have led generations to 
believe, moral life isn’t just a good faith effort to put the call of conscience into practice.  Life is 
filled with obstacles rife with contingency and the random shifts of fortune.  In a word, life is 
difficult.  The task, then, is not to simply make a best effort “here and now” to put some abstract 
moral truths somehow into practice.  Instead, the task is to convert the “somehow into practice” 
problem confronted by the principled moralist into an occasion for self-perfection.  What is truly 
excellent in life, what is truly a source of happiness and human flourishing, is great and greatly 
difficult at one and the same time.  A “good faith effort” is the wrong response to such great 
difficulty.   
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The right response is to try to cultivate the skills, wisdom, know-how, predictive power – 
in short, the habits – that come with a perfection of our moral capacity.  We need to learn how to 
cope with chance by making predictions, by comparing present circumstances with similar past 
lessons, and by tracking our pursuit of the good and avoidance of evil every step of the way.  In 
doing so, we can really make a “good faith effort” worthy of the name, one that is honestly 
dedicated to refining the operation of our moral capacity into a perfected state.   
Whatever guidance principles offer us in this process of self-perfection is secondary 
because the content of conscience, Aquinas argued, is inchoate.394  The very goods we encounter 
in life are themselves shaky and mutable.  They therefore resist relevance to stark, universal 
principles of the kind associated with the moral conscience.  Furthermore, these goods 
themselves are good because they are good for creatures like us.395  Our desires do not provide us 
with “efficacious representations,” as Kantians would have it, appearing in the theater of 
deliberation as clear plans needing only our stamp of approval.  Instead, our desires present us 
with vague inclinations – inclinations that strive towards what is good and away from what is 
evil – but not in any particular manner.  Consequently, our will is always inclined towards the 
good and away from evil, but particular decisions are demanding of us precisely because this 
pure will is too vague to guide concrete choice.  The task of practical reasoning of the kind 
deliberative democracy places front and center in its account of politics is therefore the task not 
of applying principles to determinate desires, but rather of charting particular choices in the 
presence of vague moral principles and even vaguer natural desires.396   
The major point here bears repeating.  From a Thomistic perspective, the task of practical 
                                                
394 Bowlin 2010, 50 
395 For an updated version of this position, see Railton, Peter (2003). Facts, Values, and Norms. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 106-26. 
396 Perkams, Matthias (2013). “Aquinas on Choice, Will, and Voluntary Action,” in Aquinas and the Nichomachean 
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decision-making boils down to efforts to predict our goods and how they will relate to us during 
life’s uncertain course so that we might … just might … skillfully master how to anticipate their 
appearance and cultivate their enduring presence in our lives.  Principle tells us “nothing in 
particular” about which courses of action to take, how to track their unfolding success, and when 
to cut our losses.397  The goal of life is to be able “to choose the good with some constancy,” not 
to exert raw willpower in applying moral principles that tell us nothing in particular about what 
to do here, now, in this uncertain form of existence.  To fail the moral core of our lives, then, is 
not to follow temptation into fixating on experience over universal moral knowledge, but rather 
to abandon the perfection of our capacity to pursue the good in all its difficulty in favor of 
something easy.  By “something easy,” what is meant is not only instant gratification, but also 
the clever manipulation of others or the short-term satisfaction attained by the inhumane, 
oppressive, and brutish habits of some people.  Such vice is a sign of taking the “easy way out,” 
when we consider the difficulty of predicting and thereby living for the good with constancy.   
From this Thomistic perspective, my initial claim that principles are secondary in 
deliberative democracy follows quite naturally from the nature of human morality itself.  Any 
moral core to deliberative democracy can only play a secondary role in its contribution to the 
moral lives of the citizenry because task assigned to those lives is to live for the good 
consistently.  Using analogies, I have argued, we can approach that task with a richer, more 
accurate grasp of what is likely to confront us in life’s inconstant course.  It is only too easy to 
ignore the great difficulty of this task and to fixate on some esoteric call of conscience and its 
moral epistemology that tells us “nothing in particular” in the face of manipulation and 
inhumanity.  Far greater in difficulty as well as moral goodness is the task of cultivating reliable 
habits for getting things right, time and again, across life’s uncertain course.   
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Thus, with Aquinas I would conclude my response to the current objection with a 
qualified rejection: I am happy to admit a principled moral core at the deepest levels of 
deliberative democracy; however, I am keen to stress that such a moral core tells us “nothing in 
particular” about deliberative democracy as a contribution to moral life.  As Peter Railton has 
recently pointed out, something like what I am here attributing to a Thomistic perspective is 
implicit in the findings of recent work in the cognitive and social sciences.398  After some years 
of skepticism about the possibility of anything like moral habits playing a realistically consistent 
role in our lives, research has come full circle and revealed that such habits are not only 
consistent with rationality, but with morality as well.  In this way, some of the latest and some of 
the oldest sources of wisdom seem to point in the same direction: Less focus on principle and 
more focus on techniques for dealing with life’s uncertainties is a step in the right direction not 
just politically, but morally as well.  
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Chapter Five: Tackling the Vagueness of Deliberative Democracy 
 
 
Tying the Project Together Again 
In the last chapter, I tried to show how my focus on analogy is, logically speaking, (1) 
superior to the deductivist’s preferred mode of principled reasoning; and (2) very different from 
anything that has been said about deliberation under the heading of “judgment” by deliberative 
democratic theorists in the past.  Additionally, I also (3) tried to deal with three remaining 
concerns that might lead people to still bristle at my proposal’s heavy focus on analogy.  As a 
result, I sought to go beyond merely deflating rival accounts of deliberative democracy by 
demonstrating the real advantages (1-3) of my deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c) and its 
underlying logical interpretation of political judgment associated with analogical reasoning.  
Now that these advantages (1-3) have been identified and many potential background concerns 
have hopefully been addressed, the ground is finally sufficiently prepared to return to the central 
problem of this entire project, namely: the indeterminacy worry.  The question to be dealt with at 
this point, then, is how my deliberative outlets proposal, with its heavy focus on analogy 
(DOP.c), might offer a response to Gaus’s problem of underdetermination, as well as the other 
variations of the indeterminacy worry (1-3 above) with which it is closely bound as a set of 
variations on a theme.  More specifically, how does analogical reasoning provide any better 
response to the problem of underdetermination in deliberation than the alternatives surveyed 
earlier?   
After demonstrating how my deliberative outlets proposal and its focus on analogy 
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successfully addresses the indeterminacy worry, the next chapter will pick up on another “loose-
end” from the first chapter, namely, my diagnostic approach.  In the first chapter, I suggested that 
the key to unlocking the indeterminacy worry was to strike out on a different path.  Instead of 
arguing that the indeterminacy worry is not as serious of a threat as it might seem (i.e., what I 
called the “apologetic” approach), or that the very debate about the indeterminacy of deliberative 
democracy presupposes a problematic methodology that makes addressing the indeterminacy 
worry unnecessary (i.e., what I called the “critical” approach), I argued that a diagnostic 
approach to the indeterminacy worry would be preferable.  This approach, as I defined it, targets 
a foundational assumption behind the views of both proponents and critics of deliberative 
democracy alike … an assumption that lends the indeterminacy worry its force.  By tying up this 
loose end, I hope to do more than bring the narrative of this project to an end.  Additionally, I 
hope to lend further appeal to my analysis by showing that it not only explains how the problem 
of the indeterminacy worry can be addressed, but also why other deliberative democrats have not 
already advanced similar proposals … if the benefits of doing so are so great. 
 
“The Larger Difference:” Framing My Response to the Indeterminacy Worry 
Above, I have drawn on a number of insights and arguments to underscore a central 
point, namely: What makes deliberation practical, or action-guiding, is that it possesses a 
probabilistic dimension.  To deliberate in a practical manner is to make plans as we reason.  As I 
tried to show, though, it makes no sense to speak of planning without also talking about 
probabilities such as predictions about what is expected to happen.  Even abstract, universal 
principles, like the principle of respect championed by deliberative democrats, gain practical 
traction in deliberation because of their predictive aspect.  We champion principles like the 
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principle of respect because we predict that they will change the probability of specific effects 
(e.g., increase reciprocity in reasoning or decrease the use of brute coercion).  In other words, 
even abstract principles factor into deliberation as a component in the process of rationally 
planning; they too are attractive to deliberators as reasons because of their predicted effects, 
rather than simply as reasons in abstraction from any assignment of probabilities.  Here, the 
essential point is that deliberation is practical when it means not simply “to reason,” but rather to 
rationally plan.   
I have tried to convey this probabilistic dimension of genuinely practical deliberation in 
various ways, often by appropriating terminology, distinctions, theses, and claims advanced by 
other philosophers from diverse sub-disciplines of philosophy.  Some of the terms drawn from 
others and developed above include allusion to practical deliberation’s “predictive aspect” 
(Salmon, Geuss), “calculative form” (Vogler), assessment of “ballpark” “prior probabilities” 
(Bartha), “commoner” humility (Dummett), and inductive logic (Salmon).  To be truly 
democratic, though, this probabilistic dimension needs to be accessible to “the people.”  
Ordinary reasoners lacking specialized training in statistical analysis need to be able to approach 
and engage with this probabilistic dimension.  I will refer to this need as the “democratic 
accessibility requirement.”  In my analysis, the democratic accessibility requirement was 
overcome by couching my central point in the language of analogy from the start.  I did not 
begin with an account of the “predictive aspect” of dynamic democratic deliberation, but rather 
with observations about the prevalence of analogy in majority-rule driven democratic discourse.  
In doing so, I tried to show that it is realistic to attribute recognition of this probabilistic 
dimension to the demos, or ordinary citizens of modern democracies.  Because analogies allow 
people to qualitatively assess and assign probabilities, they offer a uniquely qualitative means for 
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citizens to reason about the quantitative complexity that is probability.  Consequently, analogical 
reasoning is uniquely capable of embodying this probabilistic dimension while also making it 
accessible to the “commoner.”  These two points about the probabilistic dimension of practical 
deliberation and democratic accessibility flowed naturally from the logical interpretation of 
political judgment developed in chapter four. 
In stark contrast to these two points about the probabilistic dimension of practical 
deliberation and democratic accessibility, the deductivist’s alternative vision of democratic 
deliberation lacks any significant probabilistic dimension, let alone connection to democratic 
accessibility.  Dummett’s logical insight into the degeneration of probability was shown to pose 
a serious threat to deductivist approaches to deliberation precisely because they lacked a humble 
appreciation of the humility demanded by practical life.  Accordingly, the “real problem” for 
earlier visions of deliberation is that at some point they must translate their certain or near certain 
principles into the context of practical life.  That translation, however, involves a two step (Stage 
1 & 2) process in which a move is made from the “Euclidean” domain of deductivism to the 
domain of practical life.  This process involves translating our most idealized, Herculean 
commitments (χ*) into the lived world represented by first-personal beliefs (e.g., α and β), which 
tend not to be Herculean at all.  Because this latter, practical context is probabilistic, those 
Herculean commitments (χ*) suffered from a degeneration of probability that rendered them 
practically irrelevant, or im-practical and logically inferior at the same time. 
 The contrast I am drawing here helps to frame the larger reason why my deliberative 
outlets proposal and its focus on analogy offer a better response to the indeterminacy worry than 
any developed elsewhere.  My analogy-focused approach to deliberation escapes the problem of 
underdetermination because it never starts with (Stage 1) im-practical, idealized, Herculean 
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commitments (χ*), which must then (Stage 2) somehow be made practical (χ*+?).399  As the 
discussion of Bartha’s two ideas about the probabilistic dimension of analogical reasoning 
revealed, the analogical process is one that begins with an assignment of prior probabilities, and 
then reasons forward from there.  Such were the two stages of probabilistic analogical reasoning.  
By contrast, the principled, deductivist judgments of other deliberative democrats and theorists 
of deliberation are condemned to tarry endlessly with an impossible translation problem.  
Deductivists cannot avoid reality; they must shift from the Herculean domain to the domain of 
prediction, probability, and analogy to be real world theorists at all.  That translation is made 
especially difficult because they must figure out what it is about the practical domain that is 
significantly relevant, which requires figuring out how all of the private, first-personal beliefs of 
an Alf or Betty stand in relation to the Herculean domain.  Figuring out that relevance is no small 
task.   
By contrast, analogical reasoning excels at not only beginning with probabilistic matters 
always already in hand, but also in framing extremely sophisticated evaluations of those 
probabilities and their relative strength in the qualitative language of the “commoner.”  What 
does it mean to begin with “ballpark” prior probabilities “already in hand,” rather than 
translating abstract principles into a particular decision context?  An excellent illustration of 
what this difference amounts to is provided by Paul Churchland’s examination of how a 
“neurocomputational perspective” on analogical reasoning differs from other views.400  
According to Churchland, the key difference has a great deal to do with the recurrent structure of 
neurocomputational processing.  When a matrix of synaptic connections processes a piece of 
                                                
399 Indeed, inductive reasoning with analogies is not even necessarily (or ideally!) bound by some previously 
established, ideal principles or rules for reasoning, as I mentioned above with regard to John D. Norton’s work, see 
footnote 298. 
400 This discussion of Churchland’s work is drawn from Churchland 1992, 217-219. 
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information, it not only “feeds forward” a result, but also “feeds back” that result to recalibrate 
the synaptic layers that were involved initially or earlier  (i.e., prior to the actual emergence of a 
result from its unfolding information processing).  For instance, when trying to solve a 
theoretical problem, we may reflectively approach the theoretical problem from many angles 
before an epiphanic “A ha!” moment occurs.  When that moment occurs, the resulting theoretical 
solution to the problem will not only drive us to act accordingly, but will also be “fed back” into 
our memories so that the next time we approach a similar problem, the lesson of this epiphany 
will not be forgotten.  Because of such “feedback,” we will directly apprehend the similar 
problem in terms of the earlier epiphany.  What we learned from that earlier epiphany will 
always already have structured how we see the analogous theoretical problem. 
By contrast, Churchland observes, the way people usually think about cognitive activities 
like theoretical problem-solving does not allow learning to factor into how we directly 
apprehend an analogous problem.  Rather, people usually talk about the theoretical solutions 
devised in the past in terms of their formulation as linguistic or mathematical expressions.  In 
this more usual way of framing theoretical problem-solving, when a similar problems comes 
along, we do not directly see the problem in terms of our past epiphany, but rather pull out the 
linguistic or mathematical formulation of the theory and see how well the new problem “falls 
under it” … which is to say, whether this particular problem is subsumed by a general theory we 
devised in the past.  Like so many ethical theories, the usual way of framing problem-solving 
proceeds by trying to subsume moral problems under theories to see if they fit.  By contrast, 
Churchland’s “neurocomputational perspective” asks us to see ethical “theories” as the result of 
prior “feedback” into our memories such that we see moral problems certain ways.  
Churchland’s examination of how his own “neurocomputational perspective” differs 
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from the more usual one vividly illustrates the larger difference I am trying to describe here 
between my own approach to democratic deliberation and that of deductivism.  When analogical 
reasoning begins with “ballpark” priors, it begins by directly apprehending a problematic 
domain in terms of another, more familiar and systematically understood domain (CPAR.ii).  By 
contrast, deductivism proceeds not by direct apprehension, but rather through subsumption.  A 
general theory, which is linguistically formulated as a “principle” or two, is “applied” a 
particular context or “translated” into it.  That process of translation, in which a deliberator tries 
to figure out how to take all of one’s linguistically formulable beliefs and deduce or at least 
“frame” a decision in a given context is an enormously challenging process.  In many ways, it is 
a classic “frame” problem.  By contrast, with the direct apprehension of a deliberative scenario in 
terms of an analogous one (CPAR.ii), this challenging translation process “simply evaporates” 
(to use Churchland’s provocative phrasing).401  The use of analogy, Churchland claims, “will 
typically be activated within a second or so” to achieve direct apprehension in terms of past 
insight.402 
Analogical reasoning thereby avoids the difficult task of “figuring out” from the 
conjunction of all of someone’s individual commitments, what is logically implied and how 
probable it may be (i.e., what Churchland calls the “access problem”).403  Likely to a great 
degree (the aforementioned empirical evidence has revealed), analogical reasoning eludes these 
difficulties because of its comparative cognitive architecture (a topic to which I turn again later 
in this chapter and explore in much greater detail).  Notably, this cognitive architecture is often 
claimed to be wildly different from the architecture associated with the sentential psychology 
assumed in most discussions of deliberation among political philosophers like Gaus, as well as 
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nearly all deliberative democrats.404   
As a result, it may be an empirical matter that actually explains why analogical reasoning 
is not faced with the “frame problem” that occurs when one has to sift through a massive array of 
first-personal considerations for the relevant ones.405  If this well-studied difference between the 
non-sentential cognitive architecture of analogical reasoning and the sentential psychology of 
principled, deductivist deliberation does explain this difference, the explanation is especially 
interesting because it resonates with the fact that (in Holton’s words) “psychology is full” of 
studies testifying to the remarkable capacity of non-expert human beings to engage in highly 
sophisticated probabilistic reasoning, without being able to put that reasoning into sentential 
form.  If Tetlock’s hedgehog knows “one big thing,” and knows how to state it in a sentence as a 
general principle from which conclusions should be derived, we might say that the fox knows 
many probabilistic “tricks of the trade,” few of which the fox can sententially formulate.  
Furthermore, given John D. Norton’s claim that inductive reasoning has no general, formal 
“rules,” being instead “material,” this resistance to sentential formulation (Tetlock) and 
associated architecture (computational research) follows naturally from the very nature of 
inductive reasoning itself. 
Stepping back from these details about cognitive architecture and its manifestation in real 
world prediction, one can frame the simple difference between my approach and others with 
regard to the problem of underdetermination by boiling it down to one surprising fact: I agree 
with Gaus!  I agree with him that no matter how Herculean we are as reasoners, translating our 
general, principled certainties into practical deliberation is going to render those certainties 
practically irrelevant, or im-practical.  Michael Dummett offered a more precise expression for 
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this point.  No matter how Herculean we are, to the extent that we aim to be Herculean at all in 
our practical deliberation, we condemn ourselves to conclusions that are only “negligibly” better 
than “0” in their probability.  By contrast, as Bartha claimed, analogy excels at “ballpark” 
estimates of probabilities, which allow us to qualitatively assign and assess non-negligible 
probabilities.  Thus, I agree with Gaus.  Even the deductivist’s most Herculean efforts will yield 
improbably determinate results for action.  By contrast, focusing on analogy will allow us to 
determine what to do in a non-negligible way.   
The reason is that analogical reasoning operates through direct apprehension in terms of 
past insights into what is probable, not through the subsumption of particular problems under 
general principles.406  In other words, analogical reasoning proceeds by (1) initially, directly 
apprehending a present problem in terms of past insights into prior probabilities, before (2) 
proceeding to assess that assignment of prior probabilities for spuriousness by attending to the 
many systematic relations that offer themselves up for evaluative correlation.  This way of 
proceeding stands in stark contrast to the process of subsumptive translation in which we (1) first 
try to find a general principle, etc. with which to tackle a problem and then (2) see how well it 
squares with the particularities of our concrete situation.  This contrast will become more vivid in 
the next section, as I take it up with regard to each variation of the indeterminacy worry.   
 
Addressing the Indeterminacy Worry in Reverse Order 
Having framed and “boiled down” the larger difference between my approach and the 
approach of other deliberative democrats, I turn now in each of the following sections to 
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addressing the specific variations on the indeterminacy worry.  I take up each variation in reverse 
order, since the current section has drawn so much on Gaus and therefore establishes a natural 
transition to the third, “first-personal” and very “Gausian” variation of the indeterminacy worry. 
 
1.  The Third Variation of the Indeterminacy Worry  
One may still push back against this simple point about the alignment of Gaus’s analysis 
and my proposal.  What about the divergent implications among individuals, regarding the 
probabilities of a given analogical inference?  Do these not still pose a problem?  Isn’t it still 
possible that two people will differ on the prior probabilities assigned by an analog?  For 
instance, take a debate between a refugee from a 20th century fascist regime and a young student 
of history.  If an analogy is drawn between the threat posed by that fascist regime and a current 
government, will there not be some dramatic, phenomenologically divergent implications 
between the refugee and the student?  In their investigation of Khong’s work on the similar 
analogies that defined American foreign policy decisions in the 1960’s, Hofstadter and Sander 
point out that analogies like the “domino theory” are “profoundly mixed.”407  
This mixture, they observe, not only includes the mundane analog of a chain of dominos 
falling in a few seconds, but also the composite analogy identified by Khong with the fascist 
threats of “the 1930s,” which are constituted by such analogs as the invasion of Manchuria, the 
annexation of Ethiopia, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
and also by analogy, political events in Asia including the Korean War.408  Furthermore, for the 
various policymakers involved in the Vietnam decisions of 1965, each of these analogs had 
varying degrees of personal resonance.  Those with a history of military service in different 
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conflicts found these analogs more or less personally resonant; while those with no such military 
service had something more akin to the student’s perspective.  Among the policymakers, their 
divergent personal histories suggested divergent analogs for framing the Vietnam decisions of 
the 1965. 
 However, as Khong’s research reveals, this personal divergence posed no problem, but 
rather provided the basis for a composite historical analogy framed around the mundane analog 
of a chain of dominos.  The familiar, mundane image of dominos offered a reference point for 
understanding the composite lessons of very concrete, personal, lived, and historically significant 
analogs.  A kind of “mental blending of situations” was made possible, they observe, one that 
could be:  
encoded at various levels of abstraction, which means it is perfectly possible for us to see 
as one and the same phenomenon the succumbing of a series of neighboring countries to 
an evil empire’s domination and the successive toppling-over of many dominos neatly 
lined up in a chain.  This universal fact of human high-level perception allows us to see 
far beyond the concrete details of situations and to connect events that superficially are 
enormously different from each other.409 
 
In other words, analogical reasoning provides a “mental blending” of the personal and the 
abstractive in ways that make the meaning of the different analogs equally present to people, 
despite their different backgrounds, with reference to one and the same mundane analog.  
Analogy has a remarkable capacity to cross phenomenological divergence without any sacrifice 
to the concrete, lived backgrounds of individuals.  In the language I developed earlier from 
Bartha, the point is that though our personal histories may be divergent, we can still extend the 
same “ballpark” prior probabilities from those prior experiences with the familiar, mundane 
source analogs we actually tend to mention when deliberating together.  Since phenomenology 
involves human anticipation (as claimed above), this point might be rephrased as follows.  Even 
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though people have different past experiences, the mental blending of those similar past 
experiences allows people to arrive at similar predictions about what is probable in the future. 
This “mental blending” is not only the key to understanding the “concrete” dimension of 
politics, but is also no rare part of the human condition.  Rather, to borrow the strong language 
employed by Hofstadter and Sander above, it is a “universal fact of human high-level 
perception.”  Furthermore, not only do we universally engage in blending phenomenologically 
divergent analogs, but as Hofstadter and Sander maintain, the “crisscrossing” achieved in this 
blending is inevitable, for as they write, “The problem is that whatever abstract concept is under 
discussion (dominos, containment, etc.) in a military or political context, it will necessarily 
evoke, simply because of the words it involves, familiar everyday images.”410  Analogy is not 
only capable of crisscrossing phenomenological divergence, but it also is inevitable (“will 
necessarily evoke”) that we will use analogy, just because political dialogue is populated with 
mundane terms to which we assign rich, concrete, lived, analogically-profound significance.  
Indeed, this thesis about “mental blending” is not a speculative remark; rather, the remark itself 
abstractly encodes lessons from the rich backgrounds both Hofstadter and Sander possess in 
relevant empirical and computational research, backgrounds which thereby play a major role in 
conferring a “ballpark” prior probability to the idea of “mental blending” for both of them.411  In 
other words, though their backgrounds are not identical, Hofstadter and Sander have sufficiently 
similar pasts to project similar anticipated futures for what would happen in their examples (e.g., 
the french fries example).   
Similarly, in our example involving the refugee and the student, phenomenologically 
divergent implications pose no real threat.  Whatever familiar terms are used by the refugee to 
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describe the current political situation (e.g., dominos) will inevitably be sufficiently familiar 
(e.g., “blending”) to encode “ballpark” prior probabilities in ways that effectively crisscross their 
divergent personal histories (unless, of course, the analogy is spurious).  Notably, this point 
about “mental blending” follows naturally not only from empirical and computational research, 
but also from the logic of induction itself.  In the philosophy of logic, it is hotly debated exactly 
to what extent induction is simply enumerative, which is to say, it involves enumerating past 
(and projected) instances of a specific kind so as to infer expectations that future events will be 
of this specific kind.412  However, even those who disagree that induction reduces completely to 
this enumerative reasoning about frequency, still agree that frequency is a reliable guide, a major 
factor in successful inductive reasoning.413   
As a result, the idea of “mental blending” makes logical sense.  Insofar as it involves 
using our past experiences (let alone projected future ones) to assess frequencies, it means 
different people can come together and all contribute to the process of establishing the frequency 
of the specific kind of event under discussion.  They can collate instances from their personal 
histories to assess the frequency of the specific kind of event under discussion.414  Also, because 
induction is concerned with “full evidence” (unlike deduction), they will always able to add 
more personal input to strengthen their assessment of the frequency.415  Indeed, according to a 
major tradition in the logic of induction, its structure is “asymptotic,” which (non-formally) 
means the bar of success for induction is never actually met, but rather continually approached 
until, for pragmatic or formal purposes, its success is practically insured.416  This success is often 
described as occurring “in the limit.”  The reason for using this phrase is that we can understand 
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there to be a limiting point to the enumeration of cases in which we study the frequency of the 
specific kind of event.  This limit is the point at which the specification of additional cases would 
seem to contribute little additional understanding to the frequency.   
For example, we may believe there is a practical limit to the number of case histories we 
have to do on the effects of childhood lead exposure before we are justified to believe that the 
probability of such effects is very high (i.e., very frequent).  Similarly, advocates for limiting the 
use of cluster munitions will likely believe that the audience need only hear a rough number of 
personal testimonies, for practical purposes, to “get the point.”  Beyond that number, little is 
contributed to their understanding of the associated probabilities.  So too, with “mental 
blending,” our first-personal case histories can contribute to understanding the ballpark 
probabilities involved in something like the “domino theory” because they strengthen its 
assessment.  In Khong’s research, for instance, we discover a composite analogy that was surely 
strengthened by the numerous historical analogs that contributed to it (e.g., Manchuria, Ethiopia, 
the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia).  When our understanding of some probability is “in the limit,” 
whether one or another of these historical analogs is mentioned may make no practical 
difference.  Thus, the student of history can understand the probabilities conferred by the 
refugee’s analogy, even if the two are not mutually aware of the same exact historical analogs. 
 
2.  The Second Variation on the Indeterminacy Worry 
This last point not only helps explain the power of analogies to deal with Gaus’s “first-
personal” exposition of the problem of underdetermination in deliberation.  Additionally, it also 
explains how analogy overcomes the other two variations of the indeterminacy worry with which 
I framed this project in the first chapter.  Having provided my response to the third, “first-
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personal” variation in this chapter section, I will continue this reverse order of attack and next 
take up the second, “informational” variation.  According to this variation, democratic 
deliberation founders in the face of what might be called “informational complexity,” meaning 
the contradictions and inconsistencies that run rife through the beliefs and desires of a large 
citizenry, or even every citizen taken as an individual.  No one has a set of completely consistent 
and harmonious beliefs, let alone the members of a democratic society collectively.  The 
pluralistic character of modern societies in which religious beliefs, fundamental principles, and 
core values stand in tension with one another makes this informational complexity even worse.  
In such societies, the beliefs and desires of the citizenry are too diverse for reasoning to ever get 
beyond debating the starting point of political decisions, let alone determining what ought to be 
done in a particular situation in light of those contested principles. 
The last statement is worth stressing.  If the diverse citizens of a pluralistic society cannot 
agree on what is most fundamental or basic, how can they ever get to the point of actually 
making decisions?  This point resonates with Gaus’s own skepticism that Herculean reasoning 
would ever be feasible, because no people ever completely agree on the canons of good 
reasoning, let alone on how to apply those canons to a decision (even Socrates!).  This point also 
resonates with another idea attributed to a different political philosopher above: John Rawls.  In 
discussing Rawls’ work, I commented on the distinction he draws between the “order of 
deduction” and the “order of support.”  Recalling that distinction, it can be seen that the dilemma 
posed here takes a very specific order of deliberation for granted, namely, the “order of 
deduction.”  This dilemma depends on the assumption that deliberation must first settle on 
principles before any particular decisions can be made.  It assumes that decisions are the kinds of 
things we derive from principles, which is to say, decisions are the kinds of things we deduce.  
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Furthermore, as we saw with Tetlock’s hedgehogs, it also assumes that decisions start with 
“certain” truths whose level of commitment is then “preserved” from premise to conclusion.  
Fittingly, intractable disagreement erupts in our real and imagined democratic discourses because 
we try to be hedgehogs … pursuing a first, initial “certainty” the truth of which we intend to 
preserve as we infer what to do from it. 
If we adopt my proposal, though, and shift away from deductivism, this informational 
complexity and the attending dilemma disappear.  To use an analogy, it does not matter whether 
what we believe is generally and universally true, valid, moral, ethical, or just.  We do not move 
from the general to the particular.  Moreover, we also need not be mutually aware of the same 
exact particulars, which we are mentally blending into a composite analogy under discussion.  
The “asymptotic” character of analogical reasoning means that different distributions of past 
(and projected) analogs are possible.  People can have radically divergent personal histories 
while still sharing a similar appreciation of the “ballpark” probabilities associated with some 
systematic set of relations.  Personal divergence poses no threat, because analogical reasoning 
deals with probability, which is to say, it deals with statistical distributions of properties, 
components, and other systematic relations which can vary within the limit.  Fittingly, 
deliberation both real and imagined need not be intractable.  Instead, it can take a foxlike line of 
approach and start not with certain truths that are to be preserved until the decision point, but 
rather with “ballpark” perspectives on a decision problem from which further inquiry can 
proceed.  Thus, if we adopt my proposal, a major source of intractable disagreement disappears. 
The question is how this distributive, statistical character can help deal with the pluralism 
in modern democracies.  The answer is simple.  As a probabilistic (or statistical) function, 
analogy is what logicians call paraconsistent, which is informally equivalent to meaning it 
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tolerates inconsistency.  When propositions in a set of information are logically incompatible in 
the aggregate, the traditional logic associated with deductivism only tells us that our use of 
deductive inference is problematic until some of this incompatible information is abandoned.417  
Nicholas Rescher describes this situation, in which some information needs to be abandoned for 
us to proceed, as a case of “informational overdetermination.”418  The problem behind this 
situation is that the “computational architecture” associated with deductivism breaks down in the 
presence of conflicting information.419  After truth values are assigned to the propositions in a set 
of information, we are unable to calculate a result, where “calculation” involves inferring a result 
by applying rules to the information (e.g., principles of deductive logic, other principles).   
By contrast, analogical reasoning utilizes a comparative architecture, one that is not 
governed by the application of general rules, but rather by retrieval of similar past cases to 
“grade” them along a comparative scale embodied in the structure of the past case.420  In other 
words, rather than calculate a conclusion with rules that cannot tolerate inconsistencies, we 
classify content as more or less similar according to a retrieved standard (e.g., past historical 
analogs or “specific types” inferred at the limit).  Being comparative, rather than rule-governed, 
analogical reasoning does not use negation in assessment.  It need not divide propositions into 
two camps, to which some universal principles are applied to determine a conclusion.  Instead, it 
classifies content into grades of more or less similar, where the standard for grading is supplied 
by our mentally blended analogs.421   
Another way of stating this point, less technically, is in terms of binaries.  When 
computing with rules, one is concerned with what is compatible, and what is incompatible with 
                                                
417 Rescher, Nicholas (1976). Plausible Reasoning. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 2. 
418 ibid. 
419 Rescher 1976, 59. 
420 Rescher 1976, 59, Bach 2012, 350-1. 
421 Rescher 1976, 55. 
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them.  Furthermore, where we take the deductivist approach, we are concerned with binaries like 
certain/uncertain, true/false, truth-preserving/ampliative, etc.  Analogical reasoning can flourish 
without these “binary” categories (to employ Christian List’s description).422  For instance, it can 
allow for gradations of belief (e.g., more or less probable, more or less the kind of consideration 
on which I would expect to act when voting) because it has more than “two camps” to which 
propositions can be assigned.  These gradations can, in turn, be used to mark gradations of 
divergence among individuals on the probability of various systematic relations obtaining in a 
target domain.  As Christian List has pointed out, the “move from a binary to a probabilistic 
setting” described here has many fascinating formal results for group decision-making, including 
a capacity to resist the degeneration of probabilities discussed above in reference to Michael 
Dummett’s work.423  Furthermore, the move from a binary to a comparative, probabilistic setting 
also opens up very interesting ways to calculate a collective perspective from individual 
perspectives that are divergent in the ways they assign probabilities.424  While the details of this 
formal work would take the present analysis too far astray, it is nonetheless worth noting that 
these results bear a striking affinity to the idea of “mental blending” described by Hofstadter and 
Sander.  For present purposes, though, what matters is that citizens can assign the same 
“ballpark” probabilities, where that ballpark is defined “for practical purposes” at some 
asymptotic limit.   
In short, analogical reasoning does not suffer the same fate in the presence of conflicting 
information as does principled, deductive reasoning because it uses a “graded,” comparative 
method of inquiry.  Its hands are not tied by rules the way traditional modes of justification and 
testing tend to be.  Accordingly, in the presence of information that is complex because conflict-
                                                
422 List, Christian (2012). “The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.” Synthese 187: 204. 
423 ibid. 
424 ibid. 
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ridden, we would do better to shift away from the rule-governed, principled methods associated 
with deductivist deliberation and towards analogical reasoning and its associated logical 
interpretation of political judgment.  Just as importantly, not only would we do better to enact 
this shift, but, every day, we enact this shift on a routine basis.  In the face of complex 
information, we predict that a rule-governed, binary approach will encounter obstacles and 
instead engage in analogical reasoning when practical decisions actually need to be determined.   
Dunbar’s research on real life scientific reasoning illustrates this routine shift in everyday 
affairs.  In the most diverse labs, where people shared the least amount of past research 
experience, analogy proliferated.  By extension of the present discussion, we should expect 
analogy to flourish in the face of social diversity as well.  When decisions have to be determined, 
real people understand that the probability of coming to a successful decision is far superior 
when analogy is employed.  Thus, in a diverse democracy, political theorists should hope for 
exactly what the “commoner” would see as most probable: A heavy reliance on analogical 
reasoning is the best bet.  Anything else, to paraphrase Geuss, would involve a “narcissistic” 
fixation on belief management, as opposed to “anything that might be called trying to engage 
cognitively (in the widest possible meaning of that term) with the real world.”425  The charge 
may seem excessive, but the point is simply that to the extent that practical engagement is 
engagement with the real world, it is not concerned with the abstract quality of our individual 
sets of beliefs, but rather with their predicted impact on life. 
 
                                                
425 Geuss 2010, 59, though notice that Geuss realizes how strong the resistance to this idea probably is, when he 
writes, “It is a fact I fully acknowledge that the general idea of a closed form of human life guided by fixed rules - 
by ‘real rules’ if at all possible, but certainly in any case subject to ‘ideal moral rules’ - holds an almost invincible 
dominion over the modern imagination, even though in many individual cases we show ourselves very well aware of 
the fact that this is a fantasy,” ibid. 
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3.  The First Variation on the Indeterminacy Worry 
I now proceed to the last remaining variation of the indeterminacy worry.  In many ways, 
this variation is the easiest to dissolve with reference to analogy.  The very idea of having 
citizens deliberate together towards a decision seems to demand a dramatic (if not unrealistic) 
amount of time, energy, and other resources.  Not only must citizens express their views, but 
they must also take the time to cite the relevant commitments that justify those views as the 
supporting reasons.  Moreover, after citing those commitments, they must also spend even more 
time and energy actually assessing those justifications and revising their original positions 
accordingly.  Since political decision-making is frequently (if not almost always) pursued under 
severe time pressures, it seems practically impossible to cover the three stages of this process of 
“conjunctive criticism,” by which I mean the process including (1) the expression of citizen 
positions, (2) the explication of the supporting conjunction of commitments that justify those 
positions, and (3) the critique of those justifying commitments.  The deliberative determination 
of political decisions seems to set impossible practical demands, therefore making actual, 
determinative, political reasoning practically impossible. 
Analogical reasoning quickly overcomes these sources of impracticality for a number of 
reasons.  First, in being “asymptotic,” it allows us to set practical benchmarks for the assessment 
of probabilities.  No logical ideal, no universal principle or standard, need be the case in every 
situation.  Depending on the situation, we can set the asymptotic limit at different levels.  When 
Z. is eating fries in the example supplied by Hofstadter and Sander, the limit is quite low: One 
good fry is enough to infer that the others are probably equally good and should be treated as 
such in predicting the considerations that ought to guide our decision-making about what to eat 
next.  By contrast, in a Supreme Court decision, we expect a thorough review of past case 
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histories for analogical precedents with which to grade current opinions the judges may write.426   
A still stronger response can be located by attending to the interesting systematicity of 
analogies (CPAR.i).  As I mentioned in my account of the contemporary perspective on 
analogical reasoning, analogy tends to deal with inter-level (IL) systematic relations that operate 
across different time periods (inter-temporal, or IT).  These “IL-IT relations” mirror the 
“calculative form” described by Vogler as well as the “predictive aspect” of practical 
deliberation, as mentioned above.  With massive systematicity spread out across different time 
periods, analogical reasoning might seem to be condemned to an impossible cognitive task.  
However, the inter-temporal dimension of this systematicity means that some of those complex 
relations will be trackable to earlier time periods than others.  For instance, when Betty goes into 
the school and changes her mind about the strategy that should be used to put principles into 
practice, she changes her mind before other stages of their rational plan occur.  Similarly, we 
can assess the “ballpark” prior probabilities extended by an analogy in a very timely manner by 
simply (1) beginning to act on them and then (2) checking the initial stages of the resulting 
action to see if the probabilities line up with the reality.  In doing so, we can circumvent all 
manner of complex evaluation by using feedback to guide action, rather than pre-decision 
reasoning.427  As Daniel Steel explains, such “comparative process tracing” offers a realistic and 
effective means for dealing with underdetermination and overwhelmingly complex analogical 
inferences.428  We can reduce the effort needed to assess an analogy by first checking the 
“upstream” stages of the rational plan it suggests (meaning the earlier systematic relations), 
                                                
426 This contrast can be explained in terms of the different “kinds” of entities involved, as discussed in chapter five 
in my summary of John Haugeland’s work. 
427 This “feedback” conception of systematicity has historically been associated with the legacy of G.W.F. Hegel, 
see Hegel, G.W.F. (2012). Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science. trans. and ed. by J. Michael Stewart and 
Peter C. Hodgson. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 70-73, as well as Yeomans 2012, 15-23, Geuss 2014, 95-
111 . 
428 Steel, Daniel (2008). Across the Boundaries. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 194. 
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while temporarily setting aside the complex, “downstream” stages for a later inquiry.429   
Furthermore, as Michael Strevens has argued, we can often assess probabilities by 
focusing on what he calls “macrovariables,” which are systematic relations that can be assessed 
probabilistically independent from knowing the details of the smaller, microlevel parts of the 
system (e.g., temperature).430  With upstream macrovariables, we can quickly assess whether an 
analogy is at least temporarily acceptable.  Pragmatic considerations can then determine how 
much more or how often to “check back” on the process as it unfolds.  For example, a past 
analog may suggest that a tax cut is in order, which we may decide to act upon with the 
expectation that in five years we will check on its effectiveness and determine whether it is 
sufficiently successful to be kept around for another five years.   
For empirical support to this reasoning, I will turn (yet again) to computational research 
on analogical reasoning.  This research reveals that analogical reasoning is indeed wildly faster.  
As my discussion of the inter-temporal and inter-level systematicity (IT-IL) of analogies 
(CPAR.i) was meant to indicate, analogical reasoning traces the unfolding of a process at various 
levels and stages in parallel.  Empirical research on this method of reasoning shows that it 
allows cognitive systems to “guess ahead” about what to expect.431  When several inter-level 
relations are observed as a process unfolds, our memory allows us to “mentally blend” that 
partially unfolded process with analogous processes from the past, so as to anticipate what will 
happen among these and other systematic relations as time continues to unfold the process.  
Consequently, this “mental blending” allows the cognitive system to figure out what to anticipate 
and to consider how to respond to that anticipation before the process has been completed.  
Much as we often know what someone will say before they finish saying it, so too analogical 
                                                
429 Steel 2008, 79. 
430 Strevens, Michael (2003). Bigger Than Chaos. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 346-355. 
431 Clark, Andy (2013). “Expecting the World.” The Journal of Philosophy. 110:9, 469-496. 
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reasoning guesses and then checks for residual errors.   
What makes this reasoning so efficient and yet so accurate, though, cannot really be 
appreciated without a firm grasp of the unthinkably massive number of systematic relations that 
are being computed in parallel in these instances.  Literally hundreds if not thousands of factors, 
including (to name just a very, very small number of these factors) the speaker’s tone of voice, 
body language, choice of pronouns, rhetorical questions, etc. are all being considered 
simultaneously and in parallel as the process unfolds.  A few seconds of computing across so 
very, very many factors quickly reduces the viable guesses that might be extended (through 
“mental blending”) to anticipate how to understand the present speaker.  Such complex, multi-
relational, parallel processing can come to an accurate guess with tremendous speed and 
efficiency, rarely needing to observe the unfolding of an entire process to recognize it.  An 
illustrative analogy here would be the widespread ability among avid listeners of a genre of 
music to identify a performer, if not a particular performance, by as little as “one note.”  The idea 
here is that people are capable of processing the countless variables that can be weighted in as 
little time as the performance of “one note,” using such considerations as timbre, vibrato, etc. to 
quickly identify a unique performer or performance from a seemingly unthinkable number of 
possible alternatives.  Similarly, the massive systematicity and entrenchment with which 
analogical reasoning deals makes it equally capable of efficient “one note” information 
processing.  
 
The Analogy Above 
 In the last three sections, I explored the many ways in which my deliberative outlets 
proposal (DOP.a-c) answers the indeterminacy worry.  In doing so, the sense in which 
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deliberative democracy need not serve as a vague vision of real democratic politics was 
hopefully made especially clear in a summary way.  The analysis of the last four chapters, 
however, has tried to answer the indeterminacy way in another, perhaps less direct way as well 
… one that may come as a surprise given the apparent disjunction between the first two chapters 
and the last two chapters.  However, despite that apparent disjunction, a profound and 
clarificatory connection between these discussions emerges if an analogy is drawn (CPAR.ii) 
between their respective conclusions.  For ease of reference, I will refer to the conclusions of the 
first two chapters with the Roman numeral “I” and the last two chapters with the Roman numeral 
“II.”  What are the respective conclusions of these two sets of chapters (i.e., I and II)?  In the first 
domain (I) represented by the first two chapters, voting seemed like the space of strategic, 
individualistic behavior, but was shown to be richly deliberative.  In the second domain (II) 
represented by the last two chapters, the inductive argument of the analogical reasoning 
associated with that richly deliberative voting (i.e., I) was shown itself to be richly deliberative, 
rather than psychologically manipulative or logically weak compared to alternatives.   
At a higher level of systematicity (CPAR.i), these conclusions (I-II) not only share the 
same demand that a given human practice is under-appreciated for its deliberative significance, 
but a similar explanatory perspective as well.  The reason voting is insufficiently appreciated for 
its deliberative richness, is that people too often fixate strictly on its day of use (i.e., election 
day), rather than the anticipation of its use that is the cause of campaign seasons.  Analogously, 
the reason inductive argument by analogy is insufficiently appreciated for its deliberative 
richness is that people rarely pay attention to the way it too is caught up in anticipation.  In the 
latter context, this anticipation takes the form of the “phenomenology of deliberation,” by which 
was meant the lived, first-personal dimension of decision-making.   
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This phenomenology involves anticipation because it is concerned with the future, in 
which more or less probable changes to other beliefs are expected.  For some, like Alf, those 
changes may be (j) of little consequence for what else Alf believes.  For others, like Betty, those 
changes may (k) call for heavy revision of what else matters to her.  In either case, as Gerald 
Gaus argues, the key point is that deliberation has a phenomenological dimension.  For Alf, that 
phenomenological dimension is the rich sense of anticipation that accompanies his deliberation 
with Betty (Stage 1) and which portends good things to come for his other commitments.  Betty, 
on the other hand, finds herself tense with anticipation during the same process of deliberation 
with Alf (Stage 1).  Her anticipation is tense because she is aware of the upheaval that is going to 
occur when she gets a chance to trace the consequences of this deliberation to what matters to 
her so dearly as a result of her high school experience (Stage 2). 
In other words, deliberation is “phenomenological” insofar as it involves constant 
anticipation of the more or less probable effects of that process of deliberation.  As the account 
of Gaus’s arguments above makes clear, some of these effects have a psychological bearing, as 
in the case of Alf and Betty.  For the sake of argument, it may be worth noting that other effects 
are more ontological, having more to do with the world itself.  For instance, deliberators may 
find themselves engaging in an imaginative rehearsal of what would actually happen, over time, 
if they were to act on a plan presently under consideration (IL-IT systematicity of CPAR.i).  
Other times, deliberators concern themselves with the effects that can be predicted when a course 
of action involves interacting with a specific kind of entity (e.g., an ecosystem, a marketplace, or 
a museum’s collection).432  As John Haugeland has argued, such deliberation would occur at two 
levels.   
                                                
432 For a more precise account of “kinds” than the following discussion of Haugeland’s work provides, see 
Chakravartty, Anjan (2010). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
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First (1), deliberators would be thinking about how entities relevant to their rational 
planning instantiate “kinds,” a kind being a “consistent and reliable collocation of structures and 
properties and/or combinations thereof.”433  In other words, deliberators would consider what 
they could predict to reliably occur in the same location in time and space simultaneously, with 
regard to an object’s surface properties or deeper structures.  For example, when deliberating 
about what to do with a museum's collection owned by a municipality entering bankruptcy 
proceedings, the citizenry may consider the museum and its contents to be reliably and 
predictably "fragile," "sensitive to environmental changes," "prone to damage when moved," etc.  
Understanding the kinds of entities in a museum in this way, the citizenry may therefore 
critically oppose any policy that would call for simply turning off the utilities at the museum to 
save money, since such a policy would subject the museum's collection to serious environmental 
changes.   
Second (2), deliberators would take these predictions about the kinds of entities involved 
in their rational plans and then reflect on what those predictions should mean for each potential 
course of action.  As Haugeland makes this point, “given that there are such kinds, there can be 
consistent and reliable kinds of interaction.”434  Thus, in the previous example, the citizenry 
would formulate plans and policies based on their understanding that the contents of the museum 
are (1) the kinds of things that have a certain fragility, environmental sensitivity, and 
susceptibility to damage when moved.  Consequently, they would critically resist any policy that 
would involve citizens, municipal employees, or representative contractors from (2) interacting 
with the contents of the museum in ways that would create unnecessary environmental changes 
in temperature, or would force the contents of the museum to be moved from one location to 
                                                
433 Haugeland, John (2013). Dasein Disclosed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 255. 
434 ibid. 
   294 
another more times than might be absolutely necessary.  This “kind-oriented” manifestation of 
the phenomenology of deliberation is worth stressing because it helpfully encapsulates the point 
I made above about the connection between this phenomenology and analogical reasoning.  We 
use analogies in deliberation because they allow us to borrow our entrenched, systematic grasp 
of a familiar domain to better predict what can be reliably expected in another domain, often 
because the two domains involve (1) the same kinds of entities and therefore (2) call for the same 
kind of interaction.   
For instance, when the Great Depression is used as an analog to understand the Great 
Recession, the idea is that both are similar kinds of economic events.  To paraphrase Haugeland, 
they both involve massive numbers of very abstract systematic relations, which apply to specific 
kinds of properties and structures in reliable and consistent ways.  This reliability and 
consistency is what makes them deliberatively significant.  To the extent that citizens can (1) 
first understand the kinds of entities involved in each of these domains systematically (e.g., 
markets, central banks, housing policies), they can then (2) understand the kinds of interaction in 
those domains and among those kinds of entities and events that ought to be pursued (e.g., by 
enacting historically rare monetary policies).  In doing so, they demonstrate that analogical 
reasoning is highly dependent on what is anticipated of the world and our interaction with it, in 
its extension of entrenched, systematic relations (CPAR.i) from one domain to another 
(CPAR.ii).  Perhaps no phrase is more indicative of this idea than “course of action,” which 
implies by its reference to a course of action that what citizens deliberate about is not a singular 
behavior, but rather a sequence of behavior that occurs over time (IT) and at many levels (IL), all 
capable of being evaluated systematically (CPAR.i). 
As this brief recap of the above analysis is meant to underscore, the contribution made by 
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analogical reasoning to politics cannot be adequately appreciated without attending to its relation 
to human anticipation … just like voting.  In other words, there really is a profound and 
clarificatory connection between (I) the analysis of majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices in the first two chapters of this project, and (II) the analysis of analogical reasoning and 
the probabilistic dimension of rational planning carried out in the last two chapters.  Earlier, I 
referred to this connection as “profound,” in part, because it occurs at such a very high level of 
entrenched systematicity.  Two seemingly rather disparate domains and discussions are shown to 
be systematically similar.  The first domain (I) is eminently “realistic,” with its talk of campaign 
season politics, analogies that “go viral,” and other empirical details from ordinary politics.  By 
contrast, the second domain (II) is highly abstruse, involving myriad details in the philosophy of 
logic, cognitive science, deliberative psychology, and the philosophy of action. 
The connection is also “profound,” though, not only because it occurs at such a high level 
of systematic abstraction, but also because (to redeploy Haugeland’s distinction) it reveals (1) a 
remarkably consistent and reliable property of human deliberation, i.e., anticipation, and how it 
factors into (2) rational planning about kinds of interaction people ought to have with one 
another and environmental entities.  For instance, we may use analogies to systematically assess 
relations that obtain inter-temporally, across times that include an anticipated future, so as to 
rationally plan what to do by way of predictions.  Or we may use analogies to systematically 
frame a future election in ways that make it significant for democratic dialogue, rather than just 
our behavior in the voting booth.  In either case, what is significant is that human deliberation is 
pervaded with anticipation of other times.  Deliberation has a temporal reach beyond the 
immediate preferences people have for one course of action as opposed to another.   
Larry Temkin describes this temporal reach as the very essence of being “a planner,” 
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saying that the planner: 
looks ahead, he anticipates changes in circumstances, and he takes certain steps with the 
aim of affecting the future choices that will be available to him.  Often, to do this is to 
engage in strategic planning involving others.435 
 
In other words, Temkin believes it is the essence of the planner to look ahead and “anticipate 
changes in circumstances,” which is to say, how psychologically or ontologically, changes are 
(systematically) predictable.  However, Temkin makes another, even more striking point about 
the nature of this anticipation.  Not only do we anticipate psychological or ontological effects, 
but we also anticipate how a current decision will impact later deliberation.  Because we can 
anticipate the future effects of deliberation now, we can also anticipate the effects of various 
plans, currently under discussion, on later stages of planning.  We can, for instance, plan now to 
be “resolute” in the future and simply stick to whatever plan is made now, regardless of “what 
may come.”  Or we may plan now to set aside planning on certain agenda items until a certain 
date or specific kinds of circumstances evolve.  In any of these instances, the phenomenological 
dimension of deliberation allows us to deliberate in ways that train a steady eye on future 
deliberation at the same time that current considerations are evaluated. 
This “meta”-observation about the scope of human anticipation in deliberation reveals 
why this profound connection between (I) my earlier account of majority rule procedures and (II) 
my more recent analysis of analogical reasoning is a clarificatory connection too.  Recall that I 
described the first domain (I) above as more “realistic” in being more familiar from ordinary 
politics and its campaign season activities.  After this description, I then described the second 
domain (II) as more “abstract,” or less familiar, insofar as it deals with the philosophy of logic, 
                                                
435 Temkin, Larry (2012). Rethinking the Good. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 189, an idea which receives 
an especially illuminating expression in McLennen, Edward (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 97-8. 
   297 
cognitive science, deliberative psychology, and other areas of highly specialized inquiry.  These 
two descriptions clearly differ in the familiarity people typically have with each of their 
respective domains.  The first (I) domain of real democratic politics is familiar; the second (II) 
domain of highly specialized inquiry is typically unfamiliar.  
Given these two descriptions, an additional, clarificatory connection can be drawn 
between these two discussions at a still higher level of systematicity.  The first (I) discussion of 
majority rule procedures and “deliberative outlets” was meant to make more probable a clear 
understanding of the second (II) discussion of the way rational planning benefits from the use of 
analogical reasoning to assess complex probabilities in qualitative, “ordinary” terms.  In other 
words, the claims made in the first domain (I), provided a familiar, source analog with which to 
understand the less familiar, target analog that was the second domain (II).  In this way, by 
stressing the role of human anticipation in the more familiar domain of campaign politics (I), and 
then moving into the less familiar terrain of logic (II), the above analysis connects the chapters of 
this project in ways that exemplify the very kind of deliberative anticipation that I have been so 
keen to stress all along.  The first two chapters anticipate what is to come in the second two 
chapters, and as a result, are cast in ways meant to make a clear grasp of that later, more abstract 
material more probable.   
Furthermore, the above analysis also exemplifies the very kind of deliberative 
anticipation I have been so keen to stress by reproducing the methodological structure I have 
time and again underlined as essential to understanding analogical reasoning.  Analogy beings 
with “ballpark” prior probability assessments and then explores the spuriousness of their 
extension to the present case.  Similarly, I used our entrenched understanding of contemporary 
politics to assign some prior probability to my deliberative outlets proposal (DOP.a-c), in the 
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first two chapters (I), before then turning to the detailed discussion of the logical and empirical 
support for that probability assignment in later chapters (II).  Indeed, time and again I have 
introduced ideas by using the richly suggestive phrasing quoted from others to initially provide a 
“ballpark” characterization of the idea, before analyzing it in greater detail for spuriousness.  
Thus, the two parts of this project (I and II) reflect the two stages of analogical reasoning as 
identified in the contemporary perspective on analogical reasoning (CPAR.ii and CPAR.iii).   
Thus, the very structure of this work manifests Temkin’s point about how the definitive 
quality of a “planner” is a capacity to anticipate future deliberation during present decision-
making.  Temkin’s words not only help tie the two major analyses in this work together, though.  
At the end of the above quotation, Temkin refers to the fact that when it comes to anticipatory 
deliberation, in which future choices are kept in view, we find that, “Often, to do this is to 
engage in strategic planning involving others.”436  In this brief observation, Temkin stresses 
(with italics) that once we recognize the anticipatory or “phenomenological” dimension of 
deliberation, we can also recognize that “strategic planning” with others is one of its most 
common manifestations.  To find people rationally planning courses of action with an eye on the 
future, we need only look to the way people collectively strategize with one another about the 
best plan for a course of action.  Temkin does not squarely locate the efforts of deliberators in a 
space distinct from the space of strategy and planning, but rather safely within it. 
However, if we follow so many other theorists and assume that democratic deliberation is 
best described in juxtaposition to majority rule procedures and the strategic behavior they 
occasion, then we cannot recognize this space in which the "planner's" anticipatory deliberation 
commonly appears as an exemplary space of deliberation in general.  In searching for common, 
familiar, realistic, and exemplary instances of citizen deliberation with which to convey the 
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practicality of the deliberative vision of democracy, the case of the everyday "planner" is 
inadmissible as evidence and unavailable for illustrative purposes.  Assuming such a 
juxtaposition, then, ties the hands of the proponent of deliberative democracy when it comes to 
rendering the deliberative vision of democracy practically appealing.  In the next chapter, I will 
explore this “self-constraint” at greater length to gauge its impact on deliberative democratic 
theory.  The results will bring this project “full circle,” returning to the diagnostic approach I 
identified my project with in the first chapter.   
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Chapter Six: Where Deliberative Democracy Went Wrong 
 
 
A Blinding Assumption 
At the end of the last chapter, I observed an unfortunate consequence of assuming a 
juxtaposition between deliberation and the strategic activities of the “planner” traditionally 
associated not with deliberative democracy, but rather with rival visions of democratic politics.  
The unfortunate consequence was a blindness to the exemplary instance of the “planner.”  Drawn 
from Larry Temkin’s work on decision theory, the “planner” is a person for whom deliberation is 
saturated with prior anticipations and who is also familiar from real world affairs.  These two 
characteristics allow the “planner” to serve both as an exemplary instance of citizen deliberation 
and as a familiar analog for remembering that it is the probabilistic dimension in real politics that 
provides a foothold for deliberative democracy.  To the extent that we are like the planner, 
making rational plans that involve predictions and prior probability assignments, we require 
analogical reasoning in political affairs to provide a means for assigning and assessing these 
probabilities in the qualitative terms to which both ordinary persons and “experts” alike typically 
find themselves bound (in accord with the “democratic accessibility requirement”). 
What makes this blindness so unfortunate is that it prevents us from seeing the common, 
familiar, realistic, and exemplary instances of citizen deliberation that exist right before our eyes 
and with which we can convey the practicality of the deliberative vision of democracy.  
Assuming such a juxtaposition, then, ties the hands of the proponent of deliberative democracy 
when it comes to rendering the deliberative vision of democracy practically appealing.  Of 
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course, this unfortunate consequence of this assumed juxtaposition leads quite naturally back to 
the point from which this project began: Why does deliberative democracy seem so impractical 
as a vision of democratic politics?  This question gained greater urgency as the above 
investigation unfolded.  The widespread use of analogies in real politics would seem to 
obviously suggest that citizens are engaged with more reasoning (of one particular and rarely 
recognized type, it must be admitted) than is often said to be the case by critics and proponents 
of deliberative democracy alike.  In the face of such apparent obviousness, and given the force of 
the arguments and research championed above as a testament to the logical and practical value of 
analogical reasoning in democratic deliberation, the problem becomes more jarring still. 
When I introduced my diagnosis of the root of the indeterminacy worry in the first 
chapter, though, I tied it not to a prejudice against analogical reasoning, but rather to a common 
assumption among critics and proponents of deliberative democracy alike.  That assumption, 
Temkin's words help convey, is the assumed juxtaposition between deliberation and the strategic 
behavior associated with majority rule procedures that forces us to think of deliberation as 
distinct from one of its most common, real life forms: Planning.  However, as the analysis of the 
last two chapters (II) has hopefully shown, the prospects for finding other evidence and 
illustrations of the practical determinacy and appeal of deliberative democracy is unlikely to be 
very promising, given the prevalence of this assumption.  The reason is that in assuming that 
deliberation and planning are distinct activities, the assumption I have diagnosed as the source of 
the indeterminacy worry tends to obscure other "common" cases of real deliberation as well.  
Temkin’s “planner” is just one example. 
As has already been stressed, the juxtaposition between deliberation and voting is like the 
juxtaposition between deductivism and its rival.  Both juxtapositions involve relegating the 
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anticipatory dimension of decision-making to the non-deliberative realm.  In the former case, the 
anticipatory dimension is relegated to the side of strategizing about how to vote, as opposed to 
reasoning about what it is right for everyone to concede to as a decision.  Similarly, in the latter 
case, the anticipatory dimension is relegated to decision-making that has a "calculative form," 
"predictive aspect," or probabilistic dimension.  Principled deliberation and the opaque judgment 
it occasions do not anticipate the future, because they allow for decision to be made on the basis 
of universal, context-transcending considerations like principles of respect and reciprocity 
(which is preserved). 
The striking similarity between these two juxtapositions sheds light on why other 
attempts to find illustrative cases and real life evidence of the practical determinacy of citizen 
"deliberation" will tend to come up short.  Many of these attempts to banish the strategic realm 
of the "planner" and voter from the vision of citizen deliberation also adopt the same kind of 
perspective (to refer back to Haugeland's analysis) on citizen reasoning and decision-making that 
is occasioned by a commitment to deductivism.  Reliably and consistently, one can expect to find 
in certain locations the same properties and structures that eschew the kinds of anticipatory, 
temporally-extended considerations that constitute the "predictive aspect" of real life democratic 
deliberation.  
This last point raises an obvious question, though: Does one actually find such a reliable 
and consistent perspective in work that lends majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices a less central role in deliberative democracy?  In this chapter, I turn to this question not 
only because it is an obvious “follow-up” to this last point, but also because it nicely brings this 
project full circle by returning to the way I described my approach in the first chapter.  It is a 
diagnosis that attempts to move deliberative democracy towards a more “suggestive” method of 
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inquiry for assessing its practicality than has thus far been the case by looking at a pervasive 
assumption among deliberative democrats and their critics: Deductivism in its various varieties, 
including the classic juxtaposition become democratic deliberation and majority rule.  Before I 
actually explore particular works by deliberative democrats for evidence of such a reliable and 
consistent, “deductivist” perspective, some work must first be done to set up a heuristic 
framework for “ferreting” it out.  After all, as the final section of the previous chapter disclosed, 
the explanatory perspective of their project is one that moves from (I) “ballpark” (CPAR.ii) 
analogical reasoning to (II) more fine-grained analysis (CPAR.iii). 
 
A Helpful Analogy for Ferreting Out Deductivism 
In the first chapter of this project, I claimed to be developing an alternative approach to 
earlier work on the indeterminacy worry.  Where others have adopted apologetic or critical 
approaches, my own approach was to be a diagnostic one.  By this description, I meant to convey 
that my own approach seeks to challenge the terms of the debate not as a way to deflate its 
motivating concern about practical determinacy, but rather so as to suggest that the two sides of 
the debate rest on a faulty assumption.  That assumption, I explained, is the assumed 
juxtaposition between citizen deliberation and majority rule procedures and their associated 
practices.  Above, I have developed my “deliberative outlets proposal” as a way to demonstrate 
that once majority rule procedures and their associated practices are recognized for their real 
deliberative significance, the indeterminacy worry can be tackled with greater facility than ever 
before.  Instead of suggesting that the indeterminacy is not as bad as it looks (i.e., the apologetic 
approach), or that political ideals should not be concerned with practicality, let alone worry about 
it (i.e, the critical approach), I instead tried to show how incorporating majority rule procedures 
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centrally into the vision of deliberative democracy overcomes the indeterminacy worry by 
achieving hitherto unrecognized levels of efficiency, paraconsistency, and “mental blending” in 
real political deliberation. 
In the last section of the previous chapter, I brought together two of the major discussions 
pursued above regarding voting and probabilistic reasoning (referenced as “I” and “II,” 
respectively) by showing that these two discussions themselves make an analogous point.  Both 
of these discussions were concerned to restore the anticipatory dimension of real life politics to 
the vision of deliberative democracy, where it often goes ignored.  In drawing this analogy 
between these two major discussions (I-II), though, an obvious question has now arisen.  Does 
this anticipatory dimension associated with voting and probabilistic reasoning actually go 
ignored by deliberative democrats?  Is there actually a reliable, consistent tendency to ignore this 
dimension of political life among deliberative democrats?  In short, is there really something like 
a “deductivist tendency” to ignore this dimension in its institutional (I) and logical (II) forms?  
Of course, to answer this question is to pick up a loose end from the first chapter’s elaboration of 
my diagnostic approach to the indeterminacy worry.  Analogously, both questions aim at the 
same practical result: Can it be shown that indeterminacy arises in actual instances of democratic 
theorizing because of a faulty assumption now diagnosed under the name of the deductivist 
tendency? 
To see a deductivist tendency at work in democratic theory broadly speaking, I would 
like to first explore an analogy (which only seems fitting) drawn from Hannes Leitgeb’s work in 
epistemology.437  In doing so, my intention is to set up a heuristic device with which to better 
ferret out the deductivist tendency in deliberative democratic theory.  The analogy will provide, 
as it were, a helpful reminder in later sections for recalling the striking difference of explanatory 
                                                
437 Leitgeb, Hannes (2014). “The Stability Theory of Belief.” Philosophical Review. Vol. 123: 2, 163. 
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perspective that is obtained when deductivism is held in check, as particular works of theory by 
deliberative democrats are assessed for their latent deductivism. 
Like politics, science is filled with cases in which decision-makers are faced with the 
indeterminacy that arises in the face of inconsistent information that must be dealt with despite 
restricted amounts of time and energy.  For instance, in one case study from the 19th century, the 
theoretical system of mechanics inaugurated by Isaac Newton’s Principia came into conflict with 
a set of hypotheses and observational data relevant to the acceleration of the moon.  If scientists 
were to believe what observational data about the moon made evident, they had to choose 
between abandoning their commitment to either Newtonian mechanics, or to a set of hypotheses 
with which it had become associated.  As Hannes Leitgeb points out, this indeterminacy facing 
scientists of the day could easily be construed as a classical case of one particular kind of 
indeterminacy: The underdetermination of theory by evidence.438  When evidence forces a 
choice between two theoretical commitments, a kind of practical indeterminacy arises, best 
captured by questions such as the following: What is a scientist to do?  How will future 
experimental work be planned?  What position will shape practical and experimental efforts in 
the face of this informational complexity, let alone the limited time and energy scientists have to 
tackle it? 
However, the real life scientists who actually faced this indeterminacy did not find 
themselves faced with an intractable problem.  Before their very eyes stood not a collection of 
abstract considerations, each equally weighted, yet in conflict.  Rather, no serious practical 
indeterminacy arose at all.  How to practically plan “What a scientist is to do next” and “How to 
shape future practical and experimental efforts” was not practically indeterminate in real 
historical events.  Why?  Paraphrasing an earlier analysis of this historical moment of merely 
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apparent practical indeterminacy, Leitgeb writes, “this apparent instance of underdetermination 
vanishes as soon as one takes into account subjective probabilities,” or “what might be called the 
‘ideal astrophysicist’s degrees of belief at the time.”439  In other words, in this moment of 
apparent practical indeterminacy, a clear way to determine a practical course of action presented 
itself because these scientists brought into the context of deliberation a set of prior probabilities.   
Before the deliberation itself began, these Newtonian scientists already had some prior 
set of expectations about the probability of any of the relevant considerations being worthy of 
commitment.  In other words, these real life scientists began to deliberate in response to this 
apparent conflict between the associated hypotheses and Newtownian mechanics proper with a 
set of prior expectations about the comparative probabilities of each.  In comparison with one 
another, Newtonian mechanics was expected, or anticipated (read: phenomenology) to be so 
much more probable than the set of attending hypotheses, that when observational data presented 
a conflict between the two, the scientists readily knew what to do.  They simply updated their 
beliefs and stuck to what they already believed (prior to the moment of deliberation) to be more 
probable.   
In a word, Newtonian mechanics was more worthy of belief than the set of hypotheses 
with which it only now came into conflict in light of new observations about the moon, because 
of prior probabilities.  Practical indeterminacy never erupted and Newtownian mechanics never 
provided a vague vision of the physical world when these question-raising observations about the 
moon came in.  The reason was simple.  The context of deliberation here, which deals with how 
these scientists should respond to the new observations about the moon, possessed a 
phenomenological, anticipatory dimension.  The scientists already believed that it was more 
probable that Newtownian mechanics should be believed than the conjunction of the set of 
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auxiliary hypotheses.  The problem was solved before it began by the phenomenology of 
deliberation.  As Leitgeb suggests, one helpful way to express the moral of this story from the 
history of science is by conjoining together our talk of belief with talk of subjective probability 
assessments, or prior probabilities, in a “joint theory of belief and subjective probability” he calls 
the “stability theory of belief.”440   
Leitgeb’s stability theory of belief offers a fascinating resource (read: analog), the details 
of which I cannot explore here.  However, even with these details aside, Leitgeb’s theory is 
worth drawing on because it helps with the present purpose of setting up a heuristic analogy with 
which to locate exemplary instances of the deductivist tendency at work in democratic theory.  In 
this story from the history of science, a way forward past practical indeterminacy was charted 
when the initial description of a conflict among beliefs was replaced with a more nuanced, 
phenomenologically-saturated description that included prior probabilities.  As Leitgeb 
(analogically) describes the difference between these two descriptions, the former, initial 
description was “coarse-grained” in its focus on mere belief, while the second, 
phenomenologically-saturated description was a “fine-grained” version of that coarser 
description.441  The implication of this language, Leitgeb explains, is that “a lot of information is 
being abstracted away” by the coarse-grained language of mere belief.442  That “lot of 
information” is precisely the probabilistic dimension that solved the practical indeterminacy in 
this example from the history of science.  To talk of mere belief is to talk in “coarse-grained” 
terms that abstracts away from the more precise, “fine-grained” terms in which real life decisions 
are made in a determinate way, despite apparent practical indeterminacy. 
                                                
440 Leitgeb 2014, 165. 
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442 ibid, a related point is made from a neurophilosophical perspective in Churchland 2012, 262, and used to critique 
not only logical empiricism, but much contemporary philosophy as well, which remains fixated on the “low-
dimension” level of human cognition. 
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It is not hard to see how Leitgeb’s language and analysis sets up a helpful, heuristic 
analogy with which to probe democratic theory for a latent deductivist tendency.  Any time we 
find ourselves facing an apparent practical indeterminacy in human affairs, we should ask 
whether we are either (1) Adopting a “coarse-grained” perspective on those human affairs, as we 
did when we first described the Newtonian scientists as confronting a problematic 
underdetermination among mere beliefs, or (2) Adopting a “fine-grained” perspective on those 
human affairs, as when we allowed the prior probabilities those scientists brought with them to 
supplement the underdetermination of their beliefs with a probabilistic dimension (i.e., the 
phenomenology of deliberation, or entrenched systematicity).  More succinctly stated, Leitgeb’s 
analysis provides an analogy with which to reveal whether an apparent case of practical 
indeterminacy is the result of a pre-probabilistic, pre-phenomenological perspective on the parts 
of those interpreting it, or not.  In this sense, the analogy is “heuristic” because it helps shed light 
on whether we may be labeling a deliberative scenario as rife with practical indeterminacy 
simply because we have adopted too coarse-grained a perspective on it.  The relevant analogy, in 
other words, discloses what our interpretation of indeterminacy often takes for granted, namely: 
An assumed pre-probabilistic description of the scenario.  For sake of convenience, I will refer to 
this analogy as the Newtonian scientists analogy.   
 
The Relevance of the Analogy to All Factors in Deliberation 
While the analogy itself has to do with the indeterminacy that results from a pre-
probabilistic, pre-phenomenological description of those beliefs that factor into deliberation, it is 
worth noting at this point that the same point can be made with regard to any factor in 
deliberation.  For instance, we are able not only to demand a “joint theory,” as Leitgeb does, 
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with regard to belief, but also with regard to other factors in deliberation, including preference, 
value, etc.443 Indeed, as Richard Jeffrey elaborated on this approach to human affairs, any factor 
in deliberation needs to be considered from a “joint” perspective that treats prior probabilities as 
part and parcel of the very factors themselves.444  Prior probabilities are not just more data to 
which a “unitary faculty of reason” is applied so as to produce “good judgment” as a “successful 
outcome.”445  To reiterate, they are not just more data to be lumped in with the other 
considerations that factor into judgment (e.g., beliefs, preferences, values, principles, 
observations, facts, sensory data, etc.).  They are transformative considerations in decision-
making that change the form and practical significance of the other factors in deliberation. 
A view of deliberation that fails to recognize this transformative role for probability runs 
afoul of the fact that what I have been calling the “probabilistic dimension,” or phenomenology 
of deliberation, is a dimension in the most thorough and penetrating sense of the term.  Just as the 
vertical dimension makes little sense without the horizontal dimension, and just as color makes 
little sense without vividness, so too these factors in deliberation make little sense as sources of 
decision-making in a practically real manner, without the dimension of prior probabilities. We 
make the kinds of decisions we do, about the kinds of things to which they relate, because we 
know how those kinds of things typically react when we interact with them in certain types of 
ways.446  As a result, we believe based on what we assign as prior probabilities to how (1) those 
kinds of things, will react to (2) kinds of interaction on our part with them.  Similarly, we prefer 
and desire specific outcomes based on what we expect to typically be the case when certain kinds 
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446 See the discussion of Haugeland’s work in the fifth chapter. 
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of behavior ensue (e.g., it is less probable, and therefore much preferred to make a winning move 
in a professional league’s championship game over the more probable event of making a winning 
move in a game on the local playground).  Belief without “ballpark” priors, preference without 
prior expectedness, values without a sense of how they are predicted to influence our flourishing 
… none of these is practically significant to us in a real, determinative sense, apart from the 
probabilistic dimension of life. 
Another analogy may help clarify the thrust of the current point about the transformative 
role prior probability assignments play in lending all deliberative factors their significance.  In 
related work on the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl, Nicholas de Warren has 
stressed that we often fail to see what I am here calling the probabilistic dimension, because of a 
misleading metaphor about experience the metaphor of a storehouse.447  As experience flows by, 
we often think of ourselves as transferring what we currently are experiencing into our memory, 
where it is stored.  When we experience the traffic at a busy intersection at the moment before a 
traffic accident, we visualize it with an image that is then transferred into our memory.  During 
the accident, we do the same.  After the accident, we can then summon these visualized images 
from our memory.  To help us think about this framework for understanding experience, we 
routinely talk about it as a flow of distinct experiences that are “stored,” or transferred into a 
“storehouse” the way a current issue of a magazine might be transferred into storage for later use 
by a historian or collector.  
On the one hand, the metaphor of the “storehouse” helps us understand that present 
experiences are not lost forever; they are retained in some sense.  However, Warren points out 
that the “storehouse” metaphor is misleading.  What is retained is not our experience of the 
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present exactly as it is presently experienced.  Retention of the present is not like a current issue 
of a magazine that is simply transferred, exactly as it is, into storage.  Instead, as Warren 
explains, retention works by “de-objectifying” the present, transforming it as it “stores” it in 
memory.448  To better express this point, I would suggest a competing metaphor to the 
storehouse, namely, the process of transduction or the use of transducers.  Transduction refers to 
any process in which something is converted in form, i.e., trans-formed, during a larger sequence 
of activity.   
For instance, to “send money” to a friend in a far and distant land with a different 
currency, my monetary units must undergo transduction as they are transformed both from one 
currency into another, and from the raw material I currently possess (e.g., paper U.S. dollars) to 
an electronic form that can be sent overseas rapidly to a different bank, where they may undergo 
further transduction by being turned into the paper version of that far and distant land’s own 
currency.  Unlike the storehouse metaphor, the “transducer” metaphor makes it explicit that the 
transfer being made is carried out not by leaving the involved entities exactly as they are, but 
rather by transforming them along the way.  Unlike a magazine simply sent into a storehouse for 
later recall, the transduction that happens during a money transfer requires a change in form to 
make the involved entities practically useful.  Without being changed into an electronic form, my 
paper U.S. dollars are practically useless or of limited relevance to solving my friend’s crisis 
overseas.  Sending the paper money in a paper form will be slow, prone to interference through 
theft, and very likely to confront obstacles when received and used to pay debts overseas (i.e., 
not accepted for payment).  The transduction of my paper monetary units makes them practically 
significant. 
These two competing metaphors – the “storehouse” versus the “transducer” – are helpful 
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in driving home the point made in the previous paragraph about the transformative role of prior 
probability assignments in our use of any deliberative factor whatsoever.  Regardless of which 
specific factor in deliberation we are dealing with (e.g., preferences, beliefs, values, principles, 
etc.), those factors are practically useless without transduction into a probabilistic form.  In other 
words, unless one admits that these factors in deliberation are enriched along a probabilistic 
dimension, one fails to see how they are practically significant as drivers of decision-making and 
action.  Above, I developed numerous arguments and insights to motivate this claim about the 
close association between practical significance in decision-making and probabilistic 
significance or the “predictive aspect” in deliberation.  For instance, as Candace Vogler 
maintains, we only deliberate about what to do because we believe it ought to be a stage along 
the way to action in a given context; we believe our deliberation should be part of a larger 
process in which we formulate a response to a problem that we predict will be better thanks to 
our deliberative efforts, than it would be otherwise.  Even our most radically deductivist 
deliberation presumes this sense of predicted impact on deliberation.  If we adopt deductive, non-
ampliative reasoning instead of inductive, ampliative reasoning, it may be on account of the 
logical rigor of deductive reasoning, but it must also be on account of the predicted effect 
deductive reasoning has on the action its inferential conclusion will ultimately initiate in the 
world.  Deliberation without prediction is not practical, simply put. 
The metaphors of the “storehouse” and the “transducer” are helpful because they make 
this point still more vivid.  Take the “storehouse” metaphor and see what it would imply for 
democratic deliberation.  We might assume each citizen is a “storehouse” of beliefs, principles, 
values, assumptions, preferences, etc.  When citizens deliberate together, they “exchange 
reasons” (to use a popular phrase among democratic theorists) by taking some of their own 
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beliefs, etc. and transferring them into the “storehouse” of one another.  Citizens then step back, 
recall their newly enriched “storehouses” of deliberative information (i.e., beliefs, values, etc.) 
and figure out what they ultimately believe ought to be done.  For instance, citizens may recall 
what a commentator said about the current state of the national debt, but then recall another 
statement about the national debt learned from a government official, and decide to ignore the 
commentator’s input to their individual “storehouses” of deliberative content.  The nexus of 
beliefs, values, principles, preferences, etc. in their individual “storehouses” of memory offer the 
decision point from which action will ultimately emerge in a rationally guided way.  
By contrast, the “transducer” metaphor adds another plane to this nexus.  Instead of 
simply piling up information in a “storehouse” that can be neatly set together to determine what 
stays and what goes as decisive considerations in our deliberation, the transducer metaphor 
suggests that prior to, during, and after deliberation, information is constantly being transformed 
into and out of various forms.  When a commentator communicates to the citizenry some belief 
about the national debt, it does not simply enter a “storehouse” where it comes into confrontation 
with prior beliefs about the national debt.  Instead, the commentator’s communicated belief 
meets a prior understanding of the national debt that is present in a different format … or on a 
different plane or form, to use the language I drew upon earlier.  For instance, some citizens 
might meet a politician informally and then find that the politician makes a statement about 
specific demographic trends in the local population.  When they hear this statement, the citizens 
are not going to find it set into neat and tidy proximity with what they have heard earlier about 
local demographics.   
Continuing with this example, let us assume that the citizens find the politician’s 
statement about demographic trends jarring.  In doing so, they recoil at the politician’s statement 
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not because it conflicts with prior beliefs or statements about demographic trends.  Rather, their 
response occurs because they understand what the politician is saying to be highly improbable 
based on “what they know” in a way that resists the tidy sentential formulation of a statement or 
belief.  Though this “knowledge” is resistant to quick and tidy communication to the politician in 
the form of a sentential expression, they might nonetheless communicate it through qualitative 
means for describing the prior probabilities they bring to the conversation.  For instance, one of 
the citizens may mention a famous piece of local news that – as an analogy for what they all 
knew to be probable prior to the conversation – conveys the force of that prior understanding, 
despite the fact that it exists on a different plane from the linguistic statement of the politician.  If 
the politician’s statement expressed worry about the crippling effects of a change in the local 
birth rates, for example, one citizen may mention the well-publicized local fundraiser to expand 
the local hospital’s nursery capacity to analogically express why prior probability assignments 
make the politician’s statement so jarring.  This prior understanding of probabilities is not 
composed out of knowledge about local affairs; rather, the local fundraiser offers a way to 
present that understanding.449   
The metaphor of transduction is helpful here because it underlines yet again my claim 
that factors in deliberation (including even communicated statements themselves) gain their 
significance for deliberation through a transformative encounter with prior probability 
assignments. If citizens are seen as “transducers,” nothing presently expressed during citizen 
deliberation meets head on, or “collides” with anything of like kind that is understood by way of 
prior probability assignments.  Expressed beliefs from one citizen cannot – except by way of 
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transduction – collide with the beliefs of other citizens that are understood to be practically 
significant prior to that communication.  When some politicians “take a stand” and argue for the 
relevance of particular values or principles in a current crisis, the community does not find those 
values and principles transferred to a “storehouse” of prior values and principles with which they 
may or may not collide or resonate (or both).  As “transducers,” the community has a 
complicated task ahead when they hear the argument from such politicians.  Many may find that 
the politicians are espousing values and principles that probably play a counterproductive role in 
moments of crisis.  This finding, though, requires taking prior probability assignments that can 
often only be expressed qualitatively by analogy and using them to process the argument from 
the politicians. 
With the “storehouse” and “transduction” metaphors in hand, we can gain a better grasp 
on the reach of Leitgeb’s analysis and his Newtonian scientists analogy.  From a coarse-grained 
perspective, the scientists in his analogy seem to confront a collision among considerations that 
ought to factor into what they do in the laboratory or what they write in articles or books.  They 
must choose between two sets of information that are squarely placed beside one another in their 
considerations, much like the “pros and cons” one would draw up in a list to decide what to do.  
This information has collided in the field of deliberation.  If each scientist’s memory is a 
“storehouse,” upon learning of the recent observations about the moon, those observations would 
be transferred into a storage space along with what they already believed about Newtonian 
mechanics and its associated hypotheses in ways that would produce a conflict among the 
contents of the storehouse.  Like transferring water for storage in a space with highly water-
soluble materials, something therefore has to give … but the question is, “What?”  How will they 
figure out what to abandon given limited time, the conflict in the storehouse, and the varying 
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personal histories of each scientist?  In short, what will they do in the face of practical 
indeterminacy? 
However, from the fine-grained perspective of a “joint theory,” each scientist is a 
“transducer,” and as a result, prior probability assignments have always already lent to 
Newtonian mechanics a practical significance in planning experiments and writing articles and 
books, which stands in marked contrast to how the associated hypotheses are understood.  Much 
as the citizens find a politician’s statement about demographics “jarring” because they already 
have prior ballpark probabilities with which to understand demographic trends in the local area, 
so too the same occurs with the Newtonian scientists.  New information is not simply on an equal 
footing with old information; which is to say, new information is not simply transferred into a 
“storehouse” where it is set on the same plane of existence or significance as old information.  A 
dimension of probability fills-out any consideration that has practical importance and makes it 
truly practical in doing so.  Consequently, when the observations about the moon become 
available, the Newtonian scientists are not at a loss about how to proceed.  As “transducers,” the 
way forward in planning experiments and writing up research is practically determinate.  
Newtonian mechanics is overwhelmingly preferred on account of long-accumulated (i.e., 
entrenched) prior probability assignments.   
 
A Note on the Systematicity of this Analogy 
As I mentioned earlier, I have explored Leitgeb’s analysis of the Newtonian scientists 
analogy because I believe it can serve a heuristic purpose, namely: To help ferret out evidence 
that the deductivist tendency runs rife in deliberative democratic theory, which in turn causes the 
deliberative vision of democracy to seem practically indeterminate.  In presenting Leitgeb’s 
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analysis of the Newtonian scientists analogy, I have used a number of further analogies to clarify 
its underlying insights.  The “coarse vs. fine grained perspectives” mentioned above draw on 
familiar prior experience to better understand the unfamiliar point Leitgeb tries to make with 
both his stability theory of belief and his own presentation of the Newtonian scientists analogy.  
The “storehouse vs. transducer” metaphors are still another set of contrasting analogs with which 
to further entrench an understanding of Leitgeb’s work.  To the extent that these metaphors 
summon prior experience to further understanding of the unfamiliar point Leitgeb tries to make, 
they are yet another contribution to deepening our understanding of deliberation.  However, as I 
have tried to stress throughout this project, when we use analogies this way, we do so because 
they capture an incredibly rich, systematic grasp of a domain that would otherwise elude easy 
sentential formulation or casual description.  Before I turn to actually drawing on Leitgeb’s 
analysis and these related analogs to shed light on the deductivist tendency in deliberative 
democratic theory, I would therefore like to briefly reiterate this point by commenting on how 
this vision of analogy is operative even in this last case of the Newtonian scientists.  In doing so, 
the ground will be even better prepared for investigating the deductivist tendency in deliberative 
democratic theories. 
Brian Skyrms has developed a “theory of dynamic deliberation” that is dedicated to 
making and formally proving an analogous point to the one made by Leitgeb’s analysis and the 
analogs with which I have tried to clarify its meaning.450  According to Skyrms, deliberation is 
“dynamic” when it uses a process of informational feedback to move from the state of indecision 
to the time of decision, which is defined as the moment when the “probability of doing the 
selected act becomes virtually one.”451  Here, informational feedback occurs when instead of 
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moving completely from an evaluation of our options during deliberation, directly to action itself, 
we take an alternative and roundabout approach.  Instead of simply evaluating our options and 
acting on the one with the greatest weight in our considerations (i.e., most desirable, the duty-
bound option, etc.), we feed that evaluation back into the set of prior probabilities with which we 
first entered deliberation.  When the probabilities meet the initial evaluation, how we ranked the 
options may change dramatically.  More importantly, even if the change is not enough to identify 
a single best outcome, we can repeat this process in which stages of evaluation are updated with 
regard to prior probabilities over and over until a single decisive outcome is identified and action 
can follow. 
For example, I may prefer a good espresso with whipped cream to a cup of tea on the 
menu at a new local establishment.  However, instead of moving completely from that preference 
directly to ordering the espresso, I may reflect on what I already understand to be the probability 
of getting a good espresso with whipped cream at a new establishment.  The cream tends 
(probabilistic) to be of disappointing richness, I may admit.  Tea, on the other hand, is also 
highly variable because it is so often over steeped.  Still, I may realize, the risk of over steeped 
tea is far less than the risk of encountering disappointingly thin and watery whipped cream.  In 
light of these expectations about the relative probability of getting good whipped cream versus 
over steeped tea at an unknown establishment, my initial preference for ordering the espresso 
drink rapidly shrinks in desirability and a cup of tea becomes the single, indeed obvious choice.   
Moreover, as I mentioned in the last paragraph, this process in which expectations are 
used to update preferences can often occur across multiple iterations.  From a larger number of 
desirable beverages on a menu, for example, updating our preferences once with our 
expectations may not be enough to determine an outcome.  We may get a rough sense of what is 
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preferred and then update those preferences based on prior probabilities of actually getting what 
is preferred at the local establishment.  Three or four beverages may still seem to be close 
contenders.  We may think that the tea, the espresso with whipped cream, the lemonade, and the 
mineral water all appeal.  The expectations of getting any of these may reshape our preferences 
for ordering them at that given time into a clear lead for the lemonade and the tea.  From among 
these two options, we may then carefully weigh them up against each other, considering the 
relative advantages and set-backs each has to offer across a vast number of variables, including 
hydration, energizing vigor, calories, sensitivity to current temperatures, etc.  After this second 
round of evaluation, we can, yet again, “feed back” the new preference among these two options 
into our expectations to generate yet another updated perspective on what is to be done … 
repeating this process over and over until the probability of us acting becomes “virtually one” as 
a determinate outcome emerges. 
As these examples are meant to reveal, when Skyrms allies deliberation with information 
feedback processes, he means to highlight the systematic role played by repetition in the way 
prior probability assignments can factor into deliberation.  Recall the way I cast systematicity in 
terms not only of relations among properties in a domain, but also relations among relations 
(meta-relations), and relations among those meta-relations (meta-meta-relations), and on and on 
to the degree of n, with which we can refer to a large number of such meta-meta-etc.-relations as 
n-relational.  Recall also that I cast this n-relational systematicity in terms not only of inter-level 
systematicity (IL), but also inter-temporal (IT) systematicity as well.  A meta-relation can obtain 
not only because there is a relation among the relations in a domain at any given time t (i.e., as a 
synchronous relation), but also among relations that obtain across a number of different times, 
such as t’, t’’, t’’’, etc. (i.e., as diachronic relations).  Finally, recall as well the use of the term 
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“entrenchment” above.  Similarly, what Skyrms is observing is that over time (i.e., inter-
temporally, or IT), meta-relations obtain among the stages of deliberation in which evaluation 
and updating with prior probabilities alternate to eventually arrive at a determinate outcome 
about what is to be done, with entrenched relations often leading the way.  As Skyrms observes, 
“the very process of deliberation may generate information that is relevant to the evaluation” of 
the options under consideration, because that process is systematically related by a repetitious 
feedback loop that stretches across time (IT) and eventually entrenches an outcome.452  
In his formal models of real deliberative scenarios and artificial ones alike, Skyrms has 
shown a number of fascinating results that occur when we pay attention to the power of this 
inter-temporal, entrenched systematicity.  Deliberative scenarios that decision theorists famously 
assume to be indeterminate or to be suggestive of one outcome, actually yield different outcomes 
when deliberation updates itself with prior probabilities repeatedly.  Indeed, otherwise 
unintuitive decisive states of equilibrium can be achieved when we temporally extend 
deliberative episodes.  Borrowing a phrase from the theorist David Axelrod, Skyrms describes 
such a perspective on deliberation as one that invokes the “shadow of the future,” which is to 
say, what happens when a deliberative episode is “indefinitely repeated.”453  Seen from this 
perspective, classic deliberative scenarios in political theory, such as the infamous “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma” are transformed into different kinds of problems, with very different results.454   
While it may be interesting to survey some of these formal results and how they upset 
conventional perspectives on these deliberative scenarios, for present purposes what is more 
important is to note the way Skyrms’ work highlights the astonishing changes in the very nature 
                                                
452 ibid. 
453 Skyrms, Brian (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 5. 
454 Skyrms 2004, 6. 
   321 
of the problems that occupy the attention of political philosophers, when the “shadow of the 
future” is allowed to hover over their investigations.  When an episode of deliberation is repeated 
“indefinitely,” or even until the probability of action approaches “1,” either way … space is 
provided for recognizing that an inter-temporal relation that extends across episodes of 
deliberation not only exists, but also plays a role in selecting the decisive outcome.  
Thus, to return to Leitgeb’s analysis of the Newtonian scientists analogy, what that 
analogy vividly captures is just this inter-temporal dimension and its practical significance.  The 
Newtonian scientists avoid practical indeterminacy in planning their experiments and writing up 
their research findings because their deliberation about what to do in the face of the new 
observations about the moon is part of a sequence of related episodes of deliberation, which are 
inter-temporally entrenched and systematically bound together by the “shadow of the future.”  
The scientists are at no loss for what to do because they have prior probability assignments with 
which to confront the problem and from which – through repeated updating with those 
assignments in the past as well as in the present course of deliberation – an obvious and decisive 
response to the new observations follows.  In this way, Leitgeb’s analysis of the Newtonian 
scientists analogy offers a helpful heuristic device for vividly and effectively communicating a 
highly sophisticated, inter-temporally systematic relation that plays a crucial role in human 
deliberation and decision-making (i.e., the entrenched systematicity identified in my account of 
analogical reasoning with CPAR.i).   
 
Deductivism Run Amok 
The task of diagnosing a deductivist tendency in deliberative democratic theory can now 
be stated more vividly, systematically, and concisely, thanks to Leitgeb’s analysis: To what 
   322 
extent have deliberative democrats encountered problematic practical indeterminacy in their 
theories because they have failed to recognize the “shadow of the future,” unlike the Newtonian 
scientists in Leitgeb’s analysis?  Below, I will organize responses to this question according to 
the three variations on the indeterminacy worry with which I have continually structured this 
project. 
 
1. Pragmatic Indeterminacy 
 Deliberative democrats themselves often acknowledge the pragmatic indeterminacy that 
faces their vision of democratic politics.  The act of deliberation is typically seen to be extremely 
demanding when it comes to time and energy.  The problem is that the citizenry seems to be 
overtaxed as it is, therefore making the prospects for democratic deliberation appear unrealistic 
and implausible.  As Thomas Christiano writes, “Few have the time and energy for putting a 
great deal of effort into political discussion and reflection.”455  The problem is exacerbated by 
“The intricacies of law and policy and the empirical research necessary to justify policy as well 
as the reflection necessary to put together packages of law and policy,” which “are significantly 
too complex and extensive for most citizens to have a good grasp of them.”456  Democratic 
theorists frequently say as much themselves.  The complexity and amount of relevant 
information in modern political deliberation is such that the hope for “the people” ever uniformly 
drawing upon it seems quaint and out of date.  The issue for deliberative democracy, Christiano 
stresses, is not that citizens are lazy or inept, but rather that they have full-time jobs and 
households to maintain, after which “they have some entitlement to some time off from hard 
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work.  And politics and political issues are hard work.”457  Each day only has so many hours, 
Christiano observes, and after working hard at work and at home, what little is left is deservedly 
reserved by and large for “time off.”  Recognizing this reality, Christiano maintains, “Even 
someone who is morally committed to good politics would experience serious limits to their 
capacity to read up on and reflect on the many difficult and complex issues that arise in a 
democratic society.”458 
 Earlier, I described the motivation behind this problem as the pragmatic variation on the 
indeterminacy worry.  It just seems unrealistic to expect the hard-working citizens of 
contemporary societies to have much in the way of time and energy left over for the hard work 
that is politics.  The answer to this problem, Christiano can be seen to stress above, is not moral 
exhortation to push citizens to invest more of these precious resources into political life.  Instead, 
Christiano observes, the result is a “division of labor” in society, roughly between the “experts” 
and the non-expert “ordinary citizens.”459  As Christiano points out, “The evaluation of policy 
includes many different elements such as expert knowledge in the sciences, expertise in the 
current state of play in law and policy, expertise in how to achieve the compromises necessary to 
make legislation, the local knowledge of those who are especially affected by legislation and the 
participation of ordinary citizens in the choice of the aims of policy.”460  For any given option on 
the agenda of deliberation, expertise seems crucial along a number of dimensions and in ways 
that not even a single expert, let alone the ordinary citizen, is likely to comprehensively grasp.   
However, if the evaluation of political decisions includes so many different points of 
expertise, a problem is created for deliberative democracy: How can the citizens be in the 
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“driver’s seat in society”?461  The greater the shift towards acknowledging the importance of 
expertise in political deliberation, the greater the shift away from a democratic politics in which 
“the people” actually play a role in shaping the laws under which they must live.  Democracy can 
only become “deliberative” by decreasing the role of the people in politics.  Well aware of this 
challenge, Christiano proposes two responses.  First, he suggests a division of inquiry with which 
to categorize the respective roles of the ordinary citizens and experts.  This division of inquiry 
contains two categories under which deliberation occurs: (1) “Basic aims,” which are the non-
instrumental values that establish what society is to pursue; and (2) The “translation” of basic 
aims into practice, which is to say, the task of figuring out the means for “best achieving” the 
basic aims established under the first category of deliberation.462  With these categories in place, 
Christiano explains how the pragmatic indeterminacy posed by the need for expert knowledge in 
modern politics can be dealt with.  The citizenry is to focus on the first category of deliberation, 
or “basic aims,” while various classes of experts focus on the second category of deliberation, 
namely, the selection of means for translating those aims into practice. 
What does this proposal look like?  According to Christiano, expertise is less essential to 
selecting the basic aims of society.  Whether these aims work as constraints on what may be 
pursued (e.g., the aim to not live in an intolerant society), or whether they function as goals to be 
pursued (e.g., no citizens should go without food), either way they are the topic of the ordinary 
citizen’s deliberation.  Citizens deliberate about these basic aims largely by assessing how they 
should be “packaged together.”463  For instance, should a constraint on intolerance be packaged 
with an absolute requirement for freedom of speech?  As Christiano understands this category of 
deliberation, it is less dependent on specialized knowledge from the social sciences, “Citizens are 
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capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values 
and of their interests.”464   
Though they retain this capacity, more specialized groups in the division of labor in 
society play a role in this category of deliberation nonetheless, as political parties, interest groups 
and activist groups, as well as opinion leaders all work together to help craft the packages of 
aims the society holds dear.  In this way, “Citizen deliberation about aims takes place through 
these processes over many years and culminates in elections in which citizens choose candidates 
or parties that represent the packages of aims they want the political system to pursue.”465  
Furthermore, legislators and politicians work hard to negotiate these packages of aims, through 
compromise and bargaining, “to form workable majorities in the legislature.”466   
Under the second category of deliberation, various groups of experts work to figure out 
the best means for any given package of aims.  Some of these experts are actually the legislators, 
who along with the administrative officials in the government, work to develop laws and turn 
abstract law into “actual policy.”467  An additional “network of intellectual labourers,” which 
“spans the universities, political parties, political staffers, interest group associations, and parts of 
the administration” contains experts in “economics, sociology, law, political science, and the 
natural sciences” who influence both the crafting and evaluation of laws and policy as well as the 
process by which policy-making and execution are monitored.468  These experts play an essential 
role in democracy, Christiano maintains, because they “discuss the extent to which the various 
aims of citizens can be met and what kinds of trade-offs are necessary and how to achieve the 
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aims.”469  Here, questions of “means to ends” and “trade-offs” are the main concern.  As 
Christiano concedes, though, “The difficult question here is how does all this sophisticated 
expert knowledge influence the process of decision-making when the decision-makers 
themselves are not experts?”470 
Christiano adopts a stance that other deliberative democrats have similarly advocated: 
“The basic process of influence has to be essentially a kind of filter that separates out theories 
that have some substantial support within the expert community from those that do not.”471  
Through a variety of “mechanisms and institutions,” Christiano believes that the expert 
knowledge necessary to making democracy truly deliberative plays the role of eliminating 
options.  Citizen politicians and ordinary citizens alike find that this network of experts often 
“rules out certain theories as possible bases of policy-making and permits choice among a certain 
small subset of theories for policy-making” in the process by which they supply advice about the 
best means for achieving the basic aims over which the citizenry deliberates separately.472   
Christiano’s second response is to identify how citizens can influence this network of 
experts.  He cites three principal forms of influence along these lines.  The first is that in 
deliberating about basic aims of the society, citizens can “play some important role in 
determining what the aims of scientific research are.”473  Interest groups and activist 
organizations often provide support for (e.g., funding) and attraction to experts in different fields, 
and in doing so, play a role in determining research agendas.  The second form of influence is 
that the advocacy and expressive efforts of citizen groups can often bring to the attention of 
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experts “distinct hypotheses to articulate and test.”474  Third, citizens can influence the network 
of experts by “checking on the defensibility of expert knowledge,” looking for “anomalies in 
theories” based on “long experience with certain kinds of social structures.”475   
In these ways, the scientific pursuits carried out within the network of experts are not 
only influenced by the citizenry, but even benefit from its influence as well.  The “parochialism, 
group-think, and cognitive bias” that often “distort the process of the production of knowledge” 
are reduced when the larger citizenry articulates the conditions under which they live and to 
which social science in particular must be sensitive to maintain its commitment to the use of “a 
lot of different sources of evidence.”476  Through these two responses, Christiano believes the 
political system can be reliant on expertise without becoming incompatible with democratic 
ideals.477 
In light of Christiano’s two responses to pragmatic indeterminacy of this particular 
variety, it is now worth asking the following question: In what sense can deductivism be 
observed in Christiano’s account, and to what extent does it yield an unsatisfyingly indeterminate 
vision of deliberative democracy?  Christiano’s choice of terms likely raised several immediate 
red flags in light of the above investigation.  First, the description of the political system as one 
that “translates” general, context-transcending “basic aims” into particular contexts of policy and 
practice clearly mirrors the principled model of deliberation with which I identified deductivism 
earlier.  A discussion of generalities comes first, with politics aimed at the process of making the 
general then fit the particular.  This order is reminiscent of the order of deductive reasoning, 
which moves from the general to the particular as well.  Furthermore, the fact that Christiano 
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separates these two categories of deliberation is important here.  He writes, “The subjects of 
these kinds of deliberations are distinct form the central subject of citizen deliberations.”478  To 
the extent that these two categories are so distinct in their subject matter, Christiano seems to 
suggest that these basic aims do not emerge from prior experiences with the nitty gritty details, 
exemplars, shameful examples, and other analogs of political deliberation.  Furthermore, in 
describing the basic aims as “constraints” on what the experts do in the study, selection, 
implementation, and revision of means, he further underlines the sense in which they are 
generalities that exist prior to the specifics of deliberation.   
This language of constraint not only refers back to his use of the popular suggestion 
among deliberative democrats that specialized parts of the political system work as a “filter” to 
eliminate problematic options from citizen deliberation.  More importantly, it also reflects the 
way in which this deductivist approach to pragmatic indeterminacy ends up replicating the very 
practical indeterminacy it originally meant to overcome.  Like other deliberative democrats for 
whom the purpose of deliberation is to use abstract general considerations (e.g., principles, 
values, etc.) to eliminate the options on the table during deliberation, Christiano also finds 
himself forced to admit that his responses to pragmatic indeterminacy ultimately lead to 
underdetermination.  This admission follows a summary description of the filtering role of 
expertise in his vision of democratic deliberation: 
All that is necessary is an external connection between a theory being among the best 
available ones and its adoption by a policy-maker.  So the policy-maker’s decision may 
be truth sensitive in an external sense and there may be a large amount of arbitrariness in 
the choice of policy.  The policy-maker’s decision is not completely unjustified because 
they have reason to think that the theory on which they are operating is well thought of in 
the expert community.479 
 
Being only a filter on the considerations that factor into non-expert deliberation, the specialized 
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efforts of experts do eliminate some options on the basis of their lack of a “truth sensitive” 
property, which is to say, their unjustifiability among experts.  However, as he admits, such 
elimination means that no single option will emerge as best, but only a range of options that are 
not eliminated for total lack of justifiability among experts.  The result is that non-expert 
deliberators have latitude among these options that is not governed by epistemic factors (i.e., 
truth sensitivity), but rather by “a large amount of arbitrariness in the choice of policy.”  This 
description amounts to a classic case of underdetermination.  The deliberative side of democracy 
can constrain the choices made by the people, eliminating some of them.  Nonetheless, the final 
stage of decision-making is not driven by deliberative considerations, really, but rather by 
arbitrary ones. 
 This concession to underdetermination in his response to pragmatic indeterminacy shows 
up in other aspects of Christiano’s account.  Take for instance his description of the process in 
which experts “translate” the basic aims of the citizenry into political decision-making.  In his 
description, he states, “they discuss whether and to what extent the legislation and policy in place 
and in prospect are likely to further the aims of the citizens.”480  This language of “to what 
extent” calls to mind the same indeterminate language that was identified in the accounts of other 
deliberative democrats and to which they themselves often conceded an ultimate form of 
underdetermination in their theories.  For instance, it is reminiscent of Joshua Cohen’s claim that 
democratic deliberation ultimately concludes at an opaque stage of judgment during which 
questions of what is “too far” a divergence from principle and “too deep” an infringement of 
principle are gauged.  As in Cohen’s work (as analyzed in chapter four above), so too here 
Christiano also concedes space to the underdetermination of deliberation by invoking these 
phrases; vague phrases of “too far” and “too deep” and “to what extent” are simply labels for the 
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variety of practical indeterminacy known as underdetermination.  They are not, however, 
contributions to an understanding of how deliberation really effects outcomes. 
 Furthermore, in allocating these kinds of “judgment” questions to the second, expert-
oriented category of deliberation, Christiano also takes ordinary citizens out of the “driver’s seat” 
precisely where the other deliberative democrats surveyed above have identified the point of 
practical indeterminacy in their theory.  In this way, rather than really tackle pragmatic 
indeterminacy, he has used the categories of “basic aims” and “means” to simply outsource 
worries about indeterminacy to the world of expertise.  Far from a contribution to making the 
deliberative view of democracy more practically determinate, then, Christiano’s contribution 
may seem to simply shift the burden to another field of inquiry, namely, the study of expertise 
and inquiry among experts.  Such a characterization would be unfair, though.  Christiano not 
only concedes the ultimately arbitrary nature and underdetermination in which policy choices are 
made, he also makes it explicit that he realizes the problem of pragmatic indeterminacy does not 
dissolve when shifted into the world of experts.  Among experts themselves, he states,  
 
There is a lot of disagreement on the best theories as well as on the implications of the 
best theories in social science.  And there is a lot of disagreement on how to apply the 
best theories to the social phenomena they apply to.  And there is disagreement about the 
empirical support for these theories.  These disagreements make for a great deal of 
complexity in the application of social science to policy.  And they create 
indeterminacy.481 
 
In this passage, Christiano states very clearly his recognition of the indeterminacy that exists in 
the community of experts itself.  Disagreement among experts obtains in such a way that a best 
theory, let alone a best application of that theory to figuring out the best means to a “basic aim,” 
is ultimately underdetermined.  Expertise can filter out some of the theories and applications of 
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theories that are available.  However, as he concludes, “it is indeterminate from the standpoint of 
the community which view is the best view and whether a political decision-making process is 
really using the best means to its ends when applying one theory rather than another.”482  From 
the standpoint of a community of experts as well, indeterminacy obtains with regard to the best 
means for translating the abstract “basic aims” of the citizenry into practical decisions about 
policy.  
 To further underscore the sense in which a deductivist tendency is responsible for this 
relentless indeterminacy, consider what was said about expertise in chapter four above.  When it 
comes to political judgment, research by Philip Tetlock was shown to reveal that the usual 
markers of “expertise” do not track any greater understanding than non-expert dilettantes and 
computer algorithms.  The class of “so-called experts” is worthy of suspicion and should not be 
relied upon as a tracker of improved capacity in making political judgments.  The reason is that 
two styles of reasoning both popular within expert communities obtain, one of which is quite 
good at political judgment, one of which is very bad.  As a result of this divergence, the 
community of experts taken as a whole will – when averaged out – be no better than a dilettante 
or flip of the coin, and indeed much worse than a statistical algorithm.  For sake of clarification, 
it should be recalled that these two styles of reasoning were associated with two analogs, namely, 
the fox and the hedgehog.  The fox used “tricks of the trade,” a wily intelligence about the limits 
of deductive approaches to explanation and prediction, and a humility about the fox’s own 
knowledge when deliberating.  By contrast, the hedgehog was a card-carrying deductivist, 
drawing on “big ideas” and general principles about which the hedgehog was certain and from 
which – by way of non-ampliative inference one might suppose – decisions could be derived 
with the same level of certainty. 
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 Christiano’s definition of expertise shows that a deductivist tendency even informs his 
definition of experts.  Drawing on Alvin Goldman’s understanding of expertise, Christiano 
defines them (in part) as people who have “an amount of true beliefs that is significantly greater 
than ordinary people.”483  Surely, here is a definition of the expert as a hedgehog!  To talk about 
“true beliefs” as part of the measure of expertise is to firmly oppose the fox’s humble uncertainty 
with regard to what is known about a domain of expert knowledge in favor of the hedgehog’s 
certainty.  A foxlike expert would never even go so far as to say that what the expert knows 
about the domain should be described as true beliefs; the fox is too humble and uncertain to 
associate “truth” with what is understood about the domain.  Only a hedgehog would ever use 
those terms to describe expertise.  By contrast, we might instead expect the foxlike expert – 
being the expert who is actually successful in political judgment against the non-expert dilettante 
– to talk less in terms of true beliefs, and more in terms of an ad hoc array of probabilities.  Set 
into contrast with Christiano’s deductivist definition of expertise (largely borrowed from 
Goldman), Christiano’s characterization of expertise reveals that his attempt to address the 
problem of pragmatic indeterminacy is ultimately a deductivist one.   
Further evidence for this claim is revealed by the other part of his definition of expertise, 
which states that experts are defined by “a set of skills that enable them to test the ideas and 
arguments as well as extend the ideas and arguments of the community to new problems and 
objects within the domain.”484  Since the “ideas and arguments” referred to here are defined by 
reference to “the community of persons who have a lot of true primary beliefs concerning the 
subject matter in the domain,” the kinds of reasons that a fox would extend are eliminated – by 
fiat – from the kinds of reasons experts apply to “new problems and objects” in their domain of 
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expertise.  It then comes as no surprise that disagreement – and subsequent indeterminacy – 
abounds even in the second category of deliberation within Christiano’s account.  He has, by fiat, 
excluded the kinds of reasons empirically associated with successful political judgment (i.e., the 
fox’s reasons).  As a result, we can only expect that experts would fail to generate much in the 
way of decisive judgments, as their hedgehog approach to political judgment is only going to do 
worse than the ordinary citizen, not better.  Of course, such an expectation is born out by 
Christiano’s own admission that indeterminacy plagues the community of experts too. 
The role of the deductivist tendency in forcing this indeterminacy is further clarified by 
referring back to Leitgeb’s analysis of the Newtonian scientists analogy.  Recall how Leitgeb’s 
analysis reframes indeterminacy in terms of a fine-grained picture in which a probabilistic 
dimension plays a crucial role.  Confronted with apparent indeterminacy, the Newtonian 
scientists simply refer back to their prior probabilities to quickly and easily find a way forward – 
just as they did in real life.  Their prior experience plays a role in determining courses of action.  
This last phrase reflects a point I stressed above.  When we use analogies to deliberate, we draw 
on prior probabilities gained from familiarity with one domain to better understand another, less 
familiar domain (CPAR.ii).  In doing so, we extend our prior understanding of objects and how 
we understand ourselves to interact with them to the objects and forms of interaction that are of 
the same kind in the second domain.   
For instance, familiarity with environmental challenges at work may help people 
understand the same kinds of environmental challenges when they are present not only at home, 
but also in politics.  Having seen how easy and cost-saving programs dedicated to recycling and 
waste reduction are at work, the discussion of similar programs at a town meeting will be better 
understood by analogy to what is familiar from the workplace than it would be otherwise.  Like 
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the Newtonian scientists in Leitgeb’s analogy, so too ordinary citizens extend their prior 
understanding of what is probable in one domain to contexts of deliberation to figure out what to 
do in a quick, time-saving, and determinate way. 
This last point stands in marked contrast to Christiano’s account.  He assumes that 
because ordinary citizens lead energy and time consuming lives as workers and household 
members, their engagement with politics should be defined in terms of what is “left over” after 
the demands of these roles are subtracted from their lives.  Not surprisingly, little is indeed “left 
over” and the demands of political problems – which stream in anew and afresh each and every 
day – seem to challenge the possibility of ordinary citizens doing much in the way of 
deliberating.  Furthermore, with the possibility of deliberation in this meager left over space so 
constrained, the value of experts as guides seems to immediately become appealing.  By contrast, 
the analogical approach I have advocated here draws no such line between work and domestic 
life, on the one hand, and political deliberation on the other.  Each space learns from the other by 
analogical extension.  Thus, if someone works a lot, familiarity with objects and kinds of 
interaction in that time and energy consuming domain can be seen to provide a rich set of prior 
probabilities with which to process the day’s political problems.   
Moreover, here “experts” will not be those who know better because they have 
specialized knowledge, but rather those who (like the real experts studied by Dunbar and 
discussed above) have a knack for using analogies to convey an understanding of the prior 
probabilities and systematic structure of a complex kind of object or interaction in vivid, familiar 
terms to audiences … especially audiences with very different backgrounds.  In this way, both 
the problem to which Christiano dedicates his account and the expert/non-expert distinction with 
which he frames it, both become obsolete when an analogical focus is used to understand the 
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meaning of real, practical, and determinate democratic deliberation.485 
 
2. Informational Indeterminacy 
 As with pragmatic indeterminacy, so too the second variation on the indeterminacy worry 
is often dealt with by deliberative democrats in a way that is “deductivist” and therefore less 
satisfying as a response to the underlying indeterminacy to which their theoretical efforts are 
directed.  The account of deliberative democracy developed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson is an illustrative case study in this regard.  Their approach to deliberative democracy 
takes its bearings from what they take to be the most “formidable” challenge facing American 
democracy: Moral disagreement.486  It is easy to see how this topic relates to informational 
indeterminacy.  In modern societies like the one they take as their object of focus, pluralism 
reigns insofar as people approach morally relevant political decisions with highly divergent 
moral perspectives.  Gutmann and Thompson follow many others in describing this divergence 
in terms of “conflicts about fundamental values.”487  One source of such conflict, they claim, is 
“incompatible values” among people.488  This language of incompatibility demonstrates a 
connection with my description of informational indeterminacy, stressing as it does that 
deliberation often seems to face an unbridgeable chasm when it has to deal with commitments 
among citizens that are incompatible.   
This connection is further strengthened when they claim that such informational 
complexity obtains not only at the inter-personal level, but also at the intra-personal as well.  As 
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they observe, “moral conflicts can be understood and experienced by one person appreciating the 
competing claims of more than one fundamental value, and therefore struggling internally to 
resolve the conflict.”489  This statement calls to mind the idea that even a single and solitary 
individual can experience the informational complexity that occurs when the individual’s own 
values conflict in calling for different responses to a conflict.   
Clearly, Gutmann and Thompson are aware of the informational complexity that is often 
said to plague modern democracies.  Notably, they also tie this complexity to indeterminacy as 
well.  An outcome for citizen deliberation seems impractical in such a society, they admit, 
because “Finding the right resolution becomes more difficult when moral values conflict, and a 
conflict among values readily turns into a conflict among persons, as citizens come to different 
conclusions about the same decisions and policies.”490  Here, Gutmann and Thompson draw a 
line from the informational complexity they associate with incompatibility among citizen values 
and an indeterminacy in democratic deliberation.  Citizens “come to different conclusions about 
the same decisions and policies,” they explain, because a conflict among their values makes a 
right resolution more difficult to identify.  They write:  
Persistent moral disagreement comes in various forms.  In some cases citizens hold 
conflicting reasonable beliefs (about the status of the fetus, for example), which their best 
efforts at moral understanding cannot resolve.  In other cases different citizens balance 
competing moral considerations in different ways … in both kinds of cases our best 
efforts at moral reasoning in the spirit of mutuality produce no uniquely correct 
solution.491 
 
Like the intra-personal conflict of values that makes it difficult to deal with a potential decision, 
the collective, inter-personal process of deliberation is likely to generate no “right resolution” in 
the face of conflict among values and other forms of difference in moral reasoning.  Here the 
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worry about informational indeterminacy I introduced in the first chapter raises its head.  In the 
face of such differences, “no uniquely correct solution” will emerge and a decision is 
underdetermined as a result.  Consequently, deliberative democracy may seem like a problematic 
ideal if modern societies (and even individual citizens) contain values conflicts that make 
resolutions to moral dilemmas unlikely.  How can a decision be made about what is to be done if 
people have divergent values with which to rank and eliminate the options on the table? 
 Gutmann and Thompson believe the cure to this worry about deliberative democracy is 
not to abandon citizen deliberation, but to call for more of it.  Frequently, they claim, a conflict 
among values is accompanied by an “imperfect understanding” of the context in which the 
conflict occurs.492  This observation is important because it provides the basis by which Gutmann 
and Thompson believe deliberation can advance beyond an apparent roadblock comprised of 
informational complexity.  If citizens can allow that in a given moral disagreement, everyone 
lacks a perfect understanding of the subject matter in such a way that a uniquely correct 
resolution to the problem could be determined, then deliberation can proceed by bifurcating the 
considerations that enter into it into two groups.493  In the first group (1), are those values and 
related moral reasons that could not be accepted as principles and policies by other citizens in 
keeping with the principle of reciprocity.494  In the second group (2) are those values and 
considerations that are consistent with the principle of reciprocity.   
Agreement on imperfect understanding is essential to the efficacy of the principle of 
reciprocity as a method for sorting conflicting moral values into these two groups.  More 
specifically, agreement on imperfect understanding pushes citizens to identify which of their 
moral values are – in the current condition of imperfect understanding – (1) amenable to entrance 
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into the public space of citizen deliberation, and (2) those which are not.  Such a line of 
questioning, Gutmann and Thompson argue, will “encourage them to discover what aspects of 
those beliefs could be accepted as principles and policies by other citizens with whom they 
fundamentally disagree.”495  In short, deliberation can move forward with moral learning when 
citizens (1) admit that everyone currently has a state of imperfect understanding, and then (2) 
engage in collective reasoning with one another strictly on the basis of those values, beliefs, and 
other relevant considerations that they believe are mutually appreciable in this state of imperfect 
understanding.   
They believe this two-step process of deliberation will advance moral learning because it 
will leave at least some of the conflicting values that currently create moral disagreement out of 
deliberation.  Furthermore, because the current state of affairs is admittedly an imperfect one, 
citizens need not feel like they “have to trade off their personal moral views against public 
values.”496  People can move on with deliberation because they are aware that the current state of 
affairs is a problematic one that does not permit them to disclose all of their personal views, 
though in doing so it does not demand that they abandon them. 
Above, I already devoted considerable space to locating the deductivist tendency in this 
account of deliberative democracy, which orients deliberation around reciprocity as its “first 
principle.”  Here, it is again easy to see.  Moral choices are approached in terms of abstract 
generalities like “values” and “principles,” even when those choices are supposed to be moving 
past ordinary forms of moral disagreement by taking their lead from the “principle” of 
reciprocity.  In putting the general before the particular, they demonstrate a deductivist 
orientation.  Even more telling is the way they try to deal with the admitted indeterminacy of 
                                                
495 ibid. 
496 ibid. 
   339 
principles as a guide to democratic deliberation.497  They recognize this indeterminacy 
throughout their account, writing statements such as, “Even if we cannot philosophically 
establish principles specific enough to determine justifiable policies,” and “But abstraction 
purchases agreement on principles at the price of disagreement about their interpretation.”498 It 
comes as no surprise then that they believe the abstract agreement they may purchase with their 
principle of reciprocity must be accompanied by the admission that “The best way to prove the 
value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and 
policies, and its contribution to actual political debates.”499  In other words, they believe their 
account can best offset the indeterminacy that admittedly attends their principled approach to 
deliberation by applying it to real concrete cases of deliberation. 
When we turn to the concrete cases in which they attempt to deal with indeterminacy, 
though, their deductivist tendency becomes still more apparent.  For instance, in describing the 
concrete case of debates about abortion, they frame it in deductivist terms.  More specifically, 
they present it as a disagreement issuing from divergent abstract principles, which is most 
evident when their description of this concrete case is quoted at length: 
The public controversy over legalizing abortion is the paradigm of deliberative 
disagreement.  Both pro-life and pro-choice advocates argue from fundamentally 
different but plausible premises to conflicting public policies.  Both make generalizable 
claims that are also recognizably reciprocal in their moral and empirical content.  Pro-life 
advocates believe the fetus to be a human being – a person in the generic sense, with 
rights that should be constitutionally protected.  The strongest general reason on which 
they base their opposition is the principle that innocent persons should not be killed.  Pro-
choice advocates believe the fetus to be only a potential constitutional person.  The 
principle they invoke for defending legalized abortion is that women should have the 
liberty to decide whether to bear a child.500 
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As this passage demonstrates, the concrete case Gutmann and Thompson believe to be “the 
paradigm of deliberative disagreement” is one in which conflicting public policy 
recommendations issue not only from “generalizable claims,” but more fundamentally, from two 
divergent “principles.”  For one side, a principle related to killing innocent persons is cited; for 
the other side, a principle related to the liberty women should have to make decisions about the 
children they will bear is cited.  Such a description is deductivist insofar as it paints the origins of 
citizen decisions about what should be done in politics in terms of “generalizable claims” and 
“principles.” 
 Having tried to indicate the sense in which Gutmann and Thompson demonstrate a 
deductivist tendency in their account of deliberative democracy, as well as how it relates to a 
problematic indeterminacy in that account as well, I now turn to what I take to be of striking 
importance for supporting my diagnosis of contemporary deliberative democratic theory.  As I 
mentioned above, Gutmann and Thompson believe their account can best offset the 
indeterminacy generated by its focus on principles like reciprocity by turning to “actual political 
debates” like this “paradigmatic” one about abortion.  However, what one finds in the way of 
“moral learning” in their turn to this paradigmatic case is not an instance in which admissions to 
imperfect understandings and reference to second-order principles moves deliberation forward.   
Instead, one finds the triumph of analogical reasoning!  In supporting their case that 
“convergence” towards agreement in moral dilemmas like abortion is a real world possibility, 
they cite Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “well-known philosophical analysis of the abortion 
controversy” as a contribution to deliberation that “narrows the range of reasonable disagreement 
between pro-life and pro-choice advocates.”501  In the face of this well-known philosophical 
analysis, they claim, “The example should convince even people who perceive the fetus to be a 
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full-fledged person that to permit abortion is not obviously wrong in the case of a woman who 
becomes pregnant through no fault of her own (for example, by rape).”502  For present purposes, 
what is significant in this quotation is that the “example” employed in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 
well-known philosophical analysis is no example from real life, but rather an analogy that 
engages the reader in a thought experiment about an unconscious violinist.  The expansive 
literature on this well-known philosophical analysis bears out this way of labeling her 
“example,” as it is routinely referred to as an “analogy.”503  Furthermore, not only do Gutmann 
and Thompson believe analogy can lead the public towards a more pro-choice stance in this 
particular context, but pro-life advocates have also claimed that progress on this paradigmatic 
moral dilemma will only come when new analogies are found to lead a way past the current 
impasse.  Similarly, some moral philosophers have argued along not unrelated lines by 
suggesting that progress on the topic of abortion will come with a richer description of the 
relevant complexities, not more attention to the underlying principles.504  
 If in their paradigmatic case of moral disagreement, Gutmann and Thompson try to 
justify the practical determinacy of their principled account by citing the impact of Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s analogical reasoning, then their own analysis seems to bear out the point I have been 
trying to stress throughout this project.  In real life political affairs, decisions are made in a 
determinate way when analogical reasoning, rather than abstract principles and values, plays the 
leading role in democratic deliberation.  Consequently, the account of deliberative democracy 
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developed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson illustrates with remarkable clarity how a 
deductivist tendency can generate indeterminacy in deliberative democratic theory as well as 
how analogical reasoning can offer a more practically determinate alternative … even in the eyes 
of deductivists. 
 
3. First-Personal Indeterminacy 
 The last variation on the indeterminacy worry has by far received the most extensive 
treatment already in earlier chapters.  The extensive exploration of Gerald Gaus’s work, and the 
numerous quotations from deliberative democratic theory with which it was brought into contact, 
have both gone some distance towards showing the relationship between deductivism and 
indeterminacy.  Furthermore, the presentation of Gutmann and Thompson’s account of 
deliberative democracy in the last section further underscores those points.  There, they were said 
to believe that deliberation can make progress amidst disagreement by getting citizens to set 
aside some of their divisive values by (1) admitting that the current state of understanding in a 
given area of deliberation is imperfect, and (2) thereby focusing on values that others could 
reasonably be expected to accept in this state of imperfect understanding as well.   
Gaus’s analysis calls into question the efficacy of this vision of real democratic 
deliberation.  If, as Gaus suggests, we tend to think of our beliefs, values, etc. as “epistemic 
assets,” allowing that they may be set aside because of the current state of imperfect 
understanding implies that we must think they are lesser epistemic assets than we really believe.  
Many people will hesitate to endorse a vision of deliberation that asks them to ignore such 
accomplishments in understanding.  Furthermore, even if they could set those epistemic assets 
aside as “not so epistemic after all,” during deliberation they would be anticipating all the while 
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how the options on the table would impact these epistemic assets.  Will they find themselves 
endorsing publicly a position that demands extensive reconsideration of the epistemic assets they 
have left off the table?  This question will be on the minds of everyone engaged in democratic 
deliberation because (as was shown above) its significance is far reaching for these people from 
a first-personal perspective.  As a result, Gutmann and Thompson’s account of deliberation will 
be highly indeterminate from a first-personal perspective.  When it comes to actually acting on 
the outcome of collective deliberation about a serious moral disagreement, would we really 
predict that people will take action though they have set some of the dearest epistemic assets 
aside in the face of the current state of imperfect understanding?  The likelihood of such activity 
in the case of genuinely serious moral disagreements seems low, as critics of their account of 
deliberative democracy have frequently said.505 
Not everyone who has critiqued deliberative democratic theory along these lines is 
necessarily a critic of the very idea of deliberative democracy, though.  Robert Talisse, a 
deliberative democrat, lends some concrete details to this critique of much of the principled work 
done in deliberative democracy in his own account of deliberative politics.  Turning to the work 
of Habermas in particular, Talisse asks to what extent the principles he selects as the guides to 
real political action could actually generate a decisive outcome when people have remarkably 
divergent first-personal evaluative perspectives.506  In the case of Habermas, the relevant 
principles are specified by the “conditions under which it becomes possible to engage in speech 
acts,” or “proper communication” aimed at “reasoned consensus.”507   
Talisse asks, though, what weight do these principles carry in leading people to act who 
have radically “anti-democratic” first-personal perspectives?  For instance, how might people 
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whose life histories have led them to become “racists, sexists, and tyrants” be pushed to embrace 
the outcome of deliberation that is constrained to exclude their anti-democratic considerations 
from the outset?508  Talisse suggests that Habermas’s position vacillates between two 
unattractive responses.  In the first case, these anti-democratic citizens are pushed to adopt the 
decisions of democratic deliberation on the pain of having their “membership in the community 
of beings who argue” revoked.509  Talisse wonders how much weight this threat would carry in 
persuading a racist or sexist to act in a democratic way.  He asks, “we should wonder whether 
this rejoinder has any hope of moving, or even addressing, the anti-democrat.”510  In a word, the 
principles assumed as “inescapable presuppositions” of democratic deliberation seem like a weak 
impetus for anti-democrats to actually act on the decisions implied by those principles. 
Habermas’s other response is similarly weak, Talisse argues.  If, as Habermas suggests at 
other times, escape from a “community of those who communicate democratically” is an 
impossibility for anyone who is “not mentally ill or suicidal,” then “Habermas’s point now 
seems grossly overstated.”511  The problem posed by those whose first-personal perspectives are 
radically anti-democratic is simply dissolved by the operative definition of what it means to be a 
person involved in politics.  In other words, if the pervasiveness of communication in the real 
world means that no one can escape the use of deliberative democratic principles, then anti-
democrats like sexists and racists are simply excluded from being persons with whom the 
political theorist need be concerned in crafting a vision of deliberative democracy.  Like the 
previous response Talisse locates in Habermas’s work, this one offers little rejoinder to the first-
personal indeterminacy with which deliberative democracy has often been charged.  Both 
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responses do little to explain why it is that people with divergent first-personal perspectives 
should actually act upon the results of democratic deliberation.512   
Moreover, this failure to actually address first-personal indeterminacy is not relegated to 
Habermas’s work.  Gutmann and Thompson, for instance, concede that:  
a deliberative perspective does not address people who reject the aim of finding fair terms 
of social cooperation; it cannot reach those who refuse to press their public claims in 
terms accessible to their fellow citizens.  No moral perspective in politics can reach such 
people, except one that replicates their own comprehensive set of beliefs.  And since that 
perspective would entail rejecting entirely the comprehensive beliefs of their rivals, it 
would not help reduce, let alone resolve, moral disagreements.513 
 
In this passage, Gutmann and Thompson follow Habermas in dealing with first-personal 
indeterminacy by defining it away.  Where people do not adopt a prior commitment to the 
principle of reciprocity and thereby aim to articulate their evaluative perspective with public, 
rather than private reasons, they are beyond the reach of deliberation.  Deliberative democracy is 
for people who are willing to endorse its principles and to side-line their evaluative perspectives 
in favor of a more public presentation of their reasoning … not anti-democratic “hold-outs” in 
modern society. 
 In each of these examples from deliberative democratic theory, the problem of squaring 
principled deliberation of a deductivist variety and the first-personal perspectives of people who 
hold dear radically opposed “epistemic assets” is notably left untouched.  To see how a 
deductivist tendency might be responsible for this weak response to first-personal indeterminacy, 
it may be helpful to consider the results of an analogical approach instead.  As I mentioned 
above, part of what analogical approaches do is provide average people with a qualitative means 
for engaging in complex, systematic reasoning about probabilities.  Furthermore, as the 
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discussion of Brian Skyrms’ work in decision-theory was meant to show, one aspect of that 
systematicity is that it deals with the inter-temporal relations that obtain when a deliberative 
episode is repeated and prior probabilities are updated across a multi-episode process of 
deliberation.  To employ the provocative phrase Skyrms himself borrowed, this kind of 
systematicity involves the contribution made by the “shadow of the future.”   
 What changes in the practical appeal of deliberative democracy when the shadow of the 
future confronts first-personal indeterminacy?  For one, citizens who aim at non-cooperation 
suffer for their lack of cooperation in ways that push them towards cooperation simply to achieve 
the kinds of advantages that may have led them to reject cooperation in the first place.  While 
such convergence on cooperation may only occur “in the ultra long run” when anti-democrats 
play non-cooperative strategies to take advantage of others randomly encountered in an 
otherwise democratic society, the convergence is “remarkably rapid” when their encounters with 
others are not randomized, but rather by and large confined to “neighbors,” or people with whom 
they come into regular contact.514  When people are clustered together into localized forms of 
interaction, a rapid shift among non-cooperative neighbors is an “unavoidable consequence of 
the dynamics of local interaction,” such that “justice becomes contagious,” according to Skyrms’ 
formal results from the application of the shadow of the future to decision theory.515  While I 
lack the space to cover these formal results, the details of these results may seem irrelevant not 
only in light of limitations of space, but also because they are so formal.  How can such results 
offer insight into real politics, if they are only the results of formal modeling? 
 The answer is not only that the systematicity behind these dynamics is widely on view in 
the biological world, but also that this systematicity is familiar to us from our own every day 
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lives.  By analogy, we can easily relate to the formal results of Skyrms’ research because we 
ourselves are well aware that a truly randomized interaction with fellow citizens is quite different 
from the interaction that occurs among “neighbors.”  Indeed, the very term Skyrms employs, 
“neighbors,” provides a quick and ready analogical map to the highly sophisticated, formal 
dynamic his work deals with.  Our neighbors are people we are “condemned” to interact with 
repeatedly, not just once during a randomized interaction from among the millions of people in 
our modern democratic societies.  From this angle, we can readily see that our interaction with 
neighbors is covered with the “shadow of the future.”  How we respond to these people is very 
much shaped by our expectation – our prediction, if you will – that we will have to interact with 
them repeatedly in the future. 
 If we retain a focus on this analogy with neighbors, we can understand why an analogical 
approach, with its focus on prior probabilities and the repeatability of deliberative episodes, 
might offer a totally different response to first-personal indeterminacy.  Yes, anti-democrats may 
have radically divergent evaluative perspectives and associated personal histories, which put 
them at odds with our typical way of imagining democratic deliberators.  However, this 
difference need not imply that we should simply reject them from the democratic process, or at 
least our theory thereof.  To be a proponent of deliberative democracy is to have faith in the 
process of democratic deliberation to tackle complex differences among people… just as 
Gutmann and Thompson declared.  From an analogical perspective, though, that process is 
worthy of so much respect not only because of its predicted contribution to the lives of 
cooperative citizens, but also because – through repeated and localized interaction with 
neighbors – even non-cooperative, anti-democrats are likely to eventually switch over to the 
democratic side.   
   348 
The problem of first-personal indeterminacy may strike us as intractable and only 
surmountable by defining it away as Habermas, Gutmann, and Thompson seem to do.  In light of 
this last point, though, and the shadow of the future as well, the problem dissolves.  From the 
kind of inter-temporal perspective assumed when we reason with analogies, even the radical 
first-personal divergence that obtains when anti-democrats engage fellow citizens is not really 
problematic.  Determinate outcomes are possible in even this extreme case, but only when we 
trade a deductivist tendency for a focus on analogical reasoning among localized agents and 
across repeated episodes.   
Indeed, this extreme case is just one version of first-personal indeterminacy that can be 
formally and analogically shown to dissolve in the shadow of the future.  While I lack the space 
to survey those other versions, I would like to just briefly note the impact of the shadow of the 
future on what is probably the most influential version of first-personal indeterminacy … what 
John Dryzek calls the “social choice critique of voting in a deliberative context.”516  According 
to Dryzek, deliberative democrats should shy away from even the begrudging acceptance of 
voting as a practical concession that many advocate, and instead envision deliberation as the 
contestation of discourses, even if that vision must – like so many other accounts – admit that 
underdetermination is part and parcel to it.517  The reason Dryzek believes deliberative democrats 
should shy away from voting is that collective choice mechanisms like voting can formally be 
shown to “exacerbate instability and arbitrariness in collective choice” when people bring very 
different preferences to bear on the ranking of options in the process of deliberation leading up to 
the vote.518   
This statement is based in part on Kenneth Arrow’s famous work in game theory, which 
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makes a point that Dryzek believes is appreciable more broadly speaking.  As he writes, when 
“several evaluative dimensions are combined in a single vote or choice,” the options can be 
ranked in ways such that A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, but C is preferred to A.  For 
instance, a first vote may opt for A over B, a second vote for B over C, and yet a third vote might 
conclude that A is preferred over C.  Violating transitivity, such a result seems to show that 
voting is prone to arbitrariness and instability … or even irrational outcomes.519  In the shadow 
of the future, though, this social choice critique founders.  When decisions are not treated as de 
novo, immediate and discrete choices, but rather in terms of prior probability assignments that 
are systematically related over time (CPAR.i.IL-IT), the agent will not have “blinders on” with 
regard to the violation of transitivity identified by the social choice critique.520   
As Edward McLennen has argued, instead, the spreading of the set of choices over time 
means that citizens can learn to increase the probability of another later decision by using some 
sort of causal process in the world.521  They can “pre-commitment” themselves, for instance, 
perhaps by writing up a constant reminder to avoid transitivity in their preference rankings 
during later decisions.  In this way, the social choice critique associated with voting among 
people with very different evaluative perspectives can be overcome by simply allowing the inter-
temporal systematicity, or repeatability, in democratic deliberation to be recognized and dealt 
with via prior probability assignments.  Consequently, deliberative democracy can escape what is 
perhaps the most famous variation on the indeterminacy worry’s third variation by embracing a 
vision of citizens as rational “planners” (to return to the analogical phrase Temkin borrowed 
from Elster).  In this capacity, the citizenry knows full-well that what gives deliberative 
democracy its practical realism is the anticipatory, phenomenological dimension of deliberation, 
                                                
519 Dryzek 2000, 35. 
520 McLennen 1990, 97. 
521 McLennen 1990, 231. 
   350 
not the abstract generalities from which each discrete episode of decision-making is too often 
said to begin.  As in the previous cases of indeterminacy plaguing the potential political realism 









 Across six chapters, I have tried to show that deliberative democracy is not a vague 
vision of political life, but rather one that resonates with many current practices that are too 
rarely seen for what they are: Instances of citizen deliberation.  Among these current practices, 
the use of majority rule procedures and their associated practices play a key role.  Where others 
have seen in these procedures a rival to deliberative democracy that commands far more political 
realism, I instead adopted a diagnostic approach that challenged this classic juxtaposition that 
pervades so much deliberative democratic theory.  As my diagnosis evolved, it revealed that 
these procedures are “deliberative” because they are catalysts for an analogical form of 
reasoning, rather than the principled reasoning and process of judgment which deliberative 
democrats usually draw upon when developing their theoretical accounts.   
Further development of my own account stressed that many major differences follow 
from orienting democratic deliberation around analogical reasoning, instead of the more 
traditional ideal.  Chief among these differences is a focus on the inter-temporal form of 
systematicity with which probabilistic reasoning has long been associated.  In drawing that 
connection, I concluded, insights from a diverse set of philosophical investigations could be 
harnessed to show the surprising practical appeal and relevance of the deliberative view of 
democracy. 
 While many deliberative democrats abide by the classic juxtaposition that pits their 
theoretical model against vote-driven alternatives, others have also diagnosed this juxtaposition 
as a source of practical indeterminacy for deliberative democracy.  In these concluding remarks, 
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I would like say a word about how my project stands in relation to these other diagnostic efforts, 
particularly on account of how my project connects back to the efforts of the very first expositor 
of the diagnostic approach: Joseph Bessette. 
 Bessette is usually identified as the person who invented the term “deliberative 
democracy.”522  However, just as often he is set at a distance from contemporary deliberative 
democratic theory because he saw so very much deliberation in the real political contexts he 
studied.  John Dryzek, for instance, distances his work from that of Bessette by writing of 
Bessette’s description of democratic deliberation as a “mild voice of reason,” that should “start 
alarm bells ringing among those who think that mild reason is necessarily conservative, such that 
we should seek more unruly alternatives to it.”523  Incidentally, those for whom it does indeed set 
off alarm bells include Dryzek himself, who dedicates a large portion of his work to stressing the 
dramatic rhetoric that plays a role in his vision of real deliberation.524  Similarly, Gutmann and 
Thompson abstain from taking a stance on whether Bessette is correct to see “more deliberation 
in Congress than most political scientists assume.”525  They nonetheless distance their own 
account from his by declaring that “we do not presume that the present state of deliberation in 
Congress and American politics generally is adequate, and in any case we do not focus, as he 
does, only on the need for deliberation among political elites and their role in preventing 
spontaneous or passionate judgments by the masses,” before they proceed to identify a number 
of differences between their account and the points Bessette makes.526 
 Unlike these democratic theorists, I find far greater continuity between my work and his 
major contribution to the deliberative turn in democratic theory.  For instance, Bessette makes a 
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point similar to my “deliberative outlets proposal” when he comments:  
Elections, like hangings, concentrate the mind.  They force the electorate to review an 
incumbent president’s record, to reflect upon his policies and character, and to make 
considered judgments about whether he or his opponent will better serve the nation.  The 
result is likely to be a more deliberative assessment of a leader’s performance than one 
normally finds between elections.527 
 
In this passage, he allows that election day is not a discrete episode of deliberation, but rather a 
catalyst for deliberation because it is anticipated in ways that stimulate “more deliberative 
assessment … than one normally finds between elections.”  Or again, Bessette diagnostically 
notices how the “shadow of the future” weighs in on deliberation’s practical reality.  Once 
Congressional representatives recognize that the President is willing to bargain in not just one, 
but multiple deliberative episodes, Bessette observes, “even those who generally support the 
president’s position will want to ‘get theirs’ once trading beings.”528  The shadow of the future 
means that the repeatability of a deliberative episode plays a role in shaping its quality.   
Furthermore, he also recognizes that a principled approach to democratic decision-
making has a tendency towards indeterminacy.  For example, on the basis of another case of 
Congressional behavior, he offers the following generalization: “In many, and perhaps most, 
cases preexisting policy preferences are too general and imprecise to stipulate specific decisions 
within Congress.”529  Though he concedes that principled deliberation must face such 
indeterminacy, he also recognizes that real politics presents “a very different picture of Congress 
from the one painted by bargaining theorists.  Instead of the wholesale trading of votes, we 
observe legislators reasoning about the merits of a new policy initiative and seeking to persuade 
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their colleagues for or against the measure at hand with pertinent information and arguments.”530  
Furthermore, he also stresses the decisive role that considerations of analogous, prior experiences 
can play in stimulating and driving deliberation towards a determinate conclusion.  For instance, 
in the same case study, he observes that references to a pilot food stamp program proved decisive 
to yielding a “true deliberative process in Congress” by detailing evidence that could be 
analogically extended to a similarly structured piece of legislation to assess its impact on citizen 
consumption patterns.531 
In these and other ways, the approach to deliberative democracy pursued in the previous 
chapters carries on the line of inquiry initiated by Bessette.  Where it differs is more a matter of 
analytical perspective than substantive difference of perspective on the reality of citizen 
deliberation.  Bessette’s focus on locating instances of deliberation by carefully reviewing the 
detailed records from real political decision-making stands in stark contrast from the more 
philosophical approach pursued here, which takes up questions related to logic, information 
processing, controlled studies of political judgment, and other resources at some distance from 
Bessette’s concerns to articulate an analogous vision of deliberative democracy at work.  Being 
analogous with Bessette’s work, though, means being at odds with much of the work on 
deliberative democracy that has followed it.  In this regard, the present project sets itself apart 
from earlier work on deliberative democracy by returning to what some might call the earliest 
work on the subject.532 
This same difference in analytical perspective also characterizes the differences between 
the investigations pursued above and the work by another proponent of the diagnostic approach: 
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Elizabeth Anderson.  As discussed in the first chapter, Anderson has allowed voting to play a 
role in her account of deliberative democracy by assigning to it the role of a feedback process.  
The difference in analytical perspective between Bessette and myself returns here too.  I have 
also stressed that the feedback of information plays a key role in citizen deliberation.  However, 
in casting the point in analytical terms borrowed from a disparate number of more 
philosophically wide-ranging fields, my account differs from Anderson’s in the way it 
characterizes this feedback in terms of the probabilistic dimension along which truly determinate 
deliberation must reside.  In doing so, I believe my work offers an advantage insofar as it 
provides an explanatory perspective from which to reject the criticism of Anderson’s work 
surveyed in the first chapter, namely: The objection offered by Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel 
with regard to any focus on feedback in democratic theory.  The objection goes as follows: 
actual deliberation is, by its nature, a form of information pooling: when people take 
seriously the task of providing one another with reasons and information about 
circumstances and outlooks, what is relevant to improved policy is then brought to bear 
by those in possession of it.  No similar effects on preferences or on information are 
likely to issue from non-deliberative processes subject to subsequent review.  Indeed, 
understanding the process of review as the natural forum of principle may well encourage 
strategic, as distinct from deliberative, conduct.533 
 
As mentioned before, this objection to assigning feedback a role in deliberation is based on two 
arguments.  First, Cohen and Sabel claim that people are less likely to take seriously the task of 
pooling their reasons and information if they know that a later chance will obtain for “feedback” 
to play a decisive role.534  Second, deliberation is turned into a mere “audit” on the exercise of 
political power, thereby taking the citizenry out of the “driver’s seat” (to use Christiano’s 
phrase).   
The first argument can readily be seen to topple from the analytical perspective I have 
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adopted above.  To say that feedback will have these effects is to make a prediction based on a 
number of assumptions that have been shown to be problematic in previous chapters.  Chief 
among them, is the idea that deliberation works by means of information pooling.535  As the 
Newtonian scientists analogy is meant to vividly convey, deliberation proceeds to actually make 
determinate decisions not by way of a discrete, one-time processes of information pooling.  In 
particular, when indeterminacy threatens as it is often thought to do in modern pluralistic 
societies in which time and energy are limited resources, information is not “pooled” so much as 
it is “transduced” time and again across the inter-temporally related process by which 
deliberative factors are updated by prior probabilities.  Furthermore, Dummett’s logical insight 
and Tetlock’s work on excellence in political judgment both attest to the fact that instead of 
pooling information, what citizens would do best to engage in is a more foxlike, piece-meal 
process of humble reasoning with “short and sweet” sets of considerations – not expansive pools 
of information. 
The second argument also crumbles when viewed from the analytical perspective adopted 
above.  Rather than saying that deliberation is reduced in significance by being framed in terms 
of feedback processes, we should instead happily embrace the idea that deliberation is well-
captured by the idea of a feedback loop.  Far from being a reduction, this idea analogically 
conveys the rich, systematic complexity that feedback driven information-processing conveys to 
real practices of citizen deliberation.  This complexity, as Skyrms’ work shows, is especially 
effective at putting to rest the prediction with which Cohen and Sabel conclude this passage.  In 
this prediction, they suggest that processes of review “may well” encourage a shift away from 
deliberation and towards strategic action.  However, as Skyrms’ work makes abundantly clear, 
the shadow of the future associated with feedback processes actually can be shown to offer the 
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opposite prediction.  In a way, by describing deliberation as the “forum of principle,” rather than 
analogy or even majority-rule driven discourse, we should only expect such deductivist errors to 
follow. 
One last account of deliberative democracy illustrative of a diagnostic approach requires 
attention, though, before I conclude this investigation.  James Fishkin’s approach to deliberative 
democracy stands in a complicated relationship to what I am referring to as the diagnostic 
approach.  On the one hand, Fishkin offers a scathing critique of contemporary politics in 
modern democracies and the practices associated with majority rule procedures therein.  If we 
want to know what deliberative democracy entails, we should not be satisfied with the image we 
find in contemporary political affairs, he maintains.  The reason is that citizens are currently 
living under conditions that are not good for the formation of mass opinion in a deliberative 
manner.536  Their opinions do not seem to count, being one of millions in national elections.  The 
opinions citizens do have tend to be arbitrary and malleable.  Also, citizens tend only to discuss 
politics around people like themselves.  Finally, citizens are surrounded by efforts to manipulate 
their opinion, including efforts that use the techniques of “Madison Avenue” to voice public 
dialogue in the terms of the advertising industry, rather than the more deliberative terms he 
prefers.  Fishkin adds, “The picture of the mass public just sketched is widely accepted.”537 
If these poor conditions for deliberation exist, then Fishkin argues we should not simply 
accept the present state of democratic politics as the final verdict on how citizens might 
deliberate.  Instead, we should orient our vision of deliberative democracy and actual 
engagement in it by taking into account a “Counterfactual Question: what would the public think 
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if it were consulted by a democratic process embodying” deliberation under good conditions?538  
Fishkin expertly leaves the normative significance of this question open to multiple lines of 
interpretation.  For instance, he allows that it might both inform “democratic reformers,” those 
engaged in “experimentation with the possible design of democratic institutions,” as well as 
ordinary citizens deliberating about real political issues.539  What would it mean to provide a way 
to actually answer the Counterfactul Question, though?  In response to this last query, Fishkin 
has developed a method called “Deliberative Polling.”540  Modeled on the opinion polls with 
which many people are familiar from everyday political life, a “Deliberative Poll” also 
aggregates votes among a subset of the citizenry, however, these votes are not treated as “a 
snapshot of what the entire public is currently thinking,” but rather as “a representation of what 
the public would think under good conditions for thinking about it.”541   
What does this mean?  According to Fishkin, it means that the bad conditions in modern 
democratic politics are reversed before and when the poll is conducted.  As he writes, 
“Deliberative Polling begins with a concern about the defects likely to be found in ordinary 
public opinion.”542  The likely defects canvassed above comprise the same poor conditions he 
identifies as “The picture of the mass public just sketched” above.  Citizens are not motivated, 
their opinions are malleable and off the top of their heads, they tend to deliberate largely with 
people like themselves, and finally they tend to be surrounded by manipulative influences on 
their opinion formation.  His deliberative polling uses these predicted defects to create a scenario 
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in which real citizens deliberate about real political issues, but with the defects fixed so that good 
conditions for deliberation obtain. Where their votes seem meaningless in national elections, the 
good conditions he pursues involve a small enough number of voters that their selections would 
seem to count.  Where they are usually surrounded by manipulative influences, he surrounds 
them with other citizens, experts, and politicians.  Where their preferences are usually stated off 
the tops of their heads, he provides the time and space for citizens to explore those preferences 
prior to expressing them to a pollster.  Finally, where citizens tend to mostly just deliberate with 
people like themselves, he selects participants in his polls in a randomized way.  Thus, from his 
skeptical view of the quality of real political deliberation’s conditions today, he proceeds to 
frame deliberative democracy by answering the Counterfactual Question with a real world 
experiment: A poll that is conducted after citizens deliberate in “good conditions.”  
Many of the details of deliberative polling are quite subtle and its normative significance 
for deliberative democratic theory is often misunderstood.543  Details aside, though, Fishkin’s 
approach clearly resonates with my own diagnostic approach.  He too believes that when citizens 
anticipate participation in an election (albeit only those that are small enough in numbers to 
make their votes seem to “count”), deliberation is catalyzed.  Furthermore, as he puts the results 
of his deliberative polls to use, they offer a guide to democratic reformers, theorists, and ordinary 
citizens alike by offering an image from which the considered preferences and other deliberative 
factors of the democratic people can better be understood … by analogy.  Looking at the results 
of a deliberative poll, citizens may consider to what extent they themselves need to further their 
study of a topic or issue because their opinion stands at odds with the most popular vote on an 
issue after a deliberative poll.  Are the poll’s results similar to what the citizenry might wish to 
aspire to, being a kind of analog for good deliberation?  Furthermore, in simply putting majority 
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rule procedures to good deliberative use, Fishkin clearly abides by the diagnostic approach. 
However, a few points of difference from our respective orientations are notable enough 
to put some distance between our respective versions of the diagnostic approach.  For instance, 
Fishkin uses the “expert/non-expert” distinction unproblematically.  While his methods for 
selecting experts vary across different polls, his use of the distinction to structure citizen 
deliberation is problematic from my perspective, implying as it does that the class of experts 
(rather than the sub-classes of foxes and hedgehogs studied by Tetlock) should play some 
advisory role in “good conditions” of deliberation.544  Furthermore, while it is easy to understand 
that as a social scientist, Fishkin is concerned to employ randomization in structuring the 
deliberation at the polls, in doing so he creates such a large gap between the domain of 
deliberative polls and real democratic politics as to question the value of drawing an analogy 
between the two in any way.  Given the results of Skyrms’ research and its philosophical 
significance, it is clear that fixing the interaction structure among citizens to a randomized 
format has a massive impact on the results of deliberation … one that makes it far from realistic 
in many ways that my theory is open towards.   
Finally, there is a question of how far deliberative polls go towards creating a space for 
the feedback processes of good deliberation.  For instance, Fishkin divides the deliberation 
associated with his polls into different sessions, some with experts or politicians, some without, 
etc.  One might question the extent to which these divisions make the poll results suitable source 
domains for extending to the target domain of real life democratic deliberative politics in which 
the interaction structure is so very different and the temporal relations among episodes of 
deliberation stand in marked difference as well.  Taken together, this set of differences 
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problematizes the extent to which Fishkin’s work mirrors the diagnostic approach developed 
above, despite some of the obvious similarities. 
These expositions of some further consequences of my analytical perspective on 
deliberative democracy are meant to convey, hopefully, that some progress has been made 
towards the goal I announced in my initial presentation of the diagnostic approach.  My purpose, 
I said, was “not to find the method already in existence that has the least number of sustainable 
objections” to it, “but rather to locate a method of inquiry that is most suggestive of an 
overlooked line of response to the indeterminacy worry in its various formulations.”  I hope the 
analytical perspective on democratic deliberation explored above resonates with this goal, being 
just the kind of “suggestive” method of inquiry I initially set out to identify in chapter one.  By 
this statement, I mean to highlight my continuous effort throughout the preceding chapters to 
strike a precarious balance in philosophical theorizing.  This precarious balance is one that 
David T. Hansen has tied to a healthy, “cosmopolitan” tension all philosophical theorizing 
should pursue.545  This tension stands between the need to retain a reflective loyalty to what is 
known, while also remaining reflectively open to what is new … all in the face of “permanent 
uncertainty” about what from the past will remain, and what from the future will come to be 
adopted.546  Through this combination of reflective loyalty and openness, we can proceed 
philosophically without being uncritical towards both the lessons of the past as well as anything 
that may come along in the future.   
What makes my efforts to strike such a precarious balance in the preceding chapters a 
step towards a “suggestive” method of inquiry, though?  Lydia Goehr’s exploration of 
“suggestiveness” opens up a response to this question.  According to Goehr, when we talk about 
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“suggestiveness” with regard to a philosophical theory, something quite complex is involved … 
something akin to what happens when ordinary language is used to show what is “between the 
lines” of philosophical theory.547  In this capacity, ordinary language connects to what is not 
said, because it occupies the “fringes” that surround what we ordinarily mean by the terms 
employed in a philosophical theory.548  In a related way, the above inquiry into deliberative 
democracy has been written so as to be as “suggestive” … as caught up “between the lines” of its 
own terminology … as any theoretical treatment should be for which analogy plays a crucial, 
indeed decisive role.  I have constantly turned to others for analogous ways of making my points.   
By reference to their phrases, distinctions, metaphors, terms, examples, and ideas, I have 
tried to show how they make a point in an analogous way that intuitively lends a “ballpark,” 
prior plausibility to my own claims.  In the process of drawing these analogical connections, I 
have put their phrases, distinctions, etc. in quotation marks to not only show that they are 
borrowed, but also to signal that I am especially interested in what is “between the lines” or at 
the “fringes” of what they help us to see, namely: Prior probability assignments which, though 
quantitative in nature, are best dealt with in the qualitative terms of “suggestive” phrases, 
distinctions, terms, examples, etc.  Without the quotation marks and the borrowed ideas they 
contain, my own inquiry would simply consist of a “coarse-grained”  inquiry into what we do 
believe and ought to believe about democratic deliberation.   
With the aid of these “suggestive” resources from others, though, my own inquiry has 
instead emerged as a “fine-grained,” “joint theory of belief and subjective probability” with 
regard to what not only to “believe,” but also to take to be probable with regard to democratic 
deliberation, namely: its practical reality.  Deliberative democracy is not a vague vision for 
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guiding political life, as the liberal lawyer might lament when reading more deductivist accounts 
of it.  Rather, deliberative democracy has a real practical appeal or “subjective probability,” 
although that subjective probability (like most probability assessments by “commoners” and 
experts alike) demands the use of analogy to be made rigorous and relevant to our practical lives.  
As a patchwork of parallels, democratic deliberation is rigorous and relevant; by contrast, as an 
exercise in elegant deduction from first principles, it may be rigorous in theory, but it is neither 
rigorous nor relevant to practical life.  For that reason, democracy and analogy are more deeply 
connected than is usually recognized … much to the detriment of deliberative democracy’s wider 
practical appeal.  
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